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ADMIRAL HIPPER AS NAVAL COMMANDER 
ABSTRACT 
This work is intended to fill a gap in the histori- 
ography of World War I by providing the first definitive 
study of a German naval front commander. Admiral Franz 
Ritter von Hipper is known to history as the commander 
of the German battle cruisers at Jutland andcthe last 
commander of the High Seas Fleet. This study contributes 
an original interpretation of Hipper based on detailed 
research and facts essential to scholarly knowledge of 
his place in War Studies. 
An examination of Hipper's middle class Bavarian 
origin, early education, formal naval training and expe- 
rience indicates that he was highly regarded by his early 
commanders and that his rise to flag rank was influenced 
both by his competence and exposure to royalty at decisive 
moments in his career. Hipper's views on new underwater 
weapons, communications, logistics, personnel and ship- 
building clearly demonstrate that the naval environment 
was unfavourable to German commanders, especially as re- 
gards logistics. Parenthetically, the evolution of the 
German battle cruiser force and its command structure 
was in large part due to Hipper's efforts. Hipper's 
strategical and tactical thought on submarines, aircraft 
3 
and surface forces provides insight into his perform- 
ance in combat crises and the war-time record of the 
High Seas Fleet. Hipper's impact on the technical 
aspects of naval policy was not reflected in national 
policy although his plan for a battle cruiser raid on 
British Atlantic sea communications is strikingly 
similar to Erich Raeder's World War II operations. 
Hipper's role in the German naval mutinies, revo- 
lution and collapse of 1918 was one of firmness and 
moderation, manifesting a desire to avoid a 'bloodbath' 
and establishing a reasonable doubt that he participated 
in an 'admirals' rebellion' or planned an unconsummated 
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The historiography of World War I at sea does not 
yet include a definitive study of a German naval front 
commander. There are some autobiographies, apologia and 
published papers as well as a few articles on the High 
Seas Fleet commanders. The subject of the only biogra- 
phy published thus far is Admiral Franz Ritter von Hipper, 
commander of the German Scouting Forces at Jutland and 
the last High Seas Fleet Commander. Unfortunately, there 
are some major problems with this work by Capt. Hugo von 
Waldeyer-Hartz who like Hipper, was an officer in the 
Imperial German Navy. While useful for vignettes about 
Hipper's personal life and some aspects of his war career, 
it is seriously deficient in the author's use of sources, 
and it suffers from the time in which it was written and 
published--Germany, 1933. 
Waldeyer-Hartz had the Nachlass Hipper available to 
him but used it somewhat capriciously, especially in his 
treatment of the 1918 naval mutinies. Also, Hipper's 
servide record appears to have been used early in the book 
but Waldeyer-Hartz ignores it in Hipper's relations with 
Scheer who gave Hipper a less than outstanding report in 
1917, the last such report in Hipper's service record. 
7 
Further, the proceedings of the Reichstag Committee of 
Inquiry on the German collapse in 1918, extending from 
1919 to 1928, were open to Waldeyer-Hartz yet he did not 
use the complete record available on the mutiny, possibly 
because it would not have agreed with his account which 
is generally devoid of criticism of the officer corps. 
His chapter on 'Fleet Building and Peace Training' 
is essentially a recapitulation of Tirpitz' viewpoint on 
the German naval buildup with one paragraph on Hipper. 
His treatment of Hipper's professional development is 
very thin, especially at the time Hipper reached flag rank. 
The account of wartime actions, though interesting and 
largely in accord with official documents, eschews Hipper's 
planning role, his good professional relations and stra- 
tegical thinking under Admirals von Ingenohl and von Pohl 
and omits entirely Hipper's difficulties with Scheer and 
Tirpitz. In the latter case, Waldeyer-Hartz ignored 
Tirpitz' published criticism of Hipper. 
Finally, there is the matter of the biography's date 
of publication--1933. That year in Germany the Reich 
Chamber of Culture was established by the Nazis to control 
1 
writers, publishers and libraries. Waldeyer-Hartz seems 
to have anticipated the requirements of this body. The 
1 
George L. Mosse, Nazi Culture, (New York, 1966), p. 135. 
8 
book on Hipper is imbued with a budding national 
socialist Weltanschauung, especially in the first chap- 
ter entitled 'Youth. ' Filled with simplistic, irrational 
and Volk philosophy, this section pays homage to the 
'innately superior element of Aryan culture in world 
history. ' Furthermore, Waldeyer-Hartz goes so far as 
to say his 'personal opinion' is that the 'Nordic and 
Germanic races are superior sailors on biological and 
spiritual ground. ' With these deficiencies and the spo- 
radic citation of sources, the work hardly can be classed 
as a. definitive study of Admiral Hipper. 
Additional academic motivation to examine Hipper 
lies in the fact that he has been characterized by sev- 
eral writers as a significant naval officer of World War I. 
Scheer in his autobiography labels Hipper 'an outstanding 
battle hardened commander. ' Arthur Marder, in assessing 
Hipper's conduct of the battle cruisers at Jutland, calls 
him 'superb. ' H. H. Frost, the American authority on the 
German fleet in the first world war, also regarded Hipper 
highly. Admirals Raeder, Ruge and Dönitz all have the 
highest regard for him. Geoffrey Bennett said that '... 
in Hipper they had the ablest admiral on either side in 
the whole war. '2 With the exception of Scheer, all these 
opinions were offered after Hipper's biography was published. 
2 
Geoffrey Bennett, The Battle of Jutland, (London, 1972), 
p. 161. 
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When Hipper died in 1932 at the age of sixty-nine, 
Admiral Sir David Beatty, his principal antagonist 
in war, said of him: 'I am very sorry. One would 
like to express regret for the passing of a gallant 
officer and a great sailor. ' 
Four recent works begin to develop Hipper's role 
in larger contexts: Holger Herwig's study, The German 
Naval Officer Corps, cites Hipper's personal journal and 
some of his official papers. The journal is used but 
not cited in David Woodward's recent popular work, The 
Collapse of Power. Wilhelm Deist uses Hipper's personal 
journal and some of his official papers in a collection 
of published documents, Milit1r und'. Innenpolitik 1914-1918, 
which record the military and domestic political scene in 
Germany. Some documents by Hipper appear in the Reichstag 
Committee of Inquiry's record of the internal German col- 
lapse. Daniel Horn's work, The German Naval Mutinies of 
World War I, 
_ 
is the most critical of Hipper yet it lacks 
citation of his personal journal among those Horn used. 
There is one superficial article about Hipper by Fritz 
E. Giese in Soldat und Technik, published in 1962. Hipper 
himself wrote only one letter for publication and nothing 
in self-justification. The letter was in response to a 
request for comment from H. H. Frost on an article Frost 
wrote on Jutland for the U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings 
in 1919. 
10 
In order to produce a serious study of Hipper as 
a naval commander, a wide search of archives was under- 
taken. Both official and private papers in the Freiburg 
Military Archive, one German state archive, as well as 
official documents of the British and American navies 
were necessarily included. The paucity of direct source 
material posed an initial problem since a substantial 
portion of Hipper's official papers was lost when his 
flagship, S. M. S. Lützow, took its secret archive to the 
bottom of the North Sea on 1 June 1916. Also, Hipper's 
private wartime correspondence, with the exception of 
his journal, was destroyed in a fire-bombing raid on 
Munich in the summer of 1944. These regrettable losses 
were reconstructed in so far as possible from other sources 
including some 43 files of the Imperial German Navy's 
Admiralty Staff, 25 files in records of the Imperial 
Naval Cabinet, 19 Naval Archive files (post-war compendiums 
of reports on which the official history is based), 10 
Imperial Naval Office files, and 9 collections of private 
papers of German naval officers. Additional archival 
information was yielded by approximately 50 files of British 
and 14 files of United States documents. Most of these 
related documents are recorded in the bibliography and 
are intended as a research cross index of selected German 
naval documents in Washington, London, and:: Freiburg. 
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Briefly, the above material is used in conjunction 
with certain major new works on the Imperial German Navy, 
notably Herwig's and Gemzell's studies, to provide a more 
comprehensive picture of Hipper. 
Part I of 'Hipper as a Naval Commander' deals with 
his career before the war. His service record, manoeuvre 
reports in the Admiralty Staff and Naval Cabinet archives and 
Imperial Naval Office documents on the evolution of the 
High Seas Fleet were all useful in documenting Hipper's 
performance as a junior officer and captain of various 
ships. His opinions on manning and personnel, the pre- 
war readiness levels of his forces, his role in the train- 
ing and formation of the German battle cruiser force-- 
in short, the progress of his personal rise to flag rank-- 
are considered in this section. Mission, tactics and 
organization, especially the evolution of the billet of 
Flag Officer, Reconnaissance Forces, are also explored. 
Some of the above is treated in his biography but little 
has been documented either there or in other works. 
Part II examines certain aspects of Hipper's naval 
environment. It was found that German, British and 
American documents indicate a unanimity among surface 
force commanders, including Hipper, on the problems 
created by new naval weapons. His opinions are seen here 
in context and documented for the first time, as are other 
aspects of the naval environment including the progress of 
12 
German fleet wireless communications in the 1907-1918 
period and Hipper's involvement. Problems relating to 
logistics, including Tirpitz's erroneous claim of German 
shell superiority, and the critical limitations of fuel, 
personnel and materiel are considered in broad perspective. 
Documents of the Imperial Naval Office have allowed 
the writer to present for the first time the decision- 
making process which led to the construction of Germany's 
first battle cruiser. They also demonstrate why Hipper 
suffered from numerical inferiority. Finally, Hipper's 
views on possible improvements to his ships and his con- 
cept of the ideal capital ship are also presented for 
the first time. 
Part III concerns Hipper's relations with the high 
command. Research indicated that front commanders including 
Hipper had very little influence on either the naval or 
national high commands, with the possible exception of 
Scheer. Also, the documents examined show the Tirpitz- 
Hipper relationship was a great deal less than friendly; 
Tirpitz twice tried to have Hipper relieved. 
Other new discoveries include Hipper's role as a 
major operations planner under Ingenohl. A proposal of 
particular significance was his plan for a battle cruiser 
raid on British Atlantic sea communications and British 
bases in North America. This closely resembles the German 
strategy in World War II used by Erich Raeder, Hipper's 
13 
chief of staff when the cruiser plan was written. 
Further, Hipper's relations with Ingenohl appear to 
have been cordial and professionally correct, though 
by 24 January 1915 when Hipper returned from the Dogger 
Bank battle, relations were strained to the breaking 
point. As to the battle itself, new evidence from Im- 
perial Naval Office documents shows Hipper's decision to 
take the armoured cruiser Blücher in his force was not a 
professional mistake, as some haverasserted. Hipper's 
strategical overview after the battle is remarkably simi- 
lar to that of Churchill and Fisher. 
Part III also delineates and documents Hipper's official 
opinion on the U-boat for the first time. He did not believe 
it was a panacea in 1915. Another discovery was that Hipper 
had a clear strategical perception of Germany's situation, 
one very similar to Arthur Marder's interpretation. His 
ideas on flying machines and zeppelins, also hitherto un- 
disclosed, reveal considerable foresight when made in the 
summer of 1915. He said: 'Should we make as great an 
effort in air weapons as in underwater weapons it would 
give us absolute superiority over all other nations 
in the 
world. ' 
Hipper's work under Scheer, however, shows a waning 




Hipper's official and personal accounts of Jutland 
and his appreciation of the action are cited together for 
the first time and indicate a determination to counter 
fast British battleships and battle cruisers with a 
similar German 'flying squadron. ' 
Other discoveries were the differences between 
Hipper and Scheer on professional matters with a certain 
unhappiness or even envy on the latter's part about Hipper's 
performance. Despite their differences, however, it appears 
Scheer believed Hipper the best man to command the fleet 
in August 1918 when Scheer was given control over all 
naval operations and the war was all but lost. A fuller 
description of Hipper's selection as Fleet C-in-C was 
provided by the documents researched. 
Part IV of this work analyzes Hipper's role in the 
mutiny and revolution accompanying the German collapse. 
The evidence does not confirm Hipper's participation in 
an 'admirals' rebellion' or his planning of a 'suicide 
sortie. ' In dealing with the mutinies, documents indicate 
Hipper followed a consistent approach of firmness and 
moderation. In dealing with the revolution, his avowed 
goal was to 'keep it within bounds' so that it 'would not 
turn into a bloodbath. ' 
In sum, this study of Admiral Franz Ritter von Hipper 
is an attempt to satisfy-the need for a definitive study 
of a German naval front commander in World War I. 
15 
PART I 
HIPPER BEFORE THE WAR 
The Early Years 
Admiral Franz Ritter von Hipper, the last commander 
of the German High Seas Fleet in World War I, had a 
healthy fear of the sea tempered with the knowledge of 
a professional seaman. Born neither to influence nor 
great wealth, his rise to high command in the Imperial 
German Navy came in the post-Bismarckian era when autoc- 
racy and limited parliamentary democracy co-existed 
uneasily within the framework of the constitution of the 
Second Reich. 
To understand Hipper as naval commander, it is 
necessary to study his family background, early education 
and formal naval training which grounded his rise to sig- 
nificant responsibility at sea in the first World War. 
Repeating a truism, no man, is an island. There are ques- 
tions which must be asked about the socio-economic, edu- 
cational and political matrix in which Hipper matured, 
questions which must be answered to evaluate and validate 
Franz Hipper in his contemporary context. 
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The son of of a middle-class Bavarian shopkeeper, 
Franz Hipper was born 13 September 1863 to Anton and 
Anna Hipper of Weilheim, 
1 
a small town about 40 miles 
south of Munich. Little more than three years later 
his father died, 2 leaving Anna to care for Franz and his 
three brothers. 
3 
At the age of five, Hipper was sent to 
a Catholic grammar school in Munich4 where the education 
he received was likely to be laced heavily with religion. 
1A trip was made by the writer to Weilheim, Bavaria, on 
17 November 1972 to ascertain if any papers or important 
relics of the admiral were kept in the town. A visit to 
the offices of Dr. F. Bauer, Nr. 1 Burgermeister, resulted 
in the town museum being opened for a private visit. Only 
the admiral's full-dress uniform, sword, and two pictures 
remain. He is buried in the town cemetery in a grave that 
is hard to find. There are no papers at Weilheim, but 
his father's hardware business is still carried on briskly 
in the same store, location and building on Admiral 
Hipperstrasse. 
2 Hu 5o von Waldeyer-Hartz, Admiral von Hipper, (London, 
1933), p. 6. 
3 Hipper's brothers were Richard, a Munich attorney, 
Michael, who took over the business at Weilheim, and Anton, 
a chemical plant director in Hamburg. Fr. Gabriele Streitel, 
Richard's daughter, to the writer 28 June 1972. See also 
M. O. D., N. H. B., Nachlass Magnus von Levetzow, Reel 48, 
Frame 00913, Dr. Dir. H ipper to tetzow. 
4 BA/MA MGFA IM 46/13 Personal Akten Admiral Franz Ritter 
von Hipper, 1863-1932, p. 107. 
17 
In 1873, when Hipper was ten years old, he was en- 
rolled in the Gymnasium in Munich where he remained until 
1879. It is probably fair to say that in these formative 
years and this level of education, 'indoctrination was 
more important than the spirit of free inquiry and reflec- 
tive thought. '5 Hipper's generation was the first to ex- 
perience massive popular education and the new urban way 
of life which followed the Industrial Revolution and as 
such, probably became 'accustomed to a standardized form 
of group discipline. '6 He pursued the Gymnasium curriculum 
which included such subjects as German, French, English, 
Latin, Greek, Geography, History, Religion, Mathematics, 
7 
and some Science. He studied these subjects for six 
years, the objective of the curriculum being to produce 
a classical man. However, this classical influence may 
have been somewhat tempered by Hipper's acquaintance with 
Frederick Marryat's sea romances which in the opinion of 
his biographer, Waldeyer-Hartz, 
8 
had a great deal to do 
5 David Thompson, Europe Since Napoleon, (Cambridge, 1972), 
p. 339. 
6 Ibid, p. 340. 
7 Friedrich Paulsen, German Education Past and Present, 
(London, 1908)', pp. 197-220, see especially p. 2 Adolph 
Matthias, Geschichte des deutschen Unterrichts, (Munich, 1907), 
pp. 218,381; James E. asse , German Higher Schools, The History, Organization and Methods of-Secr Eccation in 
Germany, New York, 18 j, pp. ill, 1,125. 
8 Waldeyer-Hartz, op. cit., pp. 7-9. 
18 
with Hipper's naval vocation. Hipper finished his Gymnas- 
ium studies in 1879 when he was 16 with an Obersekunda 
which Holger Herwig rates as the equivalent of an American 
high school graduate's diploma. 
9 
The Obersekunda was 
awarded to persons who did not plan to pursue an academic 
career and hence did not go on to receive the Abitur. In 
Bavaria, however, after her defeat in 1866 while part of 
an Austrian alliance against Prussia, complete reforms of 
the Bavarian officer corps and army were undertaken. By 
1868 universal military service had been introduced along 
with a reserve officer corps drawn from the Einj1hrig- 
Freiwilli en 
10 
From 1872 onward, ý (one-year volunteers). 
Bavarian regular Army officers were required to pursue 
the Abitur11 but it was not a reserve requirement. 
Hipper enrolled in the EinjUhrig-Freiwilligen in 
1879, and after receiving basic officer training for a 
year (paid for by his family in accordance with require- 
ments of the reserve officer corps) decided to enter the 
navy. He attended Pressen or cram courses at Kiel to 
prepare for the naval entrance examination which he passed 
9 Holger Herwig, The German Naval Officer Corps, (Oxford, 
1973), p. 41. 
10 Rudolph Absolon, Die Wehrmacht im Dritten Reich, vol. II, 
(Boppard am Rhein), T 71 , p. 28. 
11 
Herwig, op. cit., p. 46. 
19 
successfully. On 12 April 1881, at the age of 18, Franz 
12 
Hipper entered the Imperial German Navy. 
The political milieu of Hipper's early years is no 
less significant than his education. While Hipper was in 
grammar school, several historical events of particular 
importance to his early background occurred: first, 
Bavaria, a political entity for 800 years, was made a part 
of Bismarck's Reich; second, the doctrine of Papal Infalli- 
bility was proclaimed; third, the Franco-Prussian war was 
fought; and finally, Bismarck's Kulturkampf was instituted 
to counter any possible political effects of the papal doc- 
13 
trine on German unity. 
While Hipper was studying in the Gymnasium, contemporary 
historians such as Leopold von Ranke, Johann Gustav Droysen, 
Heinrich von Sybel, Theodor Mommsen, and Heinrich von 
Treitschke were having their effect on German thinking. 
In fact, their writings of this period have been character- 
ized as a watershed of nationalism in German history. 
14 
12 BA/MA Personal Akten Hipper, op. cit., p. 107. 
13 Michael Balfour, The Kaiser and His Times, (New York, 
1972), p. 27. 
14 Harry Elmer Barnes, A History of Historical Writing, 
(New York, 1962), pp. 2Y8-2Il - 
20 
And while the German press at the time 'remained 
basically serious and educational in character, putting 
heavy emphasis on political issues, editorial opinion, 
and literary or philosophical articles, ' 
15 
German society 
was, as Balfour says, 'essentially masculine, laying 
exaggerated emphasis on toughness, self-sacrifice and 
17 
discipline.. Nowhere was the stoic ideal more profoundly 
espoused than among the 'nobility of merit'18 created by 
the 'darling of the middle classes, '19 the Imperial German 
Navy. The best-known naval executive officers including 
Knorr, Koester, Tirpitz, Ingenohl, Pohl, Schr8der,, Capelle, 
20 
Hipper, etc., were of bourgeois extraction. All but 
Hipper, who-was from Bavaria, came from northern and central 
Germany. 
15 Thompson, op. cit., p. 342. 
16 Balfour, op. cit., p. 35. 
17 Herwig, op, cit., p. 79. 
18 Jonathan Steinberg, Yesterday's Deterrent, (London, 
1965), pp. 32-33. 
19 Herwig, op. cit., p. 75. 
20 
Holger Herwig, 'Zur Soziologie des Kaiserlichen See- 
offizierkorps vor 1914, ' Marine und Marine olitik im 
Kaiserlichen Deutschland 1891-19Tý+, sse or , T772), 
p. 75. 
21 
The Genesis of an Admiral 
The social, educational, political-and-economic 
background in which Hipper matured provided the founda- 
tion for his formal-. naval education and-later experience. 
The mode of formation of Hipper's professional character, 
of his genesis as an admiral, should be prefaced by a 
brief explanation of the process of his admission into 
the navy. According to Holger Herwig, there were two 
schools of thought in the German navy regarding officer 
selection: the first consisted of those who believed that 
family background and character should be the primary con- 
siderations; the second, those who felt that higher for- 
mal education was more important. 
21 It would appear that 
the first school of thought was dominant at the time Hipper 
entered the navy since he and his cohorts were selected 
largely under an edict of Kaiser Wilhelm I which '... admon- 
ished Stosch22 "not to pay too much attention to the number 
of cadets accepted; the main issue remains the quality and 
internal homogeneity which the young men bring to their pro- 
fession from their family background, for this is the foun- 
dation upon which the firm coherence of officer recruits can 
later be achieved... "': To get into the navy, Hipper had 
23 
21 Herwig, op. cit., pp. 43-45. 
22 General Albrecht von Stosch, Chef der Admiralität, 
1 Jan 1872-20 Mar 1883, a Prussian genera who was C-in-C, 
Imperial German Navy, for the same period. 
23 Herwig, op. cit., p. 39. See also Waldeyer-Hartz, op. cit., 
p. 10. 
22 
to pass examinations in mathematics, natural science, 
English or French and drawing. 
24 There is little doubt 
that his formal training was thorough and severe25 and no 
doubt that without his family's financial support, it would 
not have occurred at all. 
26 
The course of formal training pursued by Hipper was 
as follows: 
27 
Course Date Duration 
Probationary Sea Cadet.... Apr 1881-Sept 1881... 5 months 
(S. M. S. Niobe) 
Naval Cadet School ........ Sept1881-Mar 1882... 6 months (Kiel) 
Basic Gunner -School...... Apr 1882-May 1882... 6 weeks (S. M. S. Mars) 
Sea Training, Home Watýrs. May 1882-Sept 1882... 5 months 
S. M. S. Friedrich Karl 
Midshipman World, Cruise... Oct 1882-Oct 1884... 2 years 
(S. M. S. Leipzig) 
Naval Officer School...... Nov 1884-Apr 1885... 5 months 
(Kiel) 
Executive Officer School.. Oct 1885-Dec 1885... 3 months 
(Kiel) 
Torpedo Officer Course.... Oct 1890-Jan 1891... 4 months 
(S. M. S. Blücher) 
Torpedoboat Instruction... Jan 1893-Feb 1893... 6 weeks 
Admiralty Staff Journey ... Jun:, 1897 ............. 17 days (S. M. S. Grille) 
Cruiser Gunnery Course.... Jan 1906 ............. 10 days (S. M. S. Prinz Adalbert) 
Battleship unnery Course. Apr 1906 ............. 10 days (S. M. S. Schwaben) 
24 M. O. D., N. I. D., A. W. S., German Navy, CB1182(E), 'Entry 
and Training of Executive Officers, ' p. 4. 
25 M. O. D., N. I. D., A. W. S., German Naýv , CB1182(D), 
'Officers, ' 
p. 3. See also BA/MA F 3302 le/PG7 66706 Organization des Bil- 
dungswesens der Marine, Sept 1884-Apr 1917p 'Marine Schule. '- 
26 Herwig, op. cit., pp. 54 ff. It cost about 7000 marks. 
27 BA/MA PersonalAkten Admiral Franz von Hipper, op. cit., 
Kommandos am Lande Kömmandos an Bord. 
23 
The final four courses of Hipper's formal naval 
training merit brief explanation. The Torpedo Officer 
Course marked his initiation into the ranks of torpedo- 
boat specialists and the so-called 'black art' of the 
'Sea Hussars. '28 The Admiralty Staff Journey provided him 
with exercises in collective planning, tactics and war- 
gaming29 on a joint Army-Navy basis, 
30 in short, his 
first formal exposure to strategy as participant. And 
the last two courses in gunnery served to bring Hipper 
abreast of improvements seen in the previous decade. 
31 
Hipper, howeve;, did not attend the one institution 
of higher learning in the Imperial German Navy--the Marine 
Akademie, or Naval War College, at Kiel. The Akademie was 
established by Stosch in 1872 expressly for the purpose of 
providing staff officers with an exposure to strategy32 und 
it would appear to have been the ideal place for Hipper to 
have furthered his education in this crucial area. 
28 Waldeyer-Hartz, op. cit., pp. 61-62. 
29 Walther Hubatsch, Der Admiralstab und die obersten 
Marinebehörden in Deutschland 9+ý, Fran urt, 1958), 
P" 12/. 
30 Carl-Axel Gemzell, " 
Organization, Conflict and Innovation - 
A Stud of German Naval Strategic 
ýPlannýi 
$8T-79 0, un , 
19 , p. 42. 
-See alsö ric aeder, My Lie, (Annapolis, 
1960 , p. 23. 
31 USNA, ONI Registers, RG 38, Box 119, Register 308, E-6-A, 
'Training of German Naval Officers, ' p. 1. 
32 Albert Röhr, Handbuch der Deutschen Marine Geschichte, 
(Oldenburg/Hamburg, 1963), p" Sei also Gemze , op. cit., 
p. 41. 
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The Akademie's objective was 'to afford opportunities 
to officers of extending their general and professional 
knowledge, to inculcate a sound military judgment and to 
prepare officers for higher posts in the Navy. '33 Emphasis 
was on technical subjects although national economics, 
general history and courses in English and other languages 
were available. Among the obligatory subjects were naval 
tactics, strategy and war-gaming. The curriculum covered 
two successive winters, and according to the German Naval 
Attache in Washington at the turn of the century, when 
Hipper normally would have attended, '... particularly 
capable lieutenants at an age of not more than 30 years 
may upon application and passing an examination attend the 
Naval Academy at Kiel. '34 However, more senior officers 
were allowed to apply if their fleet service had precluded 
an opportunity for them to attend-earlier. 
35 
33 Naval Intelligence Division, Admiralty War Staff, 
German Navy 1919, 'Entry and Training of Executive Officers, ' Ad alty Library, Earl s Court, CB 1182, (E), p. 17. 
34 USNA, R. G. 38, Office of Naval Intelligence Registers, 
Box 119, E-g-A 306 Captlt. Boy Ed, Naval Attache to Capt. 
C. D. Sigsbee, Chief Intelligence Officer, Navy Department, 
Washington, 26 Feb 1901, answer to question 20. See also 
M. O. D., N. I. D. A. W. S. German Navy, CB 1182, (E), op. cit., 
pp. 2-3. 
35 M. O. D., A. W. S., ibid, p. 17. 
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Approximately 20 men entered the Akademie each 
year after passing a test in English or French and sub- 
mitting an essay on a subject chosen by themselves and 
treating naval policy, strategy, naval law, ---naval history, 
or general matters dealing with the science of war. Purely 
technical essays were not acceptable. 
36 
Upon admission, officers-, were required to produce 
37 
essays in each class with the subject chosen either from 
the course of study38 or a list of topics provided by the 
Admiralty Staff. The essays had to be either naval stra- 
tegical or grand strategical in nature. 
In order to become an Admiralty Staff officer, at 
least until the Tirpitz regime, an officer had to have 
been selected to attend the Akademie. 
39 
Hipper was one of 
several fleet officers who held Admiralty Staff jobs40 
but did not have the formal education which was supposed 
to accompany such assignments. In fact, the number of 
36 Ibid. 
37 Gemzell, op. cit., loc. cit. 
38 Ibidem. See also Erich Raeder, My Life, op. cit., p. 27. 
For a list of topics done by Raeder s Ts in 1903, see 
BA/MA F 3302le cited above. 
39 Gemzell, op. cit., p. 41. 
40 Hubatsch, op. cit., pp. 39 ff, 125-127. See also Gemzell, 
op. cit., p. 41, n. 16. 
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officers selected represented only one-fifth of the 
Admiralty Staff billets. 
41 
Tirpitz had a marked effect on the development of 
the Akademie at Kiel and was instrumental in the intro- 
duction there of naval history, strategy, political science 
and national economics courses. 
42 
Tirpitz believed he 
succeeded in shaping the Akademie into a post-graduate 
school for line officers, 
3 
perhaps as an attempt to_. 
4 
counter his impression that the general overall training 
of the German navy of the 1880's was geared too rigidly 
toward its objectives of competence and discipline. 
44 
As can be seen from a review of the previously out- 
lined programmes of training, there was a distinct bias 
toward the tactical and technical side of the German 
naval officer's education. This was no less true in 
Hipper's case. 
45 
Hipper missed the longest and most 
advanced formal post-commissioning training course 
41 Gemzell, op. cit., p. 41, n. 16. Gemzell cites the 
Nachlass Keyserlink which contains a typescript biography 
o ira c se whom Hubatsch regards as the best of 
the pre-war Admiralty Staff Chiefs. See Hubatsch, op. cit., 
pp. 190-140. The percentages cited here come from that 
MSS. See BA/MA N161/9. 
42 Grand-Admiral Von Tirpitz, My Memoirs, (London, 1919), 
p. 22. 
43 Ibid. See also Eric Raeder, op. cit., p. 25. 
44 Tirpitz, op. cit., loc. cit. 
45 Personalakten Hipper, op. cit., 'Kommandos am Lande, ' 
'Kommandos an ord. '- 
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available in the Imperial Navy. His total training be- 
fore commissioning was 46.5 months and in the balance of 
his career, he received only 14.5 months of formal train- 
ing beyond this. 
Any analysis of the formation of Hipper's profes- 
sional character must reflect his career experience as 
well as formal training and s ocial origins. A small 
catalogue of his professional expe rience gained prio r to 
46 
his promotion to flag rank on 27 J anuary 1912, follows: 
Type of Assignment Date Duration 
Division Officer (Ashore). . . Apr 1885-Oct 1885 .7 months Jan 1886-Mar 1887 . 15 months Company Officer (Ashore). . . Oct 1892-Jan 1893 .4 months 
Watch Officer. ....... . Mar 1887-Oct 1890 . 43 months Oct 1894-Sept1895 . 11 months Torpedo Officer. ...... . Oct 1891-Oct 1892 . 12 months 
Commanding-Officer'VTBD's .. Feb 1893-Oct 1894 .6 months 
Senior Officer, TBD's .... Sept 1895-Septl898 . 36 months Oct 1902-Sept1905 . 35 months Oct 1908-Sept1911 . 35 months 
Navigation Officer ..... . Oct 1898-Oct 1902 . 36 months 
C. O. (Small Cruisers). ... . Apr 1903-Jun 1903 .3 months Apr 1906-Aug 1906 .5 months 
C. O. (Large Cruisers). ... . Sept 1906-Sept 1908 . 24 months Oct 1911-Jan 1912 .4 months 
46 BA/MA PersonalAkten Hipper, op. cit., loc. cit. 
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Hipper began his active naval service on 24 April 
1885 as a division officer drilling recruits of the First 
Naval Battalion at Kiel, a seven-month assignment. In 
October he began a 12-week post-commissioning course for 
naval executive officers which he successfully completed 
16 December 1885. After a period of leave, Hipper was 
assigned to the Second Seaman's Artillery Division, 
Coastal Defense Artillery, on 4 January 1886 as a division 
officer. He remained in this assignment until 3 March 
1887 and the next day was formally assigned as watch 
officer in the Friedrich Karl. 
47 
Watch officer was a qualification level assigned 
by the Naval Cabinet upon recommendation of commanding 
officers; the term also designated the one who kept the 
watch. Individual commanders, however, -could appoint 
naval executive officers to such watch officer duties 
as the situation demanded, with confirmation usually 
following at a later date from Berlin 
4 8In 
attaining 
the qualification of watch officer, Hipper had achieved 
what Admiral Reinhard Scheer later characterized as 
'the ideal of every young German executive officer in 
the era before the German torpedoboat service came of 
47 S. M. S. Friedrich Karl, central battery ironclad, 
5971 tons ist placement, armament 2 21 cm. (8.2-inch) 
and 14 21 cm. guns, 5 torpedo tubes, 13 knot speed, 
sail/steam propulsinn, 33 officers, 488 men. 
48 M. O. D., N. I. D., A. W. S., German N avy CB1182(C) 'The 
Internal Administration of lips, ' p. 8. 
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age. '49 Scheer described the duties of a watch officer 
as'primarily shiphandling, in watches of four hours each 
... the sharpest vigilance was required, especially when 
in company with other ships. '50 Hipper's experience as a 
watch officer included 12 assignments in 10 ships which 
sailed the Baltic, North Sea, Atlantic and Mediterranean 
waters. 
In retrospect, his two most significant periods as 
watch officer were his Mediterranean service and his later 
duty on the battleship WBrth. 
51 The former period included 
Hipper's service on S. M. S. Stein, 
52 
Stosch53Wacht54and 
Friedrich der Grosse55 and draws attention to the fact that 
Hipper gained cumulative sea experience, command responsi- 
bility and geographical exposure. This is in marked con- 
trast to the narrow, parochial officer corps portrayed by 
49 Admiral Reinhard Scheer, Vom Segelschiffe zum U-Boot, (Leipzig, 1925), p. 107. 
50 Ibid, p. 227. 
51 S. M. S. Wirth, pre-dreadnought battleship, 10,300 tons 
displacement, armament 6 28 cm. (11-inch) and 8 10 cm. (4.1-inch) guns, 6 torpedo tubes, 16 knot speed, steam 
propulsion, -38 officers, 534 men. 
52 S. M. S. Stein, armoured corvette, 2994 tons displacement, 
armament 12 15 cm. (5.9-inch) guns, sail/steam propulsion, 
13 knot speed, 13 officers, 386 men. 
53 S. M. S. Stosch, sister ship to S. M. S. Stein above. 
54 S. M. S. Wacht, dispatch boat, 1240 tons displacement, 
armament 3-10.5 cm. (4.2-inch) guns, 3 torpedo tubes, 19 knot 
speed, steam propulsion, 7 officers, 134 men. 
55 S. M. S. Friedrich der Grosse, central battery turret ironclad, 
5971 tons isp acement, armament 4 26 cm. (10.2-inch), 2 17 cm. 
(6.7-inch) guns, 5 torpedo tubes, 14 knot speed, sail/steam 
propulsion, 46 officers, 454 men. 
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Lothar Persius5as cited. 'in recent work 
7 
on the Imperial 
Navy, notably those of Daniel Horn and Holger Herwig. 
Rather, Hipper satisfied the stipulation enunciated by 
Tirpitz regarding qualification of would-be admirals that 
'the higher naval officer must have spent part of his life 
in the great world. '58 Further, the varied nature of the 
Mediterranean Squadron in which Hipper served was signif- 
icant professionally. S. M. S. Stein and Stosch were cor- 
vettes with mixed sail and steam propulsion and a relatively 
obsolete armament while S. M. S. Friedrich der Grosse was a 
modern central battery turret ironclad. Most important 
from the viewpoint of experience, however, was his service 
in the dispatch boat, S. M. S. Wacht because of his increased 
responsibility, which from a sheer statistical standpoint, 
allowed him more opportunity to handle her. Also, she was 
regarded as a technologically advanced vessel and Hipper 
was part of her first officer complement. Hipper's fitness 
reports during his Mediterranean service describe him as a 
competent watch officer who made no mistakes worthy of note-- 
a fine ship handler and navigator. 
59 
56 Capt. Lothar Persius (ret), correspondent for the Berliner 
Ta eblatt on naval affairs from 1912 onwards; a noted critic 
an gadfly of the Tirpitz regime and author of several books 
on the Imperial Navy. 
57 See Daniel Horn, The German Naval Mutinies of World War I, 
(Rutgers, 1969), p. =, n27; Holger Herwig, op7 cit. p-764,, 
n4. See also A. J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, 
vol ii, p. 19, for a similar assertion. 
58 Tirpitz, op. cit., p. 23. 
59 Personal Acten Hipper, op. cit., Qualificationsberichte, 
1887-1890. 
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Hipper's tour between 1894 and 1895 as senior watch 
officer, S. M. S. Wörth, came four years after he finished 
his Mediterranean service and capped his service as a 
watch officer. The WUrth was a key assignment for Hipper 
primarily because Prince Heinrich of Prussia, brother of 
Kaiser Wilhelm II, was captain of the ship. Prince Heinrich 
was the first royalty to observe Hipper closely and the 
first 'grand seigneur' Hipper knew well enough to emulate. 
Heinrich's reports on Hipper included two important 
recommendations. The first was that Hipper eventually 
should command all German torpedoboats and 18 years later-- 
in 1912--Hipper did. The second was that Hipper should be 
considered for responsible posts as a navigator and later 
Hipper was appointed to two such assignments. Moreover, 
Prince Heinrich, as personal example for Hipper, was both 
a grand seigneur and 'a better seaman than administrator. '60 
That Hipper affected the manner of a grand seigneur there 
is evidence from both his biographer, Waldeyer-Hartz, 
61 
and 
Erich Raeder, his principal war-time chief of staff. 
62 
60 P. R. O. Adm. 116/940B, H. L. Heath, Naval Attache to Sir E. 
Goschen British Ambassador to Germany, Berlin, 6 Aug 1910, 
'A General Report on Naval Affairs, ' p. 1. 
61 Waldeyer-Hartz, op. cit., p. 150. 
62 Raeder, op. cit., p. 41. 
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In this affectation Hipper was similar to Admiral 
Hugo von Pohl, Chief of the Naval Staff from 1913 to 
February 1915 and C-in-C of the High Seas Fleet until 
his death in February 1916, who modelled himself after 
the 'Grand seigneur Admiral Friedrich Count von Baudissin 
to the extent of copying the latter's external appearance 
and mannerisms. '63 Hipper served under von Baudissin in 
the Wacht in 1889 and the Hohenzollern in 1899-1902. As 
to Prince Heinrich being a "better seaman than administrator, " 
64 
Hipper himself hated paperwork all his life. Hipper's 
extensive interest in the technical side of his respon- 
sibilities6 is well documented. He complained, for example, 
about all the writing involved in the semi-annual fitness 
reports for his captains, executive officers and leading 
engineers. 
66 
Indeed, Scheer criticized Hipper 
67 for leaving 
63 BA-Koblenz, Logbuch Bo islav von Selchow, vol. 36,7189, 
cited in Herwig, op. citý7. 
64 Waldeyer-Hartz, op. cit., pp. 7-10. 
65 
BA/MA PersonalAkten Hipper, op. cit., 31 Auszug, alifi- 
cationsberichte, 1.3 Jun 19r1, Admiral von Sc r er, c ie 
o the Baltic-Naval Station, to Chief of the Naval Cabinet. 
See also 32 Auszug, ff. 
66 BA/MA N162, Nachlass Hipper, Chapter 7, p. 36,17 Oct 1917. 
67 PersonalAkten Hipper, op. cit., 39 Auszug, 1 Dec 1917, 
Admiral Scheer, C-in-C, High Seas Fleet, to Chief of the 
Naval Cabinet. 
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too much of the administrative work to his staff. In 
any event, Hipper certainly developed traits similar to 
Prince Heinrich and is best known for his seamanship, 
not as an administrator. Prince Heinrich aside, the 
fact that S. M. S. Worth was one of the most powerful and 
advanced battleships of her time was itself significant 
to Hipper's personal experience as a watch officer. The 
design of the Wörth and her three sister ships included 
three twin 28 cm. (11-inch) gun turrets on the centre line 
and light anti-torpedo armament, anticipating the dread- 
nought idea by more than a decade. And finally, it was 
during Hipper's service in Wörth that he was promoted to 
senior lieutenant and awarded his first decoration68 on 
29 August 1895--the Bavarian National Defence Service 
Medal--albeit the lowest Bavarian decoration in the Imperial 
German Navy List. 
The next step beyond watch officer in Hipper's 
career was his designation as a torpedo-specialist. He 
trained from October 1890 to January 1891 aboard the old 
torpedo training ship, Blücher, at Kiel as temporary duty 
away from S. M. S. Mücke, a self-propelled armoured coastal 
defense vessel. 
68 PersonalAkten Hipper, op. cit., Orden und Auszeichnungen. 
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Admiral Scheer, who had trained in the Blücher in 
1888, noted many years later that the torpedo training 
affected his own career since he was thereafter designated 
a torpedo-specialist69 and Hipper was similarly affected. 
He was assigned as torpedo officer of the S. M. S. Friedrich 
der Grosse, a capital ship, in October 1891 and to S. M. S. 
Beowulf7in April 1892 which he helped commission. As tor- 
pedo officer, he was 'responsible for the efficiency of 
torpedoes, torpedo armament and all that pertains to it: 
torpedo charges, explosives equipment, including charges 
and mine clearing gear, and for the administration and 
maintenance of torpedo stores. ' He was also 'in charge 
of the training of the crew in torpedo work, explosives 
and minesweeping, and head of torpedo personnel. '71 
According to Scheer, the position of torpedo officer in 
battleships ranked below the gunnery officer but above 
the watch officers* 
72 
69 Scheer, vom Segelschiffe, op. cit., p. 107. 
70 S. M. S. Beowulf, coastal armoured ship, 3741 tons dis- 
placement, armament 3 24 cm. (9.4-inch), 10 8.8 cm. (3.4-inch) 
guns, 4 torpedo tubes, 14 knot speed, steam propulsion, 20 
officers, 256 men. 
71 
M. O. D., N. I. D., A. W. S., German Navy CB 1182(C), op. cit., 
p. 5. 
72 Scheer, op. cit., p. 226. 
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Subsequently, Hipper was assigned to the Second 
Torpedo Unit, Wilhelmshaven in October 1892, as company 
commander. Between then and September 1894 Hipper had 
11 assignment changes which included command of a company 
of recruits, further training as a torpedo officer, and 
command of 9 torpedo boats. But such extensive command 
experience did not sit well with certain senior officers 
such as Admiral Alexander von Monts who succeeded General 
von Caprivi as Chief of the Admiralty in 1888. According 
to Tirpitz, Inspector of Torpedoes at the time, von Monts 
had 'an undisguised dislike of torpedoboats, which indeed 
was shared by almost all the older officers of that time 
... because younger officers were appointed to independent 
commands in the torpedo section at an age which they con- 
sidered was not sufficiently ripe. '73 It should be noted, 
however, that Tirpitz was hardly an impartial observer: 
he described his torpedoboat service 'among our black 
comrades of the wild and daring chase' as 'the 11 best 
years of my life. We were bound to our incomparable crews 
by enthusiasm and mutual comradeship in storm and danger. 
We officers of the torpedo section constituted a corps 
within a corps, the united spirit of which was everywhere 
recognized, but also envied and opposed. '74 
73 Tirpitz, op. cit., p. 43. 
74 Ibid, p. 51. 
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In light of the above, it is well to remember that 
the torpedoboat of the 1890's was by and large an uncom- 
fortable and dangerous ship, richly deserving a reputa- 
tion for "hard lying. 'Coal-fired vessels of at most 
350 tons displacement, torpedoboats carried one or two 
officers and about 20 men at a choppy speed between 18 
and 25 knots. 
75 The crews were recruited from among 
were 
North Sea fishermen, insofar as possible, and/mostly vol- 
unteers who received no extra allowance as did their 
American and British contemporaries. 
76 
Moreover, the 
quality of the German torpedo section was not lost on 
the British observer who commented that 'The torpedo ser- 
vice is probably having an effect on both officers and 
men, and this effect will be shown in the battle squadrons 
in a few years time. One can generally detect a torpedo- 
boat officer, his whole manner and bearing being so dif- 
ferent from those serving in line-of-battle ships. '17 
After an intervening tour as watch officer in Wtirth 
already described, Hipper's next torpedo assignment was 
that of Commanding Officer, Second Torpedoboat Reserve 
Division beginning in September 1895. Hipper's biographer 
75 See Jane's Fighting Ships, 1906-1907, pp. 252-253. 
76 M. O. D., N: I. D., A. W. S., German Navy CB1182(L), 'Pay 
Regulations Officers and Lower Dec atings, ' pp. 1-18. 
77 P. R. O., Adm 116/940B, Captain Heath to-Ambassador Goschen, 
6 Aug 1910, p. 2. See n. 60 supra. 
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Waldeyer-Hartz, asserts that Hipper's appointment as 
commander of the Second Torpedo Division 'was the de- 
cisive step which led to Hipper's brilliant career. ' 
78 
In retrospect, however, it would appear that Hipper's 
appointment to Prince Heinrich's ship, S. M. S. Wörth, 
had far more effect on Hipper's career, especially 
since Heinrich himself was promoted to Rear Admiral from 
that ship and went on to command the fleet from 1906-1909. 
Heinrich must have watched Hipper's progress between his 
Worth assignment in 1894-95 and his later command of the 
armoured cruiser Friedrich Karl in 1906-08 as a captain. 
Heinrich wrote a special endorsement on Hipper's annual 
fitness report in 1907 to the effect that Hipper should 
be considered for the assignment of flag officer, torpedo- 
boats, when such a position was brought into existence. 
79 
As it turned out, Hipper was the first officer to hold 
this job. 
Hipper's affinity for torpedoboat spirit was especially 
evident when he was a young lieutenant in command of the 
Second Torpedo Division. He and his captains, who were 
all lieutenants, were fond of appearing off-duty in similar 
mufti, including identical straw hats with a red'Stander Z' 
embroidered on their hats. ' black ribbon banfds:. Since. 
78 Waldeyer-Hartz, op. cit., p. 60. 
79 BA/MA F 3468/PG 67613, Akten des Kaiserl. Marine 
Kabinett, (Papers of the Imper all var- Cabinet), 1.12.07, 
Heinrich of Prussia to Chief of the Naval Cabinet. 
38 
'Stander Z' was the German naval attack signal, 
80 it 
would appear that Hipper observed the spirit of the 
torpedo service much as Tirpitz had expressed it. 
For 21 months Hipper commanded 4 boats of either 
the reserve or the active torpedo divisions, the prin- 
cipal difference being the reserve boats were older. 
After a brief interlude to acquire advanced training 
in strategy and tactics on an Admiralty Staff journey 
aboard the yacht Grille, Hipper was appointed commander 
of the Second Reserve Torpedoboat Flotilla of 8 boats,. 
a 15-month assignment. This assignment coincided with 
a particularly dangerous and costly period for the 
German torpedoboat service in peacetime, primarily be- 
cause of extraordinarily bad weather: torpedoboat S-41 
was lost in a sevelestorm in August 1895, S-46 and S-48 
collided in a storm in the Jade River in March 1896 and 
S-48 sank, and in September 1897 S-28 was sunk in a 
severe storm in the Elbe estuary. 
81 None of these boats 
were under Hipper's command. 
Inevitably, Hipper's performance in the torpedoboat 
service came to the Kaiser's attention because Wilhelm II 
habitually attended his fleet's manoeuvres. The Kaiser 
saw Hipper's torpedoboat division perform, which clearly 
80 Waldeyer-Hartz, op. cit., pp. 61-62. 
81 Fritz E. Giese, Kleine Geschichte der deutschen Flotte, 
(Berlin, 1965), p. 76. 
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demonstrated Hipper's ship handling and navigating 
abilities; the 'torpedoboat attack' on the battle 
line was a dramatic highpoint of most of the 'Kaiser- 
manoeuvres. '82 On 1 October 1898, however, Hipper's 
torpedoboat service was interrupted by an appointment 
as navigator of the fleet flagship, S. M. S. Kurfürst 
Friedrich Wilhelm. The fleet commander was Vice Admiral 
August Thomsen, 'the father-of German naval artillery. ' 
The Kurfürst was a sister ship of the WUrth and in the 
Imperial Navy, the assignment of navigator in a battle- 
ship meant Hipper was third in succession to command 
after the captain and the executive officer. 
83 After 
serving 11 months under Admiral Thomsen, Hipper was 
ordered to the Imperial Yacht Hohenzollern as navigator 
on 16 September 1899. This brought him into close con- 
tact with the highest military and political circles in 
Germany. The Kaiser spent much of his time aboard the 
Hohenzollern; in fact, more than a third of his reign. 
84 
Hipper had the good fortune to be aboard for the visit 
to England for the funeral of Queen Victoria in 1901, 
82 BA/MA F 3391/PG 67211-67219,67230,67233,67240-67243/ 
Reels 492,513-515, Ubungsberichte Aug 1889-M1rz 1915, 
(Drill Reports). 
83 Personal Akten Hipper, op. cit., Kommandos on Bord; see 
also Scheer, op. cit., p. 226 and ., erman-Nvy, CB 1182(C), op. cit., p. 4. 
84 Herwig, op. cit., p. 28. See also Emil Ludwig, Wilhelm 
Hohenzollern, The Last of the Kaisers, (New York, 1927), 
pp. 88, ,2T; 258-97 227 
ý81ý 322,402,433. 
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the Kaiser's meeting with the Tzar at Danzig, the 
American cruise in March 1902 with Prince Heinrich 
and the return visit to the Tzar at Reval. 
85 
Commander 
Count Baudissin was Hipper's captain in Hohenzollern 
and Hipper had many occasions to put his navigating 
skills to the test. For example, Queen Victoria's 
funeral necessitated a January crossing of-the North 
Sea and Prince Heinrich's American visit a crossing of 
the Atlantic in mid-winter. An understanding of Hipper's 
problems as navigator of the Hohenzollern is perhaps 
best gained through ErichRaeder's words. Raeder, Hipper's 
principal wartime chief of staff and future C-in-C of 
the German navy, was navigator of the Kaiser's yacht from 
1910 to 1912. 
As a ship, the Hohenzollern fell far short 
of what an Imperial yacht wou d be expected to 
be. In construction she could almost be called 
a monstrosity. With abnormally high freeboard, 
she rolled in rough weather to a point uncomfort- 
able even for old sailors. Her watertight integ- 
rity would not have met the safety requirements 
of even an ordinary passenger ship, much less an 
Imperial yacht. To my amazement even the navi- 
gation equipment was exceedingly antiquated; at 
a time when the ships of the fleet all had gyro- 
compasses, the Hohenzollern had only magnetic 
compasses aboard. Yet te captain, the navigating 
officer, and the watch officers were responsible 
for the very life of the Head o96the State, not to 
speak of the nation's prestige. 
85 BA/MA F 3456-3457/PG 67548-67552/Reels 602,564-565, 
Reise S. M. der Kaiser und König im Jahre 1899 1900,1901, 
I2Üý TiravT His Fýajesty the Emperor-an K11-kj . 
86 Raeder, op* cit., p. 33. 
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Hipper's assignment aboard the Hohenzollern brought 
him many medals: the Prussian Order of the Red Eagle, 
Fourth Class (lowest of ranking Imperial Service Orders) 
on 3 August 1900; the Bavarian Military Service Order, 
Third Class, on 17 September 1900; the Order of St. Stan- 
islaus from the. Tzar of Russia on the latter's visit to 
Danzig in December 1901, as a member of the officers' 
complement of the Hohenzollern; the Grand Duchy of Saxony's 
House Order of the White Falcon, First Class, on the occa- 
sion of the Grand Duke's visit aboard the yacht on 
10 August 1902; the Order of, the Red Eagle with swords, 
a higher level of the same order he received earlier, on 
12 August 1902.87 Hipper also was promoted to lieutenant 
commander 16 June 1901 while serving as navigator aboard 
the royal yacht. 
Waldeyer-Hartz, Hipper's biographer, asserts that 
the Kaiser visited Hipper 'quite informally' when Hipper 
was in command of the light cruiser Leipzig which acted 
as escort ship for the Hohenzollern in 1906. 
$$ 
This may 
be true but neither the Kaiser nor Hipper recorded it, 
at least according to the major recent biographies or 
87 PersonalAkten Hipper, Orden und Auszeichnungen, loc. 
cit. " see a sl Ran Iiste der la si er is en Marine, (Berlin, 
ann. 
j, Bezeichriu--ng der rcTen und renzeic ei'F n p. VII if., 
for 191 . 
88 
Waldeyer-Hartz, op. cit., p. 81. 
42 
analyses of that eccentric monarch. 
89 
Hipper and the 
Kaiser, however, both read the sea romances of Frederick 
Marryat90 and there is a picture of the Kaiser, Hipper, 
and Baudissin (among the royal entourage) doing 'monkey 
drill' on the Hohenzollern. The picture, entitled "Early 
Morning on the Hohenzollern, " was reproduced from the 
memoirs of Count Philipp Eulenburg, close friend of the 
91 
Kaiser. The only direct intervention in Hipper's career 
by royal authority appears to be his assignment as com- 
mander of the Second Torpedo Unit from 1 October 1902 to 
30 September 1905. This is documented in his service 
record. 
92 
When Hipper assumed command of this unit, it 
was significant that he was given the light cruiser Niobe, 
a brand new ship9,3 as his flotilla leader, because the 
Germans were developing the tactical use of such ships 
in consort with torpedoboats; and it also represented his 
first command of what could be regarded as a truly ocean- 
going vessel. Hipper personally commanded the Niobe for 
89 See Ex-Kaiser Wilhelm, LAX Memoirs 1877-1918, (London, 
1922); Balfour, op. cit.; dwiig, op. cit.; W. GUrlitz, 
The Kaiser and'His Court, (London, 1961); Georg Alexander 
von er, Der wiser..., (Gtittingen, 1965); Virginia S. 
Cowles, The Rä ser, (New -York, 1963). 
90 Balfour, op. cit., p. 161. 
91 Ibidem, photos pp. 260 ff. 
92 PersonalAkten Hipper, op. cit., Kommandos an Bord. 
93 S. M. S. Niobe, light cruiser, 2963 tons displacement, 
armament 177-cm. (4.2-inch) guns, 2 torpedo tubes, 19 
knot speed, steam propulsion, 14 officers, 243, men. 
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six months to bring her into full service but when the 
work was done he shifted his pennant to the ocean-going., 
torpedoboat D8. He received two Prussian service orders 
while. commanding the Second Torpedo Unit: the Prussian 
Distinguished Service Cross on 9 May 1903 and the Prussian 
Royal Crown Order, Third Class, while serving as the flo- 
tilla commander of the Second Torpedoboat Flotilla, on 
10 September 1904, following the summer manoeuvres. 
94 
A 
drill report states that the performance of the Second 
Torpedo Unit '... was satisfactory in all respects... in 
parts, excellent... the people have set-to, working out 
their training with great eagerness. ' 
95 The report stated 
further that 'Lt. Cdr. Hipper has fulfilled his assignment 
well* in every respect. ' 
96 On 5 April 1905 Hipper was 
promoted to commander. 
After 35 months commanding the Second Torpedo Unit, 
Hipper spent six months with the staff of the commandant, 
North Sea Naval Station. He attended two gunnery courses 
for senior officers, after which he was assigned to the 
Scouting Service. On 20 April 1906 he assumed command of 
the cruiser Leipzig, larger than Niobe and serving as escort 
94 BA/MA PersonalAkten Hipper, Orden und Auszeichnungen. 
95 BA/MA F 3391/PG 62228, Akten Hochseeflotte Ubun sber- 
ichte, Kommando der Marinestation Nordsee apers o the 
High Seä feet, aril Reports, -Nava tation North Sea 
enclosures), II, Torpedoabteilung, 1 Aug 1904, p. 1. 
96 Ibid, Section 8. 
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to the imperial yacht Hohenzollern. As captain of the 
98 
Leipzig, 97 Hipper was '... an Olympian figure, ' as were 
his peers in contemporary foreign navies; 
99 
indeed German 
naval regulations describe the position of captain as 
follows: 
The Captain is of course in all matters 
on board supreme, and as regards general circum- 
stances outside the ship, it is laid down that in 
the absence of specific instructions he must have 
no hesitation in acting on his own personal res- 
ponsibility in such a manner as he may deem con- 
ducive to the service of the Emperor. 00 
Upon Leipzig's departure for the Far East, Hipper 
was given command of the Friedrich Karl on 30 September 
1906 and subsequently the ship's gunnery was known as 
the best in the fleet. With Hipper as commander, she won 
the Kaiser's Prize for good shooting and is mentioned as 
an outstanding gun ship in the 1907 Manoeuvre Reports. 
101 
97 
S. M. S. Leipzig , light cruiser, 3816 tons displacement, 
armament 1 10.5 cm. (4.2-inch) guns, 2 torpedo tubes, 22 
knot speed, steam propulsion, 14 officers, 274 men. 
98 Herwig, op. cit., p. 70. 
99 See Peter Padfield, Aim Straight A biography of Sir 
Percy Scott, (London, 1 ), pp. 73-13 ;; see also 
Peer 
rsten, T`he Naval Aristocrac , 
(New York, 1972), pp. 87- 
89; and n D. Al en, American Steel Navy, (Annapolis, 
1972), p. 256. 
100 M. O. D., N. I. D., A. W. S., German Na 1182(C), op, cit., 
p. 3. This is a translation o -the rman regulations for 
service afloat. 
101 VSNA, PG 67503/Reel 1168, Reichsmarineamt, Admiral von 
Schrc"der, (Inspector of Naval Artillery) to Admiral von 
Tirpitz (Secretary of State for Navy), 22. Jan. 1907. 
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The command of Friedrich Karl brought Hipper the follow- 
ing report from Admiral von Pohl, Flag Officer, Recon- 
naissance Forces: 
102 
He has brought the ship to a higher 
degree of combat effectiveness, and the ship 
has won the Kaiser Prize for good shooting. 
One of the best captains we have in the crui- 
sers. A good example for his officers. Recom- 
mended for battleship command and for higher 
independent commands. 
This same year, on 6 April 1907, Hipper was promoted 
to captain. Friedrich Karl brought Hipper not only good 
fitness reports and promotion; he was also awarded, amid 
impressive surroundings, the Order of St. Andrew, Second 
Class, by Nicholas II of Russia on the occasion of the 
latter's meeting with Kaiser Wilhelm II. Hipper was one 
of Kaiser Wilhelm's 'Imperial Captains' present at the 
meeting of the two emperors. 
The new armoured cruiser Gneisenau was commissioned 
6 March 1908 with Captain Hipper in command. 
103 
In October 
he was appointed commandant of the First Torpedo Division 
102 BA/MA F 3468/PG 67613, Reichsmarineamt, Akten betref- 
fend die Hochseeflotte, 1907 Band , mperial Naval Office, Papers Concerning HigFi Sea Fleet, Reports on Performance of 
Captains in 1907 Manoeuvres). 
103 The particulars of Hipper's two commands were S. M. S. 
Friedrich Karl, armoured cruiser, 9875 tons displacement, 
armament 4-cm. (8.2-inch), 10 15 cm. (5.9-inch), 12 
8.8 cm. (3.4-inch) guns, 4 torpedo tubes, 20.5 knot speed, 
steam propulsion, 35 officers, 551 men; S. M. S. Gneisenau 
armoured cruiser, 12985 tons displacement, armament 8 21 cm. (8.2-inch), 6 15 cm. (5.9-inch), 18 8.8 cm. (3.4-inch) guns, 
4 torpedo tubes, 23 knot speed, steam propulsion, 38 officers, 
726 men. 
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at Kiel. This reorganized division consisted of recruit 
and replacement companies and several active and reserve 
flotillas of torpedoboats. 
104 
For three years Hipper 
guided the buildup and training of over half the tor- 
pedoboats in the German navy. Newer and larger types 
were introduced and the number of large torpedoboats 
nearly doubled between 1906 and 1912. Again, Hipper 
turned in another superlative performance, according to 
Admiral von Prittwitz, commandant of the Baltic Naval 
Station in 1910: 
105 
The bearing of the personnel was out- 
standing, especially the uniforms. The appear- 
ance in military drill, the understanding of the 
technical education, the knowledge and ability 
in communications, have improved in every respect 
(in the First Torpedo Division). Every part of 
the training plan has been carried out in exem- 
plary fashion... 
The report on Hipper himself tells much of the 
story behind this outstanding division. It says Hipper's 
'tremendous enthusiasm for the service (grosse Dienst- 
freudigkeit), his knowledge of the demands of the torpedo 
service and his example were vital in seeing that the 
performance of the officers and men of the First Torpedo 
Division was as good as it was in the winter manoeuvres, 
and that the torpedo flotillas find themselves in a good 
104 BA/MA F 3304/PG 66714, Organisation des Tor edowesens 
(Organization of the Torpedo Arm), Tirpitz to the Kaiser, 
26 July 1906. 
105 BA/MA F 3391/PG 67230/Reel 491, Akten Hochseeflotte, 
übun sberichte, (Papers of the High Seas Feet, Exercise 
ports), von Prittwitz to the Kaiser, 29 Apr 1910. 
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state of readiness. ' The Kaiser underlined the words 
106 
grosse Dienstfreudigkeit in this report. 
Something of a contrast is to be found in the 
report sent to the Kaiser by Admiral Ludwig von Schr8der, 
Hipper's next superior. On 23 June 1911 he forwarded his 
report on his command for the spring of that year and 
said the instruction of petty officers and officers,. was 
very good, that the wireless telegraphy proficiency had 
improved, especially in the last year, and that from the 
formal exercises it was apparent the crews were well- 
commanded by their officers. However, the military drill 
was not as good as it should be, having been neglected 
for tactical and technical training. 
107 
As to Hipper 
personally, von Schr8der characterized him as 'very 
knowledgeable in the Torpedo Service, better technically 
than militarily. 
108 
Schr8der's military bent is worthy of note here. 
He was the admiral who earned the soubriquet, 'Lion of 
Flanders, ' on the western front in World War I, commander 
of the German Naval Corps there. He also was the first 
man the German Nava High Command called upon to restore 
106 Ibid, Kommando Station der Ostsee Kiel, 9. Juni 1910, 
an Sr. Ma'-falser und K nib Berlin Fr ahrsbesichtiýg, 
TNaval tion a tic Comman ie ,9 June 
1910, to His 
Majesty the Kaiser and King Berlin, Spring Reports), Section 7. 
107 BA/MA F 3391/PG 67230/Reel 491, Kaiserlichen Marine 
Kabinett Kommando der Marine Station Ostsee r ja rsbericht 
or edo ivision micý''ral v. ST8 e Kaiser Wilhelm 
'73 June , pp. 1-3.108 
Ibid, p. 9. 
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order after the collapse of 1918 became evident. 
Events moved too swiftly for him to react in time 
and Schräder's orders were cancelled by the German 
Naval High Command. Schröder's- military bent was 
pronounced even in 1910 and this must be taken into 
account in analyzing his evaluation of Hipper. It 
will be recalled that a most telling observation on 
the quality of the German 'torpedo service was made 
by the British Naval Attache to Berlin in the same year 
Schräder was evaluating Hipper and his command. The 
Attache's report included the comment that 'There is no 
reason to suppose that either personnel or materiel are 
anything but first class... '109 
As a commander of a torpedo division, Captain 
Hipper at 45 had achieved the highest assignment in the 
German torpedo service. His total service in the torpedo 
branch was 10.3 years, more experience than he had in 
any other part of the navy. 
On 1 October 1911 Hipper was given command of the 
armoured cruiser Yorck110and also appointed chief of staff 
to the Deputy Flag Officer, Reconnaissance Forces. The 
latter included battle cruisers, armoured cruisers and 
109 P. R. O., Adm 116/940B, op. cit., loc. cit. See notes 
60 and 77. 
110 S. M. S. Yorck, armoured cruiser, 10266 tons displacement, 
armament 4 21 cm. (812-inch), 10 15 cm. (5.9-inch), 14 8.8 cm. 
(3.4-inch) guns, 4 torpedo tubes, 21 knot speed, steam pro- 
pulsion, 35 officers, 598 men. 
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light cruisers, and in time of war, all torpedoboats. 
Hipper remained in this assignment until 26 January 1912 
when Rear Admiral Gustav von Bachmann, the Deputy Flag 
Officer, Reconnaissance Forces, was made Flag Officer 
and Hipper moved into Bachmann's billet. The next day-- 
27 January 1912--Franz Hipper was promoted to rear admiral 
in the Imperial German Navy. It also happened to be the 
Kaiser's birthday. Rear Admiral Hipper was 49 years old 
and had spent 31 years thus far on active naval service; 
but his most important years as a naval commander were 
yet to come. 
Prologue to War 
Some of the events which occurred in 1912 were to 
have a serious effect on the ability of Germany's naval 
commanders to perform in war. The first event was the 
passage of the fleet law which stipulated Germany was to 
have a fleet of 41 dreadnought battleships and 20 battle 
cruisers, the culmination of 14 years of legislating in 
this area. The naval law of 1898 provided for a total 
of 19 battleships and 12 armoured cruisers; the naval 
law of 1900 for 38 battleships and 14 heavy cruisers; the 
1906 law raised the total of heavy cruisers to 20; the 1908 
law provided for replacing all these ships, after a 20-year 
life span, with dreadnoughts. 
lll Even though the 1912 law 
111 See BA/MA F 33041f1/PG 66712-14/Reels 512,513, Flotten- 
gesetze(Fleet Laws) 1898-1914 for original papers. See a so 
A. von Tirpitz, Politische Dokumente, vol. i, Der--Aufbatj der 
deutschen Weltmacht (Berlin, , pp. 461ff. See a so 
Herwig, op. cit., pp. 8-9. 
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added only three ships to the total numbers it gravely 
upset the British who felt they had to mount a strong 
response, 
112 
and from Hipper's point of view, the single 
most important decision taken by the British in 1912 was 
to arm the Queen Elizabeth class of ships with a 15-inch 
gun. 
113This 
weapon and these ships were to nullify Hipper's 
feat at Jutland on the afternoon of 31 May 1916 because 
they reversed the tactical situation he had created in 
severely damaging the British battle cruiser fleet; the 
Queen Elizabeths severely mauled Hipper's force later that 
day and by dark, it was Hipper, not Beatty, who had to 
escape. 
Another event of 1912, the slowing of the German naval 
building programme, was to haunt Hipper. This was caused 
by many factors114 including Army demands and German do- 
mestic politics which dictated that no expenditure should 
overburden the tax structure of the empire lest it cost the 
titled and wealthy classes their privileged position. 
112 A. J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, vol. i, 
1904-1914: The Road to War, Lon on, T 61) , pa75- 276. 
See also Oscar Parkes, Br fish Battleships, (London, 1970), 
pp. 558-559. 
113 Parkes, op. cit., pp. 560-561. See also Marder, op. 
cit., pp. 414-415. 
114 V. R. Berghahn, German and the Approach of War 1914, 
(London, 1973), pp. 114-115-, -T2 =-27-. -- See also Bergh hn, 
Der Tirpitz Plan, (Düsseldorf, 1972), pp. 380 ff. 
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Further, the German government wished to exert influence 
in the Mediterranean and the Kaiser, without informing 
the Fleet Command, ordered the dispatch of a dreadnought, 
the Goeben, 
115 
and the new light cruiser, S. M. S. Breslau, 
as a permanent squadron116 Their loss to the Scouting 
Forces of the High Seas Fleet meant it would be 1915 before 
anything approaching parity with the British battle cruiser 
fleet would be possible. 
117 Admiral Henning von Holtzendorff, 
C-in-C, High Seas Fleet, characterized the relative strength 
of the German scouting forces as being 'hopeless' until 
1914.118 S. M. S. Blücher, one of the most modern ships at 
the time in the scouting forces, was transferred from her 
front-line duties to gunnery training with the intent that 
she would contribute more in the long run to the fleet's 
battle readiness: Simultaneously, the scouting forces were 
reduced from five ships to four. 
115 S. M. S. Goeben, dreadnought battle cruiser, 25,400 tons 
displacement, armament 10 28 cm. (11-inch), 12 15 cm. (5.9-inc1 
12 8.8 cm. (4.2-inch) guns, 4 torpedo tubes, 28 knot speed, 
steam turbine, coal and oil propulsion, 43 officers, 1010 men. 
116 BA/MA F 3439/PG 67447/Reel 636, Mittelmeerdivision, 
(Mediterranean Division), Admiral von Heeringeng ie of the 
Admiralty Staff, to Admiral von Müller, Chief of the Naval 
Cabinet, 2 Nov 1912, via Admiral von Tirpitz, Secretary of 
State for Navy, forwarding an order. 
117 A. von Tirpitz, Politische Dokumente, vol. ii, Deutsche 
Ohnmachtspolitik im Weltkrieg-e, er in, 1926), pp. -6 5. 
118 BA/MA F 33031f/PG 66709/Reel 511, Organization des See- 
streitkrä. fte, (Organization of Naval Forces), o tzendortt 
to Tirpitz 14 Jan 1911; see also Tirpitz to Holtzendorff 
1 Feb 1911 and 1 Mar 1911. 
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As Deputy Flag Officer, Reconnaissance Forces, 
Hipper's primary tactical work was command of the torpe- 
doboats assigned to the High Seas Fleet; he was also 
responsible for administration and sometimes command of 
the four light cruisers which constituted the Second 
Scouting Group. In 1912 the numerical weakness of the 
German torpedo service vis a vis the English was criticized 
by Vice Admiral Friedrich von Ingenohl, chief of the First 
Battle Squadron, in a letter to Admiral von Tirpitz. 
Tirpitz's response was an unsupported assertion that the 
German boats were superior for 'technical reasons. '139 
Tirpitz was moved to discuss the torpedoboat question 
seven years later in his Memoirs. He blamed any significant 
faults on lack of funds and defended the relatively small 
size of the German craft, asserting that in 1909-1910 the 
fleet and the torpedo inspectorate had asked for smaller 
boats. 120 However, it should be noted that Hipper com- 
manded the First Torpedo Division from 1908-1911 and when 
he read what Tirpitz had written in his Memoirs, he commented: 
119 BA/MA F 3304/PG 66714/Reel 513, Organization des Tor- 
pedowesens (Organization of the Torpedo ranc , AcTmi 
t 
Friedrich von Ingenohl to Tirpitz 28 Nov 1912 and Tirpitz 
to von Ingenohl ff. 
120 Tirpitz, My Memoirs, op. cit., pp. 568-570. 
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'At the beginning of the war our torpedoboats did not 
have the firepower that the enemy's destroyers possessed. 
In this respect his assertions are very misleading. ' 
121 
Hipper's comment is borne out by a comparison of the 
statistics on armament on a class-by-class basis: the 
German destroyers were smaller and less well-armed than 
their British adversaries. 
122 Further, Tirpitz had con- 
sistently starved the torpedo branch of the necessary 
torpedoes, such that they were 40 per cent under inventory 
before the war. 
123 The battle fleet had higher priority. 
Hipper did the best he could as indicated from the follow---_ 
ing report from his immediate superior, Rear Admiral Gustav 
124 
von Bachmann: 
Special report about unusual improvements 
in ships' performance. 5. May. 1912. He (Hipper) 
has succeeded in preparation and motivation in 
his duties as deputy admiral of the scouting ships-- 
insofar as it is possible to make a judgement at 
this time--in discharging his duties with interest 
and enthusiasm and has demonstrated remarkable 
abilities. He has also proved he can stand up to 
the rigors of duty afloat. 
121 Niedersachsisches Staatsarchiv, (hereinafter NS/SA), 
Dep 18 A 132, Nachlass Admiral Adolph von Trotha, Hipper 
to Trotha, 24 December 111. 
122 Jane's Fighting Ships 1914 (London, 1914), pp. 78,79- 
92 for riti-shdestroyers and torpedoboats; see'pp. 143, 
144-148 for German torpedoboats. 
123 BA/MA F 3304, op. cit., Admiral von Ingenohl to Admiral 
von Tirpitz, 28 November 1912, n. 119 supra. 
124 Personalikten Hipper, op. cit., 31 Auszug, 15.5.12. 
54 
Bachmann's observation was endorsed by Admiral 
Henning von Holtzendorff, Fleet C-in-C under whom Hipper 
was serving as Deputy Flag Officer, Reconnaissance Forces, 
and Flag Officer, Torpedoboats. Holtzendorff praiselthe 
'improvements shown in military bearing and smartness, '125 
of Hipper's command in the spring, 1912 manoeuvres. After 
the exercises, the fleet made a 'spring cruise' during 
which drills were carried out utilizing light cruisers as 
command ships for the torpedoboats of the High Seas Fleet. 
S. M. S. CB1n, Hipper's flagship, was one of the command 
ships involved, and Holtzendorff praised his performance- 
in his report to the Kaiser. The Fleet C-in-C recommended 
the use of cruisers as command ships for the torpedoboats126 
be continued and the Kaiser accepted this recommendation. 
Holtzendorff also recommended that proposed changes in 
the manning system of the High Seas Fleet not be adopted. 
127 
125 BA/MA F 3391/PG 67241-42/Reel 515, Ubun sberichte, 
Hochseeflotte Mllrz 1912 (Drill Reports, High Seas Fleet, 
March , Holtzendorff to the Kaiser, 30 March 1912. 
126 BA/MA F 3391/PG 67243/Reel 516, Übungsberichte, Hoch- 
seeflotte, Frühjahrsreise, (Drill Reports, High Seas-Fleet, 
Spring Cruise , von o tzendorff to the Kaiser, 4 July 
1912. 
127 BA/MA F 728/PG 67715/Reel 511, Reichsmarineamt, Allge- 
meines Marinedepartement, Akten Hoc see otte mperial 
Navy Uttice, General Naval D partment, Papers of the High 
Seas Fleet), High Seas Fleet Command, Kiel, 9 July 1912. 
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The manning of ships of the Imperial Navy and the simul- 
taneous maintenance of a high state of readiness was an 
old and serious problem. In 1907 Prince Heinrich, shortly 
after taking over command of the High Seas Fleet, complained 
to Tirpitz that the personnel turnover was too high and 
submitted that all officer training should be aimed at 
128 
increasing fleet proficiency. The British also recog- 
nized the problem in the German fleet and according to 
A. J. Marder, believed that 'A great defect in the German 
Navy was its system of short service, although the men 
were hard-working and well-drilled and trained. '129 
Marder was quoting the British Naval Attache's letter to 
Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador, 13 October 1913. And 
Admiral Friedrich von Ingenohl, Fleet C-in-C 1913-1915, 
criticized the German manning system, albeit in retrospect, 
when he observed that the Imperial Navy's sailors were 
inferior to the long-term volunteers of the British Navy. 
130 
In June 1912, the Kaiser proposed to alleviate some 
of the problems posed by the short service system in the 
battle fleet by introducing, on an experimental basis, the 
manning system used in the torpedoboats for many years. 
128 BA/MA F 728/PG 65719/Reel 1314, Akten Hochseeflotte, 
op. cit., Prince Heinrich to Tirpitz-, =une . 
129 Marder, op. cit., vol. i, p. 413. 
130 BA/MA F 3809a/PG 62374, Admiral Friedrich von Ingenohl, 
Uberle un en, Begründungen, und Erläuterungen zum Verhalten 
der Hochseeflotte im ersten Rr, esaar, an-I9 , 
T nsi erations, Rationale, and Explanation of the Golding 
Back'of the High Seas Fleet in the First Six Months of the 
War), p. 4. 
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This was a system whereby the torpedoboats received com- 
pletely new crews every three years--officers, petty 
officers, and recruits. The Kaiser proposed this system 
supplant the method wherein one-third of the ratings 
serving in every active ship in the High Seas Fleet were 
replaced annually by recruits. As resident fleet expert 
on torpedoboats, Hipper was required to give a detailed 
analysis and deposition on the Kaiser's proposal. 
131 
The 
document which resulted appears to be one of his lengthiest 
efforts in pre-war official writing, other than his reports 
on manoeuvres. Holtzendorff, the Fleet commander, asked 
Hipper and other senior officers to examine most carefully 
the impact on operational readiness of a fleet-wide manning 
132 
system based on that used in the torpedoboats. Other 
officers asked for their opinions included Admirals Bachmann, 
Flag Officer, Reconnaissance Forces, von Ingenohl, Chief 
of the First Battle Squadron, and von Schrader, Chief of 
the Second Battle Squadron, and several captains in these 
commands. In a display of rare unanimity, all of these 
officers wrote that the proposed change in the manning system 
was incompatible with a high level of fleet readiness. 
131 
BA/MA F 728/PG 67715/Reel 511, op. cit., 2. Admiral der 
Aufklhrun sschiffe No. 655, Kiel 20. Juni. 1912, eputy Fä 
icer, econnaissance-Forc s, ie June 1912), pp. 11-18. 
For another copy see BA/MA F 3303if/PG 66709. 
132 Ibid, Kommando der Hochseeflotte, 610OA3,9 July 1912, p. 1. 
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But even though these officers thought the proposal would 
not work, Holtzendorff ordered some of them to try it out. 
Two battleships of the First Squadron under Admiral von 
133 
Ingenohl were selected to attempt the experiment moored 
and Admiral-Bachmann was told to carry it out underway, 
in the-scouting forces in at least one battle- 
cruiser-and one new light cruiser during the fall manoeuvres. 134 
Both Bachmann and Ingenohl objected strenuously and were 
supported by Hipper and their respective captains. As it 
turned out, only the dockside experiment was carried out 
and it proved the operational readiness of the fleet would 
be gravely affected should the Kaiser's suggestion be 
adopted, a result which Hipper's objective analysis several 
weeks previous had predicted. As a junior admiral, Hipper's 
initial foray into fleet policy-making foreshadowed his 
wartime efforts to debunk unsound strategical and tactical 
plans, 
135 
and his careful analysis of the German Navy's 
1912 manning system policy is reflected in his extensive 
conclusions: 
133 Ibid, loc. cit. 
134 Ibid. 
135 F 145/PG 75106/Reel 655, Kreuzerkrieg mit grosser Kreuzer 
Nov 1914 (Cruiser War with Battle ruisersT-Bd. ýA., ie ms- 
i Vauen, I2 Nov 1914, Gg. 1227 A 1. See also USNA, PG 77733d/ 
Reel 1659, Kriegserfahrungen des Kommandos der Hochseestreit- 
kräfte, 1 A7pr-30 Jun 1915, ar xperiences High eas eet 
Commands), B. d. A., Jade, Gg. 1232 A 1, pp. 6-26. See also 
BA/MA F 3820/PG 62447,0 Sache, Kriegsaufgabe 19, Aufgabe der 
I. B. d. A., K. d. H., K. T. B. de-r'-r '31. d. ., perations Orderrs,, War =an 19, I. B. d.. A. annex, i&-Seas Fleet Command, War Diary 
of the B. d. A. ), Jade, 29 Oct 1914. 
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In summation, it is my view that the 
one-third system now used throughout the fleet 
is correct in principle, though improvements 
are desirable. On the other hand, I strongly believe that the introduction of the three-year 
system would-be a dangerous course. The intro- 
duction of this system would reduce the battle 
readiness of a squadron and thereby the whole 
fleet would suffer. I know the three-year 
system personally from my command in the tor- 
pedo division and am of the opinion that it is 
impossible to maintain the present level of 
readiness in our flotillas. The fact that 
nothing has changed up to this date is due to 
the high cost of materials and wide acceptance 
on the part of everyone that the three-year 
(torpedoboat) system is a fact of life. 
I believe that an experiment with this 
(three year) system in the fleet would be of 
extremely dubious value. The low battle readi- 
ness of the particular ship which is in its 
first year would decrease the battle readiness 
of the whole fleet. We have had this experience 
(in the torpedoboats) every time we go on man- 
oeuvres in the autumn; the new ships bring 
down the performance of the whole fleet. 
I believe an experiment with this system, 
as stated and planned above, in the scouting 
ships this autumn to be extremely inadvisable. 
The greatest weakness in the High Seas Fleet, 
as far as they can figure, is the battle readi- 
ness of the scouting ships. A further weakening 
of this formation by implementing the above sug- 
estion i. e., that one of the battle cruisers ýMoltke) 
and two or three of the light cruisers 
be manned completely with recruits, plus the 
possibility that another ca ital ship may be 
lost (to front-line service) through the necessity 
of dockyard repairs, would be an especially dan- 
gerous move and gravel educe the battle readi- 
ness of the formation. 
130 
136 BA/MA F 728/PG 67715/Reel 511, op. cit., 2. Admiral 
der Aufklärungsschiffe No. 655, op. cit., pp. 17" 
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There are some other points, other than his 
conclusion, in Hipper's analysis which deserve mention. 
He observed that in the event the proposed three-year 
system was implemented, the entire officer and petty. 
officer complement of the ships involved would have 
to be changed in addition to the ratings. He said 
this would have an adverse effect on morale 
137 
because 
the officers and petty officers would not know their 
men and everything would have to be learned from scratch. 
Hipper also was concerned about the possible damage 
to expensive battle fleet materiel by a cadre unfamiliar 
with their new ship and by inexperienced recruits. He 
also noted it would be well-nigh impossible for the 
officers and petty officers of ships filled with recruits 
to make their ships battle-ready in the space of a few 
months. In essence, the ships which would be involved 
in the prospective manning system would be treated as 
newly-commissioned ships without the benefit of the 
traditional method the Imperial Navy used to build 
morale and ship spirit. This method involved the older 
vessel being tied up astern of the new ship and the old 
ship paid off; the crew would then march 'man and mouse' 
137 BA/MA F 728/PG 67715/Reel 511, op. cit., 2. Admfral 
der Aufklärungsschiffe, p. 15. 
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138 
to the new ship, the intent being to carry on the 
'tradition' which the crew of the old ship had built 
together. For example, the new battle cruiser Seydlitz 
was manned eventually with the old crew of the armoured 
cruiser Yorck and according to Hipper, 'the Seydlitz 
has a fine spirit and high morale, having carried over 
the spirit of the old Yorck crew. '139 The Seydlitz 
crew was still holding reunions as late as 1972.140 
On the other hand, the new dreadnought Prinzregent 
Luitpold was manned by personnel drawn from all over the 
fleet when she was commissioned on 19 August 1913 and 
even after 10 months of training together, the ship's 
138 BA/MA F 728/PG 65713/Reel 1401, Reichsmarineamt, 
All emeines Marinedepartement, Akten etre en ie 
Hochseeflotte, Indienstellungen deer Sc i en mperial 
Navy ice, General Naval epartment apers Concerning 
the High Seas Fleet, Commissioning of Ships) Nov 1908- 
Jan 1911. The policy is clearly illustrated here. 
139 
USNA, PG 67250/Reel 494, Akten des Kaiserlichen 
M rive-Kabinetts betreffend Ubun sberichte der Hoc isee- 
otte. Der Befehlshab er der u run ssc1f Et efecits esic ti un en Uer ut run ssc i of a 
Wilhelmshaven, apers of the Imperial Naval, Cabinet 
Concerning Drill Reports of the High Seas Fleet. The 
Flag Officer, Reconnaissance Forces, P166 A 1, Main 
Battle Inspection of the Scouting Ships), 7 Apr 1914, 
pp. 5-6. 
140 F. Ruge, Warshi Profile 14, S. M. S. Se dlitz/ 
Grosser Kreuzer -191 Windsor, 1972), pes. +8. 
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esprit de corps had not been established. This situ- 
ation was obvious to British visitors during Kiel Week 
141 
in June 1914 who labelled her a bad ship. This char- 
acteristic manifested itself when; she was the first ship 
142 
'on which mutiny erupted' on 2 August 1917. Her his- 
tory is an illustration of the problems which Hipper 
predicted could result from adoption of a . manning system 
devoid of tradition. However, the manning of the Prinz- 
regent and many of the ships of the Third Battle Squadron 
was complicated by the lack of old ships whose crews 
could be utilized, and hence was a matter of necessity. 
It will be recalled that in 1912, a year before the Prinz- 
regent was commissioned, the Kaiser had suggested a test 
be made of a manning system comparable to that employed 
for this new dreadnought even though fleet opinion, inclu- 
ding Hipper, was dead set against it. However, by 1913 
the strains of a naval buildup forced the adoption of this 
143 
type of manning system. Hipper's professional contribution 
in analyzing the German manning system in 1912 thus was 
overtaken by the necessity of unprecedented fleet expansion. 
Nonetheless, his career was enhanced with two more 
141 
P. R. O., Adm 137/1013, Intelligence Information Obtained 
at Kiel, 55 Sept 1914, C. O., H. M. S. King George V to Flag 
Officer, Second Battle Squadron. 
142 Herwig, op. cit., p. 194. 
143 See n. 138 supra. 
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service decorations: the Prussian Order of the Red 
Eagle, with Swords, Second Class, on 19 September 1912, 
and the Silver Bavarian Military Service Medal, the 
last decoration Hipper received before the war. 
As Hipper entered his second year as a scouting 
force admiral, Admiral Bachmann was moved to comment 
that Hipper 'was a great support to me when we worked 
together in the scouting service, ' even though Hipper's 
forte was torpedoboats. But Bachmann also was concerned 
about the possible adverse effect on Hipper's health 
because of the intense pace Hipper maintained to achieve 
the highest possible performance from his ships. 
144 
This 
is the first mention of health problems in Hipper's 
annual fitness reports and might be dismissed were it 
145 
not for the wartime medical leaves which followed. 
Nonetheless, Hipper was appointed Flag Officer, Reconnaissance 
Forces, on 1 October 1913 when Admiral Bachmann was made 
Chief of the Baltic Station. Erich Raeder gives an 
interesting initial assessment of his new chief: 
144 Persona]Akten Hipper, op. cit., 35 Auszug (Entry) 
16 May . 
145 See Appendix I, Chronology of Naval Service. 
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But if we had to lose Admiral Bachmann, 
we could not have had a replacement more to our 
liking than Rear Admiral Hipper... Our new com- 
mander was an energetic and impulsive individual, 
with quick perception and a keen 'seaman's eye, ' 
but unlike his predecessor, he had risen exclus- 
ively through performance in the fleet, having 
distinguished himself successively with the tor- 
pedo boats, then as captain of the armoured 
cruiser Gneisenau, and then as commander of the 
light cruiser and torpedoboat forces. Sheer 
theory was not his forte; he hated paper work, 
and up to this time had never had a staff larger 
than a chief of staff and a flag lieutenant. Now, 
as commander of all the scouting forces, he had 
to put up with the reports and suggestions of a 
large staff. 146 
The phrase, 'risen exclusively through performance 
in the fleet, ' was aptly chosen; a substantial part of 
Bachmann's career was spent in the Imperial Naval Office. 
147 
Indeed, Hipper characterized himself as a 'common ordinary 
front commander. ' 
148 
To understand the further development of Hipper's 
career as Flag Officer, Reconnaissance Forces, it is 
necessary to review the historical evolution of the billet 
of the Command of the German Home Fleet Scouting Forces. 
146 Raeder, op. cit., p. 40. 
147 BA/MA Sammelheft (Compendium) die deutschen Admirftle, 
Gustav von ac "nn, 1860-1943. 
148 NS/SA, Dep 18 A132, op. cit., Hipper to Trotha, loc. 
cit., supra. 
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In 1898, when Admiral von Tirpitz succeeded in changing 
the German navy's mission from support of overseas 
cruiser squadrons to a main battle fleet concept, the 
role of the scouting force was not neglected. Tirpitz 
said: 'A battle fleet does not only consist of battleships, 
but requires today, as it did in earlier times, scouting 
ships and watch ships... which underway, at anchor or in 
battle are to defend the fleet through advanced fast 
cruisers against torpedo attack... England has two cruisers 
for every battleship, France 1-2; we must have 6 large 
and 16 small light cruisers to escort our fleet of 17 
battleships. Small cruisers by themselves are not enough 
as they would have to go up against the more heavily 
armed (cruising) ships of the enemy; we must have ships 
which can fight the enemy. ' 
149 
As this force of scouting ships came into being, 
from 1898 onwards, it was composed of armoured cruisers, 
light cruisers and torpedoboats. Later, battle cruisers 
were added because the Germans were forced to follow the 
British lead in this area. 
150 
The evolution of the billet 
of Flag Officer, Reconnaissance Forces, began with a 
149 BA/MA F 33041f1/PG 66712/Reel 512, Akten Kaiserliches 
Marine Kabinetts (sic) betreffend das Flottengesetz apers 
of 9ýhe 
Tm-Perial Naval Cabinet Concerning eet Law ), 1898, 
150 USNA, PG 66087/Reel 1501, R. M. A.,. Zentralabteilung 
Akten Sitzungs Protokolle, (Imperial-Naval Office Central 
Bureau Papers on Plenary- Conferences), Jan 1905-Apr 1909, 
Conference on Large Cruisers 19 Sept 1906. 
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151 
request for a definition of the function and responsi- 
bilities of the Flag Officer, Reconnaissance Forces billet 
from Admiral Gustav von Senden-Bibran, Chief of the Naval 
Cabinet. The question was decided by Imperial Order with 
the resulting memorandum signed by both the Kaiser and 
Tirpitz. The memorandum stated that 'The B. d. A. (Befehls- 
haber die Aufkl rungsschiffe) shall have the disciplinary 
powers and command authority which applie6 to the Flag 
Officer, Second in Command of a Battle Squadron. '152 Six 
months later, the Kaiser followed this with another memo- 
randum that the B. d. A. 'be given the same disciplinary 
powers andleae-granting authority as a commander of an 
independent cruiser squadron. '153 The latter was a Gerichts- 
herr, 
_ 
or the sworn legal authority who was a representative 
of the Kaiser in legal matters. There were two classes of 
sworn legal authorities: the lower class dealt with minor 
offenses of those below the rank of officer; the upper 
class dealt with serious offenses and an independent cruiser 
squadron commander was a higher sworn legal authority. 
Generally, the designation was limited to admirals in 
151 BA/MA F 33031f/PG 66707/Reel 510, Organisation der 
SeestreitkrIfte, (Organization of Naval orces , von Sen en-Bi ran to Tirpitz, Berlin, 23 Dec 1902. 
152 Ibid, op. cit., Kaiser Wilhelm II and Tirpitz to 
Senden-Bibran, Berlin, Neues Palais 30 Dec 1902. 
153 Ibid, op. cit., Kaiser Wilhelm II and Senden-Bibran 
to'Tirpitz aboard the yacht Hohenzollern, 29 June 1903. 
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command. The leave-granting authority was another power 
granted in the Kaiser's name. 
154 
According to the Imperial 
Military Code (Reichsmilitllrgesetz), all discipline in- 
cluding upper and lower legal authority and leave-granting 
authority, was in the hands of the Emperor. But in practice 
this authority was delegated to various officers in command. 
Another aspect of the B. d. A. billet was that the 
actual number of ships assigned to scouting force duties 
varied from year to year with the average being about four 
or five armoured cruisers and a like number of light crui- 
sers until about 1911 when the light cruisers in service 
for manoeuvres nearly doubled in number. After the war 
broke out, all new construction was assigned to the home 
squadrons instead of being sent abroad to relieve or to 
155 
reinforce the cruiser squadron. 
There is one other aspect of the authority of the 
B. d. A. which deserves mention: it was not among the 
service assignements (Immediatstellung) from which direct 
access to the Kaiser was possible. 
156 
This was because 
154 
M. O. D., N. I. D., A. W. S., German Navy CB 1182 (M), 
'Discipline, ' pp. 3"5. 
155 USNA, PG 65537/Reel 1401, Reichsmarineamt, All emeines 
Marinedepartement Akten betreffend des Kreuzer esc wa ers 
13-d 2 Dec 1908-1915 ( eria Naval' Tice, General avaT 
Department, Papers Concerning the Cruiser Squadron, vol. 2); 
see also F 728, op. cit., PG 65714, Feb 1911-Apr 1912, for 
additional information on cruiser assignments-and shortages. 
156 Herwig, op. cit., p. 26 n. 3, pp. 38,181,236. 
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the Commander-in-Chief, High Seas Fleet, had the 
access for the forces afloat, an access retained until 
August 1918 when Admiral Reinhard Scheer reorganized 
the naval high command and subordinated all the commands 
in the navy to himself. 
It was Scheer who had added to the organizational 
strength of the B. d. A. in 1912 when, as head of the General 
Naval Department of the Imperial Naval Office, he sug- 
157 
gested a third admiral be assigned to the scouting forces. 
He made this suggestion because he felt the commanders were 
overburdened in peace and would be vulnerable in war; the 
German scouting forces were in a period of accelerated 
growth. Tirpitz rejected Scheer's idea, labelling it 
158 
overstaffing, but the Kaiser ordered the third admiral 
159 
to be added. 
Another organizational difficulty was resolved 
when the Fleet C-in-C, Admiral Friedrich von Ingenohl, 
160 
decided to assign the B. d. A. to Wilhelmshaven as a home 
port, an action concurred in by Tirpitz. 
161 It was felt 
157 
BA/MA F--33031f/PG 66709; Organisation der Seestreit- 
krgfte, op. cit., Admiral Reinhard Scheer , 
-71rector, General 
Naval Department, Imperial Naval Office, to Admiral Tirpitz, 
9 Sept 1912.. 
158 Ibid, loc. cit., Tirpitz to Scheer, 23 Sept 1912. 
159 Ibid, Kaiser Wilhelm to Tirpitz, 15 Dec 1912. 
160 BA/MA F 33041f, op. cit., PG 66710, von Ingenohl to 
Tirpitz, Kiel, 21 Apr 1913. 
161 Ibid, loc. cit., Admiral von Krosigk by direction of 
Tirpitz to von Ingenohl, 23 Apr 1913. 
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the strategic situation vis a vis England warranted 
such a move. More than that, Ingenohl believed it 
was desirable to develop 'a tight personal bond' 
between the B. d. A. and his captains so that the captains 
would be able to handle their cruisers in a manner to 
the B. d. A. 's liking even if contact was broken by the 
exigencies of a situation. This bond, Ingenohl said, 
could be achieved only if the whole command belonged 
to one harbour where they could hold frequent conferences 
and communicate easily among themselves. 
162 
In his con- 
currence with Ingenohl's switch of the B. d. A. 's home 
port from Kiel to Wilhelmshaven, Admiral Tirpitz also 
addressed the organizational problem of the role of the 
Commander, Torpedoboats (Führer der Torpedoboote), a 
position Hipper had held in the 1912 fall manoeuvres. 
At that time Hipper had been granted full authority163 
equivalent to a permanent command assignment but Tirpitz 
felt this temporary arrangement was inappropriate. On 
23 April 1913 Tirpitz wrote: 
The B. d. A. constitutes a service assignment 
which carries with it the authority of both upper 
and lower discipline as well as the leave-granting 
authority over commands which come under his organ- 
izational control; the Commander of Torpedoboats 
is a tactical commander, a flag officer of part of 
the scouting ships, whose authority exists only in 
a tactical sense, if he himself is operating with 
the High Seas Fleet. 164 
162 See von Ingenohl to Tirpitz, n. 160 supra. 
163 BA/MA F 33041f/PG 66709, op. cit., K. d. H. 9496A3,2.10.1912 
164 See Tirpitz to von Ingenohl, n. 161 supra. 
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This definition of the B. d. A. 's authority did not 
undergo much change while Hipper was in the assignment 
from 1913-1918 although in February 1914 Hipper was 
given higher disciplinary authority over all fleet 
officers below the rank of lieutenant commander. The 
Fleet C-in-C was assigned disciplinary authority over 
all officers above the rank of lieutenant. 
165 By May 1917 
many of the junior officers for whom Hipper was the 
ultimate fleet disciplinaryý3 authority were serving in 
166 
U-boats and he requested he be relieved of the disci- 
plinary power he had over them. This request was granted 
and the authority transferred to Flag Officer, U-boats. 
As Flag Officer, Reconnaissance Forces, from 1913- 
1918, Hipper was a commander who possessed complete ad- 
ministrative powers and concomitant tactical command 
authority. Certain battle squadron-level commanders 
were authorized to command the High Seas Fleet in 
tactical situations, according to notations on their 
165 BA/MA F 33031f/PG 66711, op. cit., Ingenohl to 
Hipper, 13 Feb 1914. See also Ingenohl to von Müller, 
loc. cit., 9 Feb 1914. 
166 
USNA, PG 66539/Reel 1028, Admiralstab der Marine, 
Befehle an andere Beh3rden, (Admiralty StaTro the Navy, 
r ers to Other omman s, Gg. Bes rechun im RMA, (Most 
Secret Conference in the Imperial Naval f cej, 29 May 
1917, p. 72/2. 
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fitness reports and Hipper was so authorized. And 
70 
as Flag Officer, Reconnaissance Forces, Hipper was in 
an assignment considered a step toward command of the 
168 
High Seas Fleet. 
His final tactical work before the outbreak of 
World War I involved defining the mission of the battle 
cruiser in the German fleet. Under Hipper the German 
battle cruiser forces would assume a key role in naval 
tactics and strategy. The ships represented an unprece- 
dented combination of speed, firepower, size, and rela- 
tively heavy armour; the only other nation having a 
battle cruiser force at this time was England. Hipper 
became Germany's battle cruiser commander in October 1913, 
relieving Admiral Bachmann who had initiated the 'battle 
cruiser charge' during the 1912 fall manoeuvres as'a cover 
for the withdrawal of the German fleet from a possible 
169 
envelopment. The idea was basically sound though 
167 BA/MA F 3468/PG 67613, Auszüge aus Qualifications- 
berichten über Flaggoffiziere, Dez n15-Dez 191/ptExcerpts 
from Fitness Reports on Flag Officers, Dec 1915-Dec 1917), 
p. 2. 
168 P. R. O., Adm 137/4839, D. N. I. to First Lord, Memo on Ger- 
man Naval Officer Personnel Policies, 22/8/12; Rangliste der 
Kaiserlichen Marine (Berlin, ann. ), 1907-1914,191b, , 
entries for Ac m1rrals Prince Heinrich, Holtzendorff, Ingenohi 
Pohl, Scheer and Hipper. See also BA/MA F 3303/PG 66710, 
Akten Kaiserl. Marine Kabinett, (Papers of the Imperial Naval 
a irret , irpitz 
to M er 23 Apr 1913 for billet's import. 
169 BA/MA F 728/PG 65725/Reel 1143, Akten Hochseeflotte, op. 
cit., Schlussbericht über die taktische_Täti ceit den Hoch- 
seeflotte im un sjahr 1, ina Report on eet inExer- 
cise Year T1 See Battle Cruiser Lessons, pp. 21-22. 
71 
170 
dangerous and Hipper refined the tactic by practicing 
it several times before it was actually used successfully 
at Jutland four years later. Thus, it was hardly 'brilliant' 
extrication on the part of Scheer, as Marder says. 
171 
But the 'battle cruiser charge' was not the only 
element of mission which the Scouting Forces worked on 
under Hipper; they also rehearsed a 'battle cruiser 
breakthrough' to ascertain the strength and disposition 
of the enemy fleet by smashing through the destroyer, 
light cruiser and battle cruiser screens. Hipper noted 
in his private account of the May 1914 manoeuvres that 
the objective of the battle cruisers had been attained 
when the way to the 'enemy's' main battle fleet was 
opened 
172 
and the formal report for the manoeuvres 
confirms this. 
173 
In the May 1914 manoeuvres the exercise 
concerned with the 'breakthrough' was repeated at Hipper's 
insistence, an unusual occurrence. 
170 See PG 65726/Reel 1247, op. cit., Ran an den Feind 
(Charge the Enemy), 21 Dec 1913. See HT-so Reports on 
Results of Winter Exercises, loc. cit., Mar-Aug 1914. 
171 A. J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, \vol. iii, 
Jutland and Aftej: =a TgT6-December 9T6, (London, 1966), 
p. 181. 
172 BA/MA, N 162, Nachlass Hipper, 1/3,25 May 1914. 
173 BA/MA F 728/PG 65728/Reel 1247, Akten Hochseeflotte, 
op* cit., Übungen während die Maireiser Hochseeflotte 
1914 (Drills ring te ay Voyage o tTze High Seas eet 
19145 , Paper no. 
Gg 943Al. 
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To carry out the 'breakthrough, ' the German battle 
cruiser would have to fight her way through the enemy's 
destroyer and light cruiser screens. Even if the at- 
tacking battle cruisers had their own light cruiser and 
torpedoboat escort, they would still be exposed to 
underwater attack in the first encounter. Further, if 
the German battle cruisers managed to break through the 
screens of the enemy battle cruiser force, Hipper's 
command would still come under the fire of heavy guns, 
against which it was ill-protected174 especially in 
the event of a lengthy battle. As a defense in such a 
situation, speed, supposedly the battle cruiser's forte, 
was all but useless because both sides possessed it in 
nearly equal degree. The German ships also had a serious 
organizational defect for close heavy combat: their gun 
crews tended to keep the doors between magazines open 
and too much ammunition was stored for ready use in. the 
gun-houses 
175 
The British suffered from similar problems 
and the even more serious difficulty of unstable propellant. 
174 USNA, PG 66087-66088/Reel 1501, Reichsmarineamt, 
Zentral-Abteilun, Akten Sitzun s-Proto o e, , 3- (Imperiai Naval 
Bffircep 
Centra Division, Papers Concerning 
Plenary Conferences, vols. 3 and 4). See especially S. M. S. 
Seydlitz 9 June 1908, for comment re inferiority of battle 
cruiser protection to that of battleships, p. 3. 
175 Ruge, op. cit., p. 35. 
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Another danger of the 'breakthrough' technique was the 
possibility of a torpedo engagement between the opposing 
battle cruisers. Finally, should the'breakthrough' be 
attained, and the German ships ascertain the strength 
and disposition of the enemy battle fleet, they would 
be exposed to huge volumes of heavy gunfire after 
having already endured prolonged combat and probably 
damage from the enemy's light forces. In short, the 
mission of the battle cruiser in German fleet strategy 
and tactics was difficult and dangerous. Specifically, 
the 'charge the enemy' aspect of the mission was only 
to be used in a desperate situation and was likely to 
result in serious damage to the battle cruiser force. 
Preservation' of the main fleet was uppermost in the 
minds of the German strategists. Like 'charge the 
enemy, ' the use of the 'battle cruiser breakthrough' 
was a course without alternative to the German fleet 
commander of World War I who'had battle cruisers under 
his flag and was faced with an enemy fleet. It was an 
imperative tactic because the other methods of reconnais- 
sance, notably aircraft, zeppelins, and U-boats, were 
all fraught with technical difficulties which would 
plague them for most of the war. All lacked secure and 




the other two methods of reconnaissance 
177 
were extremely vulnerable to adverse weather conditions. 
If the strategical role these ships played indeed 
determined the degree of responsibility which Hipper had 
to shoulder in war, what sort of risks could he afford 
to take? To answer this critical question it is nec- 
essary to establish the consequences to both sides should 
they lose their,. battle cruiser forces. -Churchill said 
of the First Scouting Group, Hipper's command: 'To have 
this tremendous prize--the German battle cruiser squadron-- 
whose loss would fatally mutilate the whole German navy 
and could never be repaired, actually within our claws, 
and to have the event turn on a veil of mist, was a 
wracking ordeal. '178 Is Churchill's view more rhetoric 
than strategy? Corbett defined maritime strategy as 
'the principles which govern a war in which the sea is a 
substantial factor and ... naval strategy is but that part 
176 
PG 77734/Reel 1130, Hochseeflotte, Akten Kriegser- 
fahrungen der Hochseestreit r to B. d. A. GS. - li 1915 L? L 71 ig Seas Fleet, Papers Concerning War Lessons and Ex- 
Periences of the High Seas Fighting Ships, Flag Officer, 
Reconnaissance Forces, Most Secret, 7 July 1915), Hipper 
to von Pohl, p. 9. 
177 Douglas Robinson, The Zeppelin in Combat, (Henley-on- 
Thames, 1971), p. 116. --'gee ä also USNA, 6965-76967/ 
Reels 1043,1044, Admiralstab der Marine Akta betr. Luft- 
krieg, (Admiralty to ot e-Rävy, Papers Concerning 
Air Warfare), Jan 1913-Aug 1918,3 vols. 
178 A. J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, vol. ii, 
The War Years: To the ve of Jutland "I'91 6-Cro-ndon, 
TUU5Tp . =. -- 
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of it which determines the movements of the fleet when 
maritime strategy has determined what part the fleet must 
play in relation to the land forces. '179; He further stated 
'The paramount concern, then, of maritime strategy is to 
determine the mutual relations of your army and navy in 
a plan of war. ' 
180 
This relationship had been decided 
by the Germans at the beginning-of the war: the navy was 
to hold the North Sea/Baltic front and the army the other 
two fronts. 
181 
This was a 'fleet in being' type of naval 
strategy, unwanted by the German fleet and its succeeding 
commanders. But they recognized this strategy as the 
only viable course because of their numerical inferiority 
to the British. 
l$ZWith 
the introduction of the unrestric- 
ted submarine warfare campaign in 1917, the mission of 
the High Seas Fleet was modified to support the U-boats 
insofar as access to the open oceans was required. In 
179 
Sir Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime 
Strategy, (Annapolis, 1972), p. 13. 
180 Ibid, p. 14. 
181 Reinhard Scheer, Germany's High Sea Fleet in the World 
War, (London, 1920), pp. 16-19. 
182 BA/MA F 3809a/PG 62374, op. cit., Admiral Friedrich 
von Ingenohl, pp. 1-3. See also Admiral Hugo von Pohl, 
Aus Aufzeichnungen und Briefen w9hrend der Kriegszeit, 
Ber in, 1920), pp. -7, -117. See also 
PG 64808/Reel 347, Kr. 0 Nordsee 61 Seeschlacht vor dem 
Skagerrak 3l. 5.16. -T. 6I6. (War Operation ort M 
Sea Battle in Skagerrak5, Scheer to the Kaiser, After 
Action Report on Jutland Battle, 4 July 1916, pp. 36-37. 
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neither case was the German fleet to seek a decisive 
battle. The mission of strategical defence which fell 
to the German fleet would not have been disastrously 
affected had Hipper's force been lost because his force 
was not the substance of German naval strength; the sub- 
stance was the Fleet's three squadrons of battleships. 
However, if Hipper and his four or five battle cruisers 
had been lost, it would have been difficult for the Germans 
to undertake a naval offensive against a fleet so equipped. 
Tactically, the Germans would also, have-been gravely short 
of information, a disengagement would have been much more 
difficult, lost personnel 
183 
would be irreplaceable, and 
German Fleet morale would have been gravely affected. Also, 
Churchill was correct in asserting Germany would not be 
184 
able to replace the materiel lost. 
To continue the hypothesis, if the High Seas Fleet's 
three squadrons were substantially intact, albeit without 
Hipper's force, a British assault on the North Sea front 
183 USNA, PG 76531/Reel 983, Admiralstab der Marine, Befehle 
an andere Behörden, (Admiralty Statt, Orders tither om- manUs7-, -Toh 
,I Fleet C-in-C, to Bachmann, Admiralty Staff Chief, 16 Feb 1915; Nquindienstellung der Schiffe , (Commis- 
sioning of Ships) 20 Feb These documents indicate the 
Germans could not man all their ships, much less absorb 
losses. 
184 BA/MA F 3428/PG 67388/Reel 494, Schiffbau in der Kaiser- 
lichen Marine, Beiheft Schiffsersatz, mperiaT Ni i3Fip 
ui ing pecia iip Design File). See Reichschancellor 
Bethmann Hollweg to Carl von Treutler, 27 Nov 1915. See also 
F. Forstmeier, Deutsche Grosskampfschiffe 1915-1918, (Munich, 
1970), pp. 18-19,57-65. 
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had considerably less prospects than that undertaken in 
the Dardanelles. The German coast was more heavily de- 
fended by mines, coastal defence ships and guns than the 
Dardanelles. 
185 
Additionally, the likelihood of surprise 
was diminished because of reasonably good intelligence on 
186 
the Grand Fleet's intentions and movements and Hipper, 
after the British surprise attack in the German Bight on 
28 August 1914, had set up a comprehensive watch system 
185 A. J. Marder, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 229-230 for Dardandles 
defences (100 guns, 300 mines). See BA/MA F 33041h/PG 67715/ 
Reel 513, Organisation der Schiffs-Artillerie des Marine- 
wesens und Marine e ots_blt 1899-Juni , Organiz- ion of 
the INavTArti ery Department, alb val Establishment and 
Naval Depots). Useful for coastal defences. See also BA/MA 
F 425/PG 76925-76926/Reel 942, Minenkrie führun , 
(Mine War- 
fare), 1914-1918. See also BA/ MA F -76907/Reels 995,996, Krie sf{ihrun Nordlicher Krie schau latz, (War 
Conduct Northern War eatre Oct 1914-1 Apr 1919. See 
also Seekrie sführun den Nordseekrie schau latz, op. cit. 
PG 76903-76905 for coastal e ence arrangements. 
186 BA/MA F 454/PG 77063-77064/Reels 1170,1171, Admiral- 
stab der Marine Ausgegangen e Nachrichten über englische und 
franzT sc e treittkr te, (Admiralty Staff Disseminated 
Intelligence on English and French Warships5, Aug-Dec 1914. 
See also USNA, PG 76968-76969/Reel 1091, Admiralstab der 
Marine, Akten betr. Operationen und Befeh le unsere Flotte, 
A miralt taff, Papers oncerning b pration r ers of 
our F1eet5; -Jan 1916-Sept 1917. See Neumünster telegrams. 
For Hipper s knowledge of British strength see BA/MA F 3428/ 
PG 67388, op. cit., see paper on new ship construction since 
outbreak of war, dated Apr 1916. See also BA/MA F 1885/ 
PG 93869-93872/Reel 1459, Akten B. d. A. U-boote, (Papers of 
the B. d. A. on U-boats) July 1916-FIar 19 e title is mis- 
leading as this file contains mostly intelligence on various 
incidents, actions and British intentions as well as dispo- 
sition of British naval forces and bases. The first two 
years of this file (Aug 1914-June 1916) are in Lützow on the 
bottom of the North Sea. 
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in his capacity as the flag officer responsible for the 
security of the Bight. 
187 
This watch service stationed 
four capital ships outside the Jade Bar at all times, 
and provided for frequent patrols of the inner and outer 
Bight by mutually supporting light forces, regular U-boat 
patrols, airship and aircraft reconnaissance. These last 
three methods were all effective instruments of recon- 
naissance because their state of development allowed a 
good performance close to base. Thus, in the event the 
battle cruisers were lost, their role in strategic defence 
could have been assumed by other forces. 
On the other hand, the Royal Navy's mission--command 
of the sea--could not be carried out without the help of 
the British battle cruiser force. There were some nine 
dreadnoughts in this force and it represented about 25 
per cent of the capital ship strength of the Grand Fleet, 
the principal instrument by which 'command of the sea' 
was exercised. The Fleet's existence prevented Germany's 
access to the world's oceans. 
188 
Had the strength of the 
187 BA/MA F 3817-3820/PG 62446-62617/Reels 106,176, 
Kriegstagebuch der B. d. A., (War Diary of the Flag Officer, 
Reconnaissance Forces , 30 July 1914-8 Aug 1918. See 
succeeding Grundsätze für Sicherung der deutschen Bucht 
(Principles for securing the German Bight), monthly 
appearing Aug 1914-Aug 1918. 
188 Admiral Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa, The Grand Fleet 
1914-1916 Its Creation, Development and Work, (London, 1919), 
pp. 12-14. 
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Grand Fleet been reduced 25 per cent, the difference 
between it and the High Seas Fleet would have become 
small enough for Germany to alte; -her 
'fleet in being' 
strategy. Again, the battle cruiser fleet was essential 
to British naval tactics because in a fleet engagement 
its mission was to come between the enemy and his base, 
force him to action189 and deny the enemy that crucial 
tactical knowledge of the strength and disposition of 
the main battle fleet until it was too late to escape. 
190 
In sum, if Hipper was willing to risk the loss of 
the German fleet's ability to conduct offensive operations 
against another fleet, he could afford more risks than 
his opposition. Beatty, on the other hand, could take 
tactical risks so long as he did not lose a greater 
number of ships than he sank or disabled. In point of 
fact, Hipper could not take many tactical risks because 
he had fewer ships equipped with shorter ranged and less 
powerful guns and slower engines. The fleet commanders 
decided when Hipper and Beatty would use their forces 
pursuant to strategic goals but the tactical decisions 
of Beatty and Hipper could affect their countries' naval 
and maritime strategy. 
189 Lord Chatfield, The Navy and Defence, (London, 1942), 
pp. 98-106,115. 
190 A. J. Marder, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 77. 
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By the time war broke out, Hipper had reached 
sufficiently high rank in the German navy to be pri- 
marily responsible for solving the naval strategical 
and tactical problems which the German battle cruiser 
brought in its wake. 
An understanding and evaluation of Franz Hipper, 
Flag Officer, Reconnaissance Forces, as he made the 
transition from peace to war and adapted to its exi- 
gencies, can best be found against the background of 
the naval environment of that period. 
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PART II 
HIPPER AND THE NAVAL=ENVIRONMENT 
The first part of this work included an examination 
of the risks which battle cruiser commanders could afford. 
If the context of Hipper's situation as a battle cruiser 
commander is to be fully understood, however, the special 
circumstances under which commanders of naval surface 
forces in World War I operated must be established. To 
begin with, the relatively recent naval weapons of mine 
and torpedo were to force strategic and tactical param- 
eters on commanders such as Hipper. The electronically 
expanded communications were to be of greater importance 
as an intelligence source than as a command tool. The 
demands of expanded logistics, including personnel, would 
place an almost unbearable burden on a severely rationed 
German fleet and economy. Shortages of food and materiel 
were exacerbated by the British blockade from the begin- 
ning of the war and the priority of army requirements, 
combined with poor naval personnel policies, aggravated 
the manpower shortage in the navy. Finally, the origin 
and nature of Hipper's materiel, resulting from factors 
beyond his control, were largely to dictate the strategical 
course he could follow. 
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New Naval Weapons 
New naval weapons in 1914 which had the greatest 
effect on both strategy and tactics in the war were the 
torpedo, and all its carriers, and the mine. The tor- 
pedo was carried by most dreadnoughts and battleships, 
cruisers, and destroyers as well as by submarines. By 
way of background, it is worth noting that in the 1880's 
it had become apparent that the torpedo launched from 
surface craft was a threat to the battleship. The sub- 
marine was a way of overcoming the vulnerability of the 
surface torpedoboats to gunfire, a means of achieving 
critical surprise by concealment, as well as a means of 
coastal defence against fleet attacks. The torpedo in 
its 1914 version was an inexpensive weapon which could 
sink or cripple a capital ship with one hit. In the 
first World War, the torpedo was established as a major 
consideration in operational calculations of surface 
commanders. 
Like the torpedo, the mine was not 100 per cent 
reliable but it was reliable enough to influence the 
strategy and tactics of both sides. It was not so much 
the technological novelty which distinguished naval mine 
use in World War I but rather the vast numbers in which 
83 
this weapon was employed for the first time: some 
240,000 mines were laid worldwide. Usually, the mine 
was a stationary weapon though sometimes a drifting 
type was used which could be deployed either by surface 
ships or by submarines. It was inexpensive yet one mine 
could cripple or sink a capital ship. The following 
paragraphs detail the thoughts of both German and British 
commanders on torpedoes and mines; agreement by both 
major combatants on the effects of these new naval weapons 
is the best indication of their influence on the naval 
environment of World War I. 
Admiral Friedrich von Ingenohl, the first wartime 
commander of the High Seas Fleet, provides some insight 
on the danger posed by torpedo-carrying submarines in 
the German Bight. 
1 
He relates the results of the May 1914 
manoeuvres in which a certain number of U-boats assigned 
the role of offensive English forces achieved hits on 
every large ship which came within range the first day 
of the operation. It did not matter whether the German 
1 BA/MA, F 3809/a/PG 62374, Hochseeflotte, K. T. B. des 
K. d. H., Admiral Friedrich von n eno , berle un en, VPn dun en und r uterun en zum Verhalten der ochsee- 
otte im ersten rie saa rimer in, Jan M8 ar 
Di-' ary. oFt e High as eet Command, Adm räl Friedrich 
von Ingenohl, Rationale behind the Operations of the 
Fleet in the first six months of the War), pp. 7-8. 
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battleships were anchored inside or outside the Jade 
River Bar; the U-boats were even more effective in 
inflicting heavy losses on the battle line as it emerged 
into the open sea north of Heligoland. As a result of 
these manoeuvres, von Ingenohl was extremely reluctant to 
order sorties, once the war began; to him the probabil- 
ity of losing a great number of ships to submarine attack 
seemed high, should the Fleet have to undertake a forced 
2 
sortie.., 
There were three tactical reasons for Ingenohl's 
logic: first, the unfortunate necessity for the German 
Fleet to sortie in line ahead because of insufficient room 
in the channels of the Elbe and Jade rivers to do other- 
wise; secondly, a substantial lack of satisfactory and 
effective anti-submarine weapons; and thirdly, the German 
command's belief that there was a distinct possibility3 of 
mines being laid across the track of the High Seas Fleet. 
To some extent, the tactical problems were solved with the 
construction of anti-submarine net defences and the laying 
of defensive mine fields. 
4 
2 Ibid, p. 8. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Raeder, Mir Life, op. cit., p. 47. 
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Strategically, the combination of geographic dis- 
advantage and the probability of damage by underwater 
attack also limited any German fleet commander's options. 
As Marder has so aptly stated, 'In any war with Germany, 
Great Britain started with-the -crucial geographical ad- 
vantage of stretching like a gigantic breakwater across 
the approaches to Germany. '5 Marder echoes'-the German 
official history of the war which says the unfavourable 
political constellations had resulted in a geographical 
situation extremely adverse to deployment of German sea- 
power, especially in the North Sea. 
6 
Again, von Tirpitz 
says in his discussion of the High Seas Fleet's perform- 
7 
ance in the war at sea: 
The position was extraordinarily difficult 
for the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet. He was 
only to risk a fight under favourable conditions, 
but our unfavourable strategical position made it 
very difficult to recognise when such conditions 
were present, while we were able to learn from 
the wireless messages of the English that they 
were always informed immediately any substantial 
forces on our side even left the river estuaries. 
5 Marder, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 3. 
6 Otto Groos, Der 
ýKrýie 
in der Nordsee, vol. i, Von 
Kriegsbeginn bis Anfa Meptember 1914, (Berlin, T22), 
p. 41. 
7 Tirpitz, MY Memoirs, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 371. 
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Admiral Reinhard Scheer, the third commander of 
the High Seas Fleet during the war, outlined the effects 
of mines and torpedoes as he had to deal with them: 
8 
Our commanders were faced with the many- 
sided problem which was made more difficult by 
the limited resources at our disposal: to avoid 
any chance of surprise, to prevent the safety of 
the Bight being endangered by mines or submarines, 
in such a way that the Fleet would not have the 
necessary freedom of movement to get out of har- 
bour, and finally to seek out the enemy himself 
in the North Sea and do him as much damage as 
possible by guerilla operations. 
The man responsible for carrying out the defence of 
the German Bight from the beginning of the war was Admiral 
Hipper. In the early days of August 1914, Hipper recog- 
nized the danger presented by mines and submarines and set 
out to counter it. It is a measure of the importance 
which these new naval weapons of'mine and torpedo held 
for the Germans that the Germans set up their basic defence 
system to counter them. In daylight, the first line of 
watch vessels was to guard against enemy submarines, the 
second line against minelayers. It was not considered 
probable that submarines would be effective at night; 
therefore, at night the primary defence was against 
8 Scheer, Germany's High Sea Fleet in the World War, [op. 
cit. p. 29. 
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9 
minelayers. The problem was still reflected in Hipper's 
last orders in August 1918 for the security of the German 
Bight; he warned that 'the broad mine belt between Horn's 
Reef and Terschilling is only to be crossed by our heavy 
ships with good reason beforehand and then only with com- 
plete minesweeping before and a minesweeping escort'10 
during the operation. Thus, the mine was of great impor- 
tance to the Germans and as limiting to their fleet move- 
ments as to the British. Hipper himself felt very re- 
stricted by the mine, almost to the point of psychosis. 
His personal diary, which is the substance of his literary 
legacy, or Nachlass, provides much comment on mines. One 
of the most telling is the entry for 30 October 191411 
prefatory to the 3 November bombardment of Great Yarmouth: 
'The area is not exactly a fortress--but one can easily 
run over a mine and I don't intend to die so ingloriously. ' 
He also comments on the loss of the armoured cruiser Yorck 
9 BA/MA, F 3820/PG 62446, Hochseeflotte, K. T. B. der B. d. A., 
Kontre-Admiral Franz Hipper, Grundslitze r ie cherun 
der Deutschen Bucht, 18 Al 19 , apers of e High Seas T`e-et, War Diary of tTe-FTäg ficer, Reconnaissance Forces, 
Rear Admiral Franz Hipper, Principles for the Security of 
the German Bight). 
10 BA/MA, F 3817a/PG 62436, Hochseeflotte, K. T. B. der B. d. A., 
Ganz Geheim, 28 ýAu 1918, (Papers of the High Seas-Teet, 
Aar-Dial of tT eIIig i eas Fleet Command, Very Secret). 
11 BA/MA, Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., 1/41,30 Oct 1914. 
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by mine on 4 November 1914 saying the ship's captain 
obviously was careless and should receive a heavy pun- 
ishment. 
12 
This reaction perhaps is due in part to his 
command of the Yorck just prior to his promotion to rear 
admiral. The irony was that the ship and 336 of her crew 
were lost when Yorck ran onto a German minefield. 
Hipper's next mention of mines is in connection with 
the plans for the bombardment of Scarborough and Hartlepool 
in December 1914. His entry for 25 November says 'A damned 
dangerous lack of information on where the British have 
laid mines in that area concerns me. Also U-boats could 
provide a very unwelcome reception... I am writing this from 
the depths of depression so that those not standing in my 
shoes now may in future understand, in the event we should 
lose a significant part of the Fleet by this operation. '13 
In this instance Hipper's misgivings proved unfounded. 
It was not mines but torpedoes which caused Hipper problems 
in the action off Hartlepool: he dealt with one. of the first 
destroyer-against-dreadnought torpedo attacks in history. 
Four British destroyers attacked Hipper's three capital 
ships--Moltke, Seydlitz, and the-armoured cruiser Blücher-- 
and he turned toward the attack. Despite this manoeuvre, 
12 Ibid, 1/44,4 Nov 1914. 
13 Ibid, 1/48-49,25 Nov 1914. 
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Blücher was damaged by two torpedoes, though not seriously. 
14 
The destroyers were driven off but the British torpedo had 
given the town of Hartlepool a respite and the coastal 
batteries time to bracket Hipper. Hipper, however, did 
not always turn toward torpedoes; at Jutland he turned 
away after facing a combination of overwhelming gunfire 
from the Fifth Battle Squadron and the British Battle 
Cruiser Fleet, and torpedoes from British destroyers. 
As flag officer in charge of the defence of the German 
Bight and with several flotillas of minehunters in his 
command, Hipper recommended development of more sophisti- 
cated countermeasures to underwater attack. He had 
concluded, after several months of war experience, that 
larger, more seaworthy and speedier vessels were needed. 
15 
He emphasized this in his report to the Fleet Commander 
of 7 July 1915 by asserting the new minehunters should be 
the size and speed of ocean-going torpedoboats so that 
the fleet would not be slowed by their advance mine defences. 
Also, even though he believed that his coastal mine forces 
were adequate for the time being, he said he would prefer 
vessels with shallower draft than the fishing steamers 
then in service. Hipper also made the point that U-boats 
14 Ibid, 2/5,16 Dec 1914. 
15 USNA, PG 77733d/Reel 1654, Kriegserfahrungen, K. d. H., 
op. cit., Hipper to von Pohl, July 1915, p. 24. See also 
Hipper to State Secretary of the Imperial Naval Office, 
G. 2390A3,15 May 1915. 
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which could lay mines should be developed. From mid- 
1915 onwards, the fleet began to receive minehunters 
capable of 162 knots speed, about 2 to 3 knots slower 
than that of the fleet. Shallow-draft minesweepers 
were built but did not enter service until 1918-1919. 
Most important, 10 minelaying U-boats were added to the 
German fleet in 1915-1916.16 
In November 1916 Hipper launched a large programme 
to give complete net defence to the German Bight and 
harbours. The programme included nets placed across the 
exits from the various deeps in the Bight to trap sub- 
marines and also to retard the effectiveness of drifting 
17 
mines. Though he had problems in carrying out the 
programme, he got the nets in place by mid-1917 and 
thenceforth worked his new minehunters with new trawlers 
and assigned permanent watch ships to each net barrage. 
In May 1918, however, mine damage to fleet ships on a 
sortie was still a problem and Hipper told Scheer, Fleet 
C-in-C, of a new idea to use wire-controlled speed boats 
in front of any force that went out. These boats were 
relatively cheap and could be carried by larger ships or 
16 Erich Grüner, Die deutschen Kriegschiffe, 1815-1945, 
vol. i, (Munich, T6, pp. 350- . 
17 BA/MA, F 728/PG 77744/Reel 1406, Akten Hochseeflotte, 
op. cit., Hipper to Scheer, 16 Nov 1 
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towed by smaller ones to the mine field's edge. Hipper 
was in favour of any idea'which might prevent damage to 
materiel or loss of personnel. 
'8 
The new boats were built 
but not in time for the war; the old battleships Wittels- 
bach and Lothringen were converted to carry a flotilla 
each of the boats19 but were not completed in time for 
use during the war. 
As for the British, they recognized as early as 1907 
'it would be suicidal to expose the armoured units of the 
fleet to a treacherous torpedo attack by stationing them 
within striking distance of enemy destroyers and sub- 
mariner., , 
20 By the eve of war in June 1914, a leading ad- 
vocate of new naval weapons, Rear Admiral Sir Percy Scott, 
propounded in a letter to the Times that the day of the 
battleship was over because of submarines. 
21 
However, 
the full impact of the torpedo and mine on fleet strategy 
and tactics is best seen in Admiral Sir John Jellicoe's 
book on the Grand Fleet. Jellicoe says that the first 
18 Ibid, op. cit., Hipper to Scheer, 28 May 1918. 
19 Erich Grüner, op. cit., pp. 71,74. 
20 Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, vol. i, 
op* cit., p=. 2-. 
21 Ibid, p. 333. 
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effect of the possibility of German mine and submarine 
activity had been to force the Grand Fleet to restrict 
its operational areas under normal circumstances to the 
northern North Sea. 
22 
Further, he was of the opinion that 
this had meant a general holding back of the larger and 
more valuable capital ships by both sides and a 'small 
ship' war at the outset. 
23 
If the Grand Fleet wished to 
operate in mine-infested waters, it had to be preceded 
by minesweepers, effectively reducing fleet speed to 10 
24 
knots. In 1919 Jellicoe wrote: 
During the recent war two entirely new 
features of the greatest importance were in- 
troduced. First, the torpedo could be fired 
at very long range, up to 15,000 yards, either 
from large ships or destroyers, and at shorter 
range from submarines, and the mine had been 
developed; the invisibility of these weapons 
made it difficult for it to be known when they 
were being employed. 5 
The restrictions which such weapons imposed on 
fleet movements were substantial: anti-torpedo man- 
oeuvres were such as to give the tactical initiative to 
the attacker; further, a successful torpedo attack on a 
22 Admiral Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa, The Grand Fleet 
1914-1916: Its Creation, Development an orc, Lon on, 
P. - 19. 
23 Ibid, p. 20. 
24 Ibid, p. 18. 
25 Ibid, p. 400. 
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line of battle could devastate a fleet because of 
single hits on individual ships. At the very least, 
26 
vessels would be compelled to leave the line. This 
did not compare at all with the brief movements necessary 
to derange the accuracy of gunfire. As an example of the 
kind of potential underwater damage torpedoes and mines 
posed and their effects on strategy and tactics, Churchill's 
exposition of the aftermath of Jutland is relevant. 
Jellicoe was the only man on either side 
who could lose the war in an afternoon. First 
and foremost, last and dominating in the mind 
of the commander-in-chief stood the determina- 
tion not to hazard the battle fleet. The risk 
of underwater damage by torpedo and mine, and 
the consequent destruction of the British battle- 
ship superiority lay heavy upon him. It far out- 
weighed all considerations of the results on 
either side of gunfire. It was the main preoccu- 
pation of Admiralty thought before the war. From 
the opening of hostilities the spectacle of great 
vessels vanishing in a few moments as a result of 
underwater 2zfplosion constantly deepened the 
impression. 
Beatty, Jellicoe's battle cruiser commander, backs 
up Churchill's assertion. At Dogger Bank Beatty gave an 
order to turn nearly full about to port when he 'personally 
observed a torpedo wake. '28 This manoeuvre cost the British 
26 Jellicoe, op. cit., p. 401. 
27 Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis, (New York, 1949), 
p. 612. 
28 P. R. O., Adm 137/1943, Report of Vice Admiral Sir David 
Beatty on the Action in the North Sea, 24 Jan 1915, p. 656, 
paragraph 18. 
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force time and certainly contributed to Hipper's escape. 
When Beatty took over as Commander-in-Chief of the Grand 
Fleet in 1916, he ordered a change in the tactics of 
dealing with a torpedo attack. The change involved a 
turn toward the attack rather than a turn away. 
29 
But 
the limits remained: radical alterations of course were 
necessary to deal with torpedo attack and the Grand Fleet 
was limited under normal conditions to the northern North 
Sea. 
In sum, it may be said that the overall effect of 
the two most important new naval weapons was a combination 
of limiting strategical employment of battle fleets by 
mine warfare and limiting tactical flexibility of capital 
ships in action by torpedo. Hipper, as a surface force 
commander, lived with these limitations. 
Expanded Communications 
Electronically expanded communications created a dual 
requirement which affected World War I surface force com- 
manders. Hipper, and every other flag officer, had to 
'exercise mature judgement on the advisability of employing 
radio, before contact was made, ' and secondly, his 'radio 
organization had to be comprehensive and well-drilled to 
29 Rear Admiral W. S. Chalmers, The Life and Letters of 
David Beatty, (London, 1951), p. 2$0. 
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carry out the commander's wishes to the letter. '30 At 
first glance, wireless telegraphy seems a tool which 
would appear to have 'greatly simplified the art of war 
in making communication possible under previously unheard 
of distances. '3The case was not that simple. 'Radio, in 
particular, further complicated the exercise of strategy. 
More alertness and ingenuity were required of the various 
commanders... ' 
32 
The first time wireless was used in a naval conflict 
was during the Russo-Japanese War of 1905; it enabled 
the Japanese Admiral Togo to impose a distant blockade 
off the Russian harbour of Port Arthur, safe from mines 
and torpedoes. A radio signal from a watch boat could 
bring the Japanese at anchor only 60 miles away down upon 
a Russian sortie in a few hours. 
33 
At the time, wireless 
was still in its infancy. By 1914, however, wireless teleg- 
raphy was accepted as a 'dangerous weapon, rightly used, 
dangerous to the enemy; but carelessly used much more 
30 H. A. Rochester, 'Some Strategical. Aspects of Radio, ' 
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1927, p. 857. 




dangerous for one's self. '34 
There is considerable evidence that German naval 
communicators were aware of these dangers. The evidence 
is found in reports of fleet manoeuvres carried out in 
the spring, summer and autumn of each year from 1907 
onwards. 
35 
The reports include many enclosures which 
indicate several communication exercises were conducted 
during each manoeuvre. The final report to the Kaiser 
from the High Seas Fleet Commander had a specific section 
allocated to wireless telegraphy. The reports most rele- 
vant to this study were those for the years 1912,1913, 
and 1914. In 1912 the spring manoeuvres finalized some 
of the lessons to be learned from naval wireless use, and 
Admiral Henning von Holtzendorff, Fleet C-in-C, reported 
to the Kaiser that 'the use of wireless had to be limited 
to the most urgent signals, ' and that 'the enemy would 
make the destruction of each ship's wireless installations 
a primary target. ' Also, 'ships knocked out of action 
should be silent to avoid detection; and only respond to 
34 USNA, Record Group 45, Papers of the United States Office 
of Naval Intelligence, Naval Attache's Report 19 June 1925, 
'The Use of Wireless Telegraphy in the World War, More 
Especially from the Naval Strategical Point of View, ' by 
N. von Koch, trans. from original in Marine Rundschau, 
2/3 1925, Subject File WX-5, p. 2. 
35 USNA, File T1022, Reels 494,515,519,1142,1143,1168, 
1169, and 1247, Reichsmarineamt, Allgemeines Marinedepartement, 
Akten betreffend verschiedene Ubun en, mperia Naval ice 
General ava Department, FEp--ers Various Manoeuvres , 1907-1915. 
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interrogation by fleet command. '36 Summer manoeuvres of 
1912 indicated wireless telegraphy 'should be transmitted 
as little as possible to avoid detection by the enemy, that 
a whole series of emission control violations had been ob- 
served during the manoeuvres and that all ships had proce- 
dural difficulties and made mistakes while receiving and 
sending. ' 
37 
In 1913 Hipper entered the reports for the Scouting 
Forces for the first time. Significantly, Hipper reported 
to Admiral Friedrich von Ingenohl, the High Seas Fleet 
Commander, and von Ingenohl reported to the Kaiser that 
'the communications between flotillas and leading cruisers 
have improved in all respects. '38 This was directly con- 
cerned with wireless transmission and reception and those 
ships which fell under Hipper's command authority as Flag 
36 USNA, PG 67245, Reel 494, Marine-Kabinett, Adm. Henning 
von Holtzendorff to Kaiser Wilhelm II, An a en zum ýU n s- 
'icto zur Hoc seeflotten vom 712, -iii t rische 
Verwen- 
dung der Funktente e ra ie, avCabinet, Appendix to the 
Manoeuvre Report, High Seas Fleet from 4 July 1912, Military 
Employment of Wireless Telegraphy5. 
37 USNA, PG 67246, Reel 494, Marine-Kabinett, von Holtzendorff 
tq Kaiser Wilhelm II, Bericht GetechtsUbung, Sommerreise, 
19- Iy , Funkten- tele ra ie, kl7a-v-aI Ca inet, Report 
onBattleýDrill N777, Summer Cruise, 19-20 July 1912, 
Wireless Telegraphy Appendix). 
38 USNA, PG 67247, Reel 494, Marine-Kabinett, Hipper to von 
In enohl, Bericht Gefechtsübun Hochseeflotte NH-1--L9 1ý+; unk- 
tentele ra ie nla en, I. B d. ., (Naval a . net, 
Battle 
ri Report for High Seas Fleet, May 1914, Wireless Telegraphy 
Appendix, Flag Officer, Reconnaissance Forces). 
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Officer, Reconnaissance Forces. However, von Ingenohl 
wrote in this same report that 'it must also be remembered 
that good communications could not always be assured be- 
tween forces and flagships; there were not always enough 
channels available' and ... 
'rapidity, accuracy, and se- 
curity of transmissions were still problems. '39 The growth 
in complexity and size of wireless telegraphy as a part of 
German naval warfare may be seen in the increased space 
devoted to the wireless section of the manoeuvre reports 
from 1907 to 1913; the latter was five times the length 
of the former. Technology, organization, and training 
continued to improve and by the spring of 1914 Hipper 
reported 'the wireless performance was generally good and 
the people were as competent and the equipment as well- 
organized as could be. '40 Hipper's awareness of the problems 
and dangers posed by the use of wireless is supported by 
the appearance, in every fleet operation order bearing his 
signature, of a section concerning wireless and restricting 
39 Ibid, loc. cit. 
40 
USNA, PG 67250, Reel 494, Marine-Kabinett, HiPP er to 
von In enohl, Gefechtsbereitsc a is Bericht Aufkl run s- 
sc ii e, i he ms aven, aval Cabinet; Battle 
Readiness Report of Scouting Ships, enclosure in 'Report 
on Battle Readiness Inspection of High Seas Fleet', 
Wilhelmshaven, dated 7 Apr 1914). 
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its use to an absolute minimum. 
41 
The fact that these 
orders were transmitted to the fleet several times as 
part of larger fleet orders indicated that succeeding 
fleet chiefs of staff who did the transmitting were 
somewhat less aware of the dangers of winiess than was 
Hipper. Although German ships at sea were well-exercised 
in wireless security, the command ashore does not appear 
to have been rehearsed in this capacity. 
42 
In examining further the question of communications 
between the German High Command ashore and the Fleet Command 
afloat, it should be pointed out that the German Fleet 
Command was spared the problem of interference in its 
operations by higher commands' basically because the German 
41 
Cautions may be found in BA/MA, F 3820/PG 62447, K. T. B. 
der B. d. A., (War Diary of the Flag Officer, Reconnaissance 
rörc_e 
, High Seas Fleet Plan for War Operation 19, I. B. d. A. Appendix, 2 Nov 1914. See also High Seas Fleet Plan for War 
Operation 20, I. B. d. A., Appendix, 14-15 Dec 1914. See also 
USNA, PG 64771 ee 42, K. T. B. des K. d. H., B. d. A. Order No. 
228a, Sortie to the Dogger Na-Ek, 2 Jan 1915. See also 
M. O. D., N. H. B., Admiralty, Nachlass Levetzow, Seekrie sleitun , (Papers of Magnus von Levetzow, Naval High Command), Opera- 
tion Order No. 19,24 Oct 1918, Reel 50, Frames 00506-00510. 
See also BA/MA, Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., 1/41,27 Oct 1914, 
1/46,17 Nov 191and 2/10,10 Jan 1915. 
42 BA/MA, Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., 2/13,23 Jan 1915. See 
also David Kahn, The Coodeebreakers--The Stor of Secret Writi, 
(London, 1967), pp. 270-272, and N. von Koch, ii, supra, p9.. 
'All German attacks on a larger scale were preceded by a 
lively wireless conversation. ' 
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command structure43 simply did not provide for this on 
a day-to-day basis with or without instantaneous commu- 
nication. Admiral Scheer noted that 'On land the Supreme 
Command permanently controlled the war operations; this 
was not the case at sea. If the Fleet had been defeated 
in battle, no one would have dreamt of making the Naval 
Staff responsible, but only the Commander-in-Chief of 
the Fleet. i44 Until the establishment of the Seekriegs- 
leitung (Supreme Naval Command) in August 1918, there 
was for the German navy no superior on land in a position- 
similar to that of the British First Sea Lord. 
An investigation of the German signal records45 of 
the four most important sea actions of the High Seas Fleet 
43 Carl-Axel Gemzell, Organization, Conflict, and Innovation 
A Stud of German Naval Strategic Planning, 187T--1 940 (L un , 1973) pp. - 5. See a so Herwig, op. cit., pp. 26-27 and 
pp. 234-236. See also Walther Hubatsch, Der Admiralstab 
(Frankfurt/Main, 1958), pp. 83,179. 
44 Scheer, Germany's High Sea Fleet in the World War, op. 
cit., p. 32 . 
45 USNA, File T1022, Reels 141,142, Kommando der Hochsee- 
kräfte, K. T. B., Funks räche, 28 Aug 1914, i-l ßec 1914 
'23='£rJan Iß15, ain-a 31 ay-1 June 1916. See also Otto Groos, 
op. cit., vol. i, pp. 272-289; vol. iii, pp. 250-261, and 
pp. 282-289. 
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in the North Sea up to and including Jutland shows no 
signals of an operational control nature to a fleet 
commander-in-chief from any command ashore. The Fleet 
Commanders-in-Chief (Ingenohl, Pohl and Scheer), once 
underway, were not interfered with by headquarters ashore. 
However, the fleet commanders would often use wireless, 
even while in harbour, to communicate with subordinate 
commands. This led to intercepts-'by the British, occa- 
sionally with disastrous results for the Germans. One 
element of the German naval command ashore addressed the 
problem: the Code and Cipher Section of the Imperial 
Naval Office headed by Rear Admiral Paul Behnke46 said 
it was suspected that telephone and telegraph lines 
ashore were tapped and that great caution was to be exer- 
cised in transmitting wireless from ship to shore and 
ship to ship because it was believed the codes had been 
broken and traffic intercepted. The only positive action 
which this section could take was to change the codes, 
which they did. Benhnke also sent a memorandum to this 
effect to Admiral von Pohl, chief of the Admiralty Staff, 
who concurred and readdressed it to the Fleet Command and 
46 USNA, PG 69201/Reel 1109, ReichsmarineamttiVersdhiedenes 
Geheim Akten Chiffrier Sachen an Admira stabschef Berlin. 
2.5 N ov I mperia ava OTTice, Various Secret Pa ers 
Code Section to Admiralty Staff Chief, Berlin), Rear Admiral 
Paul Behnke to Admiral Hugo von Pohl. 
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the Naval Stations North Sea and Baltic, among others. 
This was as early as 25 November 1914. 
But the warning on wireless security was not neces- 
sarily observed by the people responsible for transmitting 
wireless messages from the fleet commands to subordinate 
units. 'The most blatant violation was the transmission47 
by the Fleet Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral Eckermann, to 
Hipper from the pre-dreadnought battleship Deutschland 
anchored in the Jade to Hipper's flagship Seydlitz, also 
48 
anchored in the Jade. It was this signal the British 
47 USNA, File T 1022, Reel 142, Der Befehlshaber der Auf- 
klUrun sschiffe Gg. 2282, Vorstoss ac er o erE-an1 
K. T. B. des K. d. H. v 
(War Diarýthe Hig'ieas Fleet Cotrffiand. 
B. d. A., __Urder no. Gg 228a, Sortie to the Dogger Bank), 
23 Jan 1915. For Eckermann's role in, originating the oper- 
ation see Groos, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 191. 
48 Otto Groos, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 282. The German 
official history records the cited-signal as follows: "23. I. von Deutschland an Seydlitz (Fla schiff des B. d. A. ), 
Uhrzeit- rue 2210, Eingegangen . 2TTJhr 
Vm. ", 
Inhalt An B. . A. I. u. II. A- , I. F. d. T. und 2 
Fttiilen 
nach Wa'EL es B. d. A. -auT1laren Dogger-Bank- Ausläuýri eute 
übend in der Duman ce-lheit, c ter am o enden Abend in der 
n el1it. Chef er Hoc sehe rotte. " The American Naval 
me igence transTEion of E FF official history says: "From' 
Deutschland to Seydlitz (Flag Commander, Scouting Forces), 
time group 2210, time received Jan. -23 10.27 a. m. Contents: 
To Commander, Scouting Forces: Scouting Divisions I and II, 
first leader of destroyers and two flotillas, chosen by 
commander scouting forces, to scout the Dogger Bank. Depart 
this evening in darkness, returning following evening in 
darkness. - Signed, Chief of High Seas Fleet. See also 
P. R. O., Adm 137/1943,1914-1918 War Histories. This British 
file includes, on p. 4 as copyö the Admiralty signal cited. 
It reads: "From Admiralty London to Commander-in-Chief, Home 
Fleets. Date 23 January 1915 No. 210 Urgent. 4 German Battle 
Cruisers, 6 Light Cruisers and 22 Destroyers will sail this 
evening to scout on Dogger Bank probably return tomorrow 
evening...,, 
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intercepted that resulted in the loss of the Blücher 
at Dogger Bank. A comparison of the original signal 
from Deutschland to Seydlitz with the signal from 
Admiralty London. to Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleets, 
reveals an almost exact equivalent including the German 
time of departure, strength of force, objective, and 
time of return. 
The normal procedure49 of land-sea communications 
was to send intelligence and/or weather messages from 
Neumünster, Norddeich, Borkum or Heligoland Island to 
the forces afloat. In 1915 the, old battleship Kaiser 
Wilhelm II was converted50 into a station ship and out- 
fitted with improved wireless communications for the 
Fleet Commander when he was not at sea. In the fall of 
1915 the old cruiser Niobe was similarly converted5l for 
Hipper's use, at his request, because he was responsible 
for the security of the German Bight and desired better 
planning and communications facilities. Despite having 
this shore-based flagship, Hipper lost a large part of 
his official papers for the'Scouting Forces, papers 
covering the period 1914-May 1916, when the Lützow 
49 See note 45-supra. 
50 Otto Groos, op. cit., vol. iv, p. 185. 
51 Erich Raeder, Ily Life, op. cit., p. 81. 
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was sunk at Jutland. 
52 
Historically speaking, this loss 
is a grave impediment to the study of that period of 
Hipper's professional life. 
In effect, then, the assignment of these old ships 
as communications platforms was the German solution to 
some of the problems created by the new ability of head- 
quarters ashore to communicate with fleet commanders 
afloat. Finally, it should be noted that because of the 
German command structure no true parallel can be made 
between Admiral Scheer's position vis a vis his communi- 
cations with shore headquarters and Admiral Jellicoe's 
position vis a vis the Admiralty. The communications 
which Scheer received while underway at Jutland were 
from subordinate commands; Jellicoe received his commun- 
ications from land-bound superiors. 
The complete history of German communications at sea 
in World War I remains to be written. Almost every signal 
of any note has survived in the voluminous files of the 
Admiralty Staff. Many of the important ones have been 
published in the German Official History of World War I. 
52 USNA, PG 76543, Reel 1060, Admiralstab Geschäftsordnung.. 
beim Streitkräften, 27 
ýJul', 
1918 vom 2 22.1917 Sc eer an 
A mira sta ce, Admiralty off Business Concerning Vices 
Afloat Admiral Scheer to Chief of Admiralty Staff). Scheer 
did not wish to keep. the secret archives and papers aboard 
his fleet flagship at sea. He cites the example of S. M. S. 
Lützow which sank in May 1916 taking the B. d. A. Geheim Archiv 
ecret Papers) and Akten (Administrative Papers) wit er. 
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The effect which wireless had on World War I naval 
operations has been outlined by Admiral Reinhard Scheer, 
Commander-in-Chief of the High Seas Fleet at Jutland. He 
termed it a useful tool for obtaining intelligence but 
said it created problems in regulating the 'transmission 
of orders and intelligence in such away as to be certain 
of getting messages accurately and promptly and avoiding 
confusion through the operations of other stations. '53 
He also said that a commander was faced with the difficult 
position of either-having his messages intercepted or not_ 
conducting operations with a widely dispersed fleet because 
of the risk of concomitant wireless interception. 
54 
Scheer. reflected the general-German attitude toward 
tactical employment of wireless when. he wrote, 'Most 
important of all was to obtain correct information rapidly; 
security could be sacrificed for this, especially if the 
enemy had been sighted. '55 
On the other hand, Admiral Jellicoe, Commander-in- 
Chief of the British Grand Fleet, felt that wireless was 
53 Scheer, op. cit., p. 181. 
54 Ibid, p. 73. 
55 USNA, R. G. 45, Papers of the United States Office of 
Naval Intelligence, op. cit., Admiral Scheer to U. S. Naval 
Observer Berlin, Interview, 24 Mar 1921, 'Notes on Opinions 
Held by Admiral Scheer, ' S. F. ZOS, f-g-I, 14060, p. 6. 
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one of the five factors present when the war broke out 
which necessitated a totally new organization at sea. 
Wireless, he said, dictated '... the extreme importance 
of reducing signalling... at sea to an absolute minimum, 
except in the presence of the enemy. '56 The British, 
like the Germans, were forced to concentrate heavily on 
developing efficient signalling arrangements57 because 
'the positions of ships at sea using wireless could be 
determined by directional wireless. ' 
58 
The above attitudes displayed by British and German 
fleet commanders resulted in the imposition of a series 
of ; restrictions on the use of wireless. In the case of 
the Germans, the objective was to facilitate rapid and 
reliable communications at the price of some security; 
the British intent was to avoid detection by default. 
The overall effect of wireless on the naval environment 
for both sides was to enable a naval commander with an 
efficient wireless intercept service to know where his 
enemy was without actually sighting him, providing, of 
course, that the intercepting party was given something 
to intercept. Both sides went to considerable lengths 
to insure that this did not happen. For example, the 
56 Jellicoe, op. cit., pp. 37-38. The other factors were 
the submarine, the airship and aircraft, the mine, and 
the effective range of gun and torpedo. 
57 Ibid, p. 57. 
58 Ibid. 
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Grand Fleet wireless memoranda stated 'the closest poss- 
ible supervision over the use of wireless is to be exer- 
cised by flag and commanding officers and every precaution 
taken against its misuse; the necessity for the greatest 
vigilance in this respect is to be impressed on all con- 
cerned. '59 This remained British policy throughout the 
war. 
German operational policy was quite similar and is 
reflected in the daily orders to the fleet and to the 
watch ships and is mentioned specifically in fleet oper- 
ations orders. Hipper makes several comments on wireless' 
in his personal writings as well as official reports 
already discussed. His Nachlass reveals observations of 
both tactical and strategical nature concerning wireless, 
60 
though unfortunately, there is no such general statement 
as Scheer or Jellicoe made. However, after passing two 
ships in the early morning hours of 3 November 1914 on 
his way to bombard Yarmouth, Hipper wrote: 'Everything 
depends on whether or not these two vessels have signalled 
our presence by wireless... the indication is that they 
have, not, so we shall proceed. ' Hipper was correct. 
59 P. R. O., Adm 137/342, Grand Fleet W/T Memoranda 1914- 
1918. These were orders issued on a regular and frequent 
basis from the Commander-in-Chief to all flag and senior 
officers. 
60 BA/MA, 1/42, Nachlass Homer, 3 Nov 1914; 2/5,15 Dec 
1914; 4/35,3 Mar . 
108 
Later, on 15 December 1914 on his way to bombard Scar- 
borough and Hartlepool, Hipper reports an intercepted 
enemy message which was interpreted to mean 'they (the 
Germans) should have left harbour by now' and he con- 
cluded correctly 'the British are setting up a reception 
for us. ' Again, he shows concern lest a vessel he passed 
report his presence but none did. 
Hipper commented on the strategic effect of wireless 
on 3 March 1916, the date on which the large German wire- 
less intercept station was established at Neumünster. He 
wrote that 'For once we are lucky--the Army has done us 
a great service--the various cipher methods of the English 
have been discovered and assembled--so that we can read 
all of their W/T messages. To accomplish this the main 
wireless intercept station has been set up... with a fleet 
communications officer and direct connections with the 
fleet flagship--a tremendous advantage for our war 
leadership. ' Though he spoke of the advantage which the 
1916 developments gave the German command, it is evident 
from his earlier reports61 that he realized the British 
were just as advanced at intercept. 
61 BA/MA, F 3820/PG 62447, K. T. B. der B. d. A., (War Diary 
of the Flag Officer, Reconnaissance Urces , see entry for 3 Nov 1914. See also BA/MA, F 4063/PG 64786, Kr. Op. 
Nordsee 45 Flotten-Operation emäsz 22. Befehl-78, 
25-26.5. T71"5, ar operation North Sea 43, =eet Operation 
According to Operations Order No. 28,25-26 May 1915), 
General Lessons Learned, 31 May 1915. See also BA/MA, 
F 4062/PG 64771/Reel 345, Kr. Op. Nordsee 35 Doggerbank- 
Schlacht am. 24.1.1915, (War Operation ort-1 Sea 35, Battle 
of the Dogger Ban on 24 Jan 1915), Special Appendix to the 
Battle Report. 
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However, in both tactical and strategical situations 
Hipper was more concerned with the physical vulnerability 
62 
of wireless. The best indication of his application of 
wireless is contained in his record at Jutland: British 
documents show nothing was intercepted from the First 
Scouting Group until after contact was made. 
63 
Hipper's 
method of communication, eschewing wireless in favour of 
flaghoist and flashing light, 
64 
reflect a good apprecia- 
tion of the tactical limits which wireless imposed. 
Logistics 
Logistics in the context of this work is the art of 
supplying and maintaining a fleet. Hipper had to contend 
with some exacerbated problems in logistics because the 
conflict in which he was a commander lasted much longer 
than the planners had forecast. The failure of the con- 
flict to adhere to the paths of the materiel planners 
upset much of the basic war supply system designed by 
Admiral Tirpitz for a conflict of shorter duration. His 
62 USNA, PG 77734/Reel 1130, Hochseeflotte Krie serei - 
nisse,. Erfahrun en aus der Schlacht vor dem ca errat 
auf dem e iete des-77r. -Wesens, igFi Seas eet War 
e it ences, Lessons Learned from the Battle of the 
Skagerrak Concerning Winless Telegraphy Matters). 
63 P. R. O., Adm 137/1945, Report of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, 
on 'Action with the German High Sea Fleet 31 May-1 June 1916, ' 
Battle Cruiser Fleet enclosure, p. 3. The contact was visual. 
64 H. H. Frost, The Battle of Jutland, (Annapolis, 1964), 
p. 193. 
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plan called for peacetime naval stocks of ammunition 
to be kept low; the money could better be invested in 
new construction. He also had provided, through con- 
tracts, for the rapid expansion of ammunition production 
in wartime at peacetime prices. 
65 Besides ammunition, 
the whole system of maintaining a fleet requires training 
its personnel. The Germans, however, had 'geared their 
training system for a short sharp encounter which would 
decide the war. '66 
Further, logistics means fuel, food and other sup- 
plies for personnel. During World War I, the Germans had 
enough of heavy ship ammunition though it did not all 
perform to specification. Ships did have serious prob- 
lems getting enough coal in the winter of 1917, reflec- 
ting the national shortage. They had serious problems 
with the quality of coal, almost from the beginning of 
the war. The German navy had shortages in trained tech- 
nical manpower, officers and shipyard personnel. The crews 
themselves were plagued by insufficient food supplies. 
65 Tirpitz, My Memoirs, op. cit., p. 38. 
66 Capt. D. Miranda, 'Organization of the Naval Schools 
of Germany and Austria, ' Journal of the Royal United 
Services Instit tion, Janes- F öund-a n Papers of 




German ammunition quality was uneven. British 
after-action reports support this assertion as for 
example, Admiral Beatty's report on the battle of 
-Dogger Bank: 'German shell, for incendiary effect and 
damage to personnel, are far inferior to ours. 167 He 
also said, in a letter to Jellicoe shortly after the 
battle, that 'Their guns are good, calibration too close, 
gunlaying excellent, but the projectile no good, and I 
am sure we can stand a lot of it. '68 Commodore Tyrwhitt, 
commanding the Fifth Light Cruiser Squadron and two 
flotillas of destroyers in an action against Hipper's 
First Scouting Group on 25 April 1916 wrote that -'After 
this experience I cannot say I think the 12-inch shell 
very formidable to an armoured ship, providing it does 
not hit her in a vital spot or start a big fire. Had we 
been hit by a 12-inch lyddite (British shell) I don't 
think we would have got back... '69 There is more. Marder 
asserts: 
67 P. R. O., Adm 137/1943, 'Report of Vice Admiral Beatty 
in the Action in the North Sea, ' 24 Jan 1915, enclosure 4, 
Remarks on the Action, p. 24. 
6$ 
A. J. Marder, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 165. 
69 
P. R. O., Adm 137/1944, 'Action with German Battle 
Cruisers, 25 Apr 1916, Secret, ' p. 3. 
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The thickest armour actually passed 
through was a 72-inch tapered plate on the 
main belt of the Warspite. Although many of 
the (British) battle cruisers were hit heavily, 
of those that survived in one instance only did 
part of a shell penetrate below into the vitals 
of the ship... Indeed, excepting a small piece of 
shell which penetrated the crown of the 6-inch 
magazine in the Barham, no German projectile ever 
reached the vitals-=ma azines, en ine-room, or oiler-- British capital sip. 
What of the battle cruisers which Hipper sank? The 
latest evidence indicates that the cause was 'the compo- 
sition of their (British) cordite charges and the neglect 
of the various precautions built into the turret complex 
to*prevent fire being passed down the ammunition hoists 
to the magazines. '71 It was not, as Tirpitz has said, the 
'piercing power of our (German) heavy guns' nor the fact 
that their 'projectiles were designed to take effect after- 
ward in the interior of the enemy ships'72 that gave birth 
to the false impression of German shell superiority; rather, 
it was a combination of unstable cordite 
73 
and lack of flash 
prevention policy. According to Padfield: 
70 Marder, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 172, from M. O. D., Admiralty 
Library, Naval Staff, Admiralty, Grand Fleet Gunner and 
Torpedo Memoranda on Naval Actions 191 FýI8 (13, p. 4- 
See lso D. emorandum, 'Notes'on Damage to Warships, 
1914-1919' (1920), also cited in Marder, loc. cit. 
71 Peter Padfield, The Battleship Era, (London, 1972), p. 241. 
72 
Tirpitz, op. cit., p. 564. 
73 Antony Preston, Battleships of World War Ii (London, 1972), 
p. 90. 
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... these (flash prevention) devices had been nullified in action by the enthusiasm of 
the magazine parties to feed the guns as ra= 
pidly as possible; thus the lids- of the ammu- 
nition cases in the magazines were taken off 
before the charges were piled outside the doors, 
with igniters uncovered, ready for loading; and 
access ladders to the gunhouse which by-passed 
the anti-flash devices in the hoists were left 
open. 74 
Finally, according to Sir E. Tennyson d'Eyncourt, 
British Director of Naval Construction, there was no evi- 
dence that 'any enemy shell had penetrated to the maga- 
zines of the British ships. '75 
Nontheless, most German battle reports do not 
mention problems with ammunition. 
76 
For example, the 
battle reports of S. M. S. Lützow at Jutland are replete 
with notations of 'the enemy blew up' but contain not a 




Padfield, op. cit., p. 241. 
Marder, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 218. 
76 
BA/MA, F 3916/PG 63406, Hochseeflotte, 'Anlage zum 
Gefechtsbericht Gesammelte Kriegserfahrungen er_A7r7i"llerie 
ýAp 
r 1916,7. T. B., . von der Tann, igTSeas Fleet, Appenidix to Ammer-Action Reports--Co-ncerning War Performance 
of Artillery, found in War Diary of S. M. S. von der Tann). 
77 
BA/MA, F 3899/PG 63257, Hochseeflotte, 'Bericht über 
das Gefecht am 31. Mai. 1916, Artilleristischer Teil, ' 
Wilhelmshaven 8 June 1916, K. T. ., tzow, 
(Hi h 
Seas Fleet, Report on the Battle of 31 May71916, Gunnery 
Section).. 
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German prisoners taken after the battles of Heligoland 
Bight and Dogger Bank reported the terrible effects of 
British shells yet did not disparage their own. 
78 
Nor 
does Hipper remark on the quality of German shell although 
he, too, noted the devastating effects of British shell. 
79 
It was apparent, however, from reports received from H. M. S. 
Warspite which was exposed to 30.5 cm. (12-in. ) gunfire 
from all eight ships of the Third Battle Squadron as well 
Hipper's five ships in the First Scouting Group, that many 
80 
German heavy shells failed to detonate upon or after impact. 
Even so, it appears Hipper was satisfied with his shell. 
78 
P. R. O., Adm 137/1943, Commanding Officer, H. M. S. 
Liverpool to Commodore First Light Cruiser Squadron, 
'Confidential Report, 30 Aug 1914. This report concerned 
the survivors of S. M. S. Mainz sunk at Heligoland. See p. 3. 
See also P. R. O., Adm 137/1 , Commanding Officer, H. M. S. King Edward VII to the Secretary of the Admiralty, Secret 
Report, =e=915. This report concerned the interroga- 
tion of prisoners of war from S. M. S. Blücher on shell. 
See p. 1. 
79 
BA/MA, 5/22, Nachlass Hipper, 14 June 1916. See also 
BA/MA, F 3820/PG oHoc seeflotte, Abschrift, K. T. B. 
des B. d. A., Abschnitt 63, Operationsbefehl r. 6 betr. 
Torstoss ins Skagerrak, (High Seas eet, Copy of Section 
63, War D äry, Flag 0 ficer, Reconnaissance Forces, Papers 
Concerning Sortie in the Skagerrak), 31 May-1 June 1916. 
80 USNA, R. G. 45, Naval Records Collection of the Office of 
Naval Records and Library, Battle of Jutland, copy of damage 
report to H. M. S. Warspite, Box 804, ZOS Report No. 9231. 
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Obviously, the Germans did not know about manufacturing 
defects which resulted in unexploded shells aboard British 
warships. Thus it is difficult to establish with certainty 
that the logistical support given Hipper in terms of ammu- 
nition supply was inadequate for war purposes because after 
Jutland there was no sustained dreadnought action in which 
to test the shells. But it can be determined that the 
Germans did not change their shell manufacturing processes 
during the war: according to the NIACC report on shell 
manufacture the Germans had not altered their heavy shell 
process at all during the war. Such a change would have 




believed that German shells, even though usually a calibre 
smaller than those of the British, were equally effective 
in penetration and bursting power. This assumption, however, 
became less and less valid as the war progressed. By April 
1918, the British were completing the process of replacing 
defective and ineffective shell in the powder rooms of the 
Grand Fleet, 
83 
a process begun after Jutland. They intro- 
duced a new type of highly efficient armour-piercing shell 
81 
M. O. D., Admiralty, N. I. D., D. N. I. SL3480, 'Report of the 
Visit of the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control Armour 
Experts to Germany, ' June 1920, -. p. 1. 
82 
83 
Tirpitz, op. cit., p. 564. 
Marder, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 216. 
. ýýý.. 
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'which ... certainly doubled the offensive power of the 
Fleet's heavy guns. '84 There were over 12,000 of these 
shells in the Grand Fleet's magazines by the end of the 
war. When it is remembered that on any given day the 
British Grand Fleet's broadside, without the improved 
shell, was at least twice as heavy as that of the German 
High Seas Fleet, the loss of what the Germans thought was 
their technical superiority and consequently their tacti- 
cal equality was made almost certain by the new British 
development. 
This logistical weakness was important because 
Hipper was responsibile for an operations plan in October 
1918 which held as a basic assumption that German super- 
iority in shell quality would help balance greater British 
numbers in ships in a decisive sea battle in the English 
Channel. Luckily for Hipper, this action did not take 
place. 
A definitive technical study of the ordnance aspects 
of the battle of Jutland exists in an as yet unpublished 
manuscript by Mr. N. J. M. Cambell which shows German 
shells were seriously defective. Mr. Cambell has traced 
the path of virtually every shell fired in the battle. 
His work, based on both German and British official docu- 
85 
ments, indicates German ignorance of shell defects. 
84 Marder, quoting Jellicoe, loc. cit. 
85 N. J. M. Cambell, 'The Battle of Jutland, ' MSS, Quarrhurst, 
Binstead, Ryde, Isle of Wight. Antony Preston, author of 
Battleships of World War I, op. cit. concurs withM Cambell's 
views; in a conversation with the writer 10 March 197. 
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A final point on ammunition quality and supply will 
demonstrate the difference in amount of ammunition required 
by the First Scouting Group 1914-1918 as compared with 
five pre-dreadnought capital ships of the Deutschland class. 
The I. A. G., including von der Tann, Moltke, Seydlitz, 
Lützow and Derfflinger, required 3,720 rounds of ammunition 
for their main armament while five Deutschland class ships 
required only 1,700 rounds. Over 9,000 rounds of secondary 
86 
ammunition were required by each group of ships. The 
main armament of Hipper's battle cruisers required more 
than twice the number of heavy shell as a division of 
capital ships built before the dreadnought era. There 
can be little doubt that expanded ammunition requirements 
were part of an expanded logistics system, an unavoidable 
characteristic in a war where dreadnoughts fought each 
other for the first time. 
Fuel 
Another contributing factor of the new dimensions of 
logistics was fuel. Coal was the primary fuel. -. for both 
British and German capital ships in World War I. In dis- 
cussing the role of fuel in Hipper's activities as a naval 
commander two aspects of the problem must be considered: 
86 
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1919, (London, 1973), 2nd Photo, High Seas Fleet being 
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amount and quality. For a full war sortie of the First 
Scouting Group and escort, some 25,000 tons of coal and 
approximately 2,500 tons of oil were required. 
87 
It was 
important that the coal be of good quality because, ac- 
cording to Capt. Maurice von Egidy, of S. M. S. Seydlitz, 
bad coal 'formed so much slag that fires had to be cleaned 
after half the usual time, and grates burned through and 
fell into the ash pits. '88 This means that bad coal was 
inefficient from both machinery standpoint and a tactical 
standpoint. It was inefficient for machinery because the 
engines would not develop their designed horsepower and 
for tactical reasons because it decreased the range and 
the speed. If the fire-boxes of the boilers had to be 
cleaned after half the usual time it also meant increased 
strain on the personnel involved and increased vulnerabil- 
ity to enemy action. There are several documented instances 
of Hipper's ships having poor coal. For example, as early 
as 17 December 1914 Capt. Max von Hahn of the battle cruiser 
87 
Ibid, pp. 20,25,32-33. See also BA/MA F 728/PG 65727, 
Akten Hochseeflotte, op. cit., Requirements of High Seas 
eet Me -Min war, 25 Nov 1914. 
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B. Fitzsimons, ed., Warships and Sea Battles of World 
War I, (New York, 1973), p. 102. Reprinte rom a talk 
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von der Tann reported in his 'Lessons Learned' after the 
bombardment of Scarborough and Hartlepool that 'the in- 
adequacy; of our coal and its burning properties results 
in heavy smoke clouds and signals our presence. '89 The 
situation with regard to coal quality had not improved 
by 31 May 1916 when, during the battle of Jutland, the 
von der Tann was not able to keep fires under all boilers 
after 1600 hours because of the metal grates collapsing 
The under the stony (literally, stone-heavy) coal. 
90 
stokers had to be heavily augmented from other parts of 
the ship. S. M. S. Derfflinger reported on 24 January 1915, 
more than a year before Jutland, that she could 'only make 
maximum speed with pure "torpedoboat coal. 11191 Derfflinger 
had the same problems at Dogger Bank and at Jutland and 
so did Seydlitz. 
89 
BA/MA, F 3916/PG 63403, Hochseeflotte, K. T. B., S. M. S. 
von der Tann, Allgemeine Beo ac tun en, 17 eTýz91 ,, 
'High 
o the Battle cruiser, von Ter Tann, eas-TTee, War iar). 
General Observations 
90 BA/MA, F 3916/PG 63406, Hochseeflotte, K. T. B., S. M. S. 
von der Tann, Gefechtsbericht zur c act am 31. aNf iý1916, IV 
I1g1 'Seas Fleet, War Diary of tTe Battle Cruiser, vorm er 
Tann, Battle Report on Engagement 31 May 1916). 
91 BA/MA, F 3885/PG 63178, Hochseeflotte, K. T. B., S. M. S. 
Derfflinger, Gefechtsbericht er das efecFt mit den I. 
englischen Panzer reuzer eschw-wer am 24. . 15(F 1gh Seas 
Fleet, War Diary, S. M. S. Der inger, Battle Report on Engage- 
ment with English First Battle Cruiser Squadron, 24 Jan 1915). 
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This reference to torpedoboat coal pointed up 
German logistic policy to supply the destroyers of their 
fleet with the best coal available and to give the capi- 
tal ships lower priority. The fire-boxes of the boilers 
in the smaller ships were not as tolerant of bad fuel 
and could'not be cleaned by their heavily taxed crews 
any more often than was absolutely necessary. 
Having demonstrated there was a serious problem 
with regard to quality of capital ship coal for Hipper's 
command, the question may be asked whether Hipper was 
ever short of even bad coal for his ships. The answer 
may be found in the documents of the Imperial Naval Office 
which indicate that for December 1917,160 tons (sic) of 
92 
coal were delivered of the 14,000 tons requested. This 
was the coal shortage at its worse and yet it did not 
interfere seriously with Hipper's operations for this 
93 
particular period; the weather was too foul for major 
92 
BA/MA, F 2047, Reichsmarineamt, Zentral Abteilung, Akten 
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sorties, the period of maximum shortages in the German 
economy coincided with the regularly scheduled time for 
94 
capital ship refits, and the fleet stockpiles, adequate 
to begin with, were not depleted by a high tempo of oper- 
ations. In any case, there was little Hipper could do. 
The effects -of the British blockade were felt in 
Germany long before the shortage of coal at Wilhelmshaven. 
Gerhard Ritter says '... what really depressed the mood of 
the people in this third war year was the British blockade, 
the impact of which was growing more and more severe. '95 
Ritter continues: 
During the turnip winter of 1916-17 there 
was widespread famine, draining the working ca- 
pacity even of workers in heavy industry, and 
this continued until the following harvest. The 
drought during the summer of 1917 promised not 
only no improvement, but worse to come. 
Among the reasons for the steady decline 
in morale and the rise in dissatisfaction were 
the shortage of raw materials, of labor for 
civilian needs, and of fuel; the breakdown of 
transport; and the fear that the war might 
drag on into a fourth winter. 
94 
See Kohlen und öl Bestende (Coal and Oil Stocks) in 
n. 93 supra. These stocks met 'Requirements of High Seas 
Fleet fuel in War, ' cited in n. 87 above. 
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The coal shortage is discussed in the Supply Service 
Records of the Flag Officer, Reconnaissance Forces, and 
they indicate that because of the relatively low tempo of 
operations and the foul weather a crisis was avoided. 
Personnel 
Two types of people were required to support Hipper's 
ships: those who manned them and those who repaired them 
in the Imperial Dockyards. There is considerable evidence 
that the German surface fleet suffered from a lack of 
trained shipyard workers and a lack of competent executive 
officers and petty officers. The Imperial Dockyards, 
which performed the routine heavy maintenance for the Ger- 
man fleet, were hard-pressed to keep up the regular main- 
tenance. This was because they had to handle a burgeoning 
submarine program, new surface ship construction, construc- 
tion to replace losses, and also repair damaged ships and 
refit undamaged ones. 
96 
All of this had to be accomplished 
without as many people as the peacetime establishment had 
allowed. Many workers were called to the colors and many 
96 
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volunteered. 'By the autumn of 1916 the most important 
issue at hand for the shipbuilding program was the ques- 
tion of workers. '97 Additional support for the assertion 
that Hipper's logistical facilities were overburdened as 
early as the spring of 1915 comes from German Admiralty 
Staff documents. For example, there is a letter inform- 
ing the Admiralty Staff that because of repairs to the 
Derfflinger and Se itz, the Wilhelmshaven Imperial 
98 
Dockyard would have to postpone new ship construction. 
Hipper himself comments on problems of dockyard support 
in writing about a Baltic operation by the Tenth Destroyer 
Flotilla which cost no less than seven ships lost to mines. 
He says: 'The loss in people is, thank God, light--there 
were only 1 deck officer, 5 petty officers and 6 seamen 
lost but the loss of valuable destroyer materiel is not 
easily repaired, namely because now the shipyards are 
suffering under a worker shortage. '99 
97 
F. Forstmeier and S. Breyer, op. cit., p. 39. 
98 
USNA, PG 76531/Reel 984, Admiralstab, Befehle an andere 
Behtirden, Reichsmarineamt an Admiralstab, 6 "Apr 1715, 
ers anýIc Correspondence -ith tier ira ty Staff, Orders- 
Commands, Imperial Naval Office to Admiralty Staff, 6 Apr 
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But there were moreserious logistical shortages 
troubling Hipper: the shortage of adequate executive 
officers of middle rank and of trained petty officers. 
The officer shortage in the German navy showed up early 
in the war100 when battle squadrons were culled to pro- 
vide officers for the naval corps in, Flanders. This 
also required the decommissioning of the Sixth Battle 
Squadron as an effective unit and the reduction of the 
Fifth Battle Squadron. 
101 
This policy initiated in a 
crisis became permanent. As newer vessels were commis- 
sioned the older ones were paid off, even when the shor- 
tage of light cruisers in the High Seas Fleet was desperate. 
Acmiral Scheer says: 'Our weakness in cruisers with the 
High Seas Fleet--for the requirements of foreign stations 
had to be satisfied as well--was particularly deplorable. 
102 
Hipper carried out this policy in the autumn of 1916 when 
100 
USNA, PG 76529/Reel 983, Admiralstab, Befehle an andere 
Behörden, Hochseeflotte an Admiralstab, Admi al von ýIn enohl 
an Admiral von Pohl, 30 07t. 19149 A miralty Statt, Orders 
and orrespo_n ence witT UETier-lCommands, High Seas Fleet to 
Admiralty Staff, Admiral von Ingenohl to Admiral von Pohl, 
30 Oct 1914). See also Rear Admiral Behrcke to Admiral von 
Pohl, passim, 'There is no way we can make up for the shor- 
tages of officers in the fleet. ' 
101 USNA, PG 76531/Reel 984, Admiralstab, op. cit., ibid, 
Admiral von Pohl to Admiral von Bachmann, 16 Feb 1915, with 
endorsement and concurrence of Admiral von Müller, Chief of 
the Naval Cabinet. 
102' Scheer, Germany's High Sea Fleet in the World War, 
op. cit., p. 15. 
125 
the new S. M. S. Karlsruhe was commissioned with the crew 
of S. M. S. München; in November 1916 when Hipper assigned 
the crew of S. M. S. Stuttgart to the new Emden; in Janu- 
ary 1917 when he assigned the crew of S. M. S. Berlin to 
103 
the new Nuernberg. Additionally, the commandant of the 
North Sea Naval Station, feeling the pinch of inadequate 
harbour defences, made a play for the guns of the cruiser 
Niobe which had been Hipper's headquarters ship for some 
time. The commandant wished to rearm the harbour flotil- 
las with them. Even though Niobe was permanently moored 
alongside the quay at Wilhelmshaven, the fact that these 
guns were requested (and later supplied) is indicative 
104 
of shortages. Finally, as the war drew to a close, 
the Admiralty Staff was faced with continuous reports of 
personnel and other shortages. 
105 
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alty Staff Officers, 8 Sept 1916). 
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British prisoner interrogations also indicate that 
ships in Hipper's command suffered from shortages of 
trained personnel. The evidence indicates that the 
problem existed from the beginning of August 1914. 
Survivors of S. M. S. Mainz told their British captors 
that 'The German Navy was very short of engineer officers 
and engine room petty officers, and many were embarked 
from the merchant service at the outbreak of the war-- 
106 
including most of those on the Mainz. ' Holger Herwig 
details the mostly social reasons for the shortage of 
deck, engineer and executive officers in the Imperial 
German Navy. In 1914 the Deck-Officer Corps, composed 
of skilled technicians who maintained the increasingly 
complex fleet, was over 2,900 strong, more than 50 per 
cent of the entire German naval officer corps. 
107 
Re- 
sponsibilities were roughly equivalent to those of war- 
and 
rant officers in the American/British navies but privi- 
108 
leges were not. The German navy did not treat them 
very well even though as Tirpitz once said, 'They were 
the backbone of the navy. '109 For example, when Chancellor 
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P. R. O., Adm. 137/1943, Commodore Roger Keyes to Chief 
of War Staff Admiralty (V Adm Sturdee) 29 Aug 1914, p. 5. 
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Holger H. Herwig, The German Naval Officer Corps, 
(Oxford, 1973), p. 163 n. 5. 
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Herwig, op. cit., p. 140. 
109 
Ibid, p. 164. 
127 
Bethmann Hollweg offered commissions as engineer officers 
to all retired deck officers who volunteered for war ser- 
vice in 1914, and they volunteered almost to a man, the 
German navy responded by giving the commissions to other 
people instead: executive officer cadets, naval reserve 
officers and engineer-officer aspirants. The naval high 
command was of the opinion that 'deck officers belong to 
the petty officer corps; they were not deputy officers. 
Their origins and their education relegate them to petty 
officer rank. ' 
110 
Hipper's attitude toward the deck offi- 
cer corps is difficult to determine with any degree of 
certainty although some insight may be gained from his 
actions in the following instances. 
On 27 September 1914 Hipper wrote the fleet command 
requesting modifications for war in several old torpedo- 
boats. He said the living quarters in the boats would 
have to be changed in several ways: the executive officer 
cabins would have to fit twice as many people and the deck 
111 
officers would also have to double up. Thus it seems 
that in small ships Hipper demanded equal sacrifices of all. 
110 
Ibid, p. 169. 
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USNA, PG 76530/Reel 983, Admiralstab, Befehle an 
andere Behörden, op. cit., Hipper to ngenoFii, 27 -ept 1914. 
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Hipper's proposals for wartime modifications were en- 
dorsed by the Fleet Chief of Staff in the name of the 
Commander-in-Chief, von Ingenohl, and passed on to the 
Imperial Naval Office without comment, for action. The 
modifications were made. 
On April 17,1915 Hipper wrote the Fleet C-in-C 
requesting some changes in the administrative responsi- 
bilities of the officers under his command. Among the 
proposals was one dealing with the question of deck 
officer promotions. Hipper did not wish the authority 
for such promotions to be delegated to cruiser group 
commanders; he said 'it would be inadvisable to give 
this power to such a large number (four) of commanders 
because they might develop different and incompatible 
112 
policies. ' Admiral von Pohl agreed. 
Again, after the 1917 mutinies, Hipper recommended113 
that closer relations be developed among executive officers, 
deck officers, and petty officers. But Scheer, Fleet C-in-C, 
and Rear Admiral von Trotha, Chief of Staff, ruled 
114 
that 
this recommendation was of no interest to the fleet command. 
112 BA/MA, F 728/PG 65717/Reel 1313, Akten Hochseeflotte, 
op. cit., Hipper to von Pohl, 17 Apr 1915. 
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commanders, 30 Aug 1917. 
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With treatment like this, it is little wonder 
there were shortages of deck officers or that their 
treatment became a public issue in Germany. Even as 
late as May 1918 the navy continued to reject any-at- 
tempt to place deck officers on an equal status with 
executive officers. 
115 
This policy's effects were re- 
flected in two fleet crises during the war which Herwig 
116 
describes as follows: 
In the summer of 1917 deck-officers had 
failed to report the rebellious mood of the 
sailors. because they felt that it was strictly 
a matter concerning executive officers and 
ratings. In fact Admiral von Hipper noted, on 
10 October 1918, that his petty and deck offi- 
cers had become unreliable and that some of 
them were inciting the ailors to disobey exec- 
utive officer commands. ' The discontent of the 
engineer-and-deck officers because of the re- 
fusal by the executive officer corps to grant 
them equal though separate officer status cre- 
ated a serious breakdown of communications 
within the naval hierarchy. 
Like the deck officers, the German Naval Engineer- 
Officer Corps were constantly embroiled in a struggle for 
status, a struggle which began in the 1890's and culminated 
by late summer 1918 into what Herwig describes as a 'gaping 
117 
chasm' between executive and engineer officers. The 
115 
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report from Oct 19 
117 Herwig, op. cit., p. 163. 
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engineers were responsible for the propulsion plants, 
machinery and stokers. In evaluating Hipper's attitude 
toward the engineers under his command a most useful 
tool is the annual fitness report, a confidential eval- 
uation which measures both the man and his performance 
in a particular assignment. Hipper's interest in tech-, 
nical proficiency, as opposed to military or social 
status, is evident from his evaluations of the leading 
engineers in the battle cruisers and light cruisers in 
his pre-war command. For example, in his report on the 
Senior Engineer of the battle cruiser Seydlitz, Hipper 
characterized Engineer Lt. Cdr. Thomsen as 'very capable, 
competent, and knowledgeable, fresh and flexible--he displays 
great abilities in difficult situations. 
118 
Hipper evalu- 
ated Engineer Commander Streipe of S. M. S. Moltke as 'being 
able to handle preferred jobs on the basis of his technical 
ability, his energy and his willingness to perform. '119 Of 
120 
Engineer Commander Elster of the battle cruiser von der Tann 
Hipper wrote, 'Good quality... he has been able to keep the 
machinery free of breakdowns in very difficult circumstances. ' 
118 
USNA, PG 67250/Reel 494, Akten Hochseeflotte, Haut e- 
fechtsbesichti un Apr 1914, ' 'Urteil u er den leitenden n en- 
ieuren No. (Papers of the High Seas Fleet, ain Battle 
Readiness Inspection Report, Apr 1914, Section on Leading 
Engineers, No. 2) Fitness Reports. 
119 Ibid, Report No. 1, Commander Streipe. 
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On the other hand, Herwig feels Hipper represented 
the 'hard line approach' in his attitude toward the 
engineers; he relates an incident reported to Scheer on 
16 February 1916 concerning Hipper's refusal to admit a 
flotilla engineer to the torpedoboat commander's mess. 
After the officer tried again, Hipper explained that he 
refused permission on the grounds that 'there was no 
necessity for this, it was undesirable from a military 
point of view, and the space available did not permit it, '121 
and Scheer agreed with Hipper. It should be noted that the 
incident transpired aboard a torpedoboat, and Hipper's re- 
fusal on the 'space available' grounds had real basis in 
fact. 
122 
Recalling that Hipper was the ultimate discipli- 
nary authority for all officers holding the rank of lieu- 
tenant and below in the High Seas Fleet, his objection 
from a military point of view that discipline be consistent 
seems well taken, since it was a matter of regulation in 
the German navy. In retrospect, Hipper's refusal on the 
'no necessity' grounds is the weakest of his arguments 
but only because the ultimate alienation of engineer officers 
in the closing months of the war proved the matter should 
have been taken more seriously. 
121 Herwig, op. cit., p. 156. 
122 F. Ruge, S. M. Torpedoboat B110/Warship Profile 27, 
(Windsor, 1972), p. 69. 
132 
Herwig says senior executive officers realized 
there would be a shortage of regular engineer officers 
123 
even without a war by mid-1917 at the latest. And 
following the demise of the German navy in 1918 Admiral 
von Trotha, who had been Fleet Chief of Staff, admitted 
that the officer corps, including deck, engineer, and 
executive officers, had been extended to its very limit 
and beyond by the creation of countless small units, 
U-boats, and casualties. The same applied to non-commissioned 
petty officers. 
124 
Wartime expansion concentrating on light 
ships and U-boats at the expense of heavy ships over- 
strained the training facilities and policies for officers 
and petty officers in the Imperial navy. As Trotha told 
Hipper, 'There appears ample proof that our armed forces 
were unable to withstand a long war. '125 
Besides personnel shortages, Hipper had the very serious 
logistical problem of providing adequate amounts of nourishing 
food to his men, a reflection of the very serious food 
123 
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shortages prevalent in Germany. Although the executive 
officers may have eaten well, according to Herwig, the 
126 
seamen did not. The situation was so grave that the 
German fleet command moved to set up food complaint com- 
mittees in the spring of 1917. A. J. Ryder says, 'The 
same undercurrent of discontent which produced the strikes 
in industry also led to an abortive naval mutiny in the 
summer of 1917. Morale in the navy was not high, mainly 
because of boredom induced by prolonged inaction. Specific 
grievances were bad food and the overbearing attitude of 
officers towards their men. '127 Two American naval authors, 
in their examination of the German navy's problems in World 
War I, asserted that 'the quality of the food... was bad 
throughout Germany in 1917 due to a poor harvest, and the 
British blockade, ' 
128 
and that 'bad food has long been one 
of the major grievances of sea-faring men. The German Navy 
was no exception. Rations were scanty, and in the last two 
years of the war, of the worst quality, while at the same 
126 
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time the officers continued to enjoy even luxury. '129 
To a certain extent it is true that the national situ- 
ation with regard to food shortages precluded any effec- 
tive remedy on the part of individual flag officers 
like Hipper. Horn quoting Admiral Capelle says that 
'... when the food shortage was at its worst von Batocki, 
the War Food Commissioner, ordered Admiral von Capelle, 
the Secretary of the Navy, to cut rations once more. 
Sloughing off any possible argument, Batocki admonished 
Capelle to forget his peacetime conceptions of the men's 
food requirements. '130 It is probably due to the general 
food shortage in Germany that Hipper's personal writings 
do not mention food as a problem, including the winters 
of 1916-17 and 1917-18. And even in his soul-searching 
comment on the collapse of the navy in 1918131 Hipper 
does not blame food shortages as a cause. It is also 
difficult to establish whether Hipper had much to do with 
129 J. B. Brown, 'Death of a Fleet, ' U. S. Naval Institute 
Proceedings, March 1941, pp. 346-347. 
130 Daniel Horn, The German Naval Mutinies of World War I, 
(Rutgers, 1969), T. 4O. 
131 BA/MA, Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., 9/9,31 Oct 1918. 
Hipper blamed Bolshevist agitation, war weariness and 
the abortive sortie of 29/30 October 1918. 
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the creation of the 'Food Commissions' in the spring of 
1917; they appear to have been primarily the work of 
Admirals Scheer and Capelle. 
132 
But there were other 
problems which came to Hipper's attention in the spring 
of 1917 to which he could and did propose solutions. The 
light forces were short of technical manpower and Hipper 
proposed to change the reserves' regulations so that the 
senior ratings could receive advanced professional train- 
ing and in some cases, become petty officers or even deck 
officers. He felt that the regular petty and deck officers 
could then be freed for service in the light ships. 
Hipper said the new drafts of reserves for the navy were 
usually qualified enough to take over the duties of the 
senior reserve seamen and stokers. Such a change would 
allow the regular petty and deck officers serving in the 
High Seas Fleet to go to the smaller ships in larger 
numbers and be replaced by trained reserves. However, 
Hipper's suggestion was not adopted because the fleet 
command believed there would be too much dislocation of 
132 
key personnel and readiness would be affected adversely. 
132 
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Hipper's Materiel 
About every six to nine months during the first 
two years of the war, the Fleet C-in-C asked the three 
battle squadron commanders and the flag officer, recon- 
naissance forces, for their evaluation of lessons learned 
from war experience. In the second series of such reports 
Hipper was asked by Admiral von Pohl for his opinion on 
scouting forces' materiel, what should be built for the 
German fleet in the future, and what changes should be 
made in the present materiel to correct deficiencies. 
Hipper replied133that it was 'neither correct nor 
economical to build ships of war which were anything less 
than superior to those of the enemy. ' He said his ships 
were built according to the 'principle of equality' with 
the enemy, not superiority. This principle, according 
to Hipper, allowed the enemy to set the frame of reference 
for any engagement and created other difficulties which 
resulted in his inability to dictate the course of any 
action because of the nature of his materiel. 
He contended that the slower speed of both battle 
cruisers and light cruisers allowed the enemy the option 
133 
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of engaging or escaping at will. German naval artillery 
was less powerful than that of the enemy and Hipper's 
ships were inadequately protected against the enemy's 
superior firepower and speed. 
While Hipper's criticism stems from his role as a 
naval commander, the shipbuilding policy of the Imperial 
Navy was at the heart of his problem. This policy has 
been outlined quite clearly by Tirpitz who as Secretary 
of State for Navy was responsible for German naval con- 
struction. In describing the complex decision-making 
process, Tirpitz wrote: 
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'... every warship is a compromise of 
different desires which can never all be ful- 
filled at one and the same time within the 
limits of the finished article. A definite 
standard of buoyancy armour plating and speed 
are all wanted with a given displacement. Then 
there is a fight in the committees over a matter 
of 25 or 50 tons; and to satisfy everybody, one 
would soon have a 100,000 ton ship without having 
gained anything at all. Thus it is the strategic 
idea of the ship which must be firmly determined 
before anything else; in the nature of things, 
however, only the supreme naval command... can 
decide this. 
The battle cruisers criticized by Hipper in his 
1915 report had their origin as a German ship type in 
the decisions made during a conference 
135 
19 September 
1906. At this time Tirpitz determined the 'strategical 
idea' of the German battle cruiser was to be an 'adequate 
134 
Tirpitz, My Memoirs, op. cit., p. 42. 
135 USNA, PG 66087/Reel 1501, Reichsmarineamt, Zentral- 
abteilung , Akten Sitzun s-Proto o e, Imperia Naval Of ice, entrat Division, Papers Concerning Plenary Confer- 
ences, vol 4), 18 Sept 1906. 
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reply' to the Invincible type, the first one of which 
was laid down 5 February 1906 and launched 26 June 1907, 
the second laid down 1 March 1906 and launched 16 March 
1907, and the third laid down on 2 April 1906 and launched 
13 April 1907. S. M. S. von der Tann, laid down 21 March 
1908 and launched 20 March 1909, was the German reply136 
to the Invincible class, not S. M. S. Blücher, as Oscar 
Parkes asserts. 
137 Tirpitz said at the 1906 conference 
that the British were continuing to build large armoured 
cruisers and that the decision would have to be made to 
follow the English lead. Tirpitz and his committee had 
two designs for large cruisers under consideration, both 
with about 19,500 tons displacement and both with 8 28cm. 
(11-inch). guns, but with different armament layout. 
The Naval Constructor von Eickstedt, however, opposed 
Admiral Tirpitz' concept of following the English lead 
for several technical reasons. von Eickstedt noted that 
the explosive trials for German battle cruiser protection 
systems were not yet complete and might require revising 
the design, and delay the design from three to nine months. 
The turbine question also was unclear, he said, and it 
would be three to nine months before such engines could 
136 
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18 September 1906, p. 7. 
137 
Parkes, British Battleships, op. cit., p. 492. 
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be built in Germany. He suggested it was incorrect to 
build such a large cruiser which actually would displace 
more than the 1906 battleships, the Nassau class dread- 
noughts, especially since the question of underwater 
protection had not been resolved. Further, since it 
was known the Invincible class had only 180 mm. side 
armour, Eickstedt reasoned, a main armament of 21 cm. 
(8.2-inch) or 24 cm. (9.4-inch) would be adequate to 
penetrate the British ships' armour. 
Rejecting these arguments, Tirpitz said there were 
both military and political reasons for the proposed in- 
crease in calibre and displacement. He admitted there 
were severe technical problems for the construction de- 
partment but noted that the time was right for getting 
the appropriations through the Reichstag. 
Admiral von Heeringen of the General Naval Department, 
a branch of the Imperial Naval Office, noted that the 
whole shipbuilding picture was in a state of flux and 
that 'total concept'of every ship class could only be 
decided within the context of other nations' programs. 
He said the 28 cm. (11-inch) guns were necessary so the 
ship could engage enemy battleships if need be. But Tirpitz 
replied that the battle cruiser primarily would have to 
fight her own kind and for this alone, the 28 cm. armament 
was needed. 
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Admiral Capelle, deputy director of the Imperial Naval 
Office, said that by mid-November 1906 the tests concerning 
underwater protection for battle cruisers would be complete. 
If the anti-torpedo bulkhead in the designs had to be 
strengthened, it might mean the 28 cm. guns would be. too 
heavy and 24 cm. guns mounted so that the displacement could 
be kept around 19,000 tons. But Tirpitz was adamant in his 
insistence that 28 cm. guns be mounted even if the displace- 
ment had to be increased. 
The discussion continued and covered the question of 
secondary armament; it was decided to mount 15 cm. (5.9-inch) 
guns in casemates, as in previous construction, rather than 
accept von Eickstedt's suggestion of a 17 cm. (6.7-inch) 
secondary armament which would have entailed abandonment 
of the idea of a battle cruiser design. The heavier secon- 
dary armament would have absorbed a greater proportion of 
the displacement so-that eight heavy guns could not have 
been mounted. 
The 1906 conference concluded with Tirpitz deciding 
that the final design would be a battle cruiser built 
according to the recommendations of the General Naval De- 
partment, armed with eight heavy guns, displacement not to 
exceed 19,500 tons, speed to be 232 to 24 knots, and cost 
approximately 36 million gold marks. Further, all departments 
141 
were to aid the Construction Department as needed in 
expediting completion of the project. S. M. S. von der Tann, 
followed by Moltke, Goeben, Seydlitz, Derfflinger, Lützow, 
and Hindenburg, were the results of this decision-making 
process, and were laid down under this program between 
1908 and 1913. All but Goeben were part of Hipper's forces 
during World War I. Financial stringency and the practical 
difficulties of changing a design precluded much evolution 
in battle cruiser development especially in light of the 
priority of battleship construction in a continuously 
expanding building program. However, in 1911 it was de- 
138 design 
cided that a major advance in battle cruiser/would have to 
be attempted. This was not only because of what other 
countries, notably Britain and Japan, were building but 
also because the German ship construction effort had 
reached a magnitude where naval technical personnel had to 
concentrate their designing efforts either on battleships 
or battle cruisers. To do both every year was beyond the 
capability of the Imperial Naval Office. Tirpitz therefore 
decided to make such improvements in the 1911 battle cruiser 
design that it could be used for several succeeding years. 
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The ships produced under this program included S. M. S. 
Derfflinger, Lützow, and Hindenburg. The important dif- 
ferences between this class of vessels and their predeces- 
sors included a 30.5 cm. (12-inch) main armament disposed 
on the centre line amidships; a raised midships super- 
structure and a concomitantly, higher secondary armament; and 
heavier protection. It was decided to wait until 1912 
before determining whether oil should replace coal as the 
primary fuel for propulsion. It would be well to note that 
wherever limits were imposed on the capabilities of these 
139 
ships, funding was the primary cause; and even Tirpitz could 
not manage complete control over the revenues for his fleet. 
A secondary cause was the shallowness of the North Sea 
140 
estuaries and to a lesser extent, the size of the Kiel 
Canal. Tirpitz put it this way: 
Further, we have to consider that our navy, 
compared with the great foreign navies, has always 
found itself in financial straits, which in view 
of the Chancellor's attitude toward the fleet had 
a most hampering effect on its development, espec- 
ially during the last five years of the war... 
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... in view of the shortage and the fear 
encouraged by the Treasury and the Reichstag, 
of exceeding the estimates, it will be readily 
understood with what caution the available 
money was distributed, and how we were constantly 
forced to weigh in advance the cost of remedying 
even the smalles defect, which nevertheless re- 
mained a defect. 
141 
There is evidence that Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg 
retarded the growth of the German navy during the war, 
142 
as Tirpitz wrote, but Gerhard Ritter states that 'Tirpitz's 
naval programme ultimately rested on an overestimate of 
German resources that was characteristic of the Wilhel- 
minian era. '143 He adds: 
He (Tirpitz) blandly ignored the fact 
that German finances were far from inexhausti- 
ble and that despite the fiscal reforms of 1909, 
simultaneous enlargement of army and navy, as 
planned in 1911, simply transcended German re- 
sources and was bound to throw the Reich budget 
into serious confusion. 
Thus it appears that in the development of German 
144 
battle cruiser materiel the prime consideration was funding 
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rather than superiority over the enemy as Hipper and 
other front commanders so heartily desired. That Hipper 
was aware of the political considerations inherent in 
any building program is evident from his reply of 
7 July 1915 to von Pohl's question of what kind of 
capital ships should be built in the future. Hipper 
said: 'In order to answer this properly, I should have 
to know what was the situation, what were the government's 
political objectives, and what role the armed forces of 
the country were to have in attaining those objectives. ' 
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Hipper also wrote that he believed large capital 
ships would be required to conduct overseas warfare in 
any future war, especially 'if we desire to bring the 
war into the Atlantic. ' He said the threat of the U-boat 
could be countered by greater underwater defensive measures 
and higher speed in large capital ships, though it was 
not clear to him exactly what type of capital ship should _ 
be built. He felt Germany should refrain from further 
battleship construction until it was clear what the enemy 
was going to do; meanwhile, battle cruisers should be 
built. These, he said, should have heavy calibre guns 
carried in four turrets on the center line with the 
greatest possible range and secondary artillery as at present. 
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Hipper also believed there 'should be_ at least 50 per cent 
reserve gun tubes for each heavy gun carried., As for 
armour, he was in favour of increasing the protection 
against plunging fire by adding armour to the decks and 
weapons systems, both turrets and magazine-handling areas. 
This could be accomplished by reducing the side armour; 
and thecitadel armour should be strengthened bow and stern 
to keep out the seas if necessary. Hipper also suggested 
a second armoured deck to protect the rudder machinery 
and was in favour of increased freeboard aft and completion 
of the watertight integrity of fore and aft spaces for the 
full length of the ship and to the upper deck. And he 
wanted a more spacious command tower, especially for the 
flagship, with a good view aft. 
In addition to better protection for future battle 
cruisers, Hipper's thinking on their propulsion plants 
reveals a bent towards speed. He said the machinery 
should be able to maintain the highest continuous speed 
for a fully loaded ship in sustained operations. The 
maximum speed should be six to seven. knots faster than 
the Derfflinger class (26 knots) and about three knots 
faster than any fast battleships which might be built, 
and it should be possible to achieve this 'highest contin- 
uous' speed in an hour. 
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Hipper wanted a greater radius-of action than the 
German battle cruiser of 1915 possessed (some 2,000 to 
2,500 sea miles), for operations overseas. If German 
bases or supply ships were available, then Hipper wanted 
oil-fired ships. If technology would permit, he wanted 
diesel engines because he said they provided a higher 
radium of action, contributed to ship stability, and 
advanced the ideal of a passage not heralded by great 
clouds of smoke. 
The question may be asked if any ships resembling 
Hipper's prototype ever got on the German drawing board, 
after von Pohl had passed the recommendations on to 
Tirpitz. Several ships did get on the drawing board, 
146 
a few were launched, but none saw service in World War I 
or under the Versailles Treaty. 
As to technical improvements which could be ; made 
in the ships Hipper already had, he canvassed his captains 
and endorsed their opinions in several letters to the 
Fleet Commander, both before and after Jutland. Suggested 
changes included removal of ventilation ducts between 
magazines to prevent spread of fire or explosion and 
installation of topside vents to direct any explosion 
or fire upward. This suggestion was a result of Capt. 
Maurice von Egidy's experience in the Dogger Bank battle. 
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F. Forstmeier and S. Breyer, Deutsche Grosskampfschiffe 
1915-1918, (Munich, 1970), pp. 1817-. 
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Von Egidy also desired all access between magazines 
sealed off. He further observed, and Hipper concurred, 
that so little sustained high-speed operations had been 
carried out in peacetime that the ships' characteris- 
tics cards had not been fully worked out to top speeds. 
It was obvious that an annual three-hour. full speed trial 
was inadequate preparation and therefore Hipper ordered a 
24-hour full speed drill for all of the battle cruisers to 
be carried out at least once every three months. Von 
Egidy also observed ghat coaling took far too long and 
required far too many people. He said that coal that 
was to be used as protection should be regarded as ballast 
only and never used as fuel. In improving protection, 
Egidy concurred with Hipper's assertion that additional 
armour should be given to turrets, ammunition supply 
routes, and magazines to protect them from plunging fire. 
To defend against aerial attack, armoured gratings should 
be placed atop the smokestacks. 
147 
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Besides protection, another serious problem in 
Hipper's ships which could be partially remedied by 
technical improvements was the relatively short range 
of the battle cruiser's main armament. Capt. Magnus 
148 
von Levetzow, of S. M. S. Moltke, believed the British 
superiority in long range artillery could be overcome 
if the guns in the German ships were modified to allow 
them to be elevated to reach a range of 25,000 meters. 
Hipper endorsed this in principle and indeed the ele- 
vation of the guns in Hipper's battle cruisers was 
increased by several degrees and their range by several 
thousand meters. But not by the 10,000 meter improvement 
149 
Levetzow desired. 
In sum, Hipper's battle cruiser materiel was a 
reflection of his environment as a surface force commander 
in the German navy whose ships suffered from a lack of 
adequate financing in peace and a lack of technical supe- 
riority in war. 
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PART III 
HIPPER AND THE HIGH COMMAND 
In addition to an unfavourable naval environment, 
Franz Hipper's parameters as a naval commander included 
insufficient rank and little contact with the power 
brokers in the German national and naval high command. 
Together these factors precluded Hipper's having consis- 
tent impact on national or naval policy in the World War 
through official channels. However, the records indicate 
that he did have substantial contact and impact on the 
succeeding fleet commanders of the German naval 'front' 
and that his major work was in the area of fleet opera- 
tions. Consequently, this part of the work is directed 
toward delineating Hipper's parameters in dealing with 
the national and naval high commands. Additionally, 
Hipper's relationships with his three fleet superiors-- 
Admirals von Ingenohl, von Pohl, and Scheer--are detailed 
and analyzed. Accounts of Hipper's strategical and tac- 
tical thinking are provided in the context of his per- 
formance in combat crises, culminating in his appointment 




Hipper's billet as Flag Officer, Reconnaissance 
Forces, was an inadequate level of command and an in- 
sufficient power base from which to affect national 
policy on an official, continuing basis. The assign- 
ment and the command are listed on page 26 of the Imperial 
German Navy List following the multifarious bureaux of 
the Imperial Naval Office, the Admiralty Staff, the Fleet 
Command and the three active battle squadrons. 
I 
Hipper's 
billet was rated by Admiral Scheer2 as roughly equivalent 
in responsibility to an Army division commander, albeit 
by inference because his analogy concerned the responsi- 
bility of a battle squadron commander; the test of equiv- 
valency was that only the three battle squadron commanders 
and the Flag Officer, Reconnaissance Forces, were author- 
ized to assume command of the High Seas Fleet in the 
event of the C-in-C's death or disability in action. 
3 
1 
Rangliste der Kaiserlichen Marine 1914 (Berlin, 1914), 
p. 
26. 
2 Scheer, vom Segelschiffe zum U-boot, op. cit., p. 224. 
3 BA/MA F 3468/PG 67613, Auszüge aus Qualificationsberichten 
über Flaggoffiziere, Dez 1915D_ezT1 (Excerpts from Fitness 
Reports on ag icers). See also BA/MA F 3303/PG 66710, 
Organisation des Seestreitkrafte (Organization of Naval 
Forces) Admiral von Tirpitz to Admiral von Müller 23 Apr 1913. 
See also P. R. O., Adm 137/4839, Director of Naval Intelligence 
to First Lord, Memo on German Officer Personnel Policies, 
loc. cit. 
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Scheer also equated the Fleet C-in-C to an Army Corps 
commander with one important difference: the Fleet 
C-in-C had access to the Kaiser and was one of seven4 
officers in the navy who did. However, when Hipper be- 
came Fleet C-in-C in August 1918, replacing Scheer, the 
latter's reorganization of the navy resulted in only 
one officer having direct access to the Kaiser: Scheer. 
5 
Hipper's simultaneous lack of greater rank and a 
sufficient power base practically guaranteed lack of 
continuous or sustained contact with those who held 
power in the national, political, military and naval 
high commands. 
His 'relationship, ' if one could call it that, 
with the Kaiser, was limited to a few meetings during 
6 
the war. The first time was when the Kaiser visited 
the Fleet after the Dogger Bank battle, a visit made on 
4 February 1915. While Hipper does not record any sig- 
nificant conversation he had with the Kaiser on this 
occasion, he is nevertheless pictured with the Emperor 
inspecting battle damage to the Seydlitz, which was 
4 Herwig, op. cit., pp. 26ff. 
5 Walther Hubatsch, Der Admiralstab und die obersten 
Marinebehörden in Deutsc an -l? 3+ , 
7Frannkfurt, 1958) 
p. 178. See also BA/ 2 05/Reel 450, Akten 
Marine-Kabinett, op. cit., Scheer to Capelle 9 Aug 1918, 
Scheer to MUller 16 Aug 1918. 
6 BA/MA Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., 2/19-20,4 Feb 1915. 
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7 
Hipper's flagship. The Kaiser's next visit to Wilhelms- 
haven at which Hipper was present was on 23-24 February 
8 
1916 shortly after Admiral Scheer had assumed command 
of the Fleet. The Kaiser was briefed by Scheer aboard 
the flagship Friedrich der Grosse and later addressed 
the officers in the officers' mess ashore. Hipper ob- 
served that this briefing resulted in a resumption of 
intensified U-boat warfare. 
9 
The next time Hipper saw the Kaiser was 5 June 1916 
when His Majesty awarded him the Pour le Merite, Germany's 
highest combat decoration, for his performance at the 
battle of Jutland. After the ceremonies, Hipper accompanied 
the Kaiser on a visit to the badly damaged battle cruiser, 
Derfflinger, 
10 
and dined with him in the officers' mess 
ashore. 
Hipper's last meeting with the Kaiser was 18 August 
1917 at Wilhelmshaven when he visited the fleet after the 
mutinies at Kiel. From Wilhelmshaven the Kaiser made a 
trip in the battleship Baden to inspect the defences at 
Heligoland Island but Hipper did not accompany him, as he 
7 John Wingate (ed. ), Warships in Profile, vol. ii, S. M. S. 
Seydlitz, p. 32, photo of Hipper an tze Kaiser. 
8 Walter G3rlitz (ed. ), The Kaiser and His Court, The 
Diaries, Note Books and etter AcTmira- Geor Alexander 
von Müller Chief of E1 aR val Ca5 net 1914- (London, 
. Tl I'M 
9 BA/MA Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., 4/33,23-24_Feb 1916. 
10 Ibid, 5/21,5 June 1916. 
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had to prepare for the next day's manoeuvres. 
11 
Hipper 
was to make other comments about the Kaiser in his war 
diary but he never saw the Kaiser again. 
Other records and accounts also show Hipper's 'rela- 
tionship' with the Kaiser was inconsequential despite his 
earlier exposure to the royal family. In the voluminous 
records12 of the interviews and audiences granted by the 
Kaiser between 1899 and 1918, Hipper's name does not 
appear. In the private papers13 of Admiral Georg von 
Müller, Chief of the Naval Cabinet from April 1906 until 
November 1918, Hipper is not among those recorded as 
seeing the Kaiser at times other than those Hipper himself 
mentioned in his personal war diary. Again, the Nachlass 
von Levetzow which contains substantial correspondence 
with the Kaiser particularly after the war, gives no 
indication that Levetzow's first war-time commander (Hipper) 
either knew or corresponded with the Kaiser. 
14 
And in the 
11 Ibid, 7/31-32,18 Aug 1917. 
12 BA/MA F 349013/PG 67787-67790/Reels 565,566, Vortri e 
und Audienzen bei Sr. Ma'esttt, Apr 1899-März 191, $ kAddresses 
a'Icn Audiences oFRT testy, Apr 1899-Mar 1918). - 
13 BA/MA N158/4,5, Nachlass von Muller, 1910-1926. 
14 M. O. D., N. H. B., Nachlass Kontre Admiral Magnus von Levetzow, 
Briefe und Schriftsachen, vo s7 '97-35, Reels +4-48. Tor origi- 
nals see BA , -_Nachlass von Levetzow, July 1918-Dec 1932. 
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Memoirs which the Kaiser himself wrote, Hipper does not 
15 
appear. Nor is Hipper credited in any of the recent 
major interpretations of German war policy with having 
any role in the decision-making process. 
16 
Turning to the civilian political side of the German 
government, the evidence indicates that Hipper had little 
contact with it and no impact. Of the four chancellors-- 
Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, Georg Michaelis, Count 
Georg von Hertling and Max von Baden--Hipper met only 
Bethmann Hollweg and this was at a meeting on 30 June 1916 
aboard Admiral Scheer's flagship in the Jade river after 
the battle of Jutland. According to Hipper's account 
17 
of 
this meeting which also included von Holtzendorff, Chief 
of the Admiralty Staff, it was Scheer who advanced the 
Fleet's views on future war strategy and Hipper himself 
remained silent. When Bethmann Hollweg wrote his Memoirs 
he did not mention Hipper. 
18 
Nor is Hipper mentioned in 
the memoirs of the chancellors who succeeded Bethmann 
Hollweg except for a notation in von Baden's that Hipper 
15 Ex-Kaiser Wilhelm, My Memoirs 1877-1918, (London, 1922). 
16 Gerhard Ritter The Sword and the Scepter, vols. iii and iv, 
(Miami, 1972-19735. --'gee a1so77ritz VII-sciFer, ý Germany's Aims in 
the First World War, (London, 1967). See also Hans atzce, 
Germany's Drive to the West, (Baltimore, 1966). 
17 Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., 5/24,30 June 1916. See also 
Scheer, vom Segelschiff, op. cit., pp. 334-335, and Scheer, 
German 's High Sea Fl et in the World War, op. cit., pp. 177-178. 
see also Bet nn HolT-weg,, Betracchun en zum Weltkrie , vol. ii, Während des Krieges, (Berlin, , pp. -T33 . 
18 Bethmann Hollweg, op. cit. 
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19 
was Fleet C-in-C at the end of the war. Hipper does 
rate a footnote in the recent volume of published 
documents edited by Erich Matthias and Rudolf Morsey 
20 
concerning von Baden's regime. 
Hipper's 'relationship' with the army seems limited 
to an occasional personal comment in his war diary on 
the actions of leading figures. 
21 
This lack of contact 
is significant since after August 1916 'German military 
leaders became the undisputed rulers of Germany, no 
longer subordinated to the emperor, still less held in 
check by the chancellor... Success, the key to political 
19 Georg Michaelis, Für Staat und Volk, Eine Lebensgeschichte, 
(Berlin, 1922) and Georg von Hertling Erinnerun en aus 
meinem Leben, 2 vols, (Munich, 1920). See a so Max von Baden, 
The Memoirs of Prince Max of Baden, 2 vols, (New York, 1928), 
T. i-'i, pp. -77 82. _' 
20 Erich Matthias and Rudolf Morsey, Die Regierung des 
Prinzen Max von Baden, (Düsseldorf, lm), p. 470, n. 20. 
21 Nachlass Hi er, op. cit., for mention of Generals 
Mac enc'sen an Hindenburg see 3/18, entry for 18 July 1915 
and 4/5 19 Sept 1915; Mackensen 4/8 10 Oct 1915; von 
Falkenhayn 4/28 5 Feb 1916; Hindenburg and Ludendorff 
5/22 8 June 1916; Hindenburg, Ludendorff and Falkenhayn 
6/7 30 Aug 1916; Mackensen and Falkenhayn 6/15 27 Nov 1916; 
Hindenburg and Ludendorff 7/23 4 July 1917; Hindenburg and 
Ludendorff 8/30 and 8/32 11 Sept 1918; Ludendorff 9/8 
26 Oct 1918. 
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authority in Germany, rested with the military leaders 
alone. '22 The succeeding chiefs of staff of the German 
army were Moltke, Falkenhayn and the duumvirate of 
Hindenburg and Ludendorff. Moltke does not appear in 
Hipper's diary at all nor does Hipper appear in Moltke's. 
23 
General Erich von Falkenhayn, Prussian Minister of War and 
Chief of the General Staff 1914-1916, does not mention 
Hipper in his account of these years. 
24 
But in early 1916 
Hipper characterized von Falkenhayn as a defeatist and 
an enemy of the U-boat25 But later that year, after Falken- 
hayn was relieved of his post in grand headquarters and 
assigned to the Balkans, Hipper's attitude changed be- 
cause of Falkenhayn's success in that theatre. 
26 
Field 
22 A. J. P. Taylor, The Course of German 
ýHistory , 
(New York, 
1962), p. 171. See also A. Rosen Imperial ýGerman , 
The Birth of the German 
ýRe 
Republic 1871-1918, (Boston, 1964), 
pp. TIT-7577. --eeTGer- chard Ritter, op. cit., vol. iii, 
The Tragedy of Statesmanship--Bethmann Hollweiz as War 
Mancell, l3N iami, , pp. - . 
--See also titter, 
op. cit., vol. iv, The Reign of German Militarism and the 
Disaster of 1918, TFIiami I973). 
23 Helmuth von Moltke, Erinnerungen, Briefe, Dokumente, 
1877-1916, (Stuttgart, . 
24 Erich von Falkenhayn, General Headquarters 1914-1916 and 
Its Critical Decisions, ( on on, 1919). 
25 Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., 4/28,5 Feb 1916. 
26 Ibid, 6/15,27 Nov 1916. 
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Marshall Paul von Hindenburg's memoirs do not mention 
27 
Hipper and neither do those of Ludendorff. In short, 
Hipper seems to have had no contact with and no influence 
on the military leadership. 
Indeed, even his involvement with the national naval 
command was minimal. Hipper dealt with the. seven senior 
officers who had access to the Kaiser through his own 
'C-in-C who was included in this select group. Because 
of Hipper's level of rank, it was only through the Fleet 
C-in-C that Hipper would have any contact with them 
in his capacity as Flag Officer, Reconnaissance Forces. 
28 
And an examination of the documents in the Naval Cabinet, 
Naval State Secretary's Office and Admiralty Staff shows 
Hipper had little influence through official channels. 
Of the senior naval officers who had access to the Kaiser 
and were most important in their impact on policy, the 
following admirals played leading roles: Admiral Georg 
von Müller, Chief of the Naval Cabinet 1906-1918, Admiral 
Alfred von Tirpit; Secretary of State for Navy 1897-1916 
and his successor, Admiral Eduard von Capelle, 1916-1918, 
27 
Paul von Hindenburg, Out of My Life, (London, -1920). War es, (London, 19 See also Erich Ludendorf f emori 20). 
28 
Every paper Hipper submitted to-'higher authority went 
via his Fleet C-in-C. For example, see n. 136, Part I of 
this work, Hipper on Recruiting System. Also see BA/MA 
F 145/PG 75106/Reel 655, Hipper on Cruiser Warfare. 
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and the three Chiefs of the Admiralty Staff, Admirals 
von Pohl (1914-1915), Bachmann (1915) and von Holtzen- 
dorff (1915-1918). 
29 
There is massive documentary evidence to indicate 
Hipper was not involved in the decision-making process 
which had its origins in the Naval Cabinet. He had 
nothing to do with the organization of the higher naval 
commands, 
30 
does not appear anywhere in the correspon- 
dence concerning differences of opinion among the higher 
naval commands31 which discussed the smaller things at 
times such as the fleet drill book and the torpedoboats' 
drill book, subjects close to Hipper's heart, as well as 
29 
Herwig, op. cit., pp. 272-274. See also Ritter, op. 
cit., vol. iii, p. 602, entries for von Müller; p. 608 
entries for von Tirpitz; p. 593 entries for von Capelle; 
p. 603 entries for von Pohl; p. 590 entires for von 
Bachmann; p. 598 entries for von Holtzendorff. See also 
Fritz Fischer, op. cit., entries for each of the above. 
See also Gatzke, op. cit., entries for each of the above. 
Carl-Axel Gemzell, op. cit., also details the important 
roles played by each of these men in German naval strategy 
as does Walther Hubatsch in Der Admiralstab, op. cit.. 
Wilhelm Deist, Militgr und Innenpolitik im eltkrie 1914- 
1918, (Dusseldorf, 197OTTs another good record as is ýIitz, op. cit., and GBrlitz, Der Kaiser..., (Berlin, 
1965). Also see Tirpitz, Deutsc10 nmac tspolitik im 
Weltkriege, (Berlin, 1926). 
30 BA/MA F 3301/PG 66696-66699, Akten Kaiserliches Marine- 
Kabinett. Or anisation der Obersten Marinebehörden, Juni 1888- 
Se t-1318 apers of the -Imperial a1 Naval a inet, Organization 
o the Higher Naval Commands, June 1888-Sept 1918). 
31 BA/MA F 3302/PG 66700/Reel 488, AHIKK, Meinungsverschieden- 
heiten zwischen den obersten Marinem h5rden Nov 1892-März1911 
i erences o lpinion' Among te Higher ava=Comman s. 
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the larger questions of spheres of authority of the 
highest naval commands. Hipper made no comment on the 
32 
Admiralty Staff organization which would serve him in 
war by providing intelligence. Despite his operational 
concern for good training and readiness, Hipper did not 
contribute to the files of the German navy's training 
establishment. 
33 
He did not contribute to the discussion 
centered in the Naval Cabinet concerning the organization 
34 
of naval forces. This file indicates that no 'front' com- 
mander of scouting forces participated in the decisions 
affecting the evolution of his billet. Ironically, the Naval 
Cabinet file on torpedo force organization shows Hipper 
had no input on the way these important forces were set 
35 
up. The worth of inventions to the war at sea was de- 
cided by the Naval Cabinet, not by the people who would 
use them. 
36 
The Naval Cabinet also kept files of articles 
32 BA/MA F 33021d/PG 66701-66705/Reels 539,540, ABMK, 
Organisation des Admiralstabs der Marine Mllrz 189ýov 1918, 
rganizationT the A mira tyEaFF -of-tiheNavy, rch-I899- 
Nov 1918). 
33 BA/MA F 3302 le/PG 66706/Reel 540, Or anisation des 
Bildun swesens der Marine Se t 1884-Apr 1914, rgan nation 
of the Naval r is ning Command). 
34 BA/MA F 33031f/PG 66707-66711/Reels 510,511, AHtVIK, 
Organisation des Seestreitkräfte June 1891-Aug 1918, 
rganization Naval Forces). 
35 BA/MA F 3304/PG 66714/Reel 513, AHMK, Organisation des 
Torpedowesens Juli 1890-Okt 1914, (Organization of the 
Torpedo Forces). 
36 BA/MA F 3310IVb/PG 66667-66668/Reel 631, AHMK, Erfindungen 
1914-1918, (Inventions). 
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or books written by all serving or retired naval officers; 
Hipper published nothing. 
37 
Exercise and drill reports of 
the High Seas Fleet found in the Naval Cabinet papers 
indicate Hipper submitted only those reports which went 
38 
via Fleet superiors. Thus, it appears Hipper figures 
only in the drill reports of the High Seas Fleet so far 
39 
as the Naval Cabinet papers are concerned. In the private 
papers of the Chief of the Naval Cabinet, Admiral von 
40 
Müller, Hipper is mentioned in connection with Tirpitz' 
attempt to fire him; fortunately for Hipper, von Müller 
refused. Müller was able to do this because as he explained 
37 
BA/MA F 3386/PG 67143-67415, AHMK, Literarische Ver- 
öffentlichungen von Offizieren und Beamten Mai 18 
uni 1916, u licä ions by icers andOfficiäls . 
38 BA/MA F 3391/PG 67211-67219,67230,67233,67240-67243/ 
Reels 492,513,514,515, AHNK, Ubungsberichte Aua 1899- 
März 1915, (Drill Reports). 
39 BA/MA F 3391-3396/PG 67237-67246/Reels 494,515,516, 
AHMK, Akten Hochseeflotte Ubun sberichte, Okt 1905-Dec 1914, 
IPapers of te High Seas Feet, Exercise Reports See 
F 1912,1913 May manoeuvres. See also BA/MA F 3428/PG 67388/ 
Reel 494, AHMK, Beiheft Schiffsersatz Okt 1915-Sept 1918, 
(Special File ShipbuuiZaing ip esigný 'bee a so BA TA 
F 3443 XXXI/PG 67475/Reels 501,520, Flotten olitik, Au 1911- 
Feb 1912, (Fleet Policy). See also BA/MA 67476/ 
'l6, AHMK betr. Militärpolitische ýFra eýn Apr 1918, (Papers 
of the- Naval-Cabinet Concerning i itary-Political Questions). 
40 BA/MA N159, Nachlass von Müller, 4/343,31 Jan 1915. 
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to Rear Admiral August von Heeringen, of the Imperial 
Naval Office, 'I cannot manage everything but I can 
hold up anything. '41 
Hipper also dealt with the Admiralty Staff which 
served him and other front commanders with intelligence, 
4and 
analyses of operational proposals, 
43 
geopolitics and naval 
strategy. The latter files show no contributions from 
Hipper which were adopted. 
44 
41 A. von Tirpitz, Politische Dokumente, op. cit., vol. ii, 
op. cit., p. 33. 
42 See BA/MA F 426/PG 76945-76958, Englische Hafen 1914-1918, 
(English Harbours); BA/MA F 454/PG 77063-37064/Reels 1170, 
1171, Ausgegangene Nachrichten über englische und franzBs- 
ische treat r te, u ec19149 me igence issemi- 
n on English and Frenc airships ; BA/MA F 491/PG 77211- 
77228/Reels 1101-1103,1049,1050,1195,1196, Nachrichten 
über die feindliche Flotte und Kflstenbefesti un en 14 Au -" 
T -17 ar me igence on the Enemy eet and Coastal Def'encesTrBA/MA F 1884-1890/PG 63864-63910/Reels 1461,1459, 
Akten B. d. A., (Papers of the Flag Officer, Reconnaissance 
Forces). See PG 63869 and 63892 for Hipper's intelligence re- 
ceived after Jutland. The other files were sunk. 
43 BA/MA F 149/PG 75106/Reel 655, Hipper on Cruiser Warfare, 
with marginal notes by Rear Admiral Paul Behncke, deputy chief, 
Admiralty Staff, 14 Nov 1914. See also Hubatsch, op. cit., 
pp. 165ff. See also Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., 2/12,22. Jan 1915. 
44 BA/MA F 160/PG 75652-75654/Reels 951,952, Laufende Marine- 
Politik, Nordsee Apr 1918-Mai 1919, (Current Navolicy, 
North ea See aTso $A AT177G 75704/Reel . 
872, Akten bette 
laufende Marine-Politik Nordost atlantik Jan-Dec 1918, (Papers 
Concernining Current Nava Policy on te NortiFeast lantic). 
See also BA/MA F 166/PG 75704/Reel 982, Akten betr. Militdr- 
olitische Angelegenheiten: Deutschland Dec I9l]-7 rte, 
(Military- (Military-Political Situation, Germany ; A/ / 76902- 
76906/Reel 995, Seekrie sführuna der Nordseekrie schau Latz 
1914-1918, (Conduct of the aal War in ort Sea ; BA A 
67974-67975/Reel 1060, Schriftwechsel über 0-Direc- 
tiven, (Correspondence on Operational Directives . 
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However, one particular file--Admiralty Staff Cor- 
respondence with other commands--contains a fair amount 
from Hipper via his C-in-C to the Imperial Naval Office 
which provided a copy to the Admiralty Staff. Hipper re- 
quested alterations to torpedoboats, cruisers, small craft 
45 
and other vessels to suit war exigencies. Records of 
the Naval High Command, successor to the Admiralty Staff 
from August to November 1918, indicate Hipper had no 
impact on grand strategy during this period when he was 
the Fleet C-in-C. 
46 
Another indication that Hipper's involvement with 
the national naval command was minimal may be found in 
the small number of dealings he had with the Imperial 
Naval Office concerning materiel, its primary wartime 
activity. These dealings were mostly in the area of 
47 
'nuts and bolts' matters as cited above. However, it 
45 USNA/PG 76529-76534/Reels 982-984,928-929,1027-1029, 
1030, Admiralstab der Marine, Befehle an andere Behörden, 
1 Aug 1914-30 Sept '1 AdmirTy St 'f-of the Navy, 
Correspondenceand Orders With and To Other Commands). 
46 BA/MA F 562/PG 69295-69296/Reel 1184, Akten Seekrie s- 
leitun , Akten OPII AIX Meldungen an S. M. 
I8 Äu 19189 
TR-eports to His jesty, tie Kaiser, from t-Fie val War 
Command); BA/MA F 566/PG 69329/Reel 1185, All Krie sführun 
auf dem Nord*, Krie schau Latz 21 Au 1918-7-Apr 1919, 
7n7Juct he War in the Northern Theatre). 
47 USNA/PG 76530/Reel 983, op. cit., n. 45 supra, Hipper 
to Fleet to Imperial Naval Office, cc to Admiralty Staff, 
27 Sept 1914, Substitution of Command Boats of the I. and II. 
Minehunting Divisions for S 104 and S 106. ' See also loc. 
cit., Hipper to von Pohl, 8 May 1915, forwarded to Imperial 
Naval Office , cc to Admiralty Staff. See also Hipper to Scheer 3 Nov 1916, forwarded to Imperial Naval Office, cc to 
Admiralty Staff. 
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should be noted that the policy-making role of the 
Imperial Naval Office was diminished-after the war 
broke out, primarily because of restrßction8 which 
the Kaiser applied to Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, State 
Secretary of the Imperial Naval Office. Nevertheless, 
because Tirpitz tried twice to have Hipper sacked, it would 
be a serious omission not to explore the circumstances. 
Hipper's biography by Waldeyer-Hartz suffers from such 
49 
omissions as well as a pro-Tirpitz bias. * It ignores the 
50 
published criticism of the actions of the B. d. A. on the 
28th of August 1914, the Battle of Heligoland Bight. 
British light and heavy cruiser forces swept into the 
area and sank three light cruisers and a large torpedoboat; 
Tirpitz''son, Wolf, was the paymaster of S. M. S. Mainz, 
one of the three cruisers sunk. The day after the action 
Tirpitz wrote: 
48 Ritter, op. cit., vol. iii, pp. 18,149,153. See 
also Tirpitz, My Memoirs, op. cit., p. 494, letter dated 
2 January 1914. Mee also BA/MA F 728, Reichsmarineamt 
Akten Hochseeflotte, op. cit., Papers for 1914-1918. - 
se etrace the influence on construction and manoeuvres 
which evolved after 1915 into almost entirely materiel 
matters. 
49 
Waldeyer-Hartz, op. cit., pp. 94 ff, 110 ff, 252. 
50 Tirpitz, Dokumente, vol. ii, op. cit., p. 76. 
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I can scarcely hope that Wolf will be 
among the few saved from the Mainz; circum- 
stances were too much against him. The small 
cruisers were too reckless, and apart from 
that, I feel very bitterly that my advice did 
not appear to be properly followed. One 
doesn t send them against armoured ships un- 
less one has his battleships and torpedo craft 
close behind. But I won't protest, sI can't 
review the events that proceeded it. I 
Tirpitz' published documents indicate that he did 
indeed protest, however, on the same day he wrote the 
above. In a memo to the Chief of the Admiralty Staff, 
Admiral von Pohl, Tirpitz criticized the order given 
by the B. d. A (Hipper) to the light cruisers to repel 
the attack by enemy light forces even though the German 
ships did not have capital ship support. 
52 
And on the 
same day Tirpitz, in his explanations to the Kaiser, 
said that 'both battle cruisers and fleet should have 
sortied to support the light cruisers at the first re- 
ports of enemy action. '53 This criticism seems valid 
especially since the first signal of enemy action was 
at 0637 when the entire fleet could have sortied but 
54 
Hipper only sent reinforcing light cruisers out at. 0855. 
51 Tirpitz, My Memoirs, op. cit., p. 456,29 Aug 1914. 
52 Tirpitz, Dokumente, vol. ii, op, cit., p. 76. 
53 Ibid, p. 77. 
54 BA/MA, F 3820/PG 62446, Kriegstagebuch der B. d. A., 
(War Diary of Flag Officer, Reconnaissance örces , 
28 Aug 1914, entry for 0855. 
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However, the intelligence Hipper had failed to indicate 
heavy forces would be needed as no heavy enemy ships had 
been reported. A complicating factor was the weather: 
clear in Wilhelmshaven harbour, rain in the Outer Roads, 
and fog in the outer bight where the action took place. 
Further, as early as 29 July 1914 Hipper had been ordered 
to take over the defence of the German Bight but Ingenohl, 
Fleet C-in-C, had determined the disposition of the ships 
in the outer defence line. On 28 August Hipper sent 
cruisers to support ships occupying positions which the 
Fleet C-in-C had ordered. In sum, while Tirpitz' criticism 
is valid after the fact, it remains true that only the 
Fleet C-in-C could have ordered out the battleships but 
Hipper could have ordered Moltke, von der Tann, Blücher 
and Seydlitz as well as the battleship Helgoland which 
was on outpost duty and under his operational control that 
morning. But this would have had to be done before 0830 
when the tide was sufficient for the ships to cross the 
55 
Jade River bar. The first report of British capital ships 
in, the Heligoland Bight was from the Mainz at 1303. 
Tirpitz continued to press his criticism of Hipper's 
action on 28 August in a personal letter to Admiral 
Wilhelm von Lans, Chief of the First Battle Squadron, 
mentioning Hipper by title rather than name, a practice 
55 
BA/MA, F 3820/PG 62446, Kriegstagebuch der B. d. A., 
op. cit., 28 Aug 1914, entry for 1303. 
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Tirpitz adheres to in his Memoirs and the two volumes 
of published documents. 
56 
Tirpitz told Lans he was 
writing to him 'because I have no formal right to write 
to von Ingenohl. ' He said he did not understand the 
order which the B. d. A. gave which had German light cruisers 
attacking British cruisers and destroyers without benefit 
of German torpedoboat forces operating with them. Tirpitz 
stated the two were designed to work together and sending 
one without the other was a grave tactical error. And 
another mistake by the B. d. A., he said, was the order to- 
57 
the light cruisers to pursue the enemy. Lans, however, 
defended Hipper, noting the Fleet C-in-C did not order 
the heavy ships out and Hipper did not intend to have 
58 
cruisers attack without support. Lans also said that 
the cruisers Frauenlob and Stettin did a very good job 
supporting the German torpedoboat flotillas which were 
in the outer defence line and that the B. d. A. had never 
given an order for the light cruisers to pursue the enemy. 
Ingenohl also staunchly defended Hipper to the Kaiser, 
noting that the heavy ships had been ordered not to go out 
59 
for strategical reasons. But Admiral von Pohl, who agreed 
56 Tirpitz, Dokumente, vol. ii, op. cit., p. 81-83. 
57 Ibid, p. 82. 
58 Ibid, p. 86, Lans to Tirpitz, 13 Sept 1914. 
59 BA/MA, F 3890a/PG 62474, op. cit., von Ingenohl, p. 11. 
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with Ingenohl's strategy, and Prince Henry of Prussia, 
who disagreed with Ingenohl's strategy, both blamed 
Hipper and his captains for not doing a better job 
60 ' 
anyway. The German official history is vague in 
that it assigns 'some blame' to the individual cruiser 
commanders and 'other higher commands. '61 Some six weeks 
later Tirpitz received a letter from his son, Wolf, from 
a prison camp in England and Tirpitz said in his Memoirs: 
62 
... The letter of the 9th with copy, by the paymaster of the Mainz has just come to 
hand. My poor boy, who elt so strongly 
about the blunders in our leadership on 
August 28th: It is doubtful whether he would 
suffer less now if he saw how his father's 
work was being turned to no purpose. 
Meanwhile, Tirpitz had seen the Kaiser a second time 
on the 4th of September 1914 and asserted the blame for 
the results of the battle off Heligoland accrued to the 
63 
B. d. A. 
Five months later, on 24 January 1915, Hipper lost 
the battle cruiser Blücher in the battle of the Dogger 
Bank. Again it should be noted that Hipper's biographer, 
Waldeyer-Hartz, asserts thereAno accusations of incompetence 
60 
Tirpitz, Dokumente, vol. ii, op. cit., p. 97, Pohl to 
Ingenohl, 13 Sept 4, and p. 101, Prince Heinrich to 
Tirpitz, 10 Sept 1914. 
61 
Otto Groos, Der Krieg in der Nordsee, vol. i, (Berlin, 
1922), pp. 210,212. 
62 Tirpitz, My Memoirs, op. cit., p. 477. 
63 Tirpitz, Dokumente, vol. ii, op. cit., pp. 83-84. 
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64 
made against Hipper, but it would seem otherwise 
according to the diary of Admiral Georg von Müller, 
Chief of the Naval Cabinet. His entry for the days 
30 January-4 February 1915 says: 
65 
Still in Berlin. Sunday. A hard working 
day for me in Berlin. Just found time to have 
lunch at Arndt Holtenzendorff's with Admiral 
v. H. (Holtzendorff) and Dr. Jäckel and wife. 
The reports that have come back from the battle 
of the 24th have brought us to the conclusion 
that a change in the command should have utmost 
priority: Pohl for Ingenohl, Bachmann for Pohl 
(Tirpitz also wanted the Cruiser Commander, Rear- 
Admiral Hipper fired, but I do not agree). Very 
difficult decision; letter written to von In- 
genohl. 
1 Feb. Monday... in the case of the change 
of command, it has been completed very smoothly. 
I did not detect one iota of human sympathy... 
4 Feb. Wilhelmshaven. Beautiful weather. 
Pohl took over command of the Fleet. In the 
meantime the various views about the events of 
the cruisers' action of the 24th have brought 
about the consensus of opinion that Admiral 
Hipper conducted the whole matter quite sensibly. 
In evaluating the relationship between Hipper and 
Tirpitz it is well to note the omission of Hipper's 
name from the Tirpitz memoirs, published documents and 
unpublished correspondence with other admirals. Beyond 
64 
65 
Waldeyer-Hartz, op. cit., p. 160. 
BA/MA N 159, Nachlass von Müller, 4/343,30 Jan-4 Feb 1915. 
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these two battles there were other differences between 
Hipper and Tirpitz. In the critical weeks at the be- 
ginning of the war, Hipper supported the strategy advo- 
cated by the Kaiser and Bethmann Hollweg that the fleet 
should be used defensively, a strategy opposed by Tir- 
66 
pitz. Hipper also criticized Tirpitz materiel in sev- 
eral official reports, requesting larger guns for light 
67 
cruisers and torpedoboats. Finally, Hipper successfully 
opposed an idea advanced by Tirpitz that four new light 
cruisers should be sent to Flanders to prey on Allied 
shipping in the Channel; Hipper suspected this idea 
was politically motivated for a Tirpitz gain in the 
68 
Reichstag. In sum, the Hipper-Tirpitz relationship 
was more likely to be of a limiting nature for Hipper, and 
Hipper's comment on Tirpitz'-Memoirs provides its own 
66 
BA/MA, Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., 1/10,6 Aug 1914. 
For the Kaise s view see Tirpitz, Dokumente, vol. ii, op. 
cit., pp. 41-42. For Bethmann Hollweg, looc7 cit. For 
Tirpitz, loc. cit., p. 44. Cf. Herwig, op. cit., p. 176 
for a superficial interpretation of Tirpitz and Hollweg 
on strategy. 
67 USNA, PG 77733/Reel 1659, Kriegserfahrungen, op. cit., 
pp. 2ff. See also Hipper to Fleet G-in-G 27 Sept 1914 in 
n. 47 supra. See also Nachlass flipper on rearmament of 
light cruisers, 4/18,1ýTec TD=. 
68 Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., 3/12,11 June 1915. 
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insight. In December 1919 Hipper wrote to Admiral von 
Trotha, chief of the newly established German Admiralty, 
and said: 
It would have been better if he (Tirpitz) 
had given a more substantive description of the 
work the Fleet did during the war... for a work 
so largely awaited, it is a grave disappointment 
... the real tragedy is in the failure of the 70 life's work of the great statesman who wrote it. 
69 
Hipper thus stands in agreement with latter-day 
interpreters of German history and German naval strategy. 
71 
But his personal view of Tirpitz would seem to be some- 
what less than adulation. 
In retrospect, Hipper's personal influence on the 
national naval command was minimal despite the preceding 
exposition of his differences with Tirpitz. Even after 
Tirpitz resigned in March 1916, Hipper seems to have had 
no dealingsof substance with his successor, Admiral Eduard 
Capelle. 
72 
The other six positions besides the Imperial 
Naval Office Tirpitz headed, which entailed access to the 
69 Albert R3hr, Handbuch der deutschen Marine Geschichte, 
(Oldenburg/Hamburg', 1963), p. . 
70 NS/SA, Dep 18 A132, op. cit., Hipper to Trotha, 24 Dec 1919. 
71 Ritter, op, cit., vol. ii, The European Powers and the 
Wilhelminian Empire, 1890-19149iami, 1972)v p. TO; 
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Kaiser, included the Naval Cabinet, the Admiralty Staff, 
the Inspector General of the Navy, the chief of the Baltic 
Naval Station, the chief of the North Sea Naval Station, 
and the C-in-C of the High Seas Fleet. The two naval 
station commandants were seldom important to Hipper 
although at the end of the war his involvement with them 
was critical in the course of events during the mutinies 
and revolution of 1918, discussed in Part IV of this work. 
There were two physical parameters which affected 
Hipper's dealings with the national and naval high command: 
time underway and distance from the decision-makers. 
Except for periods of lea most of Hipper's time was 
spent aboard his flagships, Seydlitz, Lützow and Hindenburg, 
and the base ship Niobe, located in Wilhelmshaven. Records 
indicate he never got to Berlin or visited grand head- 
quarters during the war. 
73 
In reviewing Hipper's parameters thus far, it is 
apparent that whatever he may have thought about the great 
issues affecting Germany his opinions had little impact on 
the official deliberations surrounding the events. His 
rank and power base as Flag Officer, Reconnaissance Forces, 
73 Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., is a complete record of Hipper's 
daily existence from May 1914-January 1919, and no entry to 
indicate a visit to Berlin or grand headquarters. See also 
Personal Akten Hipper, op. cit., for an official chronology. 
See also ice. "-'... der B. d. A. , op. cit., 29 July 1914 to 9 Aug 
1918; K. T. B. des ffý. ar Diary, High Seas Fleet Command), 
9 Aug 1918-30 pct T918). 
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were insufficient for. him to affect policy ashore. 
Hipper did, however, have substantial contact and impact 
on the succeeding fleet commanders of the German naval 
'front. ' Records show he had a leading role in the oper- 
ations and command of the High Seas Fleet which the 
national and naval high commands had created. 
Hipper and the Fleet 
The long and boring process called war is punctuated 
by short,. unbelievably intense and extremely deadly, 
periods of combat. The sum of a commander's achievements 
during these periods mark him as a leader or no, for 
combat is the ultimate test of any military commander 
or naval leader. 
During the war Hipper served under three fleet com- 
manders until he himself became Commander-in-Chief. Each 
of his superiors is dealt with chronologically. The 
national and naval policy under which Hipper and his 
respective commanders worked is set forth along with 
accounts of Hipper's planning activity. 
His performance with inadequate materiel, orders 
from the high command that were hardly models of clarity, 
and frequent foreknowledgg of his plans by the enemy, can 
be evaluated by weighing his conduct in five significant 
engagements. These actions, in chronological order, 
173 
were the battle of Heligoland Bight on 28 August 1914, 
the bombardment of Great Yarmouth on 3 November 1914, 
the bombardment of Scarborough and Hartlepool and the 
action in the English Channel on 16-17 December 1914, 
the battle of Dogger Bank on 24 January 1915, and the 
battle of Jutland on 31 May-1 June 1916. 
German national policy just prior to the outset of 
World War I was set upon war. According to Imanuel 
Geiss, 'The documents prove beyond doubt that Berlin not 
only knew of the possibility of war against Serbia, but 
actually pressed for it. ' 
74 He notes that 'Berlin was 
well aware that Russia would be forced to intervene, 
making world war inevitable. '75 There are also indications 
that Bethmann Hollweg tried to keep England neutral in 
the event of a continental war. 
76 
Interestingly enough, 
Hipper perceived the fallacy of any war plan which dealt heý 
only with France and Russia andAbelieved England would 
77 
not remain neutral. This was on 27 July 1914. The final 
British answer to the German government came two days 
later to this effect. 
74 Imanuel Geiss, July 1914 The Outbreak of the First World 
War Selected Documents, (NewYrk, 1974: j, p. 364. For docu- 
ments see pp. 106, , 126,42-44,74. 
75 Ibid, loc. cit. 
76 Ibid, pp. 268-269. 
77 Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., 1/8,27 July 1914. 
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At the outbreak of the war the German strategy 
followed was a modification of the Schlieffen plan 
which mandated an attack through neutral Belgium on 
France and a holding action in the east against Russia. 
78 
One leading officer in the German navy, Reinhard Scheer, 
noted that 'The strategical plans of the Army had a 
decisive influence on the functions of the fleet. The 
Navy had the duty of supporting the Army on two fronts 
in such a way that its rear was unconditionally secured 
against any danger threatening from the north. '79 The 
political plans of the government called for a strong 
80 
fleet as a vital bargaining counter at the negotiations. 
In a situation like this, with both military and political 
pressure exerted to do as little as possible, the options 
of a fleet commander were somewhat limited. Nevertheless, 
78 
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though a struggle over the fleet's limited options might 
be expected between the fleet leadership and grand head- 
quarters, at war's outset 'there was no real struggle 
over military or political issues between the Chancellor 
and the naval command. '8 The Chief of the Admiralty Staff, 
Admiral Hugo von Pohl, the Chief of the Naval Cabinet, 
Admiral Georg von Müller, and the Chief of the High Seas 
Fleet, Admiral Friedrich von Ingenohl, all agreed on a 
basic Kleinkrieg (little war) strategy to protect the 
German north coast from the enemy and to preserve the 
fleet from loss at little or no cost to the enemy. This 
strategy, said Gemzell, was one of four 'action alternatives 
in German naval strategical planning' from 1914 to 1918.82 
These alternatives were 1)-the annihilation battle conducted 
with battleships in any number of places around the rim 
land of Europe; 2) the Kleinkrieg or guerilla war of 
attrition conducted with light ships, especially U-boats 
and torpedoboats in the North Sea; 3) the commerce war 
including surface raiders or U-boats in the Atlantic area, 
and 4) a war against sea communications using battleships 
81 
Ritter, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 19. See also Pohl, op. 
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and submarines in the Atlantic approaches with a con- 
comitant demand for bases flanking the British position 
in the North Sea. At one time or another Hipper advoca- 
ted all but the annihilation battle during Admiral von 
Ingenohl's tenure as Fleet C-in-C. For example, on 
6 August 1914, the same day as Pohl and the Chancellor 
were agreeing on strategy, Hipper noted the following: 
83 
... Nothing has been seen of the English fleet. Perhaps they are not as far with their 
preparations as we, or perhaps they are being 
very cautious about undertaking an offensive 
sortie against our coasts and desire for the 
time being to adapt to the tactic of a distant 
blockade. 
It is worth noting that Tirpitz had asked von 
Ingenohl during the 1913 manoeuvres about the possibility 
of the British adopting distant blockade tactics, to 
which question Ingenohl had no answer at the time; 
84 
lie later said that English publications gave every in- 
dication of a flexible attitude on this question and 
that a distant blockade had the permanent condition of 
American concurrence. Ingenohl also recorded Admiral 
Scheer as being of the opinion the English would not 
take up a distant blockade because it would be a loss to 
83 
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their prestige. Ingenohl still believed the English 
would attack to offset the military victories the 
Germans achieved in the east and west in the first 
85 
few months of the war. The British did not attack 
or attempt to impose a close blockade with their battle 
fleet; they did, as Hipper surmised, adopt the tactic 
86 
of a distant blockade. In another entry for 6 August 
Hipper records his agreement with the Kleinkrieg strategy 
advocated by the high command and Ingenohl: 
We have absolutely no reason to go to the 
attack now. The best and only possible course 
which we can take is to wait. First, England 
must establish her blockade which will hopefully 
afford opportunities for our torpedoboats and 
U-boats to draw the enemy's fangs and enable us 
to undertake action under more equal circumstances. 
This would afford us a possibility of success with 
the main fleet and under good circumstances we 
could win the battle. 
Hipper's comment reflects the thinking behind the 
Admiralty Staff approach to German naval strategy from 
1913 onwards under the leadership of Admiral von Pohl. 
87 
Admiral Friedrich von Ingenohl was Hipper's first 
Fleet Commander in war. Von Ingenohl had had some combat 
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experience in China, had commanded the East Asia 
Cruiser Squadron and the Second (High Seas Fleet) 
Battle Squadron as well as serving under Tirpitz in 
the Imperial Naval Office. 
88 
Ingenohl, in his official 
secret evaluation of the first six months of the war, 
said in January 1918 he believed that the German fleet 
was inferior to the British for. several reasons: the 
British had nearly twice as many ships of each type, 
their firepower was significantly greater, superior 
89 
enlisted personnel because of length of service. 
There is evidence, however, that Ingenohl himself had 
recommended Tirpitz continue to arm the German fleet 
with guns of smaller calibre than the British when 
Ingenohl was fleet C-in-C before the war. 
90 
The German official history contains a clear chart 
of naval strength which confirms Ingenohl's observations 
91 
on numbers and firepower. His evaluation of enlisted 
personnel is open to question. The German ratings were 
92 
thoroughly trained, according to British naval intelligence. 
88 
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Recent published accounts of the German naval rating's 
situation indicate his biggest problem in World War I 
93 
was lack of action, not incompetence. Hipper's own 
view at the beginning of the war was that the excellent 
training of the German sailor and a tight battle organ- 
ization might compensate for British numbers and firepower 
94 
if. a battle was forced on the Germans. Hipper also dis- 
agreed with Ingenohl's established views on smaller guns 
for the fleet and consistently pressed for heavier arma- 
95 
meet. After Ingenohl was relieved in February 1915, 
Hipper succeeded in having the light cruisers rearmed 
with 15 cm. (5.9-inch) guns, replacing their inadequate 
10 cm. (4.1-inch) guns, but there was neither time nor 
96 
resources to effect armament changes in the dreadnoughts. 
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Despite the fact that professional differences existed 
between them, however, Hipper received good fitness re- 
97 
ports from Ingenohl. In May 1914 he wrote of Hipper: 
He has proved himself quite good at the 
training of his ships in battle service, using 
the same devotion to duty he showed in the 
scouting service with good results; as the 
leader of the scouting forces in the battle 
drills the same applies. Energetic, fresh, ten- 
acious and progressing in an outstanding manner 
in the scouting service he has fulfilled his 
assignment well in every respect. 
Hipper had the confidence of his fleet C-in-C when 
war began insofar as any subordinate could. This confi- 
dence was not shaken by Hipper's direction of the light 
forces involved in the first naval action of the war 
on 28 August 1914, an action alluded to previously in 
discussion of the Hipper-Tirpitz relationship. As early 
as 1 August the German fleet command suspected the British 
might attack and Ingenohl issued an order setting up de- 




though this was'Hipper's responsibility. Arthur Marder 
notes 'The German Official Naval History says it was a 
fatal error for their Naval Command to have assumed that 
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the British light forces would have attacked so far 
100 
from their bases without the support of heavy ships. ' 
According to Raeder, Ingenohl's ship dispositions 
were not mutually supporting and could be picked off 
101 
one by one. A combination of this disposition and 
British reinforcement of the light forces with battle 
cruisers resulted in the loss of three German light 
cruisers and a torpedoboat. Rear Admiral Leberecht Maas, 
flag officer, torpedoboats, was lost along-with 1,200 
officers and men killed, wounded or missing. Despite 
the losses, Hipper did not record any misgivings over 
Ingenohl though he labelled the 28th of August 'a terrible 
day for us. '102 As a result of the lessons learned, ship 
dispositions were changed and outlying mine fields sub- 
stituted. At least four capital ships would be stationed 
outside the Jade bar for the rest of the war and all 
capital ships would be held at two hours' steaming notice. 
103 
100 
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Hipper's analysis of the action included these 
points: the German light cruisers had advanced far 
too rapidly in response to the signal of enemy destroyers 
in the Bight; if a similar situation occurred in the 
future they were to fall back on the guns of Heligoland 
fortress and 'this would prevent the English from 
achieving anything; ' again, if a similar situation should 
occur, the arrival of English battle cruisers would not 
necessarily mean a fleet action. Hipper also concluded 
from the action of 28 August that the loss of one of his 
battle cruisers, if damaged, was probable in an action 
in the Bight. Finally, he surmised the first fleet en- 
gagement would take place off Heligoland Island in the 
104 
German Bight, an area roughly bounded by the Denmark 
Peninsula to the east, the German and Dutch coasts to the 
south, and approximately 150 miles to the west and north 
into the North Sea. 
Ingenohl agreed, stating 'it would be good to be 
ready for such actions. '105 In perspective, the threat 
of such action kept the Germans thinking defensively 
although the British had no intention of attacking with 
104 
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106 
their fleet. They tried another raid with light forces 
on 10 September but this time the Germans were ready: 
Hipper had mined the Bight and withdrawn the vulnerable 
advance patrol lines only the day before107 and the 
British, presented with no targets and a dangerous mine 
field, withdrew. 
108 
In addition to the 28th of August engagement, 
Hipper was involved in three other actions and much 
planning activity under Ingenohl. One such plan was 
submitted in late September 1914 and called for Hipper 
to take his three battle cruisers in support of the 
auxiliary minelayer Berlin and attack the northern British 
109 
blockade line in the North Sea. The operation had the 
Kaiser's approval but the battle cruiser sortie was post- 
110 
poned due to machinery troubles and the operation was 
later cancelled because strong British forces were found 
to be operating across Hipper's planned course in the waters 
106 
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111 
off Norway. Berlin was sent without support, evaded 
Jellicoe's fleet and blockade forces, and laid a mine 
field which sank H. M. S. Audacious, a British super- 
dreadnought. By the beginning of October, it was be- 
coming increasingly obvious the war would be a long one. 
The Kaiser ordered his senior naval officers to convene 
and discuss their overall situation. 
112 
They did so aboard 
S. M. S. Friedrich der Grosse, the fleet flagship, on 
3 October 1914. Attending were Admirals Ingenohl, Fleet 
C-in-C, Hugo von Pohl, Chief of the Admiralty Staff, 
Wilhelm von Lans, Chief of the First Battle Squadron, 
Reinhard von Scheer, Chief of the Second Battle Squadron, and 
Rear-Admiral Funke, Chief of the Third Battle Squadron, 
Hipper did not attend. At the meeting it was decided to 
continue defensive Kleinkrieg strategy and not use the 
113 
fleet. All other admirals were informed of this decision 
on 5 October114 and the Kaiser issued an order the next 
day. 
115 
Hipper recorded the order and in the same entry 
116 
was content to glory in the Army's successes ashore. 
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In carrying out the Kleinkrieg or 'little war' 
strategy offensive minelaying operations had to be 
undertaken. The Fleet C-in-C thought minelayers should 
be protected by strong surface craft and that a large- 
scale operation might bring the British fleet down on 
117 
German mines or torpedoes. Ingenohl proposed a major 
operation off the English coast, noting that fleet morale 
and readiness would be improved by an offensive sortie 
under real war conditions. 
118 
The operation was approved 
by the Admiralty Staff in Berlin and the Kaiser in grand 
headquarters; he specified that airship and aircraft 
scouting were to be used to assure the fleet would not 
be surprised or cut off. 
119 
The concept of mining and bombarding the British 
coast began to take shape on 26 October 1914 when Hipper 
wrote the first of three drafts for the operation. 
120 
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Strangely, Hipper's biographer did not credit him with 
this planning. 
121 
Eventually, from Hipper's drafts War Plan 19 evolved 
and was cleared by the Fleet C-in-C and other cognizant 
authorities. Basically, it was a minelaying operation 
by cruisers of the Second Scouting Group. They would 
go in under cover of darkness, lay their mines by day- 
break, and steam back to Germany. Hipper's First Scouting 
Group was to stand by off the coast and out of sight; its 
mission was to deal with superior enemy forces, light or 
heavy, should the minelaying cruisers need support. A 
division of torpedoboats was to escort the light cruisers 
and raid shipping should the opportunity arise. 
At first von Ingenohl objectedlto Hipper's plan 
because a hospital was in the direct line of fire of the 
coastal batteries and a stray projectile might have 
terrible consequences. But this factor apparently had not 
worried Hipper in devising the plan, possibly because the 
British recently had captured a German hospital ship sent 
out to rescue the survivors of four torpedoboats sunk in 
the English Channel. What did concern him as a commander 
121 
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was the question of keeping his torpedoboats in an area 
that had just been mined. 
123 
He preferred to send them 
hunting for merchant ships. A fleet conference was held 
on 28 October 1914 to evaluate War Plan 19 and two changes 
were made: the torpedoboat division was dropped from the 
plan because of the danger of running onto German mines 
and the bombardment of Great Yarmouth by the First Scouting 
124 
Group was added to the original minelaying operation. 
Ingenohl also decided the range from the firing ships to 
Great Yarmouth was to be kept as great as possible, in 
deference to the town's hospital. 
125 
Final corrections to the plan, issued on 2 November, 
provided for the minelaying to be carried out at dawn and 
the bombardment executed shortly thereafter. The German 
caution regarding their torpedoboats proved wise indeed: 
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It is well to note that Hipper was ordered to 
develop the plan for the Great Yarmouth operation even 
though he lacked the formal preparation of an Admiralty 
127 
Staff officer in formulating operational plans. War 
Plan 19 was, however, detailed, it defined the tasks 
of all participants, and it disseminated available in- 
telligence, for example that the British First Fleet 
would not be in the area and some enemy light forces 
could be expected. It is also noteworthy that the 
German fleet had never practiced such an operation in 
peacetime manoeuvres 
128 
and what experience it did have, 
indicated that battle cruisers and light cruisers did not 
129 
operate well at night in close company. Therefore 
127 
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Hipper provided a different, more open night steaming 
formation for the approach to the British coast. He 
saw to it that everyone who had a part in the operation 
was properly informed of War Plan 19. 
The bombardment of Great Yarmouth on 3 November 1914 
was Hipper's 'baptism of fire' since on 28 August he 
had arrived in the battle area two hours after the 
British had left and was occupied in searching for 
survivors, not combat. Great Yarmouth provided a real 
test not only of Hipper as a naval commander; it provided 
a real test of the organization and combat effectiveness 
of Hipper's forces under wartime conditions. He wrote 
that '... the operation has been ordered and will be 
carried out, with the help of God. '130 He was on his way 
to being recognized as a commander. 
The operation itself was carried out successfully 
amd the German official history makes much of British 
redistribution of old battleships for coastal defence 
after the action. Nonetheless, there were some notable 
problems: the-weather was such that navigation had to 
be done on dead-reckoning for most of the voyage thereby 
forcing Hipper to wait an hour on his approach to Yarmouth 
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minelaying took longer than expected because the cruisers 
had to be sure of position, and there were fire discipline 
difficulties in driving off coastal defence forces. 
132 
Seydlitz, Hipper's flagship, hoisted the signal to open 
fire on a small gunboat and two destroyers coming out to 
attack the German formation. This signal was misinterpreted 
by other ships in his force, all four of which opened fire 
on the three small targets. Hipper momentarily lost control 
and the enemy escaped; he severely chastised his captains 
in the after-action report and the conference which followed 
the bombardment. Hipper's forces departed the English 
coast in time to avoid attack by the British submarine 
force which sortied. 
In his war diary,:; Hipper made five pertinent comments: 
1) identification of fishing craft in the Channel and North 
Sea was difficult in terms of either nationality or intentions; 
2) anti-submarine nets in the waters off Yarmouth precluded 
successful U-boat approach to that port; 3) only obsolete 
naval craft were found in the vicinity'of Yarmouth; 4) prev- 
ious reports on locations of English coastal mine fields were 
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Hipper's expectation that the 'bombardment itself 
will have a tremendous impact as it is to be carried out 
in such close proximity to the Thames estuary'134 rated 
the British historical rejoinder that it was '... an 
operation of no military significance whatever. '135 
And indeed the aims of the fleet commander, Ingenohl, 
were more internal than external in ordering the raid: 
he needed to raise his own fleet's morale. 
13Indicat-ive 
of 
Ingenohl's lack of success in this regard is the diary of 
Seaman Stumpf which makes no mention of the 1914 Yarmouth 
137 
bombardment. Actually, the raid was criticized within 
the German navy. For example, Admiral Paul Behncke, deputy 
Chief of the Admiralty Staff, questioned expenditure of 
138 
so many armour-piercing shells against non-naval targets 
and his chief, Admiral Pohl, not only concurred but wrote 
a criticism of the raid to the Fleet C-in-C. Ingenohl 
replied on 20 November and asserted Hipper had fired only 
40 rounds of heavy ammunition per ship and most of that 
at the attacking light ships, not land targets. He also 
134 BA/MA, K. T. B. der B. d. A., op. cit., 2 Nov 1914. 
135 Corbett, op. cit., vol. i, p. 265. 
136 Ingenohl, op. cit., p. 24. 
137 See D. Horn (ed), The Private War of Seaman Stump., 
op. cit., p. 4 n. I for origin of tTFe diary included in 
vol. x of the proceedings of the Reichstag Investigating 
Committee on Germany's collapse in World War I. 
138 BA/MA, -F 4060, op. cit., Rear Admiral Paul Behncke to 
Admiral Hugo von Pohl, 13 Nov 1914. 
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admitted the battle cruisers did not have high explosive 
ammunition for their main armament and submitted it would 
be a good idea to so equip them. Ingenohl repeated his 
139 
defence of the operation on grounds of improving morale. 
To some extent the military objectives of improved 
fleet readiness and disruption of British coastal trade 
were achieved but the latter was too limited to cause more 
than temporary damage. Hipper had hoped that part of the 
British fleet might be brought to action and damaged but 
since the results were so meagre, he said he would not wear 
the Iron Cross he had been awarded. However, he approved 
140 
of the other awards 'for the sake of the navy. ' 
Hipper was not the only officer disappointed with the 
operation's results; Tirpitz decided Ingenohl's leadership 
was severely wanting and claimed Rear Admirals Behncke, 
deputy chief of the Admiralty Staff, and Eckermann, fleet 
chief of staff, agreed. Tirpitz raised the question of 
Ingenohl's replacement in an interview with von Müller, 
Chief of the Naval Cabinet, in an interview on 8 November, 
proposing von Pohl but von Müller thought he was even less 
suitable. Tirpitz said even Captain Adolph von Trotha, a 
141 142 
fleet activist, favoured von Pohl but von Müller disagreed. 
139 BA/MA, F 4060/PG 64754/Reel 406, op. cit., Kommando der 
Hochseestreitkrafte an den Chef des Admiralstabs der Fgrine 
im Grossen Hau t uartie-r, -TiHiggh Seas Fleet Command to Ciii 
AMmira ty Sta , at Grand Hdqtrs. 
), Ingenohl to Pohl, 20.11.1914. 
140 Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., l/44,3 Nov and 1/46,15 Nov 1914. 
141 Tirpitz, Dokumente, vol. ii, op. cit., pp. 148-9,152-4,162-3. 
142 Ibid, p. 154. See also Gärlitz, op. cit., p. 43. 
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Ingenohl was to remain Fleet C-in-C until January 
1915. Hipper, meanwhile, advocated a change in fleet 
strategy as it was apparent to him that Kleinkrieg would 
not succeed in drawing the enemy into a German trap. He 
143 
forwarded to Admiral Ingenohl a suggestion from one of 
his captains, Max Hahn, of the battle cruiser von der Tann, 
namely, that the newest battle cruisers be used in the 
Atlantic in cruiser warfare. Captain Hahn had argued that 
there was no way to force England into a decisive battle 
on German terms using the present Kleinkrieg strategy, that 
operations with heavy ships in the North Sea were severely 
limited because of the danger of underwater attack, that 
German trade had been cut off from the world by relatively 
weak forces and that to destroy blockade lines would not 
free German trade. Hahn also said the destruction of 
English trade in the Atlantic might bring England to the 
peace table, thereby certainly affecting the land war. 
Hahn submitted his ideas to Hipper on 6 November 1914, three 
days after returning from the bombardment of Great Yarmouth. 
Hipper took Hahn's two-page proposal and expanded it 
into a strategical plan of operations before forwarding it 
143 
BA/MA, F 149/PG 74106/Reel 655, Kreuzerkrieg mit grosser 
Kreuzer Nov 1914, (Cruiser War with Battle Cruisers , 
Captain 
Max on Hahn to Hipper, 6 Nof 1914. 
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to von Ingenohl. Since Hipper has never been credited144 
with this position on Atlantic cruiser warfare, his po- 
sition is quoted in its entirety: 
Flag Officer Scouting Forces Wilhelmshaven 12 Nov 1914 
Most Secret 
Operations Proposal 
A proposal from Captain Hahn concerning the 
feasibility of undertaking cruiser warfare in the 
Atlantic with the newest battle cruisers is here- 
by forwarded to the Chief of the High Seas Fleet. 
My position is as follows: 
1) The occupation of the Channel coast and 
the concomitant threat this would imply to England 
would greatly facilitate the decision as to whether 
the newest battle cruisers should be sent into the 
Atlantic for prosecution of cruiser warfare as the 
author of the proposal argues, viz. for the rest-of 
the war. Following this logic, we wow wave to 
avoiU-any major planned landing in force in England 
as the whole High Seas Fleet would be needed for 
security of the landing forces since the British, 
following their policy of avoiding action, will have 
their whole fleet ready to oppose such action on our 
part; nonetheless, carrying out of cruiser war with 
the battle cruisers in the Atlantic remains the one 
way in which our High Seas fighting ships can damage 
the enemy and thereby justify their existence. 
2) Independent of the result of the eventual 
decision on an extended deployment of the battle 
cruisers in the Atlantic, I believe it to be a ne- 
cessity for the Admiralty Staff to work up contingency 
plans for doing this now and to make other preparations 
insofar as this is possible. 
144 
Cf. Waldeyer-Hartz, op. cit., pp. 130 ff. See also 
Paul Kennedy, 'The Development of German Naval Operations 
plans against England, 1896-1914, ' English Histortal Review, 
Jan 1974, pp. 48-76. See Groos, volii, op. cit., pp. 27$- 
279. See also Groos, vol. iii, op cit., p. 249; he credits 
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If the deployment is decided upon, I would 
unquestionably assign the four newest battle crui- 
sers if their coal bunkerage could be raised in 
some manner. Further, as to the conduct of commerce 
war itself, I recommend the collateral mission of 
the destruction of cruisers protecting commerce and 
the cruisers which are used to hunt down our armed 
merchant raiders. To do this, we must hit first with 
overwhelming superiority so as to destroy the enemy 
cruiser as quickly as possible and on the other hand 
also keep the battle cruisers as intact as possible 
for the nearly inevitable decisive battle which will 
occur elsewhere with newer English battle cruisers. 
The coal supply of a great power is something 
of an advantage as they are not likely to be sur- 
prised coaling in a neutral harbour; however, if the 
necessity arises it would not be difficult to sur- 
prise them and coal by force of arms in English 
bases at least once. 
3) I believe the recommendation of Captain 
Hahn should be followed in this question(of Atlantic 
cruiser raids). It should be possible to conduct 
opportune engagement of cruisers combined with the 
execution of commerce warfare in a large area 
according to a defined plan and thereby keep the 
enemy in the dark. 
4) I believe the West Indies and the South 
Atlantic the most suitable operations areas for 
battle cruiser operations. The Admiralty Staff must 
decide the best way overseas, based on their know- 
ledge of coaling possibilities. Perhaps it would be 
practicable to proceed--after coaling in one of the 
U-boat anchorages in the northwest coast of Iceland-- 
and a further coaling in Canada, simultaneously 
attacking the coast--to the West Indies along the 
American coast. Everything indicates to me that 
coaling in U-boat anchorages in Icelandic waters 
would not remain undiscovered very long; nonetheless 
the detailing of coaling steamers to such areas should 
not be overlooked. 
5) The author (Hahn) has chosen good solutions 
from the war experiences for ways to increase the 
cruiser endurance. The possibilities of the voyage 
could be greatly increased by giving the ships 
blisters for the required coal on the first part of 
of the voyage. 
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6) The possibility of a shorter sortie 
into the Atlantic with cruisers has also been 
suggested to me. The rationale for this appears 
considerably less favourable than that for the 
longer deployment. In the former case, the oper- 
ations area would be only one hundred miles off 
the English-Irish coast. Using a most economical 
speed of 15 knots, the coal supply would only be 
enough to go about 500 miles west of the Hebrides 
via the Iceland Faeroes passage, or the general 
area of the southern exit to the Irish Sea and 
return. Also, in the process of getting there, 
the position and strength of the cruisers would 
almost certainly be known at a very early time 
in the operation, and consequently a powerful 
opposition force would have to be reckoned with 
on the return passage; the high speed needed in 
the chase would require great reserves of coal. 
Refueling at an anchorage in Iceland is out of 
the question because of the probability of early 
discovery at the beginning of the mission anyway, 
and any stop would severely reduce the possibil- 
ity of an undiscovered breakthrough. There re- 
mains the question of coaling in one of the northern 
Norwegian fiords (north of Trondheim) as it is 
rumoured the Shetlands-Norway blockade line coals 
there. 
(s) Hipper145 
In his cover letter to the Chief of the Admiralty 
Staff and the State Secretary of-the Imperial Naval Office, 
von Ingenohl recommended that the U-boat be allowed a 
chance to prove itself before substantial surface forces 
were committed to commerce warfare. However, Ingenohl 
also said he recognized the advantages which Hipper's 
strategy entailed as well as the risks. Ingenohl saw 
the advantages including impact on the land war by the 
isolation of Britain; a possible link-up between the 
145 
BA/MA, F 146/PG 74106, op. cit., loc. cit., Hipper to 
Ingenohl, 12 Nov 1914. 
197 
cruisers deployed from the High Seas Fleet and the East 
Asia Cruiser Squadron under Count Spee; and the alternative 
offered by cruiser warfare to U-boat warfare should the 
enemy develop adequate defence. The disadvantages, 
Ingenohl said, included the inherent problems for the 
German fleet minus battle cruisers and scouting forces 
146 
should an engagement with the British fleet take place. 
Hipper's operations proposal and von Ingenohl's comments 
were sent on to Admiral von Pohl, chief of the Admiralty 
Staff, and Admiral von Tirpitz, State Secretary of the Im- 
perial Naval Office. The positions of both men on naval 
strategy in this period are well documented. Admiral von 
Pohl adhered to the basic premise of a 'fleet-in-being' 
in no less than five letters147 to various naval personages 
(including the Fleet C-in-C) from August to November 1914. 
Pohl preferred the U-boat warfare recommended by von 
Ingenohl in any case and his last act as Chief of the 
148 
Admiralty Staff was to authorize its unlimited prosecution. 
146 
BA/MA, ibid, op. cit., Ingenohl to Pohl, 14 Nov 1914. 
147 
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ci ed i-'n op. cit., loc. cit. n. 65 supra, 4 Feb 1917, also 
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In effect, this Pohl-Ingenohl agreement on U-boat warfare 
foredoomed Hipper's idea to the file cabinet. As to Tirpitz, 
at this time he was still advocating a battle fleet strategy 
which involved use of the battle fleet in a decisive engage- 
ment with the British Grand Fleet; 
149only 
after the battle 
150 
of Dogger Bank on 24 January 1915 did he advocate commerce 
warfare. In the end, Hipper's proposals were shelved until 
Erich Raeder, ' his erstwhile chief of staff, presented his 
'Z-Plan' for a naval strategy based on commerce warfare to 
Adolf Hitler in January 1939. Raeder outlined his rationale 
151 
behind the 'Z-Plan, ' noting: 
To operate against this lifeline of commerce, 
in case war came, should be the primary objective 
of the German fleet. 
This may be compared with Hipper's position as stated 
in the first paragraph of his proposal: '... nonetheless, 
carrying out of cruiser war with the battle cruisers in 
the Atlantic remains the one way in-which our High Seas 
fighting ships can damage the enemy and thereby justify 
their existence. ' Raeder continues: 
149 Gemzell, op. cit., loc. cit. See also Pohl, op. cit., 
pp. 39ff, 77ff, and Tirpitz, Dokumente, vol. ii, pp. 104 ff., 
111,116,117,119. 
150 
Tirpitz, Dokumente, op. cit., p. 200. 
151 Raeder, op, cit., p. 272. 
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Because of Germany's lack of naval bases 
and her unfavourable position, hemmed in as she 
was by the barrier of the British Isles, these 
ships must have great cruising range, plus speed 
to prev nt their being caught by stronger enemy 
forces. 52 
This may be compared with Hipper's position as stated 
in the second and fifth paragraphs of his proposal: '... 
If the deployment is decided upon, I would unquestionably 
assign the four newest battle cruisers if their coal bun- 
kerage could be raised in some manner... The possibilities 
of the voyage could be greatly increased by giving the 
ships blisters for the required coal on the first part of 
the voyage. ' 
Raeder's 'Z-Plan' naval strategy included attack on 
British overseas trade by groups of 'battle and light 
cruisers as well as U-boats and auxiliary raiders. j153 
British naval intelligence speculated on the possible 
connection between German cruiser warfare in the first 
World War and in World War II noting that the German 
official history criticized the High Seas Fleet commander 
for not undertaking operations which would support the 
cruiser squadron under Count Spee fighting its way home 
152 
Raeder, op. cit., p. 272. 
153 
Ibid, p. 273. 
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154 
from the Far East. It is interesting to note that 
the author of the official German history on overseas 
155 
cruiser warfare in World War I was Erich Raeder. 
156 
Ingenohl apparently considered such a move but rejected 
it in favour of commerce warfare by U-boats in the 
Atlantic, even though there was little evidence at the 
time than the U-boat was the panacea. U-boats had sunk 
10 of the 61 ships lost by the British Empire by January 
1915 and had cost the Germans 25 per cent of their total 
U-boat force. 
157 
Even as late as 19 January 1915, less 
than two weeks before Ingenohl was relieved as Fleet 
C-in-C, he was still opposed to using cruisers in commerce 
158 
warfare, despite the fact that German surface raiders 
had accounted for 51 merchant ships and several men-of-war. 
154 
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This proposal allows Hipper to emerge as a German 
naval strategist. He contributed positive suggestions 
through official channels which might have altered the 
course of the war had they been adopted. He was to pur- 
sue this line of thought with Admiral von Pohl, his next 
commander, albeit with no greater success. Meanwhile, 
in November, 1914 Hipper was heavily involved in the 
day-to-day defence of the German Bight, in minelaying 
and minesweeping, and in planning the next fleet oper- 
ation, the bombardment of Scarborough and Hartlepool. 
War Operation 20 
Ingenohl continued the 'Kleinkrieg'strategy in 
Hipper's next engagement with the enemy, and Hipper would 
be left to fend for himself because the Fleet C-in-C 
turned the fleet around and left him without support in 
the face of a superior enemy force. 
The strategical purpose of War Operation 20 was to 
entice the British Grand Fleet or part of it from its 
base at Scapa Flow south to within range of German under- 
water weapons. This was to be done by an attack on the 
British east coast which would precipitate an outcry from 
the populace for more protection, or so the Germans thought. 
At the same time mines were to be laid off Scarborough and 
Hartlepool to interfere with British coastal shipping. 
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Again, Hipper was involved in the planning. He was 
principally responsible for the operations order and 
159 
the original in the archives is in Hipper's own hand. 
Unlike Yarmouth, the bombardment was directed at two 
stronger and more important targets: Hartlepool had a 
reasonably large harbour and coastal defence works and 
Scarborough had a coast guard station and light coastal 
defence artillery. 
There were two crises in War Operation 20 for Hipper, 
the first of which led to a professional falling-out between 
Hipper and Ingenohl. According to the operations plan, 
Ingenohl was to steam out to the middle of the Dogger Bank 
and stay there until Hipper finished the bombardment of 
Scarborough and Hartlepool and also the mining of their 
coastal waters. Hipper carried out the bombardment and 
mining despite the opposition of local light forces which 
he dispersed with a few well-placed broadsides. However, 
two hours before Hipper commenced his bombardment operation 
160 
Ingenohl turned the High Seas Fleet around short of the 
rendevouz point and headed for Wilhelmshaven without 
signalling Hipper. The turn was contrary to the operations 
159 BA/MA, F 4061/PG 64758/Reel 443, Kr. 0 p. Nordsee 27 
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PT-eet Operation Against the English Coast... War Operation 20 
of the Fleet). 
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plan which stated that Ingenohl was to wait in the ren- 
devouz position until 'signalled by the B. d. A. that the 
operation was complete. '161 Ingenohl turned the fleet 
around at 0710 whereas Hipper did not complete the bom- 
bardment until 0937, about 45 minutes later than he 
expected. Foul weather and a British destroyer attack 
had delayed Hipper; as Marder says, 'Room 40 achieved its 
first great success on the evening of 14 December, when 
it pieced together from German naval messages a plan for 
an offensive operation by all five of the battle cruisers... 
with light cruisers and destroyers, directed against the 
British coast. 
162 
Because of this British intelligence coup and 
Ingenohl's abandonment of the plan Hipper was nearly inter- 
cepted and brougb to action with an overwhelming force on 
his way home. According to Marder, 'The (British) Navy 
had an excellent opportunity to cut off the raiding force. 
Four battle cruisers and six dreadnoughts stood between 
Hipper and his bases. '163 But a combination of circumstances 
161 
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allowed Hipper to escape and frustrated British pursuit: 
bad weather, good scouting by Hipper's light forces, 
164an 
Admiralty order to Vice Admiral Sir George Warrender, 
C-in-C Second Battle Squadron, to avoid going too far to 
165 
the east as the German fleet was out and his deputy's fail- 
166 
ure to open fire when sighting German warships off his bow. 
167 
Hipper described his escape crisis as follows: 
16.12.14 " Signal from Stralsund: 'Enemy heavy force 
1-239 in quadrant Being chased southwest by 
south. ' 
As the situation de' 
shifted to the support of 
were attempting to escape 
southwest by south course 
to the southeast. Course 






ped, operations were 
small cruisers which 
enemy by going on a 
thence drawing away 
changed to southeast 
1332 ... Because Stralsund signalled the enemy out 
of sight and in response to further inquiries it was 
clear no light cruiser was in danger, course was 
changed to north by east... 
168 
In his personal war journal Hipper wrote: 
... About 1200 I received a signal from Stralsund that the enemy capital ships were 
practically on top of her and she was making off 
to the southwest. Now came the difficult decision: 
should I come to her aid and thereby send my cruisers 
into certain action, or should I turn away to the 
north and escape? I decided on, the first alternative. 
164 K. T. B. der B. d. A., op. cit., 16 Dec 1914, entries for 139, 
1258,1311, T33 d 1355. 
165 P. R. O., Adm 137/1943, Admiralty to Warrender, 16 Dec 
1914,2.25 PM, p. 275. 
166 Ibid, op. cit., p. 276. 
167 K. T. B. der B. d. A., op. cit., loc. cit. 
168 Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., 2/6,16 Dec 1914. 
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Hipper turned south towards the enemy. It is 
doubtful whether he knew the High Seas Fleet was already 
on its way back to the Jade but this in no way denegrates 
his action; his willingness to engage a battle squadron 
is a remarkable testament to his fortitude. But he was 
169 
not foolhardy; Hipper suspected he was in the presence 
of 10 enemy warships, not 6, because his advance cruiser 
screens engaged the advance screen of another force. The 
light cruiser Graudenz signalled another formation of 
enemy heavy ships south of the first sighted by Stralsund. 
Meanwhile, the 18th Half Flotilla confirmed the strength 
and location of the first body of ships as did Graudenz 
for the second force. Hipper therefore turned north, 
believing he would draw the heavy ships off the light 
cruisers which is in fact what happened. The weather 
worsened and he passed the bows of Warrender's squadron 
about 1550 German time, noting that the northerly course 
would give him 'the advantage of darkness and silhouette 
170 
the enemy' should he have to fight. 
Hipper noted in his official report on the action 
that the Stralsund and her consorts were not fired upon 
when first sighted by the British because they gave the 
proper recognition signal. The Kaiser's marginal comment 
on this phase was 'Very Good! 
171 
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Hipper also noted in his official report 'the fleet 
did not remain in its supporting position until signalled 
by the B. d. A. the operation was complete as required in 
the plan. ' Nor did Ingenohl's turn escape the attention 
of Tirpitz who said about three weeks later: 
172 
... On December 16th Ingenohl had the fate 
of Germany in the palm of his hand. I boil with 
inwardf emotion whenever I think of it. 
Similarly, Admiral Scheer commanding the Second Battle 
Squadron at the time, wrote in his work on the High Seas 
Fleet in-1919, 'Our premature turning on to an east south- 
east course had robbed us of the opportunity of meeting 
certain divisions of the enemy according to the prearranged 
plan, which was now seen to have been correct. '173 
In defending the turn, Ingenohl said he wished to 
avoid a night destroyer action; a possible engagement with 
superior British heavy forces(based on the evidence of 
substantial British wireless traffic intercepted after the 
operation began)and that the British forces located in the 
Channel at the time were superior to his own forces. 
174 
Ingenohl believed the 10 British capital ships in the 
Channel were superior to the 24 he had available--14 
dreadnoughtp, 6 pre-dreadnoughts, and 4 battle cruisers. 
172 Tirpitz, My Memoirs, op. cit., p. 496. 
173 Scheer, German 's High Sea Fleet in the World War, op. 
cit., pp. 71-72. ee a ssoo Cör6et p"cim, vol. ii, p. 44. 
174 Ingenohl, op. cit., pp. 27-28. 
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Conference records indicate tremendous disappoint- 
ment in the Fleet C-in-C and substantiate Hipper's com- 
ment there was much rancor among the fleet officers. 
175 
In terms of the actual military objectives of War Plan 20, 
the action against Scarborough and Hartlepool was success- 
ful in luring a substantial portion of the Grand Fleet 
into a position where it could be damaged by German forces, 
as Hipper had planned. The Naval Staff Monograph written 
by the British Admiralty sums up the seriousness of the 
176 
affair' for Great Britain: 
Here at last were the conditions for which 
the Germans had been striving since the outbreak 
of the war. A few miles away from the port bow of 
the High Seas Fleet, isolated, and several hours 
steaming from home was the most powerful, homogen- 
eous battle squadron of the Grand Fleet, the de- 
struction of which, would at one blow, have accom- 
plished the process of attrition and placed the 
British and German fleets on a precisely even 
footing as regards numerical strength. 
Hipper's own comment dealt with reality, not possibility. 
177 
He noted these lessons for future operations: 
Any future sorties should be in total 
darkness so as to remain undetected by submarines; 
if the Fleet was to support advanced forces it 
must remain close enough to prevent those forces 
being overwhelmed and provide support; patrol of 
the outer German Bight by fishing steamers was a 
waste of time. 
175 BA/MA, F 4061/PG 64761/Reel 443, op. cit., 'Bes rechun 
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Some three weeks after the completion of the actions 
associated with War Plan 20, Hipper confided in Magnus 
von Levetzow, captain of the battle cruiser Moltke, that 
he 'felt overburdened with responsibility. '178 On the 
surface, such a confidence appears inconsequential but 
in light of what followed assumes considerable importance. 
Despite the fact it was fleet policy for the B. d. A. to 
develop a 'tight personal bond' with his captains, 
179 
Hipper was the object of a campaign by Levetzow to have 
him retired on the alleged basis of ill health. Levetzow's 
motive, however, appears to have been a professional dif- 
ference between himself and Hipper concerning use of the 
High Seas Fleet. Levetzow was in favour of a more aggressive 
180 
use of the fleet, whatever the price, than Hipper. Captain 
Levetzow-began his intrigues against Hipper with a letter 
to Admiral von Holtzendorff dated 15 January 1915 in whch 
he asserted Hipper was 'physically and psychologically at 
the end of his tether' and that 'the most senior of us 
commanders-fear for our safety as he (Hipper) trusts too 
181 
much to his chief of staff' (Raeder). Holtzendorff at 
178 
M. O. D., Admiralty, Nachlass Magnus von Levetzow, 
Levetzow to Admiral Henning g von Ho enUor , 15 Jan 191b, Reel 43, Frame 00941. ' 
179 BA/MA, F 33041f, op. cit., PG 66710, 'von Ingenohl to 
Tirpitz, Kiel, 21 Apr 1913. 
180 Herwig, op. cit., p. 177 for Levetzow. Cf. with Hipper's 
view p. 179. 
101 -- --- 1°1 Nachlass von Levetzow, op. cit., loc. cit. 
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the time was retired b in September 1915 was recalled 
to head the Admiralty Staff until August 1918. Hipper 
was not as ill as Levetzow believed, although he had 
said that he-did feel depressed when he was onboard 
Levetzow's ship on the 15th of November. On 31 December 
Hipper noted in his Nachlass he had some bursitis or 
182 
arthritis. And it is interesting to note Hipper's other 
captains did not 'fear' for their safety because of what 
he entrusted to Raeder; Levetzow's Nachlass does not 
include letters from either Max von Hahn or Maurice von 
183 
Egidy to this effect. Hipper's trust in his chief of 
staff was substantive but not blind. Raeder says: 
... as commander of the Scouting Forces, he (Hipper) had to put up with the reports and 
suggestions of a large staff. At first he 
seemed to think that the staff was putting up 
to him matters which they could have handled 
themselves, but as the smooth working group 
gained his confidence, complete cooperation 
and teamwork was established. This was expe- 
dited by Admiral Hipper's natural politeness 
and good nature, which soon made amends for 
any harshness when he lost his temper, as he 
occasionally did on the bridge. At these times 
he was likely to to} h, the offender off in crisp, 
trenchant Bavarian. 
182 
Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., 1/46,17 Nov 1914; 2/9, 
31 Dec =- 
183 
Nachlass von Levetzow, op. cit., Briefe und Schriftsachen, 
vols. i-ii x, eels 439 44. 
184 
Raeder, op. cit., pp. 40-41. 
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Holtzendorff was not impressed with Levetzow's 
communication and said the letter had aged him 10 years. 
He reminded Levetzow that von Pohl, Chief of the Admiralty 
Staff, thought highly of Hipper as a commander185 and he 
ignored the ploy for Hipper's removal. But Levetzow con- 
tinued to correspond with Holtzendorff over the next 18 
months, and also intrigued with Admiral von Lans, a hero 
of the Boxer Rebellion who had retired from command of 
the First Battle Squadron, after Dogger Bank, to Berlin, 
ostensibly for reasons of ill health. The correspondence 
was an attempt to effect changes in the fleet command 
186 
including Hipper's retirement. This ambition on the 
part of Levetzow was nearly fulfilled when Admiral Rhein- 
hard Scheer, C-in-C of the High Seas Fleet, wrote a letter 
to Admiral Georg von Moller, Chief of the Naval Cabinet, 
on 15 April 1916 submitting Hipper be retired for ill 
health. But von Holtzendorff, who had to forward Scheer's 
letter, recommended Hipper be retained. 
187 
And again, von 
Müller decided it was best to keep Hipper, as he had also 
decided 15 months previously. 
185 
Nachlass von Levetzow, op. cit., Holtzendorff to 
Levetzow, 1 FEU-1M5, eel 43, Frame 00448. 
186 
Op. cit., Admiral von Lans to Levetzow, 22 Dec 1915, 
Reel 43, Frames 00646 ff. 
187 
BA/MA, Personal Akten Admiral Franz von Hipper, Scheer 
to von Holtzen or to von Lam, 15 Ap-r'Tg b, pp. 41-42. 
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Levetzow had even attempted to get the loyal 
Maurice von Egidy of Seydlitz, Hipper's flag captain, to 
acquiesce in Hipper's removal but Egidy replied that 
'Hipper is perfectly satisfactory to me once he gets 
underway. '188 And Levetzow also wrote to Hipper's per- 
sonal physician in Wiesbaden whose reply is dated the 
same day Scheer originated his request for Hipper's re- 
tirement--15 April 1916. Dr. K8nigmann said 'There is 
nothing physically or psychologically wrong with Hipper. '189 
Levetzow received this letter at his home address in 
Berlin. 
Hipper, however, apparently was unaware of this 
campaign as he said in January 1916 that he was losing 
one of his best commanding officers to fleet staff: 
Magnus von Levetzow! 
190 It is possible he learned of 
it later, though, for there is no congratulatory letter 
from Hipper to Levetzow when the latter was awarded the 




Nachlass von Levetzow, op. cit., Capt. von Egidy to 
Levetzow, 1 Jan 191b, Reel 43, Frame 00864. 
189 
Op. cit., Kuranstalt Dr. K3nigmann, Wiesbaden, Garten- 
strasse 15, to Levetzow, 15 Apr 1916, Reel 43, Frame 00690. 
190 Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., 4/25,23-26 Jan 1916. 
191 Nachlass von Levetzow, op. cit., Reel 44, Frames 00124- 
00126- 
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The Battle of the Dogger Bank 
On 24 January 1915 the first dreadnought battle 
in history was fought in the North Sea at Dogger Bank. 
This was Hipper's initial encounter in broad daylight 
and clear weather with his opposite number, Admiral Sir 
David Beatty. The battle occurred because the British 
intercepted and decoded the wireless orders which von 
Ingenohl had sent Hipper and the British arranged a 
reception. Hipper was carrying out a muddled spur-of- 
the-moment plan for a wide-ranging reconnaissance of the 
North Sea to destroy any British light craft or commerce 
unaccompanied by a capital ship escort. This operation 
was conducted in the face of foreknowledge of his plans 
by the enemy who would oppose him in superior force. 
Hipper sortied with four battle cruisers, four light 
cruisers and a torpedoboat escort. He was intercepted by 
five British battle cruisers, six light cruisers and a 
large force of destroyers. In the engagement that followed, 
which developed on a south east course as Hipper retreated 
to the German Bight, Hipper lost his oldest and weakest 
ship, Blücher, the last ship in his battle line. The 
opposing forces concentrated their fire on each other's 
flagships; Seydlitz suffered severe damage from magazine 
fires and Lion's propulsion machinery was badly hit. 
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British communications problems in shifting command al- 
lowed Hipper to escape destruction. The British aban- 
doned pursuit and concentrated fire on Blücher which 
was already sinking. 
None of the basic facts above are in doubt as all 
192 
of the reports from both sides are available to researchers 
and there have been numerous published interpretations and 
narratives of the battle. The apologia of Admirals Scheer 
and Jellicoe and the memoirs of Tirpitz, all published in 
193 
1919, deal with it superficially. Scheer and Jellicoe 
both present brief narratives and Tirpitz barely mentions 
the action. The British official history published in 
1921 is an exposition of the action from the British point 
of view. 
194 
The German official history deals with the 
operational, strategical and technical aspects of the 
battle as well as providing the most comprehensive narrative 
192 
BA/MA, F 4062/PG 64771-64775/Reels 345,346, Kr. Op. 
Nordsee 35 Doggerbank-Schlacht am. 24.1.1915, (War Oper- 
at on North Sea 35v Battle of tFe Dogger Bank on 24 Jan 1915; 
P. ß'. 0., Adm 137/1943,1989,2134,2135,2138,2139, 'The 
Dogger Bank' 24 Jan 1915. 
193 
Scheer, German is High Sea Fleet in the World War, op. 
cit., pp. 77- ;e licoe, =e Grand feet I -l T, op. 
cit., pp. 188-199; Tirpitz, -M =rs, op. cit., p. 502. 
194 





It does not, however, explain the rationale 
for Blücher accompanying Hipper on the mission. Hipper's 
critique of the action is only partially reproduced and 
that to support the writer's argument, while Tirpitz' 
strategy is cited prominently in the conclusions. 
Tirpitz' own published documents are arranged to 
show that the strategical thinking behind Dogger Bank 
was unsound. In Dokumente vol. ii Tirpitz does not 
attempt a narrative; rather, he confirms his strategical 
observations made in his memoirs. 
196 
Hipper's biographer, Waldeyer-Hartz, covers a great 
deal besides the battle of Dogger Bank in the chapter 
entitled 'The Dogger Bank Action. ' He discusses British 
naval strategy, early 1915 operations, and compares it 
with Jutland. He cites at some length Hipper's official 
war diary but does not refer to Hipper's personal journal 
which he had previously used nor Hipper's official critique. 
The standard American work on the battle of Jutland 
by H. H. Frost is a compact history of the war at sea 
and includes a brief analysis of the Dogger Bank action. 
198 
195 
Groos, op. cit., vol. iii, Von Ende November 1914 bis 
Anfang Februar 1915, (Berlin, l97, pp. 188-249an Appendices 
7 and 8-, -p-p-. -78 =90. 
196 
Tirpitz, Dokumente, vol., ii, op. cit., pp. 195-208. 
197 Waldeyer-Hartz, op. cit., pp. 142-165. 
198 H. H. Frost, op. cit., pp. 17-19. 
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Lord Chatfield's autobiography contains a personal 
view of the battle with some interesting analysis, not- 
ably on the faults of German shell. Erich Raeder's 
200 
autobiography, published in English in 1960, provides 
a unique eyewitness acount of Hipper's behaviour in the 
battle. The most careful analysis of the Dogger Bank in 201 
battle from the British viewpoint is/Arthur Marder's 
magnum opus, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, vol. ii. 
Geoffrey Bennett has achieved a most balanced though less 
202 
detailed picture in his work on the naval battles of 
World War I. Finally, Paul Kennedy, a rising.: 3cholar in 
203 
the study of the Imperial Navy, has done an essay on the 
battle. His treatment is largely from the British point 
of view. 
Even with this extensive coverage in time and authors, 
there are still some questions which bear further examina- 
tion. Why, for example, did Ingenohl send Hipper at all 
199 
Admiral of the Fleet Lord Chatfield, The Navy and Defence, 
(London, 1942), pp. 131-137. 
200 
Erich Raeder, y Life, op. cit., pp. 53-57. 
201 Marder, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 156-175. 
202 Geoffrey Bennett, Naval Battles of the First World _War, (New York, 1968), pp. 1 68. 
203 Bernard Fitzsimons, ed., Warships and Sea Battles of 
World War I, (London, 1973), 'Dogger Bank: Clashof-t1 
BattleZruisers, ' by Paul Kennedy, pp. 44-51. 
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in view of the small potential rewards? Why was the 
armoured cruiser Blücher taken along? Was this=a, 
serious professional mistake by Hipper? What was 
Hipper thinking when he had to decide whether or not 
to leave Blücher to her fate? What did the national 
and naval command think of Hipper's conduct of the 
action? What did he learn from the Dogger Bank exper- 
ience? What did Hipper think of Ingenohl after the battle? 
To begin with, Ingenohl believed that British fishing 
steamers in the North Sea constituted a substantial threat 
in that they could reveal his strength and movements and 
204 
further restrict his operational alternatives. During 
the December operations against Scarborough and Hartlepool 
a number of British light forces had been observed in 
advance positions in the North Sea, and Ingenohl thought 
it entirely possible some of these would be out and pr-- 
sent opportune targets for Hipper. Ingenohl's apologia 
written in the spring of 1918 indicates that the Kaiser 
had given permission for sorties of this nature and had 
accepted the possibility of encountering enemy heavy forces. 
205 
204 
BA/MA, F 4062/PG 64771/Reel 345, op. cit., Ingenohl 
to Pohl, 27 Jan 1915. 
205 
BA/MA, F 3809a/PG 62374, op. cit., Ingenohl, p. 34. 
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The Chief of the Admiralty Staff, Admiral von Pohl, 
had also accepted the possibility of losses, according 
206 
to Ingenohl, and Ingenohl had opposed taking the whole 
fleet on such sorties lest it have to fight a battle 
off the English coast. Nonetheless, the Fleet--C-in-C 
believed enemy light craft, that is, cruisers, and escorting 
destroyers, were likely to be found. in the North Sea. He 
was enticed by favourable weather and intelligence which 
indicated (incorrectly) 
207 
that the British battle cruiser 
208 
fleet was at Scapa Flow. Other intelligence (correctly) 
indicated the British did have heavy forces which might 
try to intercept Hipper in Cromarty Firth and the Firth 
of Forth. But Ingenohl believed the scouting forces 
could outrun any battleships they met. In essence, the 
operation was a calculated risk, though neither Ingenohl 
nor Hipper realized it had been compromised by the British 
interception of the wireless signal from Eckermann (Fleet 
Chief of Staff) to Hipper. In sum, Ingenohl sent Hipper 
on a raid in the Dogger Bank, the object of which was to 
inflict loss on British light forces and to secure his 
freedom of action from intelligence trawlers. Ingenohl 
206 
Ingenohl, op. cit., p. 34. 
207 
BA/MA, F 4062/PG 64771, op.. cit., Ingenohl to Pohl, 
27 Jan 1915, p. 2. Cf. Corbett, Naval Operations, vol. ii, 
op. cit., pp. 82-83. 
208 Ingenohl, op. cit., loc. cit. Corbett, op. cit., loc. 
cit. 
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considered the risk small. As it turned out, it cost 
the Germans S. M. S. Blücher and 792 dead. 
Blücher was taken along because the Germans regarded 
209 
her as a relatively modern ship and because of that mo- 
dernity she had served as a gunnery training ship since 
March, 1911. Originally conceived as an armoure&icruiser, 
the construction department of the Imperial Naval Office 
considered her guns sufficient to engage an Invincible 
210 
class battle cruiser. This was because the 21 cm. (8.2-inch) 
model 1906 turret-mounted gun had a maximum range of 19,100 
meters at 30° elevation. The 30.5 cm. (12-inch) guns in 
S. M. S. Derfflinger had a range of 18,400 meters, some 700 
meters short of targets Blücher could reach. Thus, though 
Blücher carried the lightest heavy calibre guns in Hipper's 
211 
squadron, she carried the guns with the longest range. 
209 
BA/MA, F 33031f/PG 66708/Reel 511, Organisation des 
Seestreitkr. fte, (Organization of Naval Forces), o1tzendorff 
to irpitz, 14 Jan 1911 and Tirpitz to Holtzendorff, 1 Feb 1911, 
1 Mar 1911. 
210 
USNA, PG 66087/Reel 1501, Sitzun s-Protokolle Jan 1905- 
Ar 1909 B. d. 4, (Records of Plenary Conferences, vT 4), 
Conference concerning the Battle Cruisers of 1907,19 Sept 1906, 
pp. 2-3. 
211 
BA/MA, F 50/66,17, Deutsche Kriegsflotte, Grosse Kreuzer, 
Heft 5: Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Bc er, erlin, 1908), 1. 
Zrf. Siegr rie reyer, c ac tsi-cFiffe und Schlachtkreuzer, 
(Munich, 1970), p. 277, entries for Der-Mingel:. y itz, 
Moltke, von der Tann. 
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Further, German fleet organization dictated that four 
large ships were the minimum strength for the scouting 
forces. In German tactical thinking this constituted 
half a squadron-and was believed to be a handy tactical 
unit. The other fact which most interpreters, including 
the official historian, miss almost entirely is Blücher's 
speed. Though not equipped with turbines she had advanced 
reciprocating engines and was officially capable of 25.4 
knots on forced draft. Blücher was observed doing 25 knots-- 
213 
by the British flagship--before being hit. At Dogger Bank, 
the average speed of Hipper's battle cruisers was 23 knots, 
the highest continuous2speed they had managed off Yarmouth 
and Scarborough as well. 
4 
In short, Blücher was well able 
to maintain squadron speed until damaged by an engine room 
hit. The squadron itself was plagued with engineering diffi- 
culties: cranky condensers, steam turbine problems and poor 
coal. There were also training problems as well. The captain 
212 BA/MA, F 33031f/PG 66708, op. cit., Holtzendorff to 
Tirpitz, 14 Jan 1911. 
213 BA/MA, F 50/66,17, op. cit., p. 26. See also Jane's 
Fighting Shi s 1914, p. 129, entry for best recent s-pes: 
nots. 
For 
BlUcher's speed during the battle see 
P. R. O., Adm 137/1 943, op. cit., Admiral Beatty's report, p. 
38. 
214 BA/MA, F 3913/PG 63370, K. T. B. S. M. S. Seydlitz. See 
signals for 3 Nov 1914, time, signal for 23 knots and 
16 Dec 1914, time 1250, signal for 23 knots; 24 Jan 1915, 
time 1218, signal for 23 knots. 
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of S. M. S. Seydlitz observed after the battle of Dogger 
Bank that the training period of the battle cruisers 
had allowed only a three-hour full speed trial run 
every year. He recommended this be changed to allow 
24 hours at full power every 90 days so the crews could 
get used to the demands. 
215 
In light of the above, it appears that Marder, 'des- 
pite his careful analysis, has erred in asserting Blücher 
216 
slowed the squadron. He observes: 
Tactically,. the Germans had made the mis- 
take of adding the slow Blücher to the squadron. 
(Ironically, she had made ipper's escape pos- 
sible). Hipper strongly recommended that in the 
future his battle cruisers not be handicapped in 
that fashion. This seems a bit ironical on his 
part, as the Blücher was unique. 
Since Marder gives no source for Hipper's alleged 
recommendation, it is possible that he based his statement 
on Hipper's after-action report which in fact cited 
lack of speed as a much wider problem than just Blücher. 
Hipper complained that his most recently commissioned 
battle cruisers should be capable of more than 23 knots 
in formation steaming and suggested the following: 
215 
USNA, PG 77733/Reel 1659, Krie serfahrun en, ope cit., 
von Egidy to Hipper, 13 Mar 19 See n. 14/, Part II. 
216 
Marder, vol. ii, op. cit., p. 165. 
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... The difficulty of coal supply plays a 
major part in this. There are some things which 
can be done: machinery must be oil-fired from 
now on in new construction, and the boilers of 
existing ships must be modified as soon as time 
can be found for extended refits. (Arranged for 
Seydlitz). Modifications to reduce excessive 
smoking have already been seen as indicated by 217 
the lessons learned in the Hartlepool operation. 
B1lcher's design, not speed, was the real problem 
for her in any action with battle cruisers. Although 
her basic defence scheme was the modern German 'citadel' 
system, which protected her adequately against under- 
218 
water attack, her armour was insufficient to protect 
her from the heavy shell carried in British battle crui- 
sers. 
219 She was considerably weaker in protection on 
the water line and on armament than the three battle 
cruisers Hipper took along. Her horizontal armour pro- 
220 
tection was the same, however. Blücher's special 
problem was in her midships ammunition supply arrangement. 
It was a lucky hit which disabled her ammunition supply 
217 
BA/MA, F 4062/PG 64771/Reel 345, op. cit., Hipper to 
Ingenohl, 27 Jan 1915, op. cit., p. 4. 
218 
BA/MA, F 50/66,17, op. cit., S. M. S. Blücher, pp. 4-5,7. 
219 
Ibidem, pp. 8-9, and plan, p. 29. Blücher's'-main belt 
armour was 180 mm., her turrets 140 mm. 
220 Cf., op. cit. supra with Erich GrBner, op. cit., pp- 
114-118. Blucher's decks were 120 mm., von der Tann and 
Moltke 100 mm., eydlitz 150 mm. 
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and caused a fire which knocked out 60 per cent of her 
221 
main armament. The official history's assertion that 
'this hit would have been2just as deadly for any one 
of the battle cruisers' is not borne out by the fact 
that Butcher was uniquely vulnerable in this feature of 
construction. The hit mentioned above simply would not 
have done as much damage in the later ships because they 
had separate magazines. However, no German ship of the 
2 23 
day could have withstood the concentration of fire levied 
against the Blücher. 
As to why Hipper took Blücher along on the : Dogger 
Bank operation, it is highly likely he was following 
the established tactical practice in the Imperial Navy 
to operate in units based on an eight-ship squadron and 
224 
a four-ship division. In light of Blücher's ability 
to maintain squadron speed or exceed it, her ability to 
engage targets at greater range than any of Hipper's 
battle cruisers, her balanced modern defence system 
221 
Paul Schmalenbach, 'S. M. S. Blücher, -' Warship Inter- 
national, (1911), pp. 171-181. 
222 
Groos, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 239. 
223 
P. R. O., Adm 137/1943, Admiral Beatty's report, op. cit., 
pp. 9,13,25,26,46. See also Commanding Officer, H. M. S. 
King Edward VII, loc. cit., 5 Feb 1915, encl. 'Information 
Obtaine rom Survivors of Blücher. ' 
224 Tirpitz, My Memoirs, op. cit., pp. 53-54. 
223 
against underwater and surface attack, Hipper did not 
make a serious professional mistake but took a calculated 
risk. 
On abandoning Blücher when she was sinking after 
her subjection to overwhelming British gunfire, Hipper's 
personal war journal best reflects his thinking. He says: 
Hit, fire amidships, was signalled from 
Blücher; it is put out. Then Blücher signals 
tat her machinery has been knockedout. The 
ship is a wreck aft. Meanwhile, many explosions 
and hits on the enemy were observed. The lead 
ship, Lion, hit heavily, fell out of line. I 
signal=the torpedoboats to attack but as soon 
as I made the signal, the enemy swung outward and 
made a turn. The question before me, should I 
leave Blücher to her fate and take my ships out 
of the-Sat-Me or turn around and hit the enemy 
with all I have? I chose the first. Had I turned 
around with the heavily damaged Seydlitz (arma- 
ment halved), 1) I would have gone into the maw 
of many destroyers, 2) my own torpedoboats would 
be left to the tender mercies of the enemy light 
cruisers, 3) the near certainty of losing my 
remaining battle cruisers without justification 
would result. I therefore broke off the battle 
and took all my ships but Blücher home. I rendez- 
voused off Norderney at P. M. with the First and Second Battle Squadrons which weý25sent to 
my assistance. As always, too late. 
This personal account has not been reproduced hereto- 
fore but is similar in essence to Hipper's official account 
which was reproduced by his biographer. The only other 
view of Hipper in this crisis is contained in the published 
memoirs of his chief of staff, Erich Raeder: 
225 
Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., 2/15,24 Jan 1915. 
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224 
To have stood by the Blücher any longer 
would have risked losing the of er ships and 
perhaps the entire force. With a heavy heart, 
Admiral Hipper countermanded his order and 
directed a resumption of the withdrawal south- 
easterly toward Heligoland. Eyes blurred as 
the sinýjgg Blücher disappeared in the haze 
astern. 
Though the naval and national high commands ques- 
tioned Hipper's tactical assignment of Blücher to the 
end of his battle line and whether he could have saved 
her, 227 they concluded 'Admiral Hipper conducted the 
whole matter quite sensibly. ' 
228 
Ingenohl said he agreed 
with Hipper's conduct of the action though disagreed 
229 
with some of his strategical conclusions. Hipper re- 
corded his own thoughts on the result of the Dogger Bank 
results in his personal journal: 
230 
I have fought to the best of my knowledge 
and ability and have done all that is humanly 
possible despite the unfortunate result which 
I believe is the fault of the fleet. 
226 
Raeder, Life, op. cit., p. 56. 
227 
BA/MA, F 4062/PG 64774/Reel 346, op. cit., Zenker to 
Pohl and Müller, 1 Feb 1915 cited in Groos, op. cit., vol. 
iii, p. 243. 
228 Nachlass von MUller, ler, op. cit., 4/243,30.1.1915; cf. n. 65. 
229 BA/MA, F 4062/PG 64774/Reel 346, op. cit., Ingenohl to 
Pohl, 29 Jan 1915, pp. 1-2. 
230 Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., 2/16,26 Jan 1915. 
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Apparently Grand Headquarters agreed as they blamed 
231 
Hipper's C-in-C, von Ingenohl, for the losses suffered 
at Dogger Bank and he was relieved 4 February 1915. That 
same day Hipper recorded his award of the Iron Cross, 
232 
First Class, by the Kaiser himself. On 23 February 
the Grand Duke of Oldenberg awarded Hipper the Duchy's 
highest decoration, the Friedrich August Cross, First and 
Second Class. And on February 26 his birthplace, the 
Bavarian town of Weilheim, bestowed yet another honor. 
233 
Hipper wrote: 
From my home city, Weilheim, I have been 
given a great honor. And the street from which 
I came has been named for me: the main street 
has been named Admiral Hipperstrasse. 
As of November, 1972 when the writer visited Weilheim, 
the main street was still called after Hipper unlike the 
Tirpitz Ufer, in Berlin, which was renamed Reichpietsch 
Ufer, to honor one of the three sailors executed for 
234 
mutiny in 1917. 
231 
BA/MA, F 4062, op. cit., Zenker to Pohl and Müller, p. 3. 
232 PersonalAkten Hipper, op. cit., Orden und Auszeichnungen, 
18 Feb -Cf Na-chIass Hipper which recces te Kaiser's 
action on 4 Feb 1915, /20. 
233 
234 
Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., 2/24,26 Feb 1915. 
David Woodward, op. cit., p. 11. 
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Hipper made several strategical and tactical ob- 
servations in his official critique of the battle of 
Dogger Bank, only excerpts of which have. ever been 
published. 
235 
Some of Hipper's strategical observations 
are remarkably similar to the thinking of Churchill and 
Fisher, the British First Lord and First Sea Lord at 
the time; some of his tactics were, reflected in later 
fleet operations. Above all, Hipper's critique illus- 
trates what Hipper learned from the battle. The two 
observations which demonstrate his naval thinking most 
graphically are reproduced and analysed here: 
General Observations 
I. ) The experiences of the 24.1. have 
shown that the North Sea can in no way be con- 
sidered clear of the English Fleet. The bom- 
bardment of the East Coast has apparently re- 
sulted in their taking up positions from which 
they can be committed to an immediate defence of 
the East Coast. At least light forces will be 
stationed in such positions and possibly battle 
cruisers are stationed on the North Sea. Battle- 
ships Faust at least be kept in neighboring bases 
ready for action (Humber, Firth of Forth). 
Therefore it appears to me: 
1) It is again possible for us to 
damage the English fleet by U-boats in the North 
Sea. 
2) All operations have to be planned 
so that a reserve formation is available for 
timely support of advanced forces. Hence the 
decisive battle could be developed on any occasion; 
in the future the fleet will (have to) stand to 
with its full strength of modern warships in a 
state of readiness to support such operations. 
235 Tirpitz, Dokumente, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 196; see also 
Waldeyer-Hartz, op. cit., p. 154, for published excerpts. 
For Hipper's original text, see BA/MA, F 4062/PG 64771, 
Reel 345, Hipper to Ingenohl, 27 Jan 1915. 
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II. ) The superiority of the English 
fleet must cause us to conduct the battle under 
the most favourable circumstances possible, as 
soon as (such a battle) is generally desired 
politically. That is: 
1) The battle should not be sought 
in an easterl wind. 
25 The plan must include a U-boat 
line which can attack before or after the battle. 
3) The battle must be within our 
waters, not farther than 50 sea miles from Heligo- 
land. A venture farther than 70 sea miles from 
Heligoland should not be allowed. 
Every ship which remains at a greater dis- 
tance from our coasts is easy booty for the ene- 
my. A manoeuvre to her support would probably 
lead to further heavy losses. A battle in 
English waters would quickly bring About the loss 
of the German fleet without noteworthy return. 
Presumably the sorties of the enemy will 
bring him in range of our U-boat lines and by 
combining this with action by our fleet a trap 
could be sprung. The assumption must be that the 
battle will be in the German Bight, that the in- 
itiative must be with us and the enemy will have 
no time to send his U-boats. 
4) Only completely battleworthy 
ships should be committed to the battle; every 
old ship is easy prey for the enemy because of 
the enormous power of modern artillery; the 
enemy themselves will bring only first class ma- 
teriel. All flotillas must be brought to their 
places. The older squadrons could be utilized 
only as floating batteries. We should not avoid 
the necessity of decommissioning all old ships in 
favour of modern battleworthy (Lützow) type ships 
which are the best possible weapons. 
Other points in Hipper's critique included a caveat 
for smaller operations using only expendable materiel if 
no decisive battle was envisaged; another warning that 
the British would utilize superior speed and firepower 
228 
to develop an action at the longest possible range; 
an observation that feint attacks by German torpedo- 
boats would probably cause the British to turn at great 
range and single torpedoboats between opposing battle 
lines might go unnoticed, thus obtaining a good firing 
position; a suggestion that after-stacks of all German 
torpedoboats be painted red for recognition; a complaint 
that it was difficult to command from the conning tower 
because of smoke, especially on the windward side, and 
a definition of command succession in the scouting forces 
should he be killed or disabled: the senior captain in 
236 
the battle cruisers was to take command. 
In concluding that England had not abandoned the North 
Sea, Hipper reversed a position he had held since the be- 
237 
ginning of the war. Hipper's ideas were endorsed by his 
fleet C-in-C with the exception of the 50-mile range limit 
on distance of a battle from Heligoland; Ingenohl favoured 
238 
a greater radius of action in a decisive battle. Admiral 
Pohl, Chief of the Admiralty Staff, agreed with Hipper's 
concept of a decisive battle and was especially adamant that 
236 BA/MA, F 4062/PG 64771/Reel 345, op. cit., Hipper to 
Ingenohl, 27 Jan 1915, p. 6. 
237 Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., 1/10,1/12,6,12 Aug 1914. 
238 BA/MA, F 4062, op. cit., loc. cit., Ingenohi to Pohl, 
op* cit., p. 1. 
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torpedoboats should take a vital part. It would be well 
to note that Hipper made his remarks from unique authority: 
he had commanded the first force of capital ships to see 
action under the black, white and red ensign of the Imperial 
German Navy. Hipper's analysis would have suited the stra- 
tegy proposed by Churchill and Fisher, i. e., that the 
British Battle Fleet be based farther south than Scapa Flow 
to protect the English coast. But the British fleet com- 
manders, Jellicoe and Beatty, prevailed. Hipper was cor- 
rect to a certain degree in that some heavy forces, notably 
the Battle Cruiser Fleet and a squadron of pre-dreadnoughts, 
were stationed at Rosyth. But there were no light forces 
of consequence between Harwich and Rosyth after the British 
240 
post-Dogger Bank fleet reorganization. The Germans tried 
to damage the British main battle fleet with U-boats, as 
241 
Hipper suggested, but despite numerous attempts in the 
North Sea during this period, there were no notable successes. 
Hipper's awareness of the political significance of a 
decisive battle between the'German and British fleets is 
important to the analysis because heretofore it has not been 
239 USNA, PG 76974/Reel 1060, Admiralstab der Marine, Akten 
betr. Schriftwechsel über 0-Directiven AdTa tý y Staff, frs Concerning Correspondence on Operational Directives), 
Pohl to Ingenohl, 26.1.15. 
240 Marder, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 173. See also Corbett, op. 
cit., vol. ii, pp. 130-131,416-421. 
241 Groos, op. cit., vol. iv, charts 1-7. 
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242 
documented. But his approach to effecting policy changes 
was in marked contrast to other naval officers whose 
243 
method was to circumvent the appropriate chain of command. 
Captains Magnus von Levetzow and Adolph von Trotha were 
244 
among several senior officers noted for this practice. 
Hipper's concept of a battle in German waters--as 
outlined in Part II, paragraph 3 of his critique--would 
have likely been realized if either Churchill's scheme for 
storming Borkum Island or Fisher's 'Pomeranian Landing'245 
had been attempted. The U-boat trap tactic suggested by 
Hipper was to some extent employed at Jutland and promised 
much off Sunderland in August 1916 until Jellicoe refused 
246 
to be drawn. Hipper's advice on sending expendable ships 
on raids which the battle fleet did not support was to be 
242 
BA/MA, F 4062, op. cit., Hipper to Ingenohl, 27 Jan 
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work, notes 133,135. 
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191. See a so Adolph von Trotha, Grossadmiral von Tirpitz, 
(Breslau, 1933), pp. 114-124. 
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followed in the Meteor operations June-August 1915. 
The fact that the High Seas Fleet rarely ventured fur- 
ther than 100 sea miles from Heligoland in 1915 may 
248 
well be attributed to Hipper's recommendation. His 
advice on the decommissioning of older warships was 
generally heeded. 
249In 
short, it appears Hipper's con- 
clusions were reflected in the policy of the fleet 
command. 
This critique of the battle of Dogger Bank was the 
last work of significance which Hipper did for Ingenohl. 
On 1 February 1915 he wrote in his journal: 
Today I placed before the Fleet Commander 
the acutely painful question of the loyalty of 
his captains so that he would understand the con- 
sequences of the 24th. I have been very frank 
and honest with him... 
The next day Hipper recorded in his journal that von 
Ingenohl had been relieved of his command. 'I am very 
sorry about this but there was nothing I could do to 
help him... ' 
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Groos, op. cit., vol. iv, pp. 164ff., 244ff., 
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USNA, PG 76531/Reel 984, Admiralstab der Marine, 
Befehle an andere BehUrden, op. cit., Pohl -to Bachmann, 
137-eE-I'M, re reducing Sixth Battle Squadron; Tirpitz 
to Pohl, 20 Feb 1915 re reducing Fifth Battle Squadron and 
old cruisers; Kaiser to Holtzendorff, 2 Nov 1915, ordering 
all Kaiser Wilhelm II class battleships out of service. 
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On February 3 Hipper wrote: 
Von Pohl (Chief of the Admiralty Staff) 
has been named Fleet Commander. It seems to 
me a more unlikely choice could not have been 
made b the Chief of the Naval Cabinet (von 
Müller). Eckermann (Fleet Chief of Staff) also 
thinks we have made a mistake. Von Lans (First 
Squadron Commander whose squadron was held in 
harbour on Ingenohl's order until too late) 
also will give up his command. That makes a 
powerful d fference to me. I am anxious about 
tomorrow. Z1 
But the worries Hipper may have had about his own 
position must have vanished when he was invited to a 
late breakfast on the Royal Train the next day when the 
Kaiser arrived in Wilhelmshaven. Hipper accompanied 
the Kaiser as he inspected ships and visited hospitals 
and then listened without comment during the meal while 
the Kaiser lambasted Tirpitz' naval construction pro- 
gram in the presence of Tirpitz himself, von Müller, 
von Pohl, the new Fleet C-in-C, von-Laps, and von Bachmann, 
Hipper's former Scouting Forces commander. 
Shortly after the change of command, Hipper wrote 
that the new Fleet Commander could be expected to handle 
his ships with great caution. 
253The 
naval policy under 
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Hugo von Pohl amounted to a continuation of the Klein- 
krieg strategy for the battle fleet but an intensified 
use of U-boats in commerce warfare. Admiral Pohl, ac- 
cording to Gemzell, 'took the initiative... and proclaimed 
the beginning of submarine commerce warfare. '254 The 
campaign began on 4 February 1915 and continued for about 
six monthsdespite sharp protests received from the Amer- 
ican government concerning the heavy loss of life on the 
256 
Lusitania. In August, another crisis arose with the 
sinking of the liner Arabic and another sharp protest 
from Washington resulted in an order from von Pohl to the 
U-boat commanders forwarding the Kaiser's imperial decree 
that henceforth no passenger ships of any nation were to 
257 
be sunk unless the passengers could be saved. Hipper's 
reaction was that the Germans were making a mistake. 
258 
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The role of the U-boat in German naval strategy 
is central to the history of the Imperial Navy in the 
first World War. Hipper's personal journal contains 
259 
numerous references to U-boat warfare which indicate 
he favoured it as an effective weapon for Germany. 
However, Hipper's official views on the tactical and 
strategical use of the U-boat indicate he did not feel 260 
it was a panacea, unlike most of his contemporaries. 
These unpublished observations are contained in his 
analysis of ship-type questions tendered in response 261 
to von Pohl's fleet-wide request for commanders' opinions. 
On 7 July 1915 Hipper submitted an extensive 
letter on naval, ship types in response to von Pohl's 
request of 20 February; it included his definition of 262 
the missions and limitations applicable to the U-boat. 
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Hipper said: 
Apart from offensive actions against 
enemy warships (among others for example, the 
destruction of enemy sorties), and as a result 
of lessons learned, a range of activities pre- 
viously performed by surface craft alone falls 
to the U-boats in the future: 
Strategical scouting; 
Clearing and securing designated areas; 
Guarding specific parts of the fleet at 
anchor; 
Commerce warfare in the traffic lanes of 
enemy ports; 
Minelaying, especially off enemy coasts. 
Escorting and scouting by U-boats are only 
practicable by day; the securing of parts of the 
fleet underway is limited by insufficient (U-boat) 
speed; also their ability to. scout tactically is 
gravely impaired by their insufficient surface 
speed and the impossibility of diving with their 
wireless rigged. 
Concerning the scouting and security service, 
the U-boat only supports and reinforces the employ- 
ment of surface forces; it cannot replace them. 
The U-boats are of tremendous value as 
minelayers. They can lay a complete minefield, 
lay it secretly, and this is the best way to do 
it. The type of minelayer U-boats which carry 
their own mines to the entrances of enemy harbours 
appear especially suitable, effective and practical, 
and constitute a method of employment for torpedo- 
armed U-boats should they find only difficult tar- 
gets for their weapons in the event the enemy are 
driven from the high seas. 
Earlier in the paper Hipper outlined his thinking on 
the surface ship and stated his belief that the U-boat 
would not replace it. He recommended Germany take the 
lead in developing more sophisticated U-boats and build 
more of them. Hipper cautioned, however, that improved 
236 
defences and anti-submarine weapons could be expected 
and noted that in cases where the element of surprise 
was missing, the measure of U-boat success was very 
small. The two latter observations drew a marginal 
exclamation from von Pohl who wrote, 'This man always 
against the U-boat! ' 
263 
Were there any major conflicts on an official level 
between Hipper and Pohl? The documents indicate they 
usually agreed on most questions, especially technical 
and tactical matters, notwithstanding the U-boat marginal 
comment cited above. In matters of scouting force reor- 
ganization, Hipper was supported by Pohl. For example, 
Hipper desired to extend disciplinary authority to some 
of his subordinates which would require a change in fleet 
264 
regulations; Pohl endorsed Hipper's recommendation. 
Again, when Hipper recommended some changes in mission for 
265 
old torpedoboats, Pohl agreed. And Pohl supported 
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Concerning surface forces, Pohl was in favour of 
a fleet engagement in the North Sea but only on German 
terms, which-meant in the Bight. 
267 
Hipper is on record 
as being in agreement in his Dogger Bank report. However, 
268 
Pohl's view of the war at sea was limited to North Sea 
options. and like his predecessor, von Ingenohl, he was 
269 
loth to risk anything. Hipper took a broader view in his 
analysis of German war experiences at sea in response to 
Pohl's fleet-wide questionnaire already mentioned. Hipper 
wrote on 7 July 1915: 
... our present war strategy against England is due to its very nature stamped strategically 
defensive. This is because pf England's geograph- 
ical position combined with the lack of German 
Atlantic bases, i. e., the German Bight is cut off 
from the Atlantic and further, there is the relative 
strength of the British and German fleets. Due to 
the above circumstances a truly effective offensive 
on the high seas in order to sever British Atlantic 
communications and defeat Engla2$a-which should be 
our aim--has not been possible. 
It should be noted that Pohl claimed in his private 
war letters that his admirals and captains were less in 
271 
favour of offensive action than he was, as of March 1915. 
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Pohl's claim notwithstanding, Hipper's analysis was 
echoed by the German official history published in 1922 
272 
and by Arthur Marder in 1965. 
Another aspect of the Hipper-Pohl relationship con- 
cerned the question of whether flying machines could re- 
place surface ships in certain missions. Zeppelins in 
particular and to a lesser extent naval aircraft form 
273 
a major part of the official history of Pohl's tenure 
as Fleet C-in-C. Hipper's analysis of this new tech- 
nology has also not been published either by his biographer 
or the official historian. At the outbreak of the war 
Hipper was briefly in charge of all naval aircraft and 
274 
the Naval Airship Division. This force included one 
zeppelin in the North Sea and two at Kiel, 12 seaplanes, 
275 
and 12 land-based aircraft. On 29 August 1914 the billet 
of Chief of the Naval Air Forces was created and Rear-Admiral 
276 
Philipp chosen to direct the planned buildup. Though 
divested of direct command of naval aircraft, Hipper in- 
cluded scouting missions for them in his operations orders 
for the defence of the German Bight throughout the war. 
272 
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Hipper's appreciation of the capabilities and limitations 
of naval aircraft is set forth in his response to another 
question from27on Pohl in the latter's fleet-wide inquiry. 
Hipper wrote: 
Flying Machines 
Airships are--without regard to attack 
functions--suitable for: 
strategical scouting; 
the tactical scouting prior to a battle; 
the security service: 
securing a sea lane, for securing a fleet-- 
especially a fleet underway. 
In limited circumstances (fixed wing) aircraft 
can serve in a similar manner as, airships in tacti- 
cal scouting and securing of sea lanes. Embarked 
in the cruisers and used from them, (aircraft) could 
increase considerably the working range of the crui- 
sers for scouting in profitable ways, especially if 
they were equipped with wireless. 
Similarly, the results of aircraft and air- 
ships hunting U-boats are worthy of note. Neverthe- 
less, airships are as severely limited by the weather 
as aircraft; only after dawn can they be considered 
capable of scouting and escort duties. To-be-. sure, - 
they are capable of supplementing the function of 
the cruisers, and they ought to be so equipped. 
The simultaneous use of light surface forces, 
airships and aircraft could be of great impact if 
systematically developed. 
Should we make as great an effort in air 
weapons as in the underwater (weapons) it would 
give us absolute superiority over all other nations 
in the world. 
An examination of the course of the war from July, 1915,, 
when this was written, shows that Hipper's observations were 
largely valid. Airships and aircraft did perform these roles 
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and were usually successful to the degree he predicted, 
especially if the weather intervened. Michelsen's an- 
alysis of the U-boat war notes the value of aircraft in 
hunting submarines278 
During Admiral von Pohl's time as C-in-C there were 
several attempts to have him change the national defensive 
strategy to a more active one. The politics involved 
have been charted by Herwig, Gemzell, and Tirpitz himself 
279 
to a greater extent. Perhaps the fitness report Pohl 
wrote in December 1915 on Admiral-Hipper reflects Hipper's 
280 
lack of participation in the machinations toward this 
more active strategy. Pohl stated that Hipper had fulfilled 
his duties very well and had developed into a superb flag 
officer from a very good torpedoboat commander some years 
before. He rated Hipper's performance at the Dogger Bank 
battle as 'creditable under the very difficult circumstances 
of that engagement' and said 'Hipper would be the best man 
281 
to lead the fleet in its attacks on England. ' Only a few 
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weeks later Admiral von Pohl fell ill and was relieved 
as Fl2et C-in-C by Admiral Reinhard Scheer on 18 January 
1916. When Scheer's appointment appeared imminent, 
283 
Hipper's reaction was as follows: 
It looks like a new fleet commander will 
have to be named... hopefully Scheer. 
Three days later, Hipper wrote: 
284 
The danger that Admiral Holtzendorff would 
get the fleet, which I gravely feared, appears to 
-have been avoided. Everything indicates that Scheer 
will take over the job. 
Hipper's personal reaction to the staff changes under 
Scheer was concern over losing Capt. Max Hahn, of the 
battle cruiser von der Tann, and Capt. Magnus von Levetzow 
of Moltke. On 23 January 1916 Levetzow became Assistant 
Chief of Staff, Operations, for Scheer and Hahn commanding 
2 
officer of the new battleship Bayern. 286 
Scheer set up a new planning section under Levetzow 
and Capt. Adolph von Trotha which effectively removed 
Hipper from the fleet planning business; under Ingenohl 
and Pohl Hipper had been heavily involved in this. Despite, 
--- ----------- 
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this, the Hipper-Scheer relationship of Fleet C-in-C 
and Scouting Force Commander began cordially with a 
'most kind message' from Scheer to Hipper on the anni- 
versary of the Dogger Bank battle. But by 15 March 
Hipper complained of severe combat fatigue. On 19 March 
he received a letter from the Fleet informing him they 
desired a complete reorganization of his command. Hipper 
287 
wrote: 
I am very unlucky. Besides that, I have 
had the whole watch service and readiness of the 
light forces under me for 20 months, and the new 
fleet staff would cut me off from it all. There 
must be another way. 
Hipper asked for sick leave on 20 March and on the 
27th Admiral Scheer visited him aboard Seydlitz, approved 
Hipper's request and said everything had been arranged 
as Hipper desired. It was a good thing, too, for the day 288 
before, Hipper wrote of 'terrible pain and exhaustion. ' 
However, Scheer did not stop with giving Hipper a medical 
leave of absence; he called Henning von Holtzendorff, 
Chief of the Admiralty Staff, and asked that Hipper be 289 
retired. There is a memorandum of this telephone call in 
Hipper's service record and it reads as follows: 
287 Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., 5/5,19 Mar 1916. 
288 Op. cit., 5/5-9,20-27 Mar 1916. 
289 BA/MA, Personal Acten Hipper, op. cit., 15 Apr 1916, 
p. 42. 
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Vice-Admiral Scheer feels that he has 
come to the conclusion that Vice-Admiral 
Hipper no longer possesses the qualities of 
robustness and elasticity which the assign- 
ment of Flag Officer, Reconnaissance Forces 
demands and that it is also his view that 
the end of leave will not affect a complete 
restoration of his abilities. Besides, a change has been in order because the burdens of the 
B. d. A. have increased tremendously since the beginning of the war. 
The man acting in the assignment of 
B. d. A., Rear-Admiral Boedicker, has shown him- 
self to be the most suitable replacement since 
assuming the duties of the post. Perhaps it 
could be arranged that the duties of the B. d. A. 
could be lightened by removing responsibility 
for the Flag Officer, Torpedoboats and the air- 
ship contingents, and thus the senior man (Hipper) would be able to stay. 
Holtzendorff disagreed with Admiral Scheer's position 
because he did not like Scheer 'coming forward with such 
radical suggestions so soon after his assumption of his 
command. 
290 
And Holtzendorff thought that relieving Hipper 
so soon after Scheer had succeeded Pohl as Fleet Commander- 
in-Chief could 'only damage the war leadership. ' To this, 
Admiral von Müller, chief of the Naval Cabinet and re- 
sponsible for naval officer personnel, wrote 'I agree' on 
the memorandum. Thus, von MUller's support of Hipper 
continued, averting his premature retirement. Meanwhile, 
Hipper had turned over command of the Scouting Forces to 




Hipper spent five weeks at Bad Nenndorf. On 12 May he 
received a nerve specialist's report which said there 
was no evidence of damage to his central nervous system 
and that his only problem was nervous tension. That 
evening he accepted a dinner invitation from Frau Princess 
Heinrich and the next morning returned to duty aboard his 
291 
new flagship Lützow. 
The Battle of Jutland 
Soon thereafter, Hipper was involved in the largest' 
and most complex surface battle in modern naval history. 
It occurred off Jutland, Denmark in the North Sea on 
30 May-1 June 1916, and developed in five distinct phases. 
The first was the engagement between Hipper's and Beatty's 
battle cruisers on the afternoon of 31 May and the run 
south with Hipper leading Beatty onto Scheer's battle 
fleet. The second phasewas the chase north with Beatty 
leading Hipper, Scheer and the German fleet onto Jellicoe's 
Grand Fleet. The third phase was the engagement of both 
fleets with Jellicoe deploying his columns to the left 
and broadside to Scheer's van. The fourth phase was the 
German High Seas Fleet fighting through the rear of the 
Grand Fleet on the night of 31 May-1 June to return to 
home base. The fifth phase was shepherding the stragglers 
in the German fleet back into safe waters and bringing 
291 Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., 5/10,12 May 1916. 
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damaged ships home. 
Prior to the battle itself Scheer had used all means 
available to gather intelligence but weather prevented 
accurate zeppelin reconnaissance on 29 May and U-boats 
suffered from their inability to transmit safely. Hipper 
had noted these problems in his analyses of zeppelins and 
293 
U-boats the year before. Because the British maintained 
wireless silence, wireless intercept brought Hipper little 
294 
information on British intentions and movements. 
In the first phase of the battle Hipper steered 
north and encountered six battle cruisers, ' engaging them 
at 1746. At 1712 the light cruiser Frankfurt in Hipper's 
screen reported five British battleships following the 
battle cruisers. Scheer intercepted this message and 
ordered his fleet to change course so as to come to 
Hipper's support as soon as possible. Unfortunately 
for the Germans, this meant Scheer had to abandon his 
plan295to get to the west of Hipper and the enemy battle 
cruisers to trap the British between his guns and Hipper's. 
292 BA/MA, F 4061/PG 64808/Reel 347, Kr. Op. Nordsee 61 
Seeschlacht vor dem Skaggerak 31.5.162.6716, War Opera- 
tion North Sea 6Tea Battle at the -Skagerrak), Scheer to 
Kaiser Wilhelm II, 4 July 1916, pp. 7-34. 
293 See notes 262 and 277. 
294 K. T. B. der B. d. A., op. cit., 31 May 1916, FT Signal 
600 rý' om Ne_u__mUnster. 
295 Scheer to Kaiser, op. cit., loc. cit., p. 7. 
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Nonetheless, Hipper sank the British battle cruisers 
Indefatigable and een Mary in this phase of the battle. 
A critical factor in this phase was Hipper's development 
of the battle in a southeasterly direction towards the 
296 
main German fleet. In his mid-June critique Hipper said: 
Development of an action away from one's 
own battle fleet is to be avoided. 
On the other hand, Admiral Scheer asserted in a conver- 
297 
sation with the American naval observer, Berlin, on 
24 March 1921 that he had had a conversation with Hipper 
on this point: 
After the battle von Scheer had inquired of 
Admiral Hipper what the latter's course would 
have been in case Admiral Beatty had forced the 
cruiser fight to develop to the Northward instead 
of the Southwest. Admiral Hipper replied that he 
would probably have followed Admiral Beatty and 
doubted seriously he would have given the order to 
break off the engagement. In Admiral Scheer's 
opinion this would have been a serious mistake 
since the result would have been to separate the 
German battle cruisers from the main fleet to 
such an extent that it would have been impossible 
for the latter to support the cruisers. Admiral 
Scheer stated that it required extraordinary cour- 
age on the part of the Battle Cruiser Commander 
to break off the engagement under such circum- 
stance, but felt that the necessity for bringing 
the fleet into action outweighed all other con- 
siderations... 
296 
USNA, PG 77734/Reel 1130, Akten Hochseeflotte 
Kriegserfahrungen der Hochseestre tkr te, ca. Jun 1916, 
TP-apers o the ig1 eas eet, War Experiences of the 
Forces Afloat), Hipper to Scheer, Lessons Learned by the 
Scouting and Escort Forces and Cruiser Tactics, p. 2. 
297 USNA, R. G. 45, Naval Records Collection of the Office 
of Naval Records & Library, Sub-file ZOS (f-G-I 14060), 
'Notes on Opinions held by Admiral von Scheer, ' The Naval 
Observer, Berlin, 24 Mar 1921. 
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Scheer's comments, made in-1921, may be interpreted 
as an attempt to influence American naval opinion on his 
performance'at Jutland, perhaps because Hipper was regar- 
298 
ded so highly by the Americans. Raeder says: 
... The American historian, Commander Frost, is more than a little critical of Beatty in the 
battle and emphatically called Admiral Hipper the 
greatest of all the leaders at the Skagerrak. 
Admiral Hipper modestly waived the accolade in 
favour of Admiral Scheer, pointing out that 
Commander Frost was not in a position to appreci- 
ate fully the great responsibility of the fleet's 
Commander-in-Chief. 
Frost's article on the battle of Jutland was published 
299 
in 1919. The American naval observer's interview with 
Scheer took place two years later but only a few weeks 
before publication of letters from Scheer and Hipper to 
Frost in the same forum. Hipper eschewed the commander's 
role and commented strictly on tactical and technical 
300 
matters. 
The second phase of the Jutland battle was the chase 
north of'Beatty by Hipper and Scheer. However, once the 
squadron of Queen Elizabeth class superdreadnoughts joined 
Beatty Hipper was unable to either slow Beatty down or 
overcome the now superior concentration of fire to which 
he was subjected. Scheer sent Hipper an 'undertake pursuit' 
298 Raeder, ope cit., p. 74. 
299 H. H. Frost, 'A Description of the Battle of Jutland, ' 
USNI Proceedings, (Annapolis, 1919), vol. 45, p. 1829. 
300 
Hipper and Scheer to Frost, Discussion in USNI Proceedings, 
vol. 47, pp. 1083-1085. 
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order about this time. He ignored it, knowing it would 
result in his being punished heavily without being able 
301 
to gain any advantage. Though the High Seas Fleet's 
KI3nig class battleships were fast, the rest of the fleet 
302 
was not fast enough to keep up the pursuit. Hipper took 
his ships out of the fight, ordering them to turn to 
starboard to avoid further damage. He describes the 
moment: 
... when I had to work against a 
blinding 
sunset and devastating enemy artillery. The sun 
stood deep and the horizon was hazy and I had to 
fire directly into the sun. I saw absolutely 
nothing of the enemy who was behind a dense cloud 
of smoke--the gunneryofficers could find no tar- 
get though we were a superb one ourselves. There 
was nothing else to do but take the ships out of 
battle for awhile. 
303 
In his after-action critique Hipper made several 
comments on this phase of Jutland. Hipper said the 
action showed the British had managed to develop a 
'flying squadron' of battle cruisers and fast battleships, 
representing a serious problem for future operations 
because'in his opinion such a squadron could make it 
very difficult for his own main fleet to join an action 
brought about by his battle cruisers. Also, such a 
301 
Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., 5/13-14,31 May 1916. For 
Scheer's order see Otto Groos, Der Krieg in der Nordsee, 
vol. v, von Januar- bis Juni 19TH (Berlin-, I 5), p. 527. 
302 BA/MA, F 50-66/15, Deutsche Kriegsflotte, op. cit., 
vol. 14,. S. M. S. KBnig, Mar gra . -Grosser Kurfürst, p. 24. 
303 USNA, PG 77734/Reel 1130, Kriegserfahrungen, op. cit., 
Hipper to Scheer, pp. 1-4. 
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squadron made Hipper's primary mission 
enemy's main fleet very difficult. He 
Germans counter with a 'flying squadroi 
combining several new battleships with 
which he thought would be enough power 
escape and successfully trap the enemy 
and those of the main fleet. 
of scouting the 
suggested the 
: i' of their own by 
his own force 
to block an enemy 
between his guns 
In the battle's third phase at dusk on 31 May 1916 
304 
Hipper realized his flagship Lützow was so badly damaged 
by the all-day battle and by the first encounter with the 
Grand Fleet that he must shift his flag. Derfflinger was 
signalled to take command of the line while Hipper trans- 
ferred to the nearest battleworthy ship. Hipper described 
305 
his predicament: 
I had to find myself another flagship 
because I could no longer exercise command 
from one which was shot to pieces. Time to 
change ships. A torpedoboat was called along- 
side and we changed under heavy fire. The 
Fleet Commander had meanwhile reformed the line 
and began to lead them out to the west. Besides 
this, he had discovered a very unfavourable new 
development--that 24 modern battleships had been 
sighted to the northwest. 
304 
BA/MA F 3899/PG 63257, K. T. B. S. M. S. Lützow, Bericht 
über die Versenkun S. M. S. LUtzow nach der Sc lac t der 
Skagerrak am L. Junj-. 197-, 3E--4=. Vormittags, War Diary 
o S. . S. Liltzow, Report oTtT Sinking of the Litzow 
after the battle of Jutland, at 0345 1 June 191ý- 
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Nachlass Hi er, op. cit., 5/16,31 May 1916. 
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The battle cruisers, to the everlasting 
credit of their own line, received the order 
durin the battle turnabout to 'charge the 
enemy and then set themselves in full cry and 
were swept by a hail of fire because of it. 
Meantime, drove my torpedoboat hoping to find an 
advantageous moment to board one of them. These 
12 hours that I spent in a hail of shell and 
splinters aboard the torpedoboat I shall not be 
likely to forget. 
Hipper had been in the torpedoboat G-38 and followed 
the charge of the battle cruisers which had been ordered 
by Scheer to cover the fleet turnabout. Gradually, the 
murderous fire tapered as darkness fell and Hipper used 
the opportunity to board the Moltke at 2230. Meanwhile, 
his forces had sunk the battle cruiser Invincible and 
the armoured cruiser Warrior while managing to cover 
the withdrawl of the High Seas Fleet from a Grand Fleet 
envelopment. There is no doubt the German torpedoboat 
forces played a large part in preventing an immediate 
British pursuit of Scheer. 
306 
However, in his after-action 
report Hipper said he thought massive torpedoboat attacks 
were pointless as long as the battle lines were engaged 
with each other. Further, small-scale torpedoboat attacks 
were unwise because they would leave boats damaged or out 
of ammunition in the vicinity of the enemy battle line. 
307 
306 
Jellicoe, op. cit., pp. 361-366,394-399. 
307 
USNA, Kriegserfahrungen, op. cit., Hipper to Scheer, 
loc. cit. 
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The fourth and fifth phases of Jutland saw Hipper's 
damaged forces extricate themselves from the Grand Fleet's' 
maw. A last incident in the night actions should be noted. 
When Hipper was challenged by H. M. S. Thunderer at 0030 
German Standard Time June 1, the captain of the British 
battleship neither opened fire on the Moltke or reported 
her sighting 'as it was considered inadvisable to show up 
our battle fleet unless obvious attack was intended, ' 
308 
Marder says quoting the Jutland Dispatches. For the 
second time in his naval career, Hipper's life had been 
saved by a British mistake. Hipper ordered Captain Karpf 
of Moltke to steer to the south and pass ahead of the 
309 
Grand Fleet. This he did and passed ahead of them at 
0230 German Mean Time. Hipper reports the incident as 
encountering four large ships to port which were between 
him and the High Seas Fleet. 
In retrospect, it may be said Hipper played a major 
role in inflicting whatever damage was suffered by the 
British at Jutland. He had accomplished his mission to 
cut off and destroy enemy warships and to lead any heavier 




Marder, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 158. 
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BA/MA, F 3920/PG 63275, K. T. B. S. M. S. Moltke, 1M. 16, 
lh 20m Vm. (0120). 
310 BA/MA, F 4065/PG 64808/Reel 347, op. cit., 0 erations- 
befehl Nr. 6, Scheer to All Commanders, 28 May , p. 1. 
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the Germans were not unacceptable but the damage was 
more severe than initially reckoned. 
Communications were probably the greatest difficulty 
as the ships of the time were like dinosaurs with tremen- 
dous speed but blind and deaf when their delicate and 
scanty communications equipment was knocked out. German 
organization proved flexible enough to survive and fight 
through the British fleet at night. This indeed was an 
eventuality for which the Imperial Navy had been thoroughly 
311 
trained. The after-action reports on both sides consid- 
ered the night fighting performance particularly good. 
It should be remembered that Hipper's force was concerned 
with survival and escaping detection by first light. The 
only aspect of the battle which might reflect adversely on 
Hipper is the fact that his cruisers and torpedoboats did 
not sight or report the Grand Fleet until it was in a po- 
sition to engage Scheer. 
Hipper makes no excuse for this, though with his 
smaller ships to his disengaged side, he had sacrificed 
his scouts' mission so as to not obscure his gunnery range- 
finders. He also preserved them as battle resources. 
Hipper retained the ability to loose a torpedo attack 
should the main enemy fleet appear. He could also send 
in his torpedoboats to counter an enemy destroyer attack. 
311 
P. R. O. Adm 137/1945, Action With the German High Sea 
Fleet 31 May-1June 1916, Narrative of Action by Jellicoe, 
p. 75. 
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Furthermore, Beatty did his best to see that Hipper did 
not suspect Jellicoe's presence until it was too late. 
Beatty succeeded and cost Hipper much. 
It is also noteworthy that both of Hipper's options 
with regard to torpedoboats were exercised and caused 
Jellicoe to turn away, saving Scheer. On balance, it 
seems there is good argument for the course Hipper took 
in this regard. 
The fact that Hipper had first to even the odds and 
then go on to reduce the enemy to momentary inferiority 
underlines the problems faced by the admiral with fewer 
ships. Hipper seems to have prepared for every eventu- 
ality as well as possible and though German naval thought 
held that the accomplishment of the mission was more im- 
portant than sinking ships, Hipper's last statements 
about the battle before he got the damage reports show 
only a desire to get at the enemy again and to sink more 
of their ships. 
312 
He says in his Nachlass, 'My only 
thoughts were that we should have the whole English fleet 
before us at Horns Reef the next morning and there decide 
the issue. ' 
For his performance in the battle Hipper was awarded 
Germany's highest combat decordation, the Orden Pour le 
312 
Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., 5/18,31 May 1916. 
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Merite, by the Kaiser on 5 June 1916. He also received 
the Royal Bavarian Order of Max Joseph, Commander's Cross, 
which entitled him to be addressed as Ritter von Hipper 
and elevated him to the nobility. The Grand Duchy of 
Saxony awarded him the Royal Saxon Order, Order of Al- 
brecht, with silver crown and swords. The Kingdom of 
Württemberg awarded him the Commander's Cross of the Royal 
Württemberg Military Service Order. Hipper was awarded 
three Hanseatic Crosses from Lübeck, Bremen and Hamburg. 
After Jutland 
Between the aftermath of Jutland and November 1916 
little of consequence transpired for Hipper. The fleet 
went out on several operations but did not bring the British 
to battle again. U-boat warfare became a greater priority 
and on land the Brusilov offensive in the east and the 
Sommes' offensive in the west strained Germany considerably. 
As the Germans concentrated on the U-boat war the mission 
of the fleet began to shift to U-boat protection and escort 
from German home waters. On 4 November Hipper received 
orders to take all available heavy ships and watch vessels 
to rescue and salvage U-20 and U-30 aground on the Danish 
coast. Neutral Denmark's attitude was uncertain and the 
314 
Fleet C-in-C was concerned lest the boats be interned. 
313 PersonalAkten Hipper, op. cit., Orden, loc. cit. 
314 Scheer, Germany's High Sea Fleet, op. cit., pp. 191-193. 
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Hipper took 2 battle cruisers, 11 battleships, 4 
light cruisers and 12 torpedoboats because as he says, 
'every German sortie made in foul weather had run into 
a surprisingly large enemy. '315 By the time Hipper arrived 
U-30 had freed herself but was unable to dive and had to 
be escorted home. U-20, the boat which had sunk the 
Lusitania the previous year, was blown up after the crew 
was taken off to prevent her. future salvage by neutral 
or hostile powers. On the way home, the dreadnoughts 
Grosser Kurfürst and; Kronprinz were torpedoed but got 
back with little difficulty., Kaiser Wilhelm criticized 
the operation saying 'To risk-a squadron for the sake of 
one U-boat, and in doing so almost lose two battleships, 
showed a lack of sense of proportion and must not occur 
again. '316 Scheer criticized Hipper on technical grounds 
317 
in his report to the Kaiser. This incident came at an 
inopportune time for Scheer who was attempting to achieve 
complete freedom of action for his U-boats. 
8 
315 BA/MA, F 4096/PG 64839/Reel 411, Kr. 0. Nordsee. 82 
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316 Scheer, op. cit., p. 192. 
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10 Nov 1916. Cf. Scheer, Germany's High Sea Fleet, op. cit., 
p. 193. 
318 Ritter, op. cit., vol. iii, pp. 271ff. 
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Hipper supported the U-boat campaign of 1917. 
319 
He said: 
Time can make the U-boat war succeed, 
and I have the sound conviction that we will 
be victorious. I can be wrong and it is pos- 
sible the enemy might find counter-weapons 
which are beyond our present calculations, 
but as has been said, I do not believe so. 
The participation of Hipper's command in the U- 
boat campaign was two-fold: the scouting forces were 
part of the 'fleet-in-being' strategy which prevented 
a successful British attack on Germany's main U-boat 
bases and the scouting forces also supplied a large 
part of the personnel required to commission the new 
320 321 
U-boats. Hipper s role was to keep his command 
battle-ready despite the officer and rating drafts 
into the rapidly expanding U-boat service. He also had 
to defend German home waters as best he could and to 
help the U-boats get out and back 'to waters more than 
20 meters deep, beyond the range of coastal guns, where 
322 
they (U-boats) were fully capable of operating. ' 
319 Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., 6/23,1 Feb 1917. 
320 
Scheer, Germany's High Sea Fleet, op. Cit., p. 280. 
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During the latter half of 1917 the fleet was heavily 
involved in supporting mine-sweeping efforts to keep the 
U-boat sea access lanes open. There was another battle 
with heavy ships in the German Bight on 17 November 1917 
but the losses- and effects on both sides were negligible. 
The next month Admiral Scheer wrote the final fitness 
323 
report in Hipper's service record. It read: 
On Vice-Admiral Ritter von Hipper 
Commanding the Scouting Forces with 
four years in the assignment. 
Very active as a man and as a personality; 
perhaps he even stands out too much (which may be) 
the beginning of his downfall. His performance as 
a leader--for it is as such he has been in the fore- 
front of all operations and he served with special 
distinction in the battle of the Skagerrak--is 
that of performing well at the right tactical 
moment. At the same time, when he is in charge 
of subordinate forces he does not supervise the 
tactical commanders closely enough and turns too 
much of the tactical work over to his staff. As 
a combat commander his temperament and competence 
cannot be faulted. He remains always a good leader. 
I don't know about peace, though, if one would 
want him as a fleet commander. 
(s) Scheer, Fleet Commander 
Despite Scheer's doubts about Hipper as a fleet com- 
mander in peace he turned to him in the summer of 1918 to 
command the fleet in war. Scheer said Hipper was chosen 
because of the following reasons: 
323 
BA/MA, Personal&ten Hipper, op. cit., 1 Dec 1917, 
Qualificationsbrichte, (Fitness Reports), p. 39. 
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His great experience in matters apper- 
taining to the Fleet, his efficiency in all 
the technical situations in which he had 
found himself with his cruisers, seemed to 
point to him as the most suitable person to 
whom I could confidently hand over the weapon from which 314never thought to be separated in this life. 
Hipper's promotion and assignment as Fleet Com- 
mander were made in the context of a larger reorgan- 
ization of the Imperial Navy in July-August 1918.325 
Hipper was appointed Fleet C-in-C on 12 August 1918. 
A few weeks previously Scheer had told Hipper that he 
326 
'had the confidence of the officer corps etc. etc. ' and 
this was cited by Admiral von Trotha as his own reason 
for recommending Hipper to the Naval Cabinet as Scheer's 
327 
successor as Fleet C-in-C. Another officer privy to the 
proceedings concerning Hipper's assignment, Lieutenant 
Commander Ernst von Weizsäcker, confirmed in his private 
account of the conferences, that it was the view of the 
328 
fleet Hipper was the best man for the job. 
324 
325 
Scheer, op* cit., p. 333. 
Hubatsch, Der Admiralstab, op. cit., pp. 179-181. 
326 Nachlass Ham, op. cit., 8/20,26 July 1918. 
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Hipper's comment on these events was as follows: 
The Fleet Commander was with me this 
morning, having just returned from Grand Head- 
quarters. He informed me that everything had 
been arranged as he had requested. Holtzendorff 
is promoted to Grand Admiral and turns, over his 
responsibilities in the next week. Upon promotion 
to admiral I will take over command of the fleet. 
... On Thursday 
(9 August) I took over provisional 
command aboard the Kaiser Wilhelm II after a short 
speech. Enough of speeches... zis evening (11 August) 
my formal assignment as Fleet Commangg has been 
announced with promotion to admiral. 
His journal also shows he was not unaware of the 
disappointment of other naval officers who were passed 
over because of his appointment. He said that 'for 37 
years a man in the navy speaks always of the next great 330 
step and it hardly ever comes. 
' Here Hipper is referring 
to his contemporaries who had served about as long as 
he had but whose fate it was to be retired before at- 
taining one of the few full admirals' billets in the 
Imperial Navy. 
331 
Hipper's frustration with 'speeches' 
reflected the latest bad news from the western front. 
329 
Nachlass Hipýer8%24. cit., ca. 1 Aug 1918; 
8/23,79 Aug 1918s r 11 Aug 
330 Ibid, 8/22, ca. 1 Aug 1918. 
331 Cf. Herwig, op. cit., for admirals' discontent with 
personnel changes, pp. 
237ff. 
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In the final analysis, it was the 'bad news' from the 
western front which led to the German military col- 
lapse, the naval mutinies and the German revolution of 
1918. These events would force Hipper to deal with 
the most severe crises faced by any of the four war- 
time German fleet commanders. His appointment-to 
succeed Scheer as Fleet C-in-C in August 1918 when the 
war was all but lost brought him a full admiral's flag 
and mixed emotions about the future. His tenure in 
that post began with 'bad news from the western front' 
and ended in mutiny, revolution and surrender of the 
best ships under his command. 
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PART IV 
HIPPER, MUTINY AND REVOLUTION 
Franz Hipper's role in the mutiny and revolution 
which accompanied the German collapse of 1918 can best 
be followed by posing and answering a series of ques- 
tions: what events occurring prior to October 1918 
are related to Hipper's actions in the mutiny and rev- 
olution? What was Hipper's reaction to the impending 
defeat of Germany? What was the context of the fleet 
sortie proposed for October 1918 and what was Hipper's 
involvement? How did Hipper deal with the initial out- 
breaks of trouble in the fleet and later with the spread 
of the revolt? Did any of his actions help trigger the 
revolution? To what extent did Hipper accommodate him- 
self to the new political realities of the German 
revolution? 
Prelude to Mutiny 
In seeking to understand Hipper's thinking during the 
crises of October and November 1918, two aspects of the 
man must be examined: his concern for morale and disci- 
pline and his political attitudes. 
Hipper's concern for morale. and his ability to mo_ 
tivate men has been documented as early as 1907, when he 
262 
commanded the Prinz Heinrich. 
1 
In 1912 Hipper wrote an 
official paper on manning problems and his opinions re- 
.2 flected his concern for morale. Again, in 1914 his re- 
port to the Kaiser 
3 
evaluated morale as a substantial ele- 
ment of readiness. But by the summer of 1917 the course 
of the war had so debilitated the fleet that a seaman 
made a highly unusual call on an admiral and told him, 
'There is something rotten in the fleet, excellency, and 
it needs clearing out. '4 
The seaman was Petty Officer First Class Conrad Lotter 
of S. M. S. Bremse, a new light cruiser. The admiral was 
Hipper, who like Lotter, was Bavarian-born. Hipper's 
biographer, Waldeyer-Hartz, recorded the visit and said 
'Hipper failed to come to a decision '5 on what to do with 
Lotter's information. But Waldeyer-Hartz does not describe 
Lotter's reasons nor the full extent of his message to 
Hipper nor the action Hipper took afterward. This despite 
the fact that Lotter's account of his visit to Hipper is 
1 Persona1A1ten 
ýHi 
Hipper, op. cit., Sualificationsberichte, 
entry for ý Cf. BA/MA F 3468, Imperial Naval ice, 
Papers concerning the High Sea Fleet, Reports on Performance 
of Captains in 1907 Manoeuvres, op. cit., part I, n. 102. 
2 BA/MA F 728/PG 67715, op. cit., pp. 16-17. Cf. n. 136. 
3 USNA, PG 67250/Reel 494, Ubun sberichte der Hochseeflotte, 
op. cit., Der Befehlshaber der Au t run ssc'Fii . e. au pt- 
efechtsbes chti- un en der Äük rungssc i e, 7 April 1914, 
op. cit., Para J. 
4 Waldeyer-Hartz, op. cit., p. 251. Lotter visited Hipper 





in the Reichstag Committee of Inquiry's pro- 
ceedings published in 1927, six years before Waldeyer- 
Hartz's work on Hipper. 
In 1973, another student of the German collapse, 
David Woodward, repeated this canard of Hipper's repu- 
ted indecision in this matter. 
7 
Lotter visited Hipper to report what appeared to 
him to be a revolutionary gathering or 'mutineers' con- 
ference' in the Tivoli Restaurant in Wilhelmshaven. 
Lotter's commanding officer, Capt. von Billow, was away 
from the ship and Lotter did not trust the Bremse's ex- 
ecutive officer to act on his information. He therefore 
took his courage in hand and called on Hipper, delivered 
his report and was dismissed with thanks. Hipper checked 
with von Billow as to Lotter's reliability and followed up 
with action to assure no further trouble occurred. Hipper 
-made several surprise inspections in the Second Scouting 
Group, transferred Capt. von Billow to a shore billet and 
6 
Das Werk des Untersuchungsausschusses der Verfassun ge- 
bencTen eutscTen ationa versamm un und-ges Deutschen 
eic stäges 1919-1928. Vierte Reihe. Die Ursac en des 
eutsc ein Zusammen ruc esm--3a re l9187Zweite tei un , 
Der Innere Zusammen ruc , Ter in, 1919-1928), -vo . ix, 
pp. 43-44. is work is hereinafter abbreviated WUA. 
7 David Woodward, The Collapse of Power, (London, 1973), 
pp. 68-69. For a is i ar assertion see Daniel Horn, The 
German Naval Mutinies of World War I, (Rutgers, 1967), pp. 
fit. Lotter s testimony is contained in a letter dated 
S. M. S. Bremse, 20 Aug 1917, from Lotter to the Bavarian 
Reichstag Deputy Leicht. The letter was submitted to the 
Committee of Inquiry by Dr. Pfleger, formerly of the Central 
Party and later the Bavarian People's Party, their naval expert. 
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replaced him with Captain Westerkamp. 
8 
Eight days later 
Hipper called Lotter to his quarters and asked him for 
a report on the happenings in Bremse. Lotter reported 
the first officer was arrogant and badgered his men. 
Hipper replaced him. Lotter also complained about the 
drudgery of harbour routine and the deteriorating quality 
of the food. Again, Hipper thanked him, rewrote the reg- 
ulations for harbour duties so time in port constituted 
as much rest as possible and lightened the duties where 
possible. Luckily, the Imperial Naval Office about this 
time raised the food allowance by . 30 marks per person per 
9 
day so to some extent the shortages were alleviated. 
Lotter's written testimony to the Inquiry Committee's 
proceedings says that the crews were 'very very thankful' 
for all of Hipper's efforts and the navy's as well. 
Hipper also had Lotter transferred to the enlisted staff 
of the Flag Officer, U-boats, a nice shore billet. 
Strangely enough, Hipper's war journal lacks any mention 




Ibid, loc. cit., Lotter to Leicht. 
Ibid. 
10 Lotter called on Hipper 24 July 1917, several days 
before the mutiny broke out on 3 August. Hipper's journal 
for that date and those following shows no-reference to 
the visit. See Nachlass Hipper. 7/26-27,19-30 July 1917. 
265 
The Lotter incident was a microcosm of the wider 
disturbances which had broken out in the light cruiser 
Pillau on 20 July 1917. On 3 August there was open 
mutiny in five battleships of the High Seas Fleet, the 
worse incidents occurring in the Prinzregent Luitpold. 
Documents 
11 
assembled by the German Naval Archive show 
Admiral Scheer, Fleet C-in-C, assumed responsibility 
for dealing with the situation. Court martials were 
held and 77 sailors convicted of mutiny. Of these, 
four were from the scouting forces: two from Pillau 
and two from Moltke; they were not among those given 
death sentences. Hipper's reaction to the sentences was: 
Judgement has been pronounced against 
the main agitators to compensate for their 
serious deeds. 5 of them are sentenced to 
death, 4 to prison for terms of 12 to 15 
years. I am very concerned whether this 
judgement is to be confirmed. In the j terest 
of discipline, I hope very much it is. 
He also recommended to the fleet command that officers 
and petty officers develop closer relations with their men 
to prevent such outbreaks in the future. 
13 
But the fleet 
high command did not adopt Hipper's recommendation, largely 
11 
BA/MA, F 4078/PG 64923/Reels 351,352, Flottenunruhen 
1917-1918, (Fleet Disturbances). For mutineers' sentences 
see F-142 Gg 18/A1 habetische namentliche Zusammenstellung 
(Alphabetical list of Mutineers' Names). 
12 
BA/MA, Nachlass Hier, op. cit., 7/33,28 Aug 1917. 
13 Herwig, op. cit., p. 206. 
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because they were set in the belief that the 1917 muti- 
nies should be blamed on the German Independent Socialist 
14 15 
Party, and initially, Hipper did not agree. He said: 
Among our people there is unfortunately an 
anarchistic movement that occasions some serious 
thinking though only a single man on the Prinz- 
regent Luitpold started it. The whole movement 
was a result of excess--yesterday evening in the 
crew's quarters; the whole assembly was led out 
and later dispersed. One of the ringleaders was 
arrested and a list thereby obtained. Loyal men 
were contacted aboard all ships. Perhaps we have 
controlled it by this and nipped the whole thing 
in the bud, if it is not too late. 
It appears Hipper was more interested in the causes 
of the disturbances than in finding a convenient scapegoat. 
Ten days later, however, when he learned of the results of 
an investigation by Fleet Judge Advocate Dobring, Hipper 
said: 
16 
The investigation has succeeded in estab- 
lishing a connection between the main agitators 
and Dittmann and his Independent Socialists. 
There are about 12 main agitators against whom 
the (judicial) process must be intensified. 
Events later proved the Fleet's investigation to be 
less than objective; nonetheless, Hipper's concern for 
maintenance of discipline is evident throughout the 
14 
BA/MA, F 4078/PG 64923/Reels 351,352, Flottenunruhen 
1917-1918. See Aktenvermerk über die 
ýSitýzure 
im Reichs- 
kanzler Palais am 21. August. 1917,, Records of Documents 
concerning the--Conerence in eichschancellor's Palace, 
21 Aug 1917). See also Walther Gladisch, Der Krieg in 
Der Nordsee, vom Sommer 1917 bis zum Kriegsende 191 
voT. vi. i, ranTtfurt, 196 pS. 
15 Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., 7/29,3 Aug 1917. 
16 Ibid, 7/30,13 Aug 1917. 
r 
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summer of 1917. A year later, when Hipper assumed 
command of the fleet, morale and discipline were 
even more serious problems. Hipper was worried about 
the weakening of his forces which was engendered by 
major officer personnel changes; these occurred be- 
cause Scheer established the Naval High Command in 
Grand Headquarters and proceeded to deprive the fleet 
of large portions of its remaining experienced commanders: 
between August and October 1918, some 48 per cent of the 
fleet captains and 45 per cent of the first officers 
17 
were reassigned. They went where the demand was greatest: 
to the many billets created by the new high command. The 
problem even affected Hipper's own staff; Hipper had 
to insist that Rear Admiral von Trotha be allowed to 
remain as Fleet Chief of Staff for the transition from 
Scheer to Hipper as Fleet C-in-C. Hipper and Trotha 
17 
For Hipper's concern over officer personnel changes 
see Nachlass Hsi per, 8/22,30 July 1918, as cited in 
Herwig'- op. cit., p. 253, and Nachlass Hipper, 8/24, 
11 Aug 1918; for fleet personnel changes see Wilhelm 
Deist, 'Die Politik der Seekriegsleitung und die Re- 
bellion der Flotte Ende Oktober 1918, ' Viertel'ahrs- 
hefte für Zeitgeschichte, Oct 1966, p. See also 
Herwig, op. cit., oc. cit. Deist's sources for the figures 
are Nachlass Levetzow and Rangliste der Kaiserlichen 
Marine --1 or an organizational chart of c eer's 
new high comman and its billets see Hubatsch, Der Admir- 
alstab, op. cit., Document 28, pp. 252-254. 
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in 1918 worked well together though Trotha in 1916 had 
18 
attempted to have Hipper retired. Trotha reported to 
Levetzow in 1918 that Hipper was 'pleasant and amenable 
in daily service. '19 Hipper also thought highly of Trotha20 
and was explicit in that his replacement must be someone 
'who could make his views stick. '21 The change in Trotha's 
assignment was not effected until 5 November but by then 
the war was all but lost. 
Meanwhile, the navy had tried to strengthen the po- 
litical acumen in the fleet by assigning Capt. Karl Boy-Ed 
of the Admiralty Staff; his considerable experience in- 
cluded naval attache duty in Washington which had ended 
22 
in 1915 when he was expelled from the-United States. 
Boy-Ed, at the time of his assignment to the fleet, was 
chief of the Admiralty Staff's Press Department. Boy-Ed 
felt he would be able to re-educate some of the senior 
fleet officers 'with the help of the Fleet C-in-C who is 
wise to the problems of the importance of the political 
18 
Nachlass Hipper, 5/5,19 March 1916. 
19 
M. O. D., Admiralty, N. H. B., Nachlass Levetzow, op. cit., 
Reel 44, Frame 00723, Rear Admira von ro'Ir tha to Capt. Magnus 
von Levetzow, 10 Aug 1918. 
20 NA/SA, Nachlass von Trotha, op. cit., Hipper to Trotha, 
25 Sept 1918, pp. 1 
21 Op. cit., loc. cit., p. 3. 
22 Herwig, op. cit., p. 272. See also Franz von Rintelen, The 
Dark Invader Wartime Reminiscences of a German Intelligence 
0=1 cer, ew York, 1933), pp. =f. -. for Toy-Ed's s involvement 
iý'n the German sabotage effort. 
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education of the men. 123 
When Hipper assumed command of the High Seas Fleet 
it was still capable of getting underway and fighting in a 
mechanical sense, according to Lt. Cdr. Ernst von Weisz- 
sacker, navigator of S. M. S. von der Tann, who was in his 
first non-staff assignment in several years. He felt 
that the fleet was a mere shadow of its former self and 
existed solely as support for the U-boat effort and great 
24 
fleet operations were no longer undertaken. This malaise 
was engendered perhaps by the fact officers and petty 
officers had not been aboard their ships nearly as long 
as had their men. Indeed, Herwig says 'the deck and 
petty officers were judged by Hipper to be unreliable 
and some were "inciting the men" to disobey executive 
officer commands. ' 
25 
Personnel problems precipitated a conference aboard 
the fleet flagship, S. M. S. Baden, on 9 September 1918. 
One by one, Hipper's admirals and commodores reported on 
the condition of their crews. Commanders of torpedoboats 
J 
23 
Wilhelm Deist, Militllr und Innen olitik im Weltkrieg 
1914-1918, vol. ii, sse=or ,, pp. 
ß5 -. Boy-Ed 
to Lt. Cdr. Selchow, 9 Sept 1918. This is from Admiralty 
Staff, BA/MA F 2414. See n. 1, Deist, p. 959. 
24 Hill, Prof. L. E., ed. Die Weiszsäcker Papiere, MSS, 1918, 
p. 2, entry for 30 Jan 1917. 
25 Herwig, op. cit., p. 263. 
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26 
and U-boats said their crews were reliable but it was 
otherwise in the big ships. Squadron commanders reported 
the better officers had long since gone and Admiral 
Boedicker of the First Battle Squadron said 'a return to 
basic discipline' was required for the crews 'to be got 
27 
back in hand. ' Hipper told all the commanders that the 
quality of officers, as reflected in their personal be- 
haviour, 'had greatly deteriorated and a positive outcome 
of efforts to improve discipline was very unlikely. '28 
He said the officers had to handle their subordinates on 
an individual basis. Indeed, personnel problems, especially 
quality of officers, were considered a major factor in the 
collapse of naval authority not long after the conference. 
Before Trotha left as Fleet Chief of Staff, Hipper asked 
him to write an analysis of fleet troubles and although 
the report did not reach Hipper until February 1919 it 
is germarebecause Hipper told Trotha, 'I agree completely 
29 
with the report. ' The report said, in part: 
26 
BA/MA, F 4070/PG 64914/Reel 380, Revolution 1918. Capt. 
Heinrich, Commodore Torpedoboats, to Vice mri7a von Trotha, 
Chief of the Admiralty, 'Wieder geschrieben nach meinen Tage- 
buchaufzeichnungen, ' (Excerpt from my daily Journal), Kiel, 
Ju}y 1919,26 pp., entry for commanders conference on 9 Sept, 
P.. 
27 Ibid, loc. cit., Opinion of Vice Admiral Boedicker. 
28 Ibid, loc. cit., Opinion of Hipper. 
29 NS/SA, Nachlass von Trotha, op. cit., Hipper to Trotha, 
2 February 1919, p. T 
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In my personal opinion the state of 
officer manning within the fleet in October 
1918 was satisfactory for torpedoboats, good 
for light cruisers and poor for battleships... 
Senior officers of divisions had repeatedly 
pointed out the damage caused through the al- 
most total disappearance of efficient middle- 
rank officers from the large ships and also 
through the frequent changes that had taken 
place throughout all officer posts in these 
ships... 
There appears to be ample proof that our 
armed forces were unable to withstand such a 
long war... The unceasing depletion in the front- 
line ranks of youthful enthusiasm and ability in 
officers and men; their replacement by older age 
groups already burdened by home worries, or by 
the very young and inexperienced... already influ- 
enced by the eroding effects of the struggle on 
the home front--this endless and inevitable trend 
created an unsound foundation and prg ided the 
essential ingredients of discontent. 
In sum, though Hipper's concern for morale and. dis- 
cipline was evidenced from his earliest commands, he. could 
not control the events of war which gradually eroded the 
quality of his officers in the big ships. 
The second aspect of understanding Hipper's actions 
in late 1918 concerns his political attitudes, Recent 
works cite Hipper's political opinions--as expressed in 
his war journal--as 'typical' of the officer corps of 
30 
M. O. D., Admiralty, N. H. B., Nachlass Levetzow, op. cit., 
Reel 49, Frames 00990 ff. and ÜÜz3ß f. . Marder, 
op. cit., vol. v, 1918-1919: Victory and Aftermath, 
(London, 1970), pp. -. 
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which he was a part. 
31 
To illustrate his thinking in its 
larger context, three benchmarks of the political Hipper, 
which are directly related to the internal development 
of German national policy, have been selected: the 
continuing war aims debate, the 1915 crisis over unre- 
stricted U-boat warfare and the 'July crisis' of 1917. 
The first benchmark concerns an official paper 
Hipper wrote in July 1915 which dealt in part with the 
national policy decisions necessary for further capital 
ship construction. In this paper, already analyzed in 
pages 136ff. in Part II of this work, Hipper was explicit 
in leaving policy decisions to the government though he 
did outline what ship-types he believed would be required 
to implement certain possible German policies successfully. 
He advocated the kind of ships which assumed a world power 
32 
basis or Weltmacht government policy. In this he was 
typical of the naval officer corps, as Herwig shows in 
his article, 'War Aims of the German Navy. '33 But Hipper 
31 Hei°wig, op. cit., 'The Executive Officer Corps in Politics, ' 
pp. 179 if. See also Wilhelm Deist, Militgr und Innen olitik, 
op. cit., pp. 244,795,998,1014,1317,1347 . Hipper's journal is cited in all of these. 
32 USNA, PG 77733d/Reel 1659, Kriegserfahrungen, op. cit., 
pp. 3-6. See also Part II of this work, n. supra. 
33 Holger H. Herwig, 'Admirals versus Generals: the War Aims 
of the Imperial German Navy 1917-1918, ' Central European 
History, vol. 5, p. 209, pp. 212-219 ff. See alsll, 
ranizzation, Conflict and Innovation, op. cit., pp. 216 ff. 
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was atypical in that he in no way subsumed political 
responsibility in his official duties until the revo- 
lution of November 1918 forced him to do so. On a definite 
war aims program, however, his personal journal is silent 
other than to record his aversion to a 'foul peace. '34 
The second benchmark concerns Hipper's position on 
the suspension of unrestricted U-boat warfare in the 
summer of 1915. Gerhard Ritter labels this internal 
German political crisis as 'highly significant for the 
development of German militarism in war. '35 Admiral von 
Tirpitz, Secretary of State for Navy and the Kaiser's 
advisor on naval strategy, and Admiral Gustav von Bachmann, 
Chief of the Admiralty Staff who was largely responsible 
for the overall conduct of U-boat warfare, both disagreed 
with the political leadership of Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg. 
36 
34 
Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., 7/23-24,8 July 1917. 
35 
Gerhard Ritter, op. cit., vol. iii, The Tragedy of States- 
manship--Bethmann ýHollweg 
as War Chance1Tr(l914- l T7) , (Miami, 1972)v . 'n3. 
36 
Ritter, ibid, p. 132. See also Tirpitz, Dokumente, op. cit., 
vol. ii, pp. 382-384. See also GBrlitz, The Kaiser and His 
Court, op. cit., pp. 102ff. See also TheoU1 von BetHmann 
Sollweg, Betrachtungen zum Weltkriege, vol. ii, Während des 
Krieges, er in, ), p. . 
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He contended the continued sinkings of passenger ships 
would result in conflict with the United States and with 
37 
the Kaiser's backing, ordered them stopped. In pro- 
test, Tirpitz and Bachmann submitted their resignations. 
38 
Of these actions, Ritter says: 
For these high naval officers their under- 
taking had become an end in itself, a pure matter 
of prestige... the Admirals laid claim to their 
own political responsibility and had the audacity 
to put their resignations to the Sovereign in 
the form of an ultimatum in the manner of cabi- 
net ministers. 
39 
Hipper's own thoughts on this subject show he was 
against suspending unrestricted U-boat warfare: 
1 Sept. (1915). In the last few days a 
rumour has surfaced... that the Chancellor has 
been thinking about a change in the present 
form of U-boat warfare; it appears confirmed. 
Our state secretary (Tirpitz) should submit 
his resignation again. The Kaiser apparently 
has been following the unwise advice of the Chief 
of the Naval Cabinet von Müller. Indications are 
that the negotiations with the American Ambassa- 
dor Gerard will lead to a cessation of U-boat 
warfare, no neutrals to be sunk without previous 
warning, and passengers given the opportunity 
to save themselves... The devil take these 
defeatists! 
37 
Ritter, op. cit., pp. 147-149. Cf. Tirpitz, Dokumente, 
vol. ii, pp. 416ff. See also Hermann Bauer, Reichsleitung 
und U-bootseinsatz 1914-1918, (Luneburg, 1956), pp. . 
38 
39 
Ritter, op. cit., p. 133. 
Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., 4/3,1 Sept 1915. 
0 
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Hipper's view that Tirpitz should again submit his 
resignation is significant because it indicates his po- 
litical attitude was drifting toward militarism. As 
40 
Gerhard Ritter explains: 
The resignation of the universally admired 
Grand Admiral Tirpitz would have been calculated 
like nothing else to bring to the boiling point 
public agitation over the U-boat question and 
against the political leadership--including not 
the least the Kaiser himself. 
Wilhelm II described Tirpitz' approach to the crisis 
over U-boat warfare as a 'regular military plot' and 
removed him from all policy-making in the use of naval 
forces against the enemy. 
The third benchmark illustrating Hipper's political 
attitudes concerns the 'July crisis' of 1917, significant 
in both German militarism and German history. The crisis 
developed around the issues of peace and domestic political 
41 
reform. The Reichstag was recalled by Bethmann Hollweg 
because the war appropriations were exhausted and 
42 
approval was needed to continue the war. However, the 
40 Ritter, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 133; for Kaiser's opinion, 
see p. 134. , 
41 Arthur Rosenberg analyses this subject in Imperial Ger- 
many The Birth of the German Republic 1871-1.18, Boston, 
-1970 eT ), pp. 1 fESee also A. J. Ryder, e German Revo- 
lution of 1918, A Study of German Socialism in War and 




Germany Tried Democrac , 
(New York, 1946), pp. 
25-28. See also Deist; Milit7r und Innenpolitik, op. cit, 
Chapter 8, pp. 649ff. 
42 Ritter, op. cit., p. 457. 
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Reichstag was in no mood to accede to the nation's 
43 
right-wing military leadership; a highly critical 
speech on 6 July by Matthias Erzberger, a Central Party 
deputy, precipitated the crisis. Gerhard Ritter's 
44 
analysis, as it applies to naval policy, seems valid: 
This bourgeois politician now painted 
Germany's military and economic situation in 
such gloomy colours that the only way out 
seemed to be an immediate peace initiative by 
the government, based on a declaration by the 
Reichstag. Erzberger's pyrotechnics were given 
even greater impact by the proof he adduced 
from his own statistics that naval command fore- 
casts had been in error. He was lending voice 
to what countless others sensed to be true but 
dared not say openly. 
45 
Hipper's reaction to the Erzberger address was as 
follows: 
The domestic political scene appears 
worse. The enemies of the U-boat and the people 
for a foul peace gain more and more ground. In 
the Reichstag session Delegate Erzberger has made 
a tremendous attack in these directions. Great 
excitement. If we continue to dawdle further, 
we will certainly lose the war, especially if 
we go so wickedly against the Reich. Even if we 
find a way out of the present dilemma and again 
patch up our differences, we will go nowhere 
with this incompetent, the Reichschancellor. 
Away with the Reichstag, send it home, name a 
dictator. That to me appears the proper course. 
43 Hans Gatzke, Germany°s Drive to the West A 
_Sýtudy 
of 
German y' s Western War Aims Du ný gt1 First World War, 
(Baltimore, , pp. 
= ff. 
44 Ritter, op. cit., p. 465. 
45 Nachlass Hipper, 7/23-24,8 July 1917. Cf. Herwig's 
citation o alew lines in The German Naval Officer 
Corps, op. cit., p. 212, n. 3: 'Away with it, sen tie eich- 
stag home, appoint a dictator, that seems to me the proper 
course. ' Cf. Deist, op. cit., p. 795, who cites the balance 
of the passage quoted here. 
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In this instance, Hipper's reaction was that of other 
ranking naval officers, according to Holger Herwig. 
46 
As to general reaction to Erzberger's speech, Fritz 
Fischer says, 'The impression made by Erzberger's 
speech was extraordinary; the idea that the Reichstag 
should take up an independent initiative was revolution- 
ary. ý47 
The Army High Command reacted to Erzberger's speech 
by sending Generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff to Berlin 
with the intent to counter its effect. 
48 
Hipper hoped 
'that Hindenburg and Ludendorff are victorious and can 
bring all these machinations to an end. '49 As it turned 
out, the generals failed to convince the Kaiser that 
Erzberger was in error nor did they ever get to meet the 
parliamentarians involved. Ritter regarded the generals' 
action as 'open meddling with political questions' by 
50 
the Army High Command. 
46 
Herwig, op. cit., loc. cit. 
47 
Fritz Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War, 
(London, 1967), p. . 
48 Ritter, op. cit., p. 469. Cf. Deist, pp. 789-790. 
Documents 317 and 318, Reaction of Military Censors to 
Pessimistic Views of Situation and Col. Bauer to Erzberger. 
Bauer was chief of the Army Command Staff operations depart- 
ment and liaison with prominent Reichstag politicians. 
49 Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., 7/23,4 July 1917. 
50 Ritter, op. cit., loc. cit. 
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The 'July crisis' of 1917 was also concerned with 
domestic political reform. Of this Hipper said: 
The domestic political situation is 
still unclear. To begin with, the Kaiser has 
issued a rescript wherein he has promised the 
Prussian people full, secret, and direct fran- 
chise for their house of representatives. It 
looks like freedom but it is certainly forced 
under difficult circumstances. Presently, it 
appears one would desire a compromise so that 
something further could be done. The Bavarian 
representatives as well as the National Liberals 
and the Central Party appear to be the only sen- 
sible people; (they) turn away from Erzberger 
who has made the session in Berlin into a very 
divisive parley, so much that the old Spahn 
has had a slight stroke fighting it. What good 
it will do at all51 don't know as long as 
Bethmann remains. 
Hipper was apparently as anxious over the divisive 
effects of the debate engendered by Erzberger's speech 
as by the reform the Kaiser was granting. He was, like 
most of establishment Germany, on the horns of a dilemma: 
political reform was required to give the masses an in- 
centive to win the war but if granted, the resulting social 
and economic changes would precipitate the decline of the 
52 
old order. The promise of reform came at the time of the 
resignation of Bethmann Hollweg who had extracted the 
promise from the Kaiser. Hollweg was deposed by the Army 
51 
Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., 7/24,13 July 1917. 
52 
Fritz Fischer, op. cit., p. 398. 
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working with the Reichstag opposition . Further, General 
Ludendorff, Chief Quartermaster-General, threatened to 
53 
resign unless Hollweg acceded. Ritter concluded that 
after Hollweg left, 'Militarism was no longer a problem. 
It was a harsh reality. '54 Of the Chancellor's fall, 
Hipper said: 'Word from Scheer today (13 July 1917). 
At last Bethmann has fallen. Hurrah! If only it is not 
too late. ' 
55 
In his jubilation over the Chancellor's fall, how- 
ever, Hipper misjudged the consequences of virtual mili- 
tary rule as well as the veracity of the Kaiser's promise 
in the matter of reform. As Wilhelm Deist asserts, 
'There was a connection between this lack of domestic 
reform and the events of 1918. '56 A. J. Ryder also said: 
By failing to put into effect internal 
reforms the government missed taking the only' 
course which could have preserved Germany's 
basic political structure and averted the revo- 
lution of November 1918... Instead the advocates 
of total victory won the day, and total war 57 
ultimately gave rise to totalitarian politics. 
Hipper, in sum, was on the side of Hindenburg and 
Ludendorff and thus appears politically reactionary. 
53 
Ritter, op. cit., p. 476 and Fischer, op. cit., pp. 429ff. 
54 Ritter, op. cit., p. 487. 
55 Nachlass Hipper, loc. cit. 
56 Wilhelm Deist, 'Die Unruhen in der Marine 1917/18, ' 
Marine Rundschau, 1971, p, 337. 
57 A. J. Ryder, op. cit., p. 86. 
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When Hipper returned from leave on 2 October 1918 
he found the Army High Command had pronounced the war 
lost. He said he could not believe the situation was 
so bad. He asked Scheer what the navy should do and 
Scheer replied that an immediate intensification of the 
58 
U-boat war would keep some kind of pressure on the enemy. 
Hipper's reaction, when faced with defeat, was to say: 
There must be a way out of this terrible 
situation. God will show us. The bad thing is 
that the army has lost the faith of its own high 
command and vice versa--in complete contrast to 
the navy whý5h is fully behind Scheer and his 
comrades... 
But the navy was not 'fully behind Scheer and his 
comrades. ' Hipper had been told as much by his subordi- 
nate commanders, it will be recalled, when he held a 
60 
command conference aboard S. M. S. Baden on 9 September. 
In his 2 October Nachlass entry, Hipper said he hoped 
the German people would be united in adversity but he 
doubted it; the Bulgarians had withdrawn from the war 
on 29 September and left a gaping hole in southern German 
61 
defences. On 1 October General Ludendorff, who the year 
58 
Nachlass Hipper, 8/30,3 Oct 1918. 
59 Ibid, 8/31,3 Oct 1918. 
60 
See n. 26 supra. 
61 Ulrich Czisnik, 'Die Unruhen in der Marine 1917-18, ' 
Marine Rundschau, 19/U, p. b49. 
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before had advocated a victor's peace, had to report to 
the Kaiser that 'a positive end is not in sight, troop 
replacements sent to the front were becoming unreliable, 
and the army is suffering from Socialist propaganda. '62 
In essence, even German soldiers began to lose heart when 
the military results were no longer in doubt. The Flanders 
Front, held by naval infantry and artillery for four years 
and the main U-boat operations base for U-boat attack on 
63 
British sea communications, was being evacuated. Hipper 
found an officer-evacuee assigned to his quarters as a 
place to sleep. 
On 1. -. October 1918, Prince Max of Baden, a noted 
liberal, was named Chancellor. Hipper wished him good 
luck, noting in his journal that the new coalition govern- 
ment was better than he feared though it included two 
Social Democrats and Admiral von Hintze as Foreign Min- 
ister, of whom Hipper approved. 
64 
But only two days later 
von Hintze was replaced by Wilhelm Solf, the former 
Colonial Minister. And Hipper labeled Max von Baden's 
inaugural speech before the Reichstag that day as'debil- 
itating. '65 Basically, it was a proposal for peace without 
62 
Czisnik, op. cit., p. 649. 
63 Gladisch, op. cit., pp. 330ff. 
64 Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., 8/30-32,3-4 Oct 1918. 
65 Ibid, 8/33,5 Oct 1918. 
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annexations, with negotiations on the basis of Wilson's 
Fourteen Points. The speech also contained the proposal 
of full parliamentary government for Germany as well as 
some interesting ideas about European security and working 
66 
classes. As Hipper said, it was the 'death-day of Bis- 
marck's Reich. '67 His Reich had restricted the Reichstag 
to a role little more than the fig leaf of absolutism, 
68 
whereas Max was basing his government on the principles 
and the sovereignty of 'the people in parliament assembled. ' 
This same day--5 October--Max sent the first peace note to 
Wilson. 
69 
Deist says that when the realistic tone of this 
note was contrasted to the military's optimistic propa- 
ganda, 'the leading elements which advocated a victor's 
peace collapsed; and there was general demoralization in 
German society. ' 
70 
Not until February 1919 did Hipper 
say he had given up his general optimism that Germany 
would find a way out of her troubles. By then he thought 
66 
U. S. Department of State, ýPa ers Related to the Foreign 
_ Relations f the United Staes 1918 Sment'T: The World 
War, Was ington, I973) ,' vTi, pp. 34b-351. This contains 
a copy of Prince Max's inaugural speech. 
67 Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., 8/33,5 Oct 1918. 
68 A. J. P. Taylor, The Course of German History, A Survey 
of the Developmentö Germ nyýince 181 New York, 1962), p. TM. 
69 Czisnik, op. cit., loc. cit. For copy of the note see 
U. S. Department of State, op. cit., p. 338. 
70 
Deist, 'Die Unruhen in der Marine, ' op. cit., p. 339. 
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the country would go the way of Russia and was worried 
about being found by German revolutionaries. 
71 
The Last Battle 
To establish Hipper's role in the controversial 
October 1918 fleet sortie, it is necessary to analyze 
in historical context the planning and politics which 
surrounded the last battle. of the High Seas Fleet. The 
action was intended to 'relieve the right wing of the 
army either directly by inflicting damage on his supply 
ships or indirectly by threatening such damage. 
' 72 A 
fleet engagement was reckoned on as a possibility. 
Though the idea of, a decisive naval battle had early 
73 
origins in imperial naval strategical thinking, the 
origins of_such an action. in October 1918 would seem to 
be those found in the private correspondence of some 
leading naval officers. 
On 5 October Captain Michaelis of the Imperial 
Naval Office in Berlin wrote Captain Levetzow in Grand 
Headquarters and pointed out the tremendous political 
71 
NS/SA, Nachlass von Trotha, Hipper to Trotha, 2 Feb 1919. 
72 P. R. O., Adm 137/3891, 'Frustration of the Naval Offen- 
sive of Oct 1918, ' by Cdr. Hintzmann, Senior Admiralty 
Staff officer on Hipper 's Staff, p. 1. 
73 Gemzell, op. cit., pp. 50ff., 138ff., 176ff. 
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impact a successful naval action would have, especially 
on the home front. 
74 Indeed, Prince Max of Baden, the 
new Chancellor, had said in his inaugural speech that day: 
Whatever the result (of his first diplo- 
matic note to Wilson) may be, I know it will 
find Germany firmly resolved and united--as well 
for an honest peace which refuses to consider 
every selfish violation of rights of others, as 
also for the final life or death battle to which 
our people would be forced without its own fault 
if the answer of the powers waging war with us 
to our offer should be dictated by the will to 
destroy us. 75 
Sentiments similar to those of Michaelis were 
expressed on 6 October by Captain Levetzow in a letter 
to Admiral Trotha, Hipper's chief of staff; he coupled 
his sentiments with assertions about such a battle satis- 
76 
fying the 'honour of the officer corps. ' On 7 October 
the idea of a final fleet battle is mentioned in Hipper's 
journal. -Hipper discussed the. idea with his staff and 
his personal journal shows he believed the situation might 
become serious enough to warrant the risks such a battle 
would entail. 
77 
Hipper and his staff recorded their opinion 
which has been widely cited as evidence he favoured a death 
74 Herwig, op. cit., p'. 242-243. See also Deist, 'Politik 
der Seekriegsleitung, op. cit., p. 353. See also Ritter, 
op. cit., vol. iv, p. 380. See also Nachlass Levetzow, op. 
cit., Box 4 vol 9, Michaelis to Levetzow, 5.10.1918. 
75 U. S. Department of State, op. cit., p. 351. 
76 Herwig, op. cit., loc. cit. Cf. Nachlass Levetzow, op. 
cit., (Admiralty copy), Reel 49, Frame UUUbb, Levetzow to 
Trotha, 11 Oct 1918. 
77 Nachlass Hippe , op. cit., 8/1-2,7 Oct 1918. 
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78 
battle. It includes the following statements: 
5. In the final analysis the war should 
not be allowed to end without the employment of 
the fleet in its role as the trump card of national 
power working its full influence. 
6. As to a battle for the honour of the 
fleet in this war, even if it were a death battle, 
it would be the foundation for a new German fleet 
of the future if our people were not altogether 
defeated; such a fleet would be out of the ques- 
tion in the event of a dishonourable peace. 
7. The decision concerning these questions 
must follow from higher places.:; The High Seas 
Fleet is such an important factor in national 
power that the Fleet C-in-C, in his opinion, 
should not engage it, should the moment come, 
without further guidance. 
Concentrating on point 6, Wilhelm Deist asserts that 
the concept of a fleet battle for honour was obsolete and 
'had no place in modern war. '79 The British appear to have 
80 
thought otherwise and Marder cites several officers on it. 
Seen in context, point 6 was but one of several consider- 
ations in the fleet command's thinking and was by no means 
pre-eminent. Also, point 7 shows Hipper considered Scheer's 
strategical approval necessary before he would commit the 
fleet to action. 
81 
, 
Hipper was presented with a draft operations plan by 
Admiral Trotha on 10 October involving a bombardment of 
the English coast and an interruption of war supplies to 
78 Herwig, op. cit., p. 243; Horn, op. cit., pp. 204ff.; Deist, 
op. cit., p. 352. 
79 Deist, op. cit., p. 355. 
80 Marder, op. cit., vol. v, pp. 176-177. 
81 Deist, op. cit., p. 354. See also Herwig, p. 243. 
286 
to the western front as well as an encounter with the 
British fleet. On the same day Hipper reported to Scheer 
that 'his warrant officers and petty officers had become 
unreliable. '82 Two days later Hipper received information 
from Grand Headquarters which indicated the Germans had 
only two months of aviation fuel available if, as expected, 
they were cut off from the Russian-and Rumanian oil fields. 
This was cited by the Army High Command as one of the main 
reasons for the need of an armistice. 
83 
Interestingly 
enough, ýamong-Hipper's flag officers only Commodore Heinrich 
of the torpedoboats saw fit to inform his crews of the real 
war situation at this time84 although the other flag offi- 
cers were as well briefed. This fact is a harbinger of 
the communications problems which would dog Hipper until 
the final days of the conflict. 
Hipper was shown the German armistice proposals by 
Erich Raeder, his former Chief of Staff who was assigned 
to the German negotiating team. Hipper judged the pro- 
85 
posals as 'varying from the favourable to the unacceptable. ' 
82 Herwig, op. cit., p. 253. Cf. n. 25 supra. 
83 Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., 9/3,12 Oct 1918. 
84 BA/MA, F 4070/PG 64914/Reel 380, Revolution 1918, op. cit., 
Commodore Heinrich's report, p. 2,12 Oct 1918. 
85 Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., 9/2,10 Oct 1918. 
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Meanwhile, Admiral Paul von Hintze, the former 
foreign minister, was drafted to ease the Kaiser into 
recognizing a change from absolute to constitutional 
monarchy was required to forward the peace negotiations. 
Hipper records the Kaiser as being in full agreement with 
86 
the proposed changes as of 12 October. 
Hipper appears to have been well-informed on the 
progress of the peace negotiations and the political sit- 
uation in Berlin. He cited the German government's re- 
sponse on 13 October which promised constitutional gov- 
87 
ernment in Germany as the Allies demanded. Hipper noted 
that all officers 'stand behind the Imperial government 'but 
at the same time, the fleet attack plan was being discussed 
by Scheer in terms of naval honour: 
It is impossible that the fleet remain 
uncommitted in the last battle which sooner or 
later precedes an armistice. It must be committed. 
Although it is not anticipated a decisive result 
will come from such a course, it is a question of 
honor and existence, from the moral viewpoint, for 88 
the navy to have done its utmost in the last battle. 
86 
Ibid, 9/3,12 Oct 1918. See also Ritter, op* cit., vol. iv, 
pp. 341-343. See also Fischer, op. cit., pp. 628-629,635ff. 
See also GBrlitz, op. cit., pp. 405-406. 
87 
Deist, op. cit., p. 364. His source is BA/MA, Operations- 
Kriegstagebuch des K. d. H., 15.10.1918, (Operations-War Diary 
ig seas Fleet command, entry for 15 Oct 1918). 
88 Horn, op. cit., p. 206, from BA/MA, F 4055/PG 64726, 
K. T. B. der S. K. L., 15 Oct 1918, (War Diary of the Naval High 
Command3 
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Unlike Scheer, Hipper at this time seems more concerned 
about national than naval honour. Reacting to President 
Wilson's answer to the latest German diplomatic note, 
89 
Hipper wrote: 
He is unbelievably adamant and has thrown 
a bomb at us. From this it appears that we must 
give up the monarchy or at least the Kaiser and 
the Crown Prince... what will then become of Ger- 
many cannot predict with certainty. Surely its 
honour will founder. 
Indeed, the German situation was precarious. On 16 Octo- 
ber the British occupied all the former German naval po-. 
sitions on the Flanders Front and the fleet chief of 
staff, Admiral von Trotha, knew that the navy was not 
necessarily ready, either in materiel or personnel, 
90 for 
any kind of decisive action. This contrasts with Holger 
91 
Herwig's assertion that Trotha was optimistic. None- 
theless, Scheer desired to keep his options open and when 
he and Levetzow, his chief of staff, saw the Kaiser on 
the 18th Scheer told the Emperor that '... in the event we 
are forced to give up U-boat warfare the fleet will become 
available for other tasks, 
' 92 words Scheer used in 1926 to 
justify his assertion he had told the Kaiser about the 
last battle. 
89 Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., 9/4,17 Oct 1918. 
90 
Deist, op. cit., p. 344. 
91 Herwig, op. cit., p. 254. 
92 Scheer, Vom Segelschiff, op. cit., p. 355; Horn, op. cit., 
p. 207. Cf. Gla isc , op. cit., pp. 
336ff. 
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Scheer and Ludendorff saw the Kaiser again on the 
19th and he told them the formal decision on whether or 
not to renew U-boat warfare would have to be taken by 
93 
the government, not him. Prince Max refused to resume 
U-boat warfare because he did not want the negotiations 
94 
broken off. Scheer told Prince Max he had the 'fullest 
loyalty of the navy which would be demonstrated by the 
recallof the U-boats, ' as Max had ordered. Scheer also 
told him that 'The-High Seas Fleet is now relieved of 
its tasks of covering the U-boat war and has regained 
95 
its operational freedom. ' 
The German national position continued to deteriorate. 
On 21 October there was revolution in Vienna, capital of 
96 
Germany's largest ally. The same day Hipper received 
word of Max's order to give up U-boat warfare and he 
97 
noted that 'This points to the final attack by the fleet. ' 
93 
Ibid, 9/5,20 Oct 1918. See also Gladisch, op* cit., 
p. 337. 
94 Nachlass Levetzow, op. cit., Reel 49, Frames 00744ff, 
Con erb ences of 16,17,18, and 20 Oct 1918. See Deist, op. 
cit., p. 356. 
95 Deist, ibid, loc. cit., 
96 Czisnik, op. cit., p. 650. 
97 Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., 9/6,20 Oct 1918. Cf. K. T. B. 
desK. d. . -, op. cit., entry for 21 Oct 1918. 
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Indeed, on 22 October, according to several sources, 
98 
Hipper received an order from Captain Levetzow in the 
Naval High Command: 
High Seas forces to go to the offensive 
and should beset against the English fleet. 
Levetzow asserted on 25 October that Scheer assumed 
99 
full responsibility for the'order confirmed in writing 
in the War Diary of the Naval High Command. Much later, 
in a letter to the editors of the Süddeutsche Monatschefte, 
Levetzow was even more specific: 
The Naval High Command, whose chief of 
staff I was, was the highest-placed naval command 
of the Fleet, and their chief of staff was 
Admiral von Trotha. For the attack by the fleet 
the Naval High Command gave the order to the fleet. 
Admiral Scheer and I as its responsible chief T6o 
staff therefore carry the full responsibility. 
The man who actually wrote the fleet operations order 
on 22 October when Levetzow called the fleet staff and told 
them to draft the plan as quickly as possible was Commander 
Hintzmann, Hipper's. assistant__chief of staff for operations. 
Comdr. Hintzmann's version of the background of this order 
was published in January 1919 in a Wilhelmshaven newspaper. 
98 Gladisch, op. cit., p. 338; Nachlass, Levetzow, Reel 49, 
Frames 00761ff., 21-22 Oct 1918; Nachlass Hi )er, op. cit.; 
9/8,22 Oct 1918; Deist, Die Politik comer Seekrieegsleitung, 
op. cit., p. 359. 
99 Deist, op. cit., pp. 357-358, n. 37. 
100 Nachlass Levetzow, op. cit., Reel 46, Frames 00051ff, 






On receipt of information early in 
October of the serious threat to the Flanders 
Front, the C-in-C decided to take the offen- 
sive with the whole fleet to relieve the right 
wing of the army, either directly by inflicting 
damage on the enemy on his traffic route from the 
Thames to Flanders, or indirectly by the threat 
to this traffic which the offensive would involve. 
General weather conditions (bad weather during 
the whole of September which prevented mine- 
sweeping, and bright nights) and the military 
situation did not permit this offensive to be 
undertaken before the end of October. 
Indeed Hipper waited until the end of October be- 
cause he was determined the operation should be undertaken 
at the right time and under proper circumstances to assure 
102 
a modicum of success, a professional attitude whih does not 
103 
seem to support the charge the last battle was a 'suicide 
sortie. ' The-critics further chakW that Hipper and the 
naval command were so obsessed with naval honour that they 
104 
undertook the sortie in rebellion against the government. 
Two important questions arise: was Hipper involved in an 
'admirals' rebellion' in carrying out the order for a fleet 
sortie-in October 1918, and, was his sense of honour so 
101 p. R. O., Adm 137/3891, Hintzmann, op. cit., p. 1. 
Cf. n. 72 supra. 
102 Nachlass Levetzow, op. cit., Reel 46, Frame 00764, 
Levetzow's recor o conference on 22 Oct 1918. See also 
K. T. B. des K. d. H., op. cit., loc. cit., n. 99 supra. 
103 Horn, op. cit., p. 2091 see also WUA, vol. ix, Part I, 
op. cit., Dittmann's testimony, pp. 105ff. citing 14 seamen 
and stokers who believed it was a suicide sortie and an 
admirals' rebellion. 
104 Horn, op. cit., p. 221; WUA, op. cit., loc. cit. 
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over-riding as to cause him. to order a suicide mission? 
In discussing the 'admirals' rebellion' it is rel- 
105 
evant to record that Hipper was told by Levetzow that 
Scheer had informed the Chancellor about the fleet having 
regained its operational freedom. Despite Hipper's asser- 
tion that 'the High Seas Fleet is such an important factor' 
of national power that 'the Fleet C-in-C should not commit 
it' without 'a decision from-higher places, ' Scheer did 
106 
not inform Prince Max of the intended mission. It is 
difficult to ascertain beyond a reasonable doubt whether 
or not Hipper knew Scheer had withheld-information on the 
sortie itself from the Chancellor. It is known that 
Lt. Cdr. Ernst Weiszsacker, Naval High Command briefing 
officer for Scheer and Levetzow, thought 'that Admiral 
Scheer had won the Reich-Chancellor's approval of the 
plan on grounds of honour. '107 Max himself says he would 
in all likelihood approved had he been informed and that 108 
'the navy's lack of confidence in me was unjustified. ' 
105 
Nachlass Levetzow, op. cit., Reel 46, Frame 00764. 
See note= supra. 
106 Prince Max of Baden, The Memoirs of Prince Max von Baden, 
(New York, 1928), p. 282. 
107 
Hill, ed., Die Weiszsllcker Papiere, MSS, 1918, entry 
for 28 Oct 1918. 
108 Prince Max of Baden, op. cit., p. 283. Cf. Erich Matthias 
and Rudolf Morset' Die Re ierun des Prinzen Max von Baden, 
(Düsseldorf, 19625, pp. iii, on the istoriograplo -Me 
memoirs and p. 470 for mention of the mutiny and that Hipper 
was Fleet C-in-C at the time. 
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Scheer says he did not inform the Chancellor for fear 
109 
of a security leak"... 
Hipper's entry in his war journal for 26 October 
1918 shows he was aware of Scheer and Hindenburg's con- 
ference the previous evening with Deputy Chancellor von 
Payer in Berlin. He notes they were turned down in their 
attempt to have the government reject the armistice terms 
110 
set forth by President Wilson. That day Hipper had 
sent his aide de camp, Lt. Grimm, to Grand Headquarters 
cith the fleet operations plan for the proposed sortie 
111 
to have it evaluated and approved. Scheer approved 
the plan and it was returned to Hipper on 28 October. 
Deist makes much of the fact that neither the Chancellor 
nor the Kaiser were consulted in this matter and cites 
the constitutional changes which took place on the 28th 
of October as the basis for the necessity of informing 
112 
the Chancellor. These changes included the transfer of 
supreme military authority from'the Kaiser to the Chancellor. 
109 
Scheer, Vom Segelschiff, op. cit., p. 356. 
110 Nachlass Hi er, -9/8,26 Oct 1918. Cf. Nachlass Levetzow, 
op. cit., Tee Frames 00764ff., Conference in in, 
25 Oct 1918. See also Deist, Militär und Innenpolitik, op. 
cit., pp. 1338-1340. 
111 Nachlass Hipper, loc. cit. Cf. Deist, 'Die Politik der 
Seekriegs eitung, op. cit., p. 361. 
112 Deist, 'Die Unruhen in der Marine 1917/18, ' op. cit., 
p. 341 n. 74. 
294 
But other sources disagree with Deist. Arthur Rosenberg 
said naval and military authrorities were not bound to 




on the establishment of the 
Naval High Command in August 1918 show Scheer had author- 
ity to order fleet sorties 'in concert with the chief of 
115 
the General Staff' and was given total control over Ger- 
many's naval warfare effort. Herwig says the 'Kaiser was 
116 
excluded from active control over naval policy. ' Ritter 
says Levetzow told the deputy chief of'the Kaiser's naval 
cabinet 'it was a project not requiring the Kaiser's au- 
thorization. '117 A. J. Ryder commented 'The admirals had 
been technically within their rights in planning the move, 
but politically and psychologically it was a blunder. '118 
Thus from a strictly legal viewpoint, it would appear 
Hipper was not involved in an 'admirals' rebellion: ' Scheer 
had the authority under the constitution to order the_srtie, 
Levetzow, hie chief of staff, had authority to issue the 
order to Hipper, Fleet C-in-C, and Hipper was told by 
Levetzow that the Chancellor, Prince Max, had been informed. 
113 Arthur Rosenberg, Imperial Germany, op. cit., p. 265. 
114 BA/MA, F 33021d/PG 66705/Reel 540, Organisation des 
Admiralstabs der Marine, vol. 5, ca. 30 Aug , rv ci Regulations or tief of the Admiralty Staff. 
115 Walther Hubatsch, Der Admiralstab, op. cit., p. 178. 
116 Herwig, op. cit., p. 236. 
117 Ritter, op. cit., vol. iv, p. 380. 
118 A. J. Ryder, op. cit., p. 140 
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Nipper's orde'ring'of'a ', suicide. mission' for the 
sake of-honour is dubious because"he=insisted on some lat- 
itude*, in'deciding the time and"duratiDn of the -sortie. 
The fleet was not simply going to sail to Scapa Flow and 
throw down the gauntlet to the British. The plan itself 
is the best evidence to indicate Hipper's thinking was 
119 
that of a naval commander, His plan was to take the main 
fleet into the English Channel off the Belgian coast, 
detatch light cruisers to raid the Thames Estuary and 
battle cruisers to attack the traffic off Belgium and 
France. His mine laying cruisers were to lay an addi- 
tional protective field directly to the north of him; 
his bows were protected from envelopment by the vast mine- 
fields in the German Bight. Beatty was to be drawn over 
several U-boat lines. It is known that the British -fleet 
C-in-C intended to grapple with Hipper at all costs; by 
Beatty's own estimation this would cost the Grand Fleet 
at least seven battleships but he expected to annihilate 
120 
Hipper. Indeed there is substantial evidence that 
British capital ship construction prior to the Queen 
Elizabeth class was dangerously weak in underwater 
119 
Nachlass Levetzow, op. cit., Reel 50, Frames 00506-00510. 
See also isc , op. cit., pp. 344-347. See also Friedrich Ruge Scapa Flow 1919, The End of the German Fleet, (London, 
1973, p. -15ý- 
120 
Marder, op. cit., vol. v, p. 172 n. 11; ibid, p. 178. 
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121 122 
protection. The Germans realized this. It is also 
true there were 8 American dreadnoughts and 80 destroyers 
in European waters. 
123 
But Holger Herwig's assumption 
124 
that they could all have been brought to bear on Hipper 
does not consider the practical difficulties of concen- 
tration: three of the battleships were at Bantry Bay, 
at least a day's steaming from the northern channel, and. 
scores of destroyers were dispersed around the Atlantic 
littoral protecting convoys. The most useful force would 
have been the five dreadnoughts of the Sixth Battle 
Squadron with the Grand Fleet. Time was critical for 
Hipper as the longer he was out the more force could be 
assembled against him. There was also the matter of 
German and British shell. The British now had technolog- 
125 
ical superiority as well as a vastly heavier broadside 
but there was also the possibility the Germans would 
l 
have used gas shell9 
with 
the results unpredictable. 
121 
National Maritime Museum, Adm 138/413-416, Iron Duke 
class Ships' Covers. See also Oscar Parkes, British 
Battleships, op. cit., Chapters 85,86,88,9U, --71-, 95,97, 
rotection. ' 
122 Nachlass Levetzow, op. cit., Reel 49, Frame 00350, 
Levetzow to Kaiser Wilhelm II, ca. Aug 1918. 
123 Herwig, op. cit., p. 249. 
124 Ibid, loc. cit. 
125 
See Part II of this work, notes 78-85. 
126 
Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., 9/4-5,18-19 Oct 1918. 
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Nonetheless, Lt. Cdr. Weiszsäcker, Scheer's briefing 
officer who read the final draft of the plan, said there 
was a '50 per cent chance of no result, 40 per cent of a 
lucky result, and 10 per cent disastrous result. '127 
With the odds nine to one, it would seem the planned sor- 
tie was a reasonable risk from a tactical point of view. 
It was an operation by a numerically inferior fleet hedged 
about by the influence of underwater weapons. But in the 
light of what Hipper knew about the reliability of his 
men and their officers, and what Trotha told Scheer about 
the fleet's lack of battle readiness, Hipper's judgment 
in ordering the sortie was a gross miscalculation. Yet 
it is also unrealistic to have expected him not to try 
when the possible rewards are considered. A naval success 
of any kind could well have strengthened the German posi- 
tion in the armistice negotiations and according to Prince 
Max, had a tremendous impact on the deteriorating German 
128 
home front. As for a 'glorious defeat, ' Max said: 
This sacrifice would have been a moral 
force, capable of putting to shame the many dis- 
affected and despairing folk who would not have 
been able to escape its influence. I have been 
justly reminded of Thermopylae. 
127 
Hill, ed., op. cit., 1918, entry for 27-28 Oct. 
128 
Prince Max of Baden, ope cit., p. 283. 
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However, on 25 October Hipper received another 
indication of the instability present in the fleet 
from Vice Admiral Mauve, 
129 
commander of the Fourth Battle 
Squadron. Upon being ordered to return to the North Sea 
from the Baltic, Mauve appealed to Hipper for an extra 
three days so he could give his crews the home leave he 
had promised them. They had performed their drills in 
an excellent manner on the basis of this promise, accor- 
ding to Mauve, so Hipper reluctantly granted permission. 
The Fourth Battle Squadron was to arrive in Wilhelmshaven 
by 29 October but because of heavy fog they did not arrive 
130 
until the 30th. The same fog caused postponement of the 
planned fleet sortie from 29 to 30 October but on the 
night of the 30th the sortie was cancelled because of 
open mutiny in the First Battle Squadron. 
Hipper's actions and thoughts on the last battle 
are those of a highly competent naval commander. He 
produced the plan and directed the operation. The plan, 
was feasible and offered the chance, at acceptable odds, 
for major military and political gain. It reflected a 
degree of common sense rare in the Imperial Navy in the 
129 
BA/MA, F 4070/PG 64915/Reel 350, Revolution 1918, 
op. cit., Vice Admiral Mauve to Trotha, July 9, Mauve's 
report on the mutiny and revolution. Cf. USNA, PG 62436, 
Reel 211, K. T. B. des K. d. H., op. cit., entry for 25 Oct 1918. 
130 
USNA, PG 62436/Reel 211, K. T. B. des K. d. H., op. cit., 
entry for 29 Oct 1918. 
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latter half of 1918. Honor may well have played a key 
role in the genesis of the plan but for Hipper, it was 
a lesser consideration, a derivative of the plan and 
not a main objective. Hipper desired to engage the 
enemy under the best terms: the Germans had the ability 
to say when and where the action would take place. That 
Hipper's actions in producing the plan, assembling the 
fleet and attempting the sortie failed was but another 
manifestation of events in Germany itself. The moment 
was right for mutiny, rebellion and collapse. Again, 
Hipper was between the upper and lower stones--the 
reality of national defeat conflicted with his sense of 
duty to do everything possible with his command until 
the end. 
Rebellion 
The rebellion of the crews of the German battle fleet 
began as they were assembling on 28 and 29 October for 
Hipper's planned operation. An engine room rating in the 
battleship Kaiserin of the Fourth Battle Squadron has 
described the progress'of Mauve's ships toward the fleet 
rendevouz which was delayed by fog on the 29th: 
Coaling commenced as soon as the coal 
lighters got alongside but a disinclination to 
work was clearly noticeable, for no one could 
see the object of the proceedings. This feeling 
was considerably heightened by the fact that none 
of our superiors gave a satisfactory explanation 
... About an hour later we passed through the lock 
and at 5 P. M. anchored in Schilling Roads where 
we beheld an interesting spectacle of the entire 
High Seas Fleet at anchor. This meant that some 
secret undertaking had been planned... that not one 
300 
of our ships would have returned from this 
engagement was patent to all of us, for the 
entire strength of the enemy forces had been 
concentrated in the south of England. 
Petty Officer Kiehn, 131the author of this excerpt, 
knew only slightly less than his squadron commander. 
Indeed Mauve's ships had arrived too late to allow the 
operation to be carried out on the 29th; Mauve did not 
know about the sortie until 1530 on the 30th when he was 
132 
told it was not a drill. The forces which were in the 
North Sea, however, were informed by their commanding 
officers who were at the conference aboard the fleet 
flagship Baden on the night of 29 October. Rear Admiral 
Boedicker, chief of the First Battle Squadron, in his 
account of that conference, notes that Hipper was told 
it was possible the ships' crews would not obey the order 
to go out; there had been rumours of a revolution circu- 
lating in Wilhelmshaven for the previous fortnight, and 
133 
also a rumour of a fleet battle. 
131 P. R. O, Adm 137/3849, 'Translation of Extract from a 
diary written by Obermaschinistenmaat (Engine Room Petty 
Officer First Class) Kiehn, battleship Kaiserin, ' 
while interned in Scapa Flow, PP. 2-4, n. d. 
132 BA/MA, F 4070, Mauve's report, op. cit., 28-30 Oct 1918. 
133 BA/MA, F 4070/PG74914/Reel 350, Aufzeichnungen des 
Vizeadmirals Boedicker s. Zeit Chef des - esc wa ers 
er den Ausbruc er Revo ution in comer Flarine Reco lec- 
t ons Vice A irat Boedicker on t out-Treak of the 
Revolution in the Navy at the time of his command of the 
First Battle Squadron), ca. July 1918, pp. 1-2. 
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On the night of 29-30 October the ships of the 
Third Battle Squadron--S. M. S. KUnig, Bayern, Grosser 
Kurfürst, Markgraf and Kronprinz Wilhelm--all manifested 
signs of insubordination and rebellion. Hipper sig- 
nalled 'fleet drill cancelled' later that night to get 
the crews in hand. 
134 
Admiral Mauve reported that Hipper 
held another conference on the afternoon of the 30th 
during which Mauve said his men had shown considerable 
opposition to the fleet sortie but the commanders put 
forward no new opinions or solutions. 
135 
At 2200 major 
disturbances developed in the battleships Helgoland and 
Thüringen. Boedicker, their squadron commander, was 
aboard the fleet flagship Baden at the time and Hipper 
ordered him to 'clean it-up. ' 
136Boedicker 
noted Thüringen 
had been one of his best ships and after consulting with 
Capt. Windemuller, the commanding officer, he decided to 
go to the ship himself. His initial impression from 
Windemuller was that the situation was not too bad but 
upon arriving at the ship, he found 'the crew wholly rabid; 
nothing more could be reckoned from the good men. ' He 
therefore ordered up a torpedoboat, a U-boat, a steamer 
and a company of marines, and after a cliff-hanging 
134 
BA/MA, F 4070, op. cit., Bericht Ka itlin Hintzmann, (Report of the Senior Admiralty to icer, eet taff), p. L 
135 BA/MA, F 4070, op. cit., Mauve's Report, op. cit., 30 Oct M. 
136 BA/MA, F 4070, op. cit., Boedicker's Report, pp. 3-7. 
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confrontation, the mutineers who had blockaded them- 
selves below decks, surrendered. The process was re- 
137 
peated with the Helgoland. 
Daniel Horn criticizes Hipper for not giving an 
order in writing to the U-boat commander to sink the 
mutinous ships. It was hardly necessary, however, as 
both torpedoboats and U-boat were under the operational 
command of the squadron Commander who had full authority 
to deal with the situation. A record was+inhfact^kept of 
Hipper's 'commands-to Boedicker-and-ýBoedicker's-commands 
138 139 
to the torpedoboat and the U-boat. . Boedicker: 
'is report 
to Hipper indicates that the first officer of Thüringen 
was relieved and placed under criminal arrest ashore; 
both captains were relieved but no charges were preferred. 
Hipper wanted to keep the number of arrested men to a 
minimum and requested 
140 
the squadron commander single out 
the agitators., This was done but the collapse was well 
underway by the time the administrative action was completed. 
137 
Ibid, loc. cit. 
138 The action was recorded in Hipper's official war diary, 
K. T. B. des K. d. H., op. cit., 30 Oct 1918,2300ff. 
139 
BA/MA, F 4070/PG 64914/Reel 349, Boedicker to Hipper, 
1 Nov 1918, p. 1. 
140 
Loc. cit., Hipper to Boedicker, 2 Nov 1918. 
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Hipper did not simply sit on his prerogatives, however, 
after such serious disturbances; he tried to restore 
the credibility of the naval service in the eyes of the 
men and issued a remarkable document for distribution 
to all commanding officers. It was to be read to all 
crews on 30 October. 
Appeal of Admiral Ritt-er von Hipper to the Enlisted 
Personnel' of ttF e -Seas-Tl-eet ter tie Outbreak 
of Mum 
30.10.1918, Wilhelmshaven 
It is apparently the opinion of some of 
the ships' crews that the endeavours for peace 
have brought the struggle on the western front 
to an end, and also that the navy would no 
longer be required to fight. 
The rumour has also surfaced that the 
officers of the navy desire a battle with a-fsu- 
perior enemy such that the fleet would be shot 
to pieces and therefore not be surrendered 
with the armistice. 
They are incorrect opinions, they are 
untrue rumours. 
No one wants an unprofitable battle which 
would only permit the enemy to sink our ships. 
We all want the peace. In any case, it is not 
far away. 
Read the newspapers, read the army reports, 
ours and those of our enemies! New enemy for- 
mations with heavy support are continuously at- 
tacking our land front. The enemy shows no will 
for peace yet; rather they would break through 
our front, destroy us, and lay waste to our 
homeland. Daily and hourly our army fights in 
stubborn defence and makes powerful counter- 
attacks against the enemy. Also, the enemy is 
assembling off our coasts in our North Sea 
home waters to achieve a breakthrough. The call 
from the Royal Navy grows ever louder: no peace 
lest their superiority over the German fleet is 
demonstrated and the glory of the Skagerrak 
refuted. 
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We would not send the fleet out frivo- 
lously to satisfy the enemy's desire for our 
destruction. But we must be ready, with our 
spirit, our ships and our weapons to defend 
the German North Sea coasts exactly as the 
army does this on the western front through 
tenacious defence and effective counter-attack 
which itself gives us the opportunity to damage 
the enemy. Furthermore, we must aid our U-boats, 
our minesweepers, torpedoboats and all small 
fighting craft whose work is the hardest in all 
weathers. We must give them added protection 
and support. 
We wish peace. In this we are united: 
government and people, officers and men. But 
he who relaxes does not aid peace; he only 
promotes the lust of our enemies for our lives, 
our property, our total destruction. He who 
slackens now will allow this to happen, to de- 
bilitate the forces is to stamp himself a 
traitor before himself and his country. Think, 
strengthen yourselves against evil and untrue 
rumours: they come from our enemies. Seek 
support from your officers who themselves rely 
on you: 
We all stand directly before the enemy, 
no one more protected than the other. So we 
have stood during the four years of war now gone 
by. So stand all who have won and who have died, 
at Coronel, the Falklands, the Skaggerak, those 
of the cruiser squadron, those of the fleet, as 
have the many valiant of tht U-boat fought 
through and through. We can all help one another 
not to falter, avoid becoming cowards to our 
comrades before our homeland. Everybody have 
the courage to confront insane and subversively 
intended rumours and incitement! 
We want no useless sacrifice before the up- 
coming peace, but-wecesire to stand by the gates 
of the homeland with sharpened sword and undivided 
unity until that peace is actually there. The 
country depends on that, and we owe her no less 
than to keep everything ready to the end. 
141 
(s) v Hipper. 
141 Deist, Militlir und Innenpolitik, op. cit., pp. 1348-1350. 
For another cTtinn o this document see Horn, op. cit., p. 223. 
For distribution, see Deist, op. cit., p. 1348, n. 2. 
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In ordering the distribution of this appeal on the 
30th of October Hipper made his first fleet-wide attempt 
to counter the problems facing the German navy inherent 
in the defeat of 1918. The appeal appears to have been 
142 
ineffective, as the men simply no longer believed their 
officers. 
143 
The next day Hipper decided after another 
144 
conference with his flag officers to disperse the fleet. 
He wanted to keep it all in North Sea ports, however, 
but Admiral Kraft, commander of the Third Battle Squadron, 
appealed to him asserting, 'I know my men... they can be 
got back in hand if we go to Kiel... because we are meet- 
ing them half way in a humane manner. '145 Hipper agreed 
as did his other commanders with the exception of 
Commodore Heinrich of the torpedoboats. The First Battle 
Squadron was assigned outpost duty, the Fourth Battle 
Squadron and the First Scouting Group sent to sea to 
support local minesweeping operations. Hipper concluded 
142 
Deist, op. cit., p. 1349, n. 4. 
143 
Report of Petty Officer Kiehn, op. cit., pp. 5-6. See 
also WUA, vol. ix, part I, pp. 111-119. Fourteen seamen 
testified in all. See also Czisnik, op. cit., pp. 652-653. 
144 BA/MA, F 4070, Mauve's Report, op. cit., entry for 31 Oct; 
Heinrich's Report, op. cit., entry for 31 Oct; Nachlass Hipper, 
9/10,31 Oct 1918. 
145 WUA, vol. ix, part I, pp. 485-486. See also Horn, op.; cit., p. 22 
146 Heinrich, op. cit., loc. cit. supra. 
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he should give up any further thoughts of offensive 
action because 'If the men continue to disobey, it 
would be necessary to take drastic steps which would 
lead to a catastrophe of major proportions. ' 
147 
Hipper 
sent Lt. Yorck of the Fleet staff to Grand Headquarters 
which an explanation of the events of 30-31 October with 
the additional message that he intended to order a tor- 
pedoboat sortie and in general wait until the situation 
clarified itself. 
148 
Yorck saw Levetzow who condemned 
149 
Hipper for not sinking the mutinous ships out of hand. 
Obviously, the High Command' s -methods- 
for . dealing-'. - , 
with mutiny varied from Hipper's; their idea was to arm 
officers and trusted petty officers to secure control of 
each ship. 
150 
However, this method required the 'officers 
know their men, ' but as one seaman has said. there was a 
151 
virtual Chine sawall between the officers and the men. 
147 
Horn, op. cit., p. 224, from Nachlass Levetzow, op. cit., 
Reel 50, Frames 00562ff., report of Lt. Yorck to Levetzow 
from Hipper 1 Nov 1918. 
148 Ibid, loc. cit. 
149 Nachlass Levetzow, op. cit., loc. cit., Levetzow's° 
persona o serval nn following Yorck's report 1 Nov 1918. 
150 Herwig, op. cit., p. 256 n. 3 from the Diary of Lt. Comdr. 
Bogislav von Selchow, 24 Oct 1918, also cited in Deist, op. cit., 
p. 1349 n. 4. 
151 Horn, ed., The Private War of Seaman Stumpf, op. cit., 
pp. 246ff. 
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There can be little doubt that any attempt to deal 
with rebellion on a ship by ship basis,, as the High 
Command recommended, would not have worked; it was 
tried in battleship Kaiserin and frustrated by lack 
152 
of petty officer support. Hipper's concern about a 
'catastrophe' was probably justified; in any case, he 
153 
believed he handled the situation correctly. Scheer 
recognized the lack of communications between officers 
and men in the fleet and therefore gave Hipper power to 
draw on the U-boats and naval schools for officers to 
154 
replace those in the big ships. 
155 
On 2 November Hipper's formal situation report to the 
high command included a request that the high command indi- 
cate publicly that naval officers supported the government. 
Hipper also said he thought fleet problems were connected 
to a Bolshevist uprising and more serious efforts were 
required: the decommissioning of certain ships and a 
far-reaching change in officers. 
152 
153 
Kiehn, op. cit., pp. 7-8. 
Meanwhile, in Wilhelmshaven 
Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., 9/11,31 Oct 1918. 
154 
Horn, op. cit., p. 227, from Nachlass Levetzow loc. cit. 
Cf. Hipper's recommendation that c oT serelations be developed 
between officers and men after summer 1917 mutiny, Part II, 
n. 113 in this work. Scheer's command rejected the idea. 
155 Deist, op. cit., p. 1358-1360. Deist asserts this was not 
from Hipper, ignoring the evidence in Hipper's Nachlass, 
9/12,3 Nov 1918 that Hipper had ordered such a report sent 
the previous day. 
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the citizens were inciting sailors in the torpedoboats- 
156 
and U-boats to join the revolution, according to Hipper. 
This is the first time the word is used in his personal 
journal in connection with the 1918 events. 'Rebellion' 
or organized opposition to those in authority probably 
became 'revolution' when the sailors' aims turned from 
opposition to-the last sortie to rejection of the officer 
corps's authority, intrinsic in imperial Germany's 
157 158 
society. As Hannah Arendt says: 
... Revolution itself does not spring from 
a theoretical interest in a wholly perfect social 
order so much as from an urgent desire to find 
some viable alternative to conditions that are 
felt intolerable. 
Revolution 
In essence, Hipper attempted the well-nigh impossible 
in those last weeks of World War I. With a psychologically 
defeated navy whose officer corps had deteriorated badly, 
he tried first to strike a final decisive blow at the 
enemy. Failing this, he attempted to rally the fleet so 
German defences on the North Sea front remained effective. 
To some extent, this was achieved by his dispersal order 
156 
Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., 9/12,2 Nov 1918. 
157 Deist, 'Die Unruhen in der Marine, 1917/18, ' op. cit., 
p. 342. 
158 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, (New York, 1965), p. 8. 
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after the first outbreaks. Also, with his remarkable 
appeal to the crews, he tried to restore trust between 
officers and men although it would seem his words never 
reached the crews. And he tried to keep the naval mutiny 
from turning into a bloodbath.: "In this Hipper--succeeded. 
In addressing the question of whether any of Hipper's 
actions helped trigger the German revolution of 1918, it 
is necessary to review the chronology of collapse. On 
3 November, between 3,000 and 5,000 sailors marched on 
the naval prison in Kiel to liberate their comrades of 
the 1917 mutiny and those arrested within the last few 
days. Among the mob were sailors from the Third Battle 
Squadron whose admiral had requested Hipper only a few 
return to 
days before they be allowed to/their home port of Kiel. 
The mob was halted temporarily by a navy patrol but 8 
sailors were killed and 39 wounded. Admiral Snuchon, the 
governor of Kiel, requested 600 troops from the nearby 
garrison of Altona but when the first contingent arrived, 
they were disarmed by the rebellious sailors without a 
159 
fight. 
Meanwhile, Hipper returned to his old headquarters 
ship, Kaiser Wilhelm II in Wilhelmshaven where he was 
visited by Capt. Magnus von Levetzow, Scheer's chief of 
staff. Hipper gave him this account of the fleet situation: 
159 
Czisnik, op. cit., p. 658. See also Gustav Adolph Noske, 
Von Kiel bis Kapp, (Berlin, 1920), p. 10ff. 
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... any offensive action at the time is out of the question and I am"not in a 
position to gig antee the defence of the 
German Bight. 
While Hipper was talking with Levetzow, they 
observed the spectacle of the battle cruisers von der 
Tann and Derfflinger being forced into harbour by their 
crews. The commanding officers of the two ships and 
Admiral von Reuter, Flag Officer, Reconnaissance Forces, 
came to see Hipper, requesting to be relieved of their 
posts. as they felt they could not get the crews to go 
out to sea again. Hipper decided to send the captains 
back to their ships with orders to proceed the next day 
to Altenbruch Roads to anchor. As to von Reuter, Hipper 
said 'there was nothing else I could do but give-my loyal 
colleague of four years the stool by the door to sit on. ' 
161 
The next morning the two ships carried out Hipper's order. 
On 4 November Hipper clearly recognized the problem 
of enforcing any kind of authority in this period and 
162 
issued a secret fleet order to all officers. It told 
them quite specifically that their authority was personal 
in nature because of the deteriorating situation and could 
only be maintained by consistency and courage in the face 
160 
Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., 9/12,3 Nov 1918. Cf. 
Nach assLevetzow, Reel 50, Frame 00573, Levetzow's account 
of the con er ence, 3 Nov 1918. 
161 Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., 9/13,3 Nov 1918. 
162 WUA, vol. ix, part I, p. 431, Secret Fleet Order of 
4 Nov 1918. 
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of confusion and discord. Personal example was also 
critical and the officers were to do everything to 
prevent sabotage. Hipper also felt the Workers and 
Soldiers Councils could probably be 'managed, ' as most 
of the men were unsure of their goals. The Bolsheviks 
were responsible for the troubles, according to Hipper, 
their aim was clear, and the revolution had to be 
deflected from it. He suggested several specific ways 
to restore or maintain discipline. 
When Hipper received information on 4 November that 
the crew of the Markgraf had deserted en masse and that 
they and other sailors had proceeded to the naval prison 
at Kiel, he ordered the Third Battle Squadron to sail 
but they were incapable of getting underway. He was 
furious at Admiral Kraft, the S. O., of Markgraf's squadron, 
and exclaimed: 'I would hope Kraft is also a casualty 
after having served me this foul soup. '163 The same day 
Hipper noted that 1,000 troops had been ordered for 
164 
Wilhelmshaven and 2,000 for Kiel. He also said: 
The next days got worse and worse and all 
was lost because of the unlucky sortie which was 
ordered by the Naval High Command. 
The revolution broke out in Wilhelmshaven on 5 November 
1918. Hipper was in communication with Admiral Krosigk, 
163 
164 
Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., 9/14,4 Nov 1918. 
Ibid, loc. cit. 
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the commandant of the North Sea Naval Station in Wil- 
165 
helmshaven, contrary to Horn's assertion. Hipper and 
Krosigk agreed there was nothing either could do as no 
troops had arrived from Hamburg and they had only 200 
166 
loyal men. The nearest garrison, Bremen, had also gone 
over to the revolution. There were 35,000 armed sailors 
now wandering about Wilhelmshaven, the red flag was flying 
over thecnaval station barracks and Soldiers Councils had 
been established aboard the ships of the First Battle 
167 
Squadron commanded by Admiral Boedicker. By 6 November, 
the Wilhelmshaven Naval Station was 'totally in the hands 
of the revolutionaries. '168 He therefore ordered all loyal 
officers and men from the ships in harbour to assemble in 
169 
the Baden, his flagship. At noon a sailors' delegation 
was received from the Baden's crew and Hipper's reaction 
shows considerable political acumen: 
165 See Horn, op. cit., p. 263. Cf. Nachlass Hipper, op. 
cit., 9/14,5 Nov 1918. 
166 Horn, op. cit., pp. 261-262. 
167 Nachlass Hipper, op. cit., 9/14,5 Nov 1918. See also Deist, 
Milit r und Innenpolitik, op. cit., pp. 1372-; 374, especially 
n. T. 
168'Nachlass Hipper, loc. cit., 6 Nov 1918. 
169 For copy of signal see Deist, op. cit., p. 1374, n. 6. 
See also P. R. O. Adm 137/3892, Intelligence Division Wire- 
less Intercept of Hipper's signal. 
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A commission from Baden came to see 
me to take-up negotiations. Because their pro- 
posals were obviously mild, a resistance would 
only have unleashed a bloodbath. I'conceded to 
their wishes, also with the ii nt of keeping 
the revolution under control. 
Hipper was following a consistent approach of con- 
ciliation and moderation. He was in little position to 
do otherwise; the burghers of Bremen had released the 
171 
mutineers from Thüringen and Helgoland. The First 
Scouting Group and the Fourth Battle Squadron were at 
sea and all bases had hoisted the red flag so these ships, 
172 
without a place to land, established Soldiers Councils. 
By 7 November Heligoland Island, the German fortress of 
the central North Sea, had gone over to the revolution as 
had the cities of Hamburg and Lübeck. Another indication of 
the deteriorating military situation was the increasingly 
confused communications between the fleet and the high com- 
mand, e. g. the order to Hipper to court martial Commodore 
Karpf for unauthorized decommissioning of his ships. Hipper 
173 
refused because his information showed the high command in 
174 
error. British wireless intercept confirms Hipper was right. 
170 Nachlass Hipper, 9/14-15,6 Nov 1918. 
171 Ibid, 9/15,7 Nov 1918. 
172 Ibid, loc. cit. See also Mauve's report, op. cit., entry 
for 7 Nov 1918. See also P. R. O., Adm 137/3892, I. D. Report, 
Wireless Intercept North Sea, 7 Nov, p. 4. 
173 Nachlass Hipper, 9/15,7 Nov 1918. 
174 P. R. O, Adm 137/3892, I. D. Report, Baltic, 7 Nov, p. 4. 
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In Germany itself, the revolution in Munich toppled 
the Wittelsbach dynasty of 800 years standing in a de- 
175 
velopment totally unrelated to the fleet mutinies. In 
Hamburg, the revolution had local origins as well and 
the participation of naval elements was peripheral, at 
176 
least at the outset. In Kiel the city commandant was 
murdered and Admiral Souchon, governor of Kiel and the 
commandant of the Baltic Naval Station, and most of his 
officers, were held captive by revolutionaries for a night. 
Prince Heinrich, the Kaiser's brother, was nearly assassi- 
nated 
177escaping 
Kiel. Reichstag Deputy Gustav Adolph 
Noske, the 'good socialist, ' and Deputy Conrad Haussmann 
arrived in Kiel on 4 November, sent there by Prince Max 
in response to an appeal from Souchon. Noske assumed the 
178 
governorship and as much authority as he could garner. 
175 
Allan Mitchell, Revolution in Bavaria 1918-1919, 
(Princeton, 1965), pp. 75-110* 
176 Richard A. Comfort, Revolutionary Hambýur , (Stanford, 1966), pp. 36ff. News of te Kiel revolt sparked the Hamburg 
workers into far more serious revolutionary demands and were 
symptomatic of the national situation. 
177 Herwi op SoucYýon. g' " cit., p. 
259. His source is the Nachlass 
178 A. J. Ryder, The German Revolution of 1918, op. cit., pp. 141-_ 
142; A. Rosenberg, opt t., pp. -2-67; -Deist, op. cit., pp . 1380-1384, Report by Noske on Situation in Kiel 7 Nov 1918. 
See also P. R. O., Adm 137/3892, I. D. Report Baltic, op. cit 
pp. 2-6 for interesting summary of signals sent by Noske to 
naval units from 7-11 Nov 1918 as 'Commissar of Naval 
Affairs. ' 
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Kiel was back to normal in a few days although the 
performance of the officers in the Third Battle Squadron 
had been abominable as was that of most of the officers 
in the navy's other big ships. Only about 16 of more 
than 400 officers in the big ships in the Baltic are 
recorded in a secret naval document as having remained 
179 
at their posts. 
By 9 November the situation in Wilhelmshaven had 
further deteriorated and Hipper personally hauled down 
his admiral's flag from Baden's mainmast. He went ashore 
in protest over the Soldiers Council's insistence that 
the red flag be flown on all warships. Hipper said he 
180 
would return only if there was---an--emergency. This 
same day the Kaiser abdicated,, Prince Max became tempor- 
ary head of state, and Friedrich Ebert became Chancellor. 
Also on 9 November Hipper received information indicating 
the British had sent two light cruisers and a destroyer 
181 
squadron to 'scout the terrain' before a major attack. 
179 
BA/MA, F 4070/PG 64916/Reel 350, Revolution 1918, op. cit., 
Befehlshaber der Sicherun der Ostsee, (Comm an er, Baltic 
Watch Forces), 26 Nov 1918, on i ential and Personal to 
Chief of the Admiralty Staff. 
180 Nachlass. Hipp er, 9/16,9 Nov 1918. See also BA/MA, F 890/ 
PG 7$Ü%Baden, (Soldiers Council Records S. M. S. 
Baden), 9 Nov 1918. 
181 
Nachlass Hi er, loc. cit.; see also Woodward, op. cit., p.. 168. 
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Commodoie Victor Harder, who at Jutland had commanded 
Hipper's flagship, the Lützow, sortied with two ships 
of his Second Scouting Group to check the report on 
orders of Hipper. No support was forthcoming from the 
heavy ships which were absorbed with deliberations on 
182 
the revolution. In any event, Harder did not find 
the enemy. On 10 November Hipper promulgated an order 
from the Naval High Command reminding the officers to 
183 
stand by their posts. But it was all too late. Hipper 
184 
wrote on 11 November 1918: 
The armistice goes into effect at noon. 
All acts of war are suspended. The terms are 
simply crushing... For the navy the conditions 
are especially harsh. Surrender of 160 U-boats, 
interning in a neutral harbour of 10 battleships, 
6 battle cruisers, 6 light cruisers, 50 of the 
most modern torpedoboats. It falls to me to 
carry out this wretched business... 
The terms of the armistice required the Germans to 
off-load the ammunition from all of their ships to be 
interned or surrendered. Hipper proceeded with this 
disarming of the fleet noting the work progressed with 
an almost insane efficiency, probably brought on by 
fear of the English. On 13 November Beatty and Hipper 
182 
Ibid, loc. cit. 
183 Nachlass Hipper 0 9/17,10 Nov 1918. Cf. Deist, op. cit. 
pp. Ü1 nand Harder's war diary, op. cit., 10. IX. 18. _ 
184 Nachlass Hipper, 9/17,11 Nov 1918. See also Gladisch, 
op, cit., . p. 347. 
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exchanged signals and Hipper was required to have an 
'admiral with full negotiating powers in the Firth of 
Forth to discuss armistice arrangements by the 18th of 
November. ' 
185 
The Soldiers Council insisted on sending 
three representatives with the admiral and Hipper agreed 
although he told them the English would ignore them. 
186 
This in fact is what happened. 
On 18 November it was decided Admiral von Reuter 
would take the fleet into internment. Hipper said he 
did not feel up to the job though Naval State Secretary, 
187 
Ritter von Mann, wanted him to do it. At 1330 on the 
19th of November 1918, the High Seas Fleet assembled 
for the last time in Schilling Roads with Admiral von 
Reuter in command. The Soldiers and Workers Councils 
of Berlin, Cuxhaven and Wilhelmshaven were there to see 
them off. Hipper regretted he could not do violence to them 
188 
on the spot. 
185 
Ibid, 9/18,13 Nov 1918, entry for 1200 hours. See 
also K. T. B. des K. d. H., op. cit., entry for 1200 hours, 




Marder, op. cit., vol. v, p. 189. 
Nachlass Hipper, 9/20,17 Nov 1918. 
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As the ships sailed from Schilling Roads to the 
189 
Firth of Forth, Hipper wrote: 
My heart is breaking. With this my time 
as fleet commander has come to an inglorious 
end. The remaining questions of demobilization, 
disarmament, and the negotiations with the 
soldiers councils can be handled by my chief of 
staff; I have nothing more to do. I shall 
remain pro forma in command for a short time, 
otherwise Ia-mi-Uead tired. 
In examining the chronology of events to ascertain 
if any of Hipper's activities helped turn-rebellion into 
revolution, it would seem only one act--his decision to 
allow the rebellious Third Battle Squadron into Kiel-- 
may fall into this category. Ritter assigns Scheer, 
190 
Levetzow and Trotha heavy blame for the collapse of 1918. 
Deist says the naval mutiny and collapse was a contributing, 
191 
not a causal factor, in the German revolution. Czisnik's 
192 
view of the navy's role in the revolution is similar to 
Deist's in that he views the naval events as part of a 
193 
developing national revolution. Ryder regards the naval 
mutiny as 'the first act of the German revolution.. just as 
the industrial strikes with their workers' councils and 
political demands anticipated the events of 9 November 1918. ' 
189 Ibid, 9/22,19 Nov 1918. See also Herwig, op. cit., 266. 
190 Ritter, op. cit., vol. iv, p. 378. 
191 Deist, 'Die Unruhen in der Marine 1917/18, 'op"cit., p. 343- 
192 Czisnik, op. cit., pp. 661-662. 
193 Ryder, op. cit., p. 102. 
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Hipper himself played no part in the post-war 
revolts and civil war. On 2 December 1918 he sub- 
mitted his request to be placed on the inactive list; 
on 13 December he was retired with full war pension. 
Actually his record shows he was relieved of fleet 
command on 30 November but the administration of those 
194 
days was doubtless somewhat confused. Hipper began 
early to accommodate himself to the realities of the 
revolution even while he was still on active duty: his 
appeal to the crews on 30 October, his recognition that 
a 'revolution' was underway on 2 November, his attempts 
to guide the revolution on 4 and 6 November through the 
secret order to the officers, and his dealings with the 
Soldiers Council on the Baden. In the turmoil following 
the armistice and the first stage of the revolution, 
Hipper spent much of his time moving from place to place 
in northern Germany under an assumed name, lest radical 
revolutionaries find him. 
195 
He nevertheless maintained 
his interest in the navy and expressed his approval of 
the scuttling of the fleet at Scapa Flow in a letter to 
196 
Trotha, then the interim commander of the navy. 
194 
Nachlass Hipper, 9/23,2 Dec 1918 and Personal Akten 
Hipper, entry for 30 Nov and 13 Dec 1918. 
195 NS/SA, Nachlass Trotha, Hipper to Trotha, 2 Feb 1919, 
and 19 July 
19-6 Ibid, Hipper to Trotha, 25 Dec 1919. 
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In his later years, Hipper also managed to attend 
some Skagerrak Day gatherings. It is known he was in 
197 
ill health and financial straits after the war which 
helps to explain Hipper's lack of post-war social or 
political prominence. His personal correspondence and 
private wartime papers were destroyed in 1944'in an air 
raid on Munich. 
It cannot be concluded that Hipper was a counter- 
revolutionary; rather, his professional actions repre- 
sented a continuing effort through the final hour before 
the armistice to preserve the naval service. 
In Hipper's view the armistice disgraced the mod- 
erate socialist government not only because of the severe 
naval terms but more importantly because of the 5,000 
locomotives and 100,000 goods wagons Germany had to sur- 
render. These should have been used, he thought, to dis- 
tribute food to an already starving nation; and in this 
he was representative of many of the German people. Un- 
fortunately, Hipper's personal journal covering the years 
after the war until his death in 1932 is closed to 
researchers. No doubt it would reveal the evolution of 
his wartime thinking and perhaps provide much greater 
insight concerning Hipper, the man. But this study does 
197 Nachlass Levetzow, op. cit., Reel 45, Frame 00735, 
Raeder to Levetzow, 2 Aug 1922; also Reel 48, Frames 
00313-4,5 Jan 1929. The first reference concern's 
Raeder's request to Hipper for his admiral's gold stripes; 
Hipper said Raeder was too late--he had already sold them 
for the gold. Raeder asked Levetzow for his gold stripes. 
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not pretend to be a political biography; it is a war 
study of a World War I naval commander who lost. 
Admiral Franz Ritter von Hipper published no 
memoirs, no apologia. After the German revolution he 
eventually settled in a house in Hamburg where he died. 
He is buried in his native Bavarian town of Weilheim in 
a grave that is hard for a stranger to find. 
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APPENDIX I 
CHRONOLOGY OF NAVAL SERVICE 
ADMIRAL FRANZ RITTER VON HIPPER 
September T$ =2S 1. y) 
This table is extracted from the Personal Information 
Sheet of Hipper's Service Jacket, BA/MA MGFA/DZ IM 46/13, 
located in the Federal German Military Archives, Freiburg. 
Date 
12 Apr 1881 
Assignments and Promotions 
Entered the Navy. 
12 Apr 1881 - 21. 'Sept., i1881 _L S. M. S. Niobe, Cadet, North 
Sea and BaItic. 
22 Sept 1881-- 31 Mar 1882 Naval School Cadet. 
1 Apr 1881 - 12 May 1882 S. M. S. Mars, Gunnery Training, 
WilhelmTven. 
13 May 1882 - 17 Sept 1882 S. M. S. Friedrich Karl, Drill 
Squadron, Baltic and North Sea. 
16 May 1882 Promoted to Seacadet. 
18 Sept 1882 -6 Oct 1882 I. Seamans Division, Kiel. (leave) 
7 Oct 1882 - 10 Oct 1884 S. M. S. Leipzig, World Cruise. 
11 Oct 1884 -2 Nov 1884 First Line Officer Examina- 
tions. (leave) 
3 Nov 1884 - 24 Apr 1885 Naval Officer School, Kiel. 
21 Nov 1884 Promoted to Sub-Lieutenant. 
24 Apr 1885 - 11 Oct 1885 Division Officer I. Naval 
Battalion. (recruit training) 
12 Oct 1885 - 16 Dec 1885 Naval Executive Officer Course. 
17 Dec 1885 -3 Jan 1886 
4 Jan 1886 -3 Mar 1887 
I. Naval Division. (leave) 
II. Seamans Artillery Division. 




4 Mar 1887- 17 Sept :.. 1887 
Assignments and Promotions 
S. M. S. Friedrich Karl, Watch 
Officer, ri Sqron, 
Baltic and North Sea. 
23 Sept 1887- 19 Oct 1887 
20 Oct 1887 - 20 Sept 1888 
23 July 1888 
21 Sept 1888 - 27 Apr 1889 
1 May 1889 - 24 Dec 1889 
25 Dec 1889 - 28 Apr 1890 
29 Apr 1890 -3 Oct 1890 
4 Oct 1890 - 10 Oct 1890 
11 Oct 1890 - 18 Jan 1891 
19 Jan 1891 -3 Aug 1891 
S. M. S. Prinz Adalbert, Watch 
Officer, Dri7T Squadron, 
Baltic and North Sea. 
S. M. S. Stein, Watch Officer, 
Mediterranean and Atlantic, 
Maneuvre Squadron. 
Promoted to Lieutenant. 
S. M. S. Stosch, Watch Officer, 
Mediterranean Squadron. 
S. M. S. Wacht, Watch Officer, 
Manoeuvre Squadron, Baltic, 
North Sea and Mediterranean. 
S. M. S. Friedrich der Grosse, 
Watch Otticer, - e iterranean 
Squadron. 
S. M. S. Siegfried, Watch Officer, 
Commissioning and Trials, 
Baltic. 
S. M. S. Mücke, Watch Officer, 
Cadre Crew, Baltic. 
S. M. S. Blücher, Officers Tor- 
pedo Course del. 
S. M. S. Mücke, Watch Officer, 
Cadre Grew, Baltic. 
4 Aug 1891 - 14 Sept 1891 S. M. S. _V_i_p_eýr, 
Watch Officer, 
Armoured Squadron, North Sea 
Maneuvres. 
15 Sept 1891 - 24 Sept 1891 S. M. S. Mücke, Watch Officer, 
Cadre Crew, Baltic. 
11 Oct 1891 - 31 Mar 1892 S. M. S. Friedrich der Grosse, 




Date Assignments and Promotions 
1 Apr 1892 -8 Odt 1892 S. M. S. Beowulf, Torpedo Offi- 
cer, Trials and Commissioning 
Crew. 
9 Oct 1892 -2 Jan 1893 II. Torpedo Unit, Company 
Commander. 
3 Jan 1893 - 18 Feb 1893 S. M. Tor edoboat S2, Officer 
Under Instruction. 
19 Feb 1893 - 14 Mar 1893 II. Torpedo Unit, Company 
Commander. 
15 Mar 1893 - 25 Mar 1893 S. M. Torpedoboat S21, Commanding 
Otticer. 
26 Mar 1893 -5 Apr 1893 II. Torpedo Unit, Company 
Commander. 
27 Mar 1893 -4 Apr 1893 S. M. Tor edoboat S16, 
Commanding Officer. 
25 Apr 1893 -30 Sept 1893 S. M. Torpedoboat S78, Commanding 
0 icer. 
1 Oct 1893 - 25 Nov 1893 S. M. Torpedoboat H1, Commanding 
Utticer. 
26 Nov 1893 -8 Jan 1894 S. M. Torpedoboat S4, Commanding 
icer. 
9 Jan 1894 -6 Feb 1894 S. M. Torpedoboat S73, Commanding DTFI'cer. 
7 Feb 1894 -2 July 1894 S. M. Torpedoboat S4, Commanding 
Otticer. 
3 July 1894 -28 Sept 1894 S. M. Tor edoboat S54/56, Command- 
ing icer. 
29 Sept 1894- 12 Oct 1894 Leave. 
13 Oct 1894 - 25 Sept 1895 S. M. S. Wdrth, Watch Officer, 
Manoeuvre Squadron, Home Waters. 
14 Jan 1895 Promoted to Senior Lieutenant. 
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Date Assignments and Promotions 
26 Sept 1895 - 17 Jan 1896 S. M. Torpedoboat D8, Commanding 
Otticer an ommodore, II. 
Reserve Torpedoboat Division. 
18 Jan 1896 - 15 Apr 1896 S. M. Torpedoboat D9, Commanding 
Officer and ommodore, II. 
Torpedo Division. 
16 Apr 1896 - 12 Oct 1896 Commodore, A Torpedo Division, 
with pennant in S. M. Torpedo- 
boat D9. 
13 Oct 1896 -7 June 1897 Commodore, II. Torpedo Division, 
with pennant in S. M. Torpedo- 
boat D8. 
8 June 1897 - 24 June 1897 S. M. S. Grille, Admiralty Staff Officer Cruise. 
25 June 1897- 30 Sept 1897 II. Reserve Torpedoboat Flotilla, 
Commanding Officer, with pen- 
nant in S. M. Torpedoboat D8. 
1 Oct 1897 - 14 Dec 1897 
15 Dec 1897, - 30 Mar 1898 
1 Apr 1898 - 30 Sept 1898 
it it it 
pennant in S. M. Torpedoboat D2. 
pennant in S. M. Torpedoboat D5. 
It it it it 
pennant in S. M. Torpedoboat D9. 
1 Oct 1898 - 15 Sept 1899 S. M. S. Kurfürst Friedrich 
Wilhelm, Navigation icer, 
Battle Squadron. 
16 Sept 1899- 30 Sept 1902 S. M. Y. Hohenzollern, Navigation 
Officer, mperia acht. 
16 June 1901 
1 Oct 1902 - 30 Sept 1905 
Promoted to Lieut. Commander. 




The following assignments were performed while assigned 
to the II. Torpedo Unit as Commanding Officer: 
Date Assignments and Promotions 
6--Apr 1903 - 15 Apr, 1903 S. M. S. Niobe, Commanding 
Officer. 
16 Apr 1903 - 30 June 1903 S. M. S. Niobe, Commanding 
Officer, and Flotilla Chief 
of Flotillas Afloat 
1 July 1903 - 30 Sept 1903 II. Torpedo Flotilla, Flotilla 
Chief, with pennant in 
S. M. Torpedoboat G112.. 
7 Aug 1904 - 12 Aug 1904 S. M. S. Comet Sailing Yacht, 'Kiel Wehe , 
ýi Crew Member. 
13 Aug 1904 - 30 Sept 1904 II. Torpedo Flotilla, Flotilla 
Chief, with pennant in 
S. M. Torpedoboat S102. 
29 Sept 1904 - 12 Oct 1904 Leave. 
13 Oct 1904 -2 May 1905 II. Torpedo Flotilla, Flotilla 
Chief, with pennant in 
S. M. Torpedoboat S102. 
5 Apr 1905 Promoted to Commander. 
2 May 1905 - 10 June 1905 II. Torpedo Flotilla, Flotilla 
Chief, with pennant in 
S. M. Torpedoboat D9. 
16 Aug 1905 - 15 Sept 1905 " of of 
1 Oct 1905 - 19 Apr 1906 Assigned to the staff of the 
Chief, North Sea Naval Station. 
The following assignments were performed as temporary addi- 
tional duty in the above assignment: 
15 Jan 1906 - 26 Jan 1906 S. M. S. Prinz Adalbert, Senior 
Officers Cruiser Gunnery Course. 
9 Apr 1906 - 14 Apr 1906 S. M. S. Schwaben, Senior Officers 
Battleship Gunnery Course. 
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The following were permanent assignments: 
Date 
20 Apr 1906 - 22 Aug 1906 
Assignments and Promotions 
S. M. S. Leipzig, Commanding 
Officer, Trriials and Commis- 
sioning Crew. 
23 Aug 1906 -29 Sept 1906 
30 Sept 1906 -5 Mar 1908 
6 Apr 1907 
6 Mar 1908 - 30 Sept 1908 
1 Oct 1908 - 30 Sept 1911 
1 Oct 1911 - 26 Jan 1912 
27 Jan 1912 
Leave. 
S. M. S. Friedrich Karl, 
Commanding icer, Home 
Fleet, Scouting Forces 
Promoted to Captain. 
S. M. S. Gneisenau, Commanding 
Officer, Trials and Commis- 
sioning Crew. 
I. Torpedo Division, Kiel, 
Commandant. 
S. M. S. Yorck, Commanding Officer, 
and Chime of Staff to Deputy 
Flag Officer, Scouting Forces. 
Promoted to Rear Admiral. 
27 Jan 1912 -30 Sept 1913 Scouting Forces, Deputy Flag 
Officer, flag in S. M. S. CU1n, 
with collateral duty as Flag 
Officer, High Seas Fleet 
Torpedoboats. 
1 Oct 1913 - 11 Aug 1918 Scouting Forces, Flag Officer, 
Flag in S. M. S. Seydlitz. 
17 June 1915 
11 Aug 1918 
11 Aug 1918 - 30 Nov 1918 
13 Dec 1918 
Promoted to Vice Admiral. 
Promoted to Admiral. 
High Seas Fleet, 
Commander-in-Chief. 
Retired at full war pension. 
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A General Note on Sources 
The study of Hipper as a naval commander required 
the broadest possible search of the German naval archives. 
The British and American archives were searched to pro- 
vide additional perspective and balance in examining 
Hipper's naval environment. The personal papers of 
Hipper and his naval colleagues were also consulted. 
Documents listed without comment were searched to pro- 
vide broader understanding of Hipper's parameters in 
his naval service and to reconstruct lost records, though 
Hipper is not mentioned by name in these files. 
I. PRIMARY SOURCES 
A. Archival Sources 
1. German Ministry-. -, of Marine Manuscripts 
The original documents are now largely at the 
Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv, 7800 Freiburg im Breisgau, 
West Germany. The Nachlasse or private papers (literally 
"literary remains") of Hipper and many of his contempor- 
aries are also found there. A notable exception is the 
Nachlass des Admirals Adolph von_Trotha, Hipper's last 
chief of staff; this collection is located in the 
NiedersUchsisches Staatsarchiv, 4967 Bückeburg, West 
Germany. 
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The National Maritime Museum at Greenwich holds 
the only surviving official-plans of ships of the Im- 
perial German Navy. 
The U. S. National Archives in Washington, D. C. 
holds microfilm copies of most of the official opera- 
tional papers and many of the logistical records of the 
Imperial Navy. There are 1,659 reels in this collection 
but no private papers of admirals are included. 
1 
The principal problems encountered in research on 
Admiral Hipper occur as the result of war-time destruc- 
tion of parts of both his official and private papers. 
In the case of official papers, the Akten des B. d. A. 
Aug 1914-Mai 1916 (Papers of the Flag Officer, Recon- 
naissance Forces) and the Geheimarchiv (Secret Files), 
both were lost when S. M. S. Lützow was sunk at Jutland. 
The destruction of both collections is cited in a memo- 
randum from Admiral Scheer, C-in-C of the High Seas 
Fleet, to Admiral Capelle, State Secretary for Navy, 
dated 27 July 1918. A letter from his surviving rela- 
tive, Frau Gabriele Streitel, of Munich, dated 28 June 
1972, confirmed the destruction of all of Hipper's 
personal war-time papers in a fire following an air 
raid on Munich in 1944 with the exception of his 
personal diary which survives as the Nachlass Hipper. 
1 
Robert Wolfe (ed. ), Captured German and Related Records 
A National Archives 
. 
Con erence, At ens, 0 io, 7+ßj, 
pp. 57-172 . 
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Even with this, there is a family restriction on access 
to the final chapter which covers the post-World War I 
era. The restriction extends to 1992. 
Additional considerations in researching Hipper 
include the dispersal of the papers of the High Seas 
Fleet among the Imperial Cabinet, the Imperial Naval 
Office, and the Admiralty Staff--each kept files on the 
Fleet's activities and there is considerable correspon:? - 
dence between the Fleet and the three authorities. 
Further, the Admiralty Staff was the ultimate repository 
for all the Fleet's war diaries and consequently much 
about Hipper is to be found here. Also, the German 
Naval Archive itself assembled several dozen packets 
on each action in World War I to write the official his- 
tory of the war at sea. However, the removal of these 
documents resulted in several blanks in the chronolog- 
ical collections of the High Seas Fleet and other forces 
afloat. Nonetheless, there is much documentation in 
these packets covering actions in which Hipper participated. 
The German Ministry of Marine MSS has had no less 
than five systems of file numbers. The first was the 
German registry (KR) numbers: four digits prefaced by 
an F (Fach or Shelf) number, the system still in use in 
Freiburg. The second and third systems reflect the 
capture of the German naval records virtually intact in 
April 1945 at Tambach Castle near Coburg. Transported to 
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London, the British and American naval intelligence 
catalogers assigned their own numbers to the collection. 
This system retained the original German archival arrange- 
ment and the organizational hierarchy of the German naval 
high command reflected therein. The PG number may con- 
tain anywhere from 10 to approximately 300 sides of manu- 
script with the average PG number containing about 250 
sides. 
The Americans, however, were less concerned with 
complete archival exploitation and preferred to extract 
and film select collections consisting primarily of po- 
litical, operational and intelligence matters. They 
applied a third index system to items dated between 1850 
and 1922, assigning microfilm roll numbers with a TA 
(Tambach Castle) preface. This TA system is of little 
use as a finding aid in exploiting the Washington col- 
lection, perhaps because the U. S. National Archives in 
1970 superimposed what amounts to a fourth index system. 
In Washington, this collection is known as the T-1022 
series and is arranged in microfilm reels numbered 
T-1022, Reels 1-1659. The Admiralty PG system is used 
in Washington and in Freiburg and can be used as a cross 
reference between the American collection and the German 
documents. The Bundesarchiv in Freiburg is in the process- 
of adding yet another system of indexing their collections. 
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In this dissertation the F (KR) number will be 
given first wherever possible, followed by the PG 
number, and if the file was consulted in Washington, 
a T-1022 reel number will also be given. 
All of the German Ministry of Marine MSS are listed 
under their archival index grouping which preceded each 
collection of files in the archive index books. These 
numbers (F, PG, and T) will be followed in this bibli- 
ography by the title of the file in German, a translation 
and a statement on the applicability of the file's con- 
tents to the course of research and Hipper. 
a. Official Papers 
Akten Admiralstab Abteilung 'B': 
F 145/PG 75106/Reel 655, Kreuzerkrieg mit grosser Kreuzer 
Nov 1914, (Cruiser War with Battle Cruisers). This file 
contains a paper by Hipper on use of battle cruisers in 
overseas warfare and considerable correspondence with von 
Ingenohl, Fleet C-in-C, and Hipper's captains. This 
file shows Hipper as strategist and tactician. 
F 150/PG 75842/Reel 823, Parlamentärischer Untersuchungs- 
ausschuss Okt 1919-Aug 1920, (Parliamentary Investigation 
} 
/ of the German Collapse). Hipper, then retired, apparently 
played no part in the proceedings and gave no testimony. 
F 151/PG 75842/Reel 837, Abwehr englischer Anschuldigkeiten 
(sic) gegen die deutsche Seekriegsführung, Jun-Sept 1920, 
(Legal Defence of the German High Command against English 
Charges). See Adm 1/8581/25 below for British view. 
334 
F 155/PG 75602,75610-75616/Reel 706, Armistice West 
Okt 1917-Mai 1919, (Papers Concerning the Armistice on 
the Western Front). Erich Raeder, Hipper's chief of 
staff, figures in some of the documents of the German 
Naval Peace Commission in PG 75610-75616. Cf. Adm 116/ 
1931-2002 below. While Hipper was not involved in the 
negotiations, both the German and NIACC files listed 
contain much about Hipper's materiel. 
F 160/PG 75652-75654/Reels 951,952, Laufende Marine-Politik, 
Nordsee Apr 1918-Mai 1919, (Current Naval Policy, North Sea, 
General). The file is useful in showing Hipper's lack of 
impact on grand strategy. 
F 162/PG 75666/Reel 828, Akten betreffend laufende Marine- 
Politik Nordostatlantik Jan-Dec 1918, (Papers Concerning 
Current Naval Policy on the Northeast Atlantic). Although 
this file contains information of strategic and tactical 
interest to Hipper, he was apparently not on the distribution 
list. 
F 163/PG 75675/Reel 708, Marineversuchskommission Mar-Okt 1918, 
(Naval Technical Commission). 
F 166/PG 75704/Reel 872, Akten betr. Militgrpolitische 
Angelegenheiten: Deutschland Dec 1917-Apr 1919, (Military- 
Political Situation, Germany). This file is useful in 
understanding Hipper's situation as Fleet Commander as 
well as the navy's role in German society of 1917-1918. 
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USNA/PG 76529-76543/Reels 982,983,984,928,929,1027,1028, 
1029,1030, Admiralstab der Marine Befehle an andere BehBrden 
1 Aug 1914-30 Sept 1918, (Admiralty Staff of the Navy, Cor- 
respondence with Other Commands). Much in this file concerns 
Hipper's ships and his efforts to improve, maintain or re- 
place materiel. It contains information confirming the loss 
of Hipper's official papers and secret archives at Jutland 
and is very useful in studying Admiral Hipper as naval com- 
mander, especially in. dealing. ithi the. shore -. establishment_. 
This collection includes war organization of German naval 
forces, details the mobilization process, organization for 
issue of orders, instructions for search and seizure, requests 
for replacements of ships, personnel and materiel. The file 
contains an overview of the demands made by the forces afloat 
on the shore establishment and is a record of matters consid- 
ered sufficiently important to merit the attention of the 
highest naval authorities. The file is approximately 4,200 
sides. 
Akten Admiralstab Abteilung 'A': 
F 368-376/PG 76545-76572/Reels 1632-1653, Dislocation der See- 
streitkrllfte Aug 1914-Nov 1918, (Disposition of Naval Forces). 
This is a vast and interesting series of weekly lists of 
materiel readiness and locations of German naval forces 
including Hipper's. It includes Kohlen-und 131-Bestände 
(Coal and Oil Stocks), a weekly status report of available 
fuel. 
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F 394/PG 76794-76796, Kohlen und ölzufuhr (Coal and Oil 
Supply). This is a compilation and handy reference for 
the fuel status of Hipper's forces and the High Seas Fleet 
from Aug 1914-Nov 1918. 
F 420/PG 76901/Reels 994,995, Dienstanweisung für Vorpos- 
tendienst Aug 1915-Sept 1918, (Instructions for Watch Patrol 
Duty). Hipper was responsible for defence of German North 
Sea home waters and this is a record of the day-to-day 
orders providing for that defence. 
F 420/PG 76902-76906/Reel 995, Seekriegsführung. Der Nordsee- 
kriegschauplatz, (Naval Warfare. North Sea Theatre). In 
PG 76905 there is a discussion of the possibility of contin- 
uing the war at sea after cessation of land hostilities. 
Some of the conclusions of this 4 June 1918 conference 
ashore are similar to those reached at a fleet conference 
attended by Hipper on 7 October 1918 and recorded in his 
Nachlass. In PG 76906, dating from 3 July 1918 to 1 Apr 1919, 
there are indications several members of the naval high com- 
mand did not give up the idea of further warfare even after 
internment of the fleet at Scapa Flow, but Hipper was not 
among them. 
F 425/PG 76925-76926/Reel 942, Minenkriegführung 1914-1918, 
(Mine Warfare Leadership). This file is of particular im- 
portance because Hipper was responsible for the defence of 
the German Bight which involved considerable minelaying and 
minesweeping. It indicates Hipper was informed of Germany's 
overall effort in mine warfare. 
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F 426/PG 76945-76958, Englische Hafen 1914-1918, (British 
Harbours). This Admiralty Staff file helps replace some 
of Hipper's secret archives lost at Jutland. It tells what 
the Germans knew about English coastal targets; Hipper was 
on the distribution list. 
F 431/PG 67974-67975/Reel 1060, Schriftwechsel über 
0-Directiven, Oct 1914-July 1918, (Correspondence on Oper- 
ational Directives). This Admiralty Staff (Operations) file 
contains drafts and copies of several papers by senior naval 
officers on the direction the war should take and a paper by 
Admiral von Ingenohl dated January 1915 outlining a strategy 
which seems to have resulted in the Battle of Dogger Bank 
several weeks later. Hipper refers in his Nachlass on 
10 January to being asked his opinion on this strategy by 
Ingenohl. 
F 454/PG 77063-77064/Reels 1170,1171. Ausgegangene Nachrithtaz' 
über englische und französische Streitkrllfte 1.8. -29.12.1914, ', 
(Intelligence Disseminated on English and French Warships). 
This file contains all the intelligence which Hipper could 
have received from the Admiralty Staff in the first half year 
of the war. It is particularly important because of the 
destruction of the B. d. A. 's own intelligence file for this 
period. Hipper is on the distribution list. 
F 491/PG 77211-77228/Reels 1101,1102,1103,1049,1050,1195, 
1196, Nachrichten über die feindliche Flotte und Küstenbe- 
festigungen 14 Aug 1916-16 Mar 1917, (Intelligence on the 
Enemy Fleet and Coastal Defences). 
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Akten Seekriegsleitung 
These papers are the records of the Naval War Command 
set up by Admiral Reinhard Scheer in August 1918 to 
control all aspects of the war at sea. Hipper replaced 
Scheer at this time as Commander-in-Chief, High Seas Fleet. 
F 561/PG 69287/Reel 1201, Akten AI Organisation Aug-Nov 1918, 
(Papers Concerning Organization of the Naval War Command). 
This file contains Scheer's proposals which resulted in 
establishment of the command. To some extent, these differ 
from published accounts and also indicate Hipper inherited 
a High Seas Fleet command whose authority was diminished in 
favor of the Naval High Command. 
F 562/PG 69295-69296/Reel 1184, Akten OPII AIX Meldungen an 
S. M. 18 Auf 1918-4 Nov 1918, (Reports to His Majesty, the 
Kaiser, from the Naval War Command). This file shows the 
Kaiser was more closely involved with the navy at the end 
of the war than several accounts admit. He does not appear 
to have been 'retired; ' Scheer consulted him several times 
after establishment of the Naval War Command and generally 
followed his advice. This file also provides evidence 
Hipper's ability to direct naval strategy and events was 
severely limited. 
F 566/PG 69329/Reel 1185, All Kriegführung auf dem Nord. 
Krieg schauplatz 21 Aug 1918-7 Apr 1919, (Conduct of the War' 
in the Northern Theatre). This is the continuation of 
Admiralty File F 420 and contains intelligence information 
which could have been given to Hipper. 
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Admiralstab der Marine Abteilung 'N': 
This collection was consulted in an attempt to complete 
the survey of incoming intelligence to which Hipper would 
have had access. 
F 602-603/PG 69389/Ree1l211,1212, 
PG 69390-69392/Reels 1212,1213, 
PG 69293/Reel 1210, 
PG 69294-69295/Reels 1210, 
__1211,23 
July 1914- 
31 Dec 1918, Westlicher Kreigsschauplatz, Kriegsperiode , 
1914-1918, (Intelligence Received, Western War Theatre, 
War Period 1914-1918). This collection shows Hipper's needs 
were not particularly. well-served by the intelligence col- 
lection system since it was biased in favour of political/ 
strategical informativ. Nonetheless, it is the most complete 
collection of general naval intelligence found in one file. 
The file shows the Germans were limited, especially in the 
latter half of the war, to central European sources for 
their intelligence and large portions of it came from their 
embassies in neutral Amsterdam and Stockholm. 
Akten der Admiralstab 
, 
Papers listed under this-heading are from the general col- 
lection which fell under the purview of the Chief of the 
Admiralty Staff. Abteilung 'A' (European Department), 
Abteilung 'B" (Extra-European Department), and Abteilung 'N' 
(Intelligence Department), referred to above, each had their 
own archive, however. 
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F 637/PG 65132-65133/Reel 1395, Geheime Militllrpolitische 
Berichte, Streitigkeiten, Meinungsdifferenzen Jan 1903- 
Apr 1916, (Secret Military/Political Reports, Disputes, 
and Differences of Opinion). 
F 722/PG 65676, Akten S. M. S. Friedrich Karl July 1902-Aug 1914, 
(Papers of the Armoured Cruiser S. M. S. Friedrich Karl). These 
are the papers of Hipper's first major ship command and those 
for 1907, the year he commanded this ship, reflect a 'tight 
ship' which won the Kaiser's gunnery prize. 
Reichsmarineamt 
F 728/PG 65702-65705/Reels 1168,1169, Reichsmarineamt Allge- 
meines Marinedepartement Akten betreffend die Hochseeflotte 
Herbstmanöver 1908-1915, (Imperial Naval Office, General 
Naval Department, Papers Concerning the High Seas Fleet 
Autumn Manoeuvres). Hipper begins to figure in the collection 
from 1912 onward. This correspondence file includes useful 
information for tracing the development of communications, 
mine warfare, U-boats, and problems encountered by an 
ever-expanding German fleet. It is a detailed overview of 
the tactical milieu in which Hipper developed as a naval 
commander prior to World War I. 
F 728/PG 65708, Akten II. Geschwader und Heimische Kreuzer- 
division Jan 1903-Aug 1917, (Papers of the Second Battle 
Squadron and the Home Cruiser Divison). This records the 
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antecedents of the First Scouting Group and the begin- 
nings of the German home cruiser forces. Students of 
the High Seas Fleet should not fail to investigate it. 
F 728/PG 65709-65728/Reels 1143,1142,1401,1402,1312, 
1313,1314,1138,1139,1143,1247,1248, Akten Schlacht- 
flotte (Hochseeflotte) Jun 1903-Nov 1918, (Papers of the 
Active Battle Fleet later High Seas Fleet ). This col- 
lection contains a , 'najor position paper by Hipper on the 
recruiting system of the German fleet in PG 65715. This 
is also found in F 33031f/PG 66709. There is also a vast 
collection of manoeuvre reports in which Hipper figures 
after 1912. 
USNA/ PG 66085/Reel 1500, Reichsmarineamt Zentral-Abteilung, 
Akten Sitzungs-Protokolle vom Juli 1900 bis Mai 1902, 
(Imperial Naval Office Central Division, Papers Concerning 
Plenary Conferences from July 1900 to May 1902). These 
files record the conferences which decided the shape and 
characteristics of ships in the High Seas Fleet. 
USNA/PG 66086/Reel 1500, Sitzungs-Protokolle Juni 1902- 
Dec 1904 Bd. '. 3, (Records of Plenary Conferences, vol. 3). 
This is a continuation of the collection begun in PG 66085 
above. The German comment on the materiel lessons to be 
learned from the Russo-Japanese War is contained in 
Protokoll 15 Nov 1904; for the British view see PRO 
Adm 116/866B listed below. The German comment has consid- 
erable bearing on later German materiel development. 
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USNA/PG 66087/Reel 1501, Sitzungs-Protokolle Jan 1905- 
Apr 1909 Bd. 4, (Records of Plenary Conferences, vol. 4). 
These records are critical in understanding the reasoning 
behind the construction of S. M. S. Blücher, the controversial 
transition ship between the armoured cruiser and the battle 
cruiser in the German navy. The records also include the 
rationale behind the re-introduction of ship-carried 
anti-torpedo nets. Especially important are the conferences 
of 19 Sept and 7 and 18 Nov 1906 which decided the charac- 
teristics of S. M. S. von der Tann, Hipper's first battle 
cruiser. As a source for the study of the German battle 
cruiser, especially its design and evolution, these records 
are invaluable. 
USNA/PG 66088/Reel 1501, Sitzungs-Protokolle Marz 1909- 
Nov 1916 Bd. 5, (Records of Plenary Conferences, vol. 5). 
This file contains the conference which decided the shape 
of Derfflinger, Lützow and Hindenburg, the finest all-around 
warships produced by any power in World War I and the most 
powerful Hipper had under him in combat. No study of the 
German battle cruiser's development can be appreciated 
without understanding the thinking behind these ships and 
investigating this file. 
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Reichsmarineamt, Konstructionsabteilung: 
F 50/66.10-15, Deutsche Kriegsflotte Band I Linienschiffe, 
1910-1915, (German War Fleet Part I, Ships of the Line). 
This series is the most compact summary of data extant on 
High Seas Fleet battleships from S. M. S. Schlesien to S. M. S. 
Grosser Kurfürst. The collection consists of a series of 
official pamphlets intended for service as ships charac- 
teristics manuals. 
F 50/66,16,17,18, Deutsche Kriegsflotte Band III Grosse 
Kreuzer, 1908-1914, (German War Fleet Part III), Battle and 
Armoured Cruisers). This file contains a technical descrip- 
tion of all German armoured and battle cruisers and is val- 
uable for a comprehensive analysis of Hipper's ships. It 
reveals much hitherto unpublished information about the 
Kaiser's navy. 
Akten Admiralstab der Marine: 
USNA/PG 62369-62382,62430-62436/Reels 141,142,207-211, 
Kriegstagebuch des Kommandos. der Hochseestreitkräfte: 
Admirals von Ingenohl, von Pohl, Scheer, von Hipper, 
30 Jul 1914-8 Jan 1919, (War Diary of the High Seas Fleet " 
Command). This chronicle, huthored by succeeding Fleet 
Commanders, is invaluable for analyzing Hipper's role in 
the war at sea. His participation in the naval war effort 
is reflected by the amount of excerpts from his own reports 
which are included in the diary by his superiors. This 
diary is also a useful compendium of tactical and strate- 
gical opinion, although the laßt portion survives only in 
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the pencilled original. Dr. Gert Sandhof er, senior 
archivist, Federal German Military Archies, told the 
writer in Freiburg in 1972 that the typed originals 
were destroyed on Hitler's order lest the navy be em- 
barrassed by revelations concerning the 1918 mutinies 
and revolution. 
F 1884-1890/PG 63864-63910/Reels 1461,1459, Akten des 
Befehlshabers der AufklHrungsschiffe, 1911-1918, (Papers 
of the Flag Officer Reconnaissance Forces). This file 
contains few papers dated prior to 31 May 1916 because 
the archive sank with Hipper's flagship at Jutland. 
This loss thus necessitated a wide search of other possible 
sources for pre-Jutland information. 
F 3817-3820/PG 62446-62617/Reels 107,176, Kriegstagebuch 
der B. d. A., 30 Jul 1914-8 Aug 1918, (War Diary of the Flag 
Officer, Reconnaissance Forces). This is probably the 
single most important document available to a historian 
of Hipper as a commander. It contains a chronology of 
the wartime operations of his command and where merited, 
extensive reports on operations and actions, as well as 
Hipper's own comment. 
F 3820/PG 62617/Reel 176, Kriegstagebuch Befehlshaber der 
Nordsee-Sicherung 12 Aug 1918-4 Nov 1918, (War Diary of the 
Flag Officer, North Sea Defences). This is the record of 
a post created at Hipper's instigation to relieve the Flag 
Officer, Reconnaissance Forces, from responsibility for 
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defence of the German Bight. 
F 3885/Reels 309,310, Kriegstagebuch S. M. S. Derfflinger, 
1914-1918, (War Diary, S. M. S. Derfflinger). This document 
is a complete war-time record of the operations of one of 
Hipper's capital ships. It is useful for corroboration of 
facts and opinions about Hipper's operations. This also 
applies to the war diaries of other capital ships under 
Hipper listed below, examined in the following order: 
F 3893/PG 63208, Kriegstagebuch S. M. S. Hindenburg 1917-1918. 
F 3899/PG 63257, Kriegstagebuch S. M. S. Lützow 1915-1916. 
F 3902/PG 63373-63375/Reel 318, Kriegstagebuch S. M. S. Moltke 
1914-1918. 
F 3913/PG 63370-63372/Reel 387, Kriegstagebuch S. M. S. Seydlitz 
1914-1918. 
F 3916/PG 63403-63406/Reel 372, Kriegstagebuch S. M. S. von der 
Tann 1914-1918. 
USNA/PG 68117-68121/Reels 1658,1659, Admiralstab der- 
Marine, Kriegsnachrichten 1 Jun 1917-5 Nov 1918, (Chief of the 
Admiralty Staff of the Navy, War Intelligence). This file 
contains a monthly assessment of the war situation based on 
available intelligence about enemy intentions and movements 
and in-house information on German strengths and weaknesses. 
However, there is no mention of the 1917 summer mutinies or 
X the 1918 mutiny and revolution in the German analysis. This 
file is the "official war news" which Hipper refers to often" 
in his personal war diary. 
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USNA/PG 77732,77732d, 77733,77734/Reels 1659,1129, 
Hochseeflotte Kriegsereignisse Jan 1915-May 1917, (High 
Seas Fleet War Experiences). This important collection 
contains several comprehensive reports from Hipper in- 
cluding his opinion of materiel, gunnery, navigation, 
machinery, torpedoes, safety measures, administration, 
food and morale, tactics, strategy and war aims. 
USNA/PG 77740-77743/Ree1s 1374,1375,1376,1406, Hochsee- 
flotte Akte betreffend Kriegs-Versuche (Kriegsarchiv der 
Marine) 1914-1918, (High Seas Fleet Papers Concerning War 
Experiments (Naval War Archive'). This file contains evi- 
dence that Hipper was involved in several wartime develop- 
ments of German naval technology, including anti-submarine 
warfare nets, general defence against submarines, smoke- 
screens (both fixed and shipboard) and minesweeping devices. 
USNA/PG 76968-76973/Reels 943,1044, Admiralstab der Marine, 
Akten betreffend Befehle für Flotten-Unternehmungen vom 
Apr 1916-Feb 1919, (Admiralty Staff of the Navy, Papers 
Concerning Orders for Fleet Operations from April 1916- 
February 1919). This file indicates Hipper's responsibility 
for wartime operational planning under Admirals Ingenohl 
and Pohl was assumed by Captains Trotha and Levetzow after 
April of 1916. PG 77969 contains a scathing report by Scheer 
on Hipper's conduct of the rerüce of U-20 and U-30. His- 
torians wishing to trace the operational planning of the 
German naval high command will find this collection useful. 
347 
Akten Kaiserliches Marine-Kabinett: 
F 3301/PG 66696-66699, Organisation der Obersten 
Marinebehörden Juni 1888-Sept 1918, (Organization of the 
Higher Naval Command). This file gives a good record of 
the decision-making process which resulted in the German 
Navy's command structure. It is an introduction to the 
problem of the command's lack of unity which plagued 
Hipper, the High Seas Fleet, and the German Navy in 
World War I. 
F 3302/PG 66700/Reel 488, Meinungsverschiedenheiten 
zwischen den obersten MarinebehUrden Nov 1892-Mllrz 1911, 
(Differences of Opinion Among the Higher Naval Commands). 
F 3302 ld/PG 66701-66705/Reels 539,540, Organisation des 
Admiralstabs der Marine M. rz 1899-Nov 1918, (Organization 
of the Admiralty Staff of the Navy). Useful in analyzing 
Hipper's service assignments; also-provides. -information on 
changes in Fleet C-in-C's authority under Hipper in 1918. 
F 3302 le/PG 66706/Reel 540, Organisation des Bildungs- 
wesens der Marine Sept 1884-Apr 1914, (Organization of the 
Naval Training Command). This file is useful in establish- 
ing Hipper's relative level of education in the navy. 
F 3303 if/PG 66707-66711/Reels 510,511, Organisation der 
Seestreitkräfte Jun 1891-Aug, 1918, (Organization of Naval 
Forces). This file contains the record of the development 
of the billet of Flag Officer, Reconnaissance Forces, as 
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well as lessons learned in war games, fleet exercise 
regulations and drill reports, information on the devel- 
opment of wireless communications in the German navy, a 
major fleet discussion of German naval manning difficulties, 
to which Hipper contributed a paper; PG 66710 contains 
a report from Hipper via the C-in-C High Seas Fleet to the 
Kaiser on the battle readiness of the Scouting Forces; 
another documentocontains a clear definition of the limited 
authority of the B. d. A. PG 66711 contains correspondence 
on authority, responsibility and assignments of Scouting 
Force admirals. 
F 3304 lfl/PG 66712-66713/Reel 513, Flottengesetz Apr 1897- 
Jan 1913, (Fleet Laws). The first fleet law contains the 
earliest justification found-in the records for scouting 
forces. This file contains the most basic documents con- 
cerning planning and some of the politics that went into 
drafting the fleet laws. A-student wishing to ascertain 
the size, timing and duration of the Imperial Navy's con- 
struction program3should examine these files. 
F 3304/PG 66714/Reel 513, Organisation des Torpedowesens 
Juli 1890-Okt 1914, (Organization of the Torpedo Forces). 
This file is important to an understanding of the service 
branch in which Hipper spent the majority of his career. 
There is evidence here the torpedo branch had a lower 
political and strategic priority than generally believed. 
349 
F 3304 lh/PG 66715/Reel 513, Organisation der Schiffs- 
Artillerie, des Marinewesens und Marinedepots Okt 1899- 
Juni 1918, (Organization of the Naval Artillery Department, 
the Naval Establishment and the Naval Depots).. This file 
shows. -the work done building the naval establishment in 
these three areas and that Hipper was not involved in it. 
FIi3310 IVb/PG 66767-66768/Reel 631, Erfindungen, (Inventions) 
1914-1918. 
F 3317-3318/PG 66787-66791, Bestimmungen betr. Stellungbeset- 
zungen Sept 1891-Nov 1918, (Stipulations Concerning the 
Filling of Service Assignments). PG 66786 contains copies 
of excerpts from the semi-annual fitness reports of all 
German navy flag officers from 1912-1915, including Hipper. 
F 3330/PG 66849-66853, Stellenbesetzungen mit Seeoffizieren 
Nov 1912-Dec 1918, (Assignment of Naval Executive Officers). 
Good evidence is provided here of shortage of officers in 
the war years. This evidence is related to the German 
naval collapse of 1918. 
F 3353/PG 66959-66961/Reel 516, Admiralstabsreisen Mai 1890- 
Apr 1911, (Admiralty Staff Journeys). This file contains 
records of inspectional and educational tours by Admiralty 
Staff officers in-training; Hipper made such a journey 
June-July 1897. 
F 3386/PG 67143-67415, Literarische Veröffentlichungen von 
Offizieren und Beamten Mai 1891-Juni 1916, (Publications 
by Officers and Officials). This source, coupled with 
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research of Marine Rundschau through 1932 (analagous to 
the Naval Review) confirms that Hipper wrote nothing for 
publication during his service years. 
F 3391/PG 67211-67219,67230,67233,67240-67243/Reels 
492,513,514,515, Übungsberichte Amu 1889-März 1915 
(Drill Reports). These documents chart, the performance 
of some of Hipper's succeeding commands, especially the 
torpedoboats. PG 67288 contains a report on the II Torpedo- 
Abteilung 1904-1905 from Hipper's superior at the time; 
PG 67230 contains a report on the I Torpedo-Abteilung under 
Hipper in 1909, which the Kaiser endorsed personally. 
PG 62735 contains reports on the Inspectorate of Naval 
Training Sept 1905-July 1913. -PG-: 67236 contains annual re- 
ports on the entire naval training effort and useful in 
understanding Hipper'a naval environment from 1913-1918. 
F 3391-3396/PG 67237-67246/Reels 494,515,516, Akten Hoch- 
seeflotte Übungsberichte Okt 1905-Dec 1914, (Papers of the 
High Seas Fleet Concerning Battle Drill Reports, incl. 
appendices). This is a vast and exhaustive series on 
virtually every peacetime drill conducted by the High Seas 
Fleet. In the 1912 manoeuvres Hipper submitted a report 
on the performance of light cruisers and destroyers in his 
capacity as Deputy Flag Officer, Scouting Forces. In 1913 
the records of the May 'Kaiser Manoeuvres' show a major 
battle drill repeated at Hipper's suggestion, an unusual 
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occurrence. This file is of importance to scholars 
because it is a good record of the methodology of German 
naval tactical development; and it delineates to some ex- 
tent the role of Hipper in the process. 
F 3426/PG 67377, Schiffsunflille in der Kaiserlichen Marine 
Jan 1914-März 1917, (Ships' Accidents in the Imperial Navy). 
This file shows Hipper's capital ships were not involved in 
any major collisions in this period though there were several 
in other commands. 
F 3428/PG 67385-67388/Reel 494, Schiffbau in der Kaiserlichen 
Marine Jan 1904-Sept 1918, (Shipbuilding in the Imperial Navy). 
The first three PG numbers which contain the record of naval 
construction prior to 1915 are available only in Freiburg 
in the original. They compare German construction with that 
of other countries. PG 67388, Beiheft Schiffersatz Okt 1915- 
Sept 1918, (Special File Shipbuilding/Ship Design), is a very 
interesting record of problems faced by the Germans in pro- 
viding for replacements_of war losses, especially capital 
ships and battle cruisers. It includes accurate and detailed 
information on the British shipbuilding program of the era 
and the Kaiser's role in the decision-making process of naval 
shipbuilding. Hipper received copies of what the Imperial 
Cabinet knew about the British effort. 
F 3439/PG 67447/Reel 636, Die Detachierte Division Okt 1913- 
Dez 1914, 'Mittelmeer;, (The Detached Division, Mediterranean). 
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This file contains evidence that Hipper was concerned 
about the effect of the deployment of one of Germany's 
few battle cruisers to a foreign station, primarily 
because this deployment depleted his small reserve of 
trained personnel. 
F 3443 XXXI/PG 67475/Reels 501,520, Flottenpolitik Aug 1911- 
Feb 1912, (German Fleet Policy). 
F 3444 XXXId/PG 67476/Reel 634, Akten Kaiserlichen Marine 
Kabinet betr. Militdrpolitische Fragen Apr 1918, (Papers 
of the Imperial Naval Cabinet Concerning Military-Political 
Questions). Evidence here indicates Hipper, as Fleet 
Commander, never reached the level of impact on national 
policy that Scheer did as Fleet Commander. 
F 3456-3457/PG 67548-67552/Reels 602,564,565, Reise S. M. 
der Kaiser und König im Jahre 1899,1900,1901,1902, 
(Travels of His Majesty, Emporer and King). 
F 3468/PG 67613, Auszüge aus Qualificationsberichten über 
Flaggoffiziere, Dez 1915-Dez 1917, (Excerpts from Fitness 
Reports on Flag Officers). This file allows a comparison 
of Hipper with other flag officers in the German navy from 
an official viewpoint. 
F 3490 13/PG 67787-67790/Reels 565,566, Vortrüge und Aud- 
ienzen bei Sr. Majestilt, Apr 1899-März 1918, (Addresses and 
Audiences with His Majesty). This collection is useful in 
ascertaining Hipper's relationship with the Kaiser though 
he is not among those who sought an audience. 
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The following documents were among those assembled by 
the German Ministry of Defence, Naval High Command 
(Marineleitung) for the purpose of writing the official 
naval history after the end of World War I. They are 
particularly rich in Hipper-related material. 
F 4059/PG 64734-64736/Reel 460, Kr. 0p Nordsee 8 Seegefecht 
bei Helgoland 28. &1914,. l Bd., (War Operation North Sea 8, 
Sea Battle off Heligoland 28 Aug 1914,3 vols. ). Hipper 
figures prominently in this substantive collection of 
after-action reports, survivors' reports and enemy reports 
on the first sea battle of World War I. He is also a subject 
of correspondence among von Ingenohl, von Müller, and von 
Tirpitz whose son was aboard the cruiser Mainz and was 
captured by the British. 
F 4060/PG 64752/Reel 406, Kr. Op. Nordsee 23a Niclt ausge- 
führte Kriegsaufgabe der Flotte 1914, IBd. 30 Sept 1914, 
(War Operations North Sea 23a Fleet War Plan 1914 Not Carried 
Out). This file contains an interesting plan authored by 
Hipper for a raid on the northern British blockade line. 
F 4060/PG 64753-64754/Reel 406, Kr. 0p. Nordsee 24 Flotten- 
unternehmung gegen die englische Küste, 2Bd. 2.11.1914- 
3.11.1914, (War Operation North Sea 24 Fleet Operation Against 
the English Coast). The German records of the planning and 
execution of the bombardment of Yarmouth on 2-3 Nov 1914 are 
contained in this file; also Hipper's evaluation. 
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F 4061/PG 64758-64761/Reels 442,443, Kr. Op. Nordsee 27 
Flottenungernehmung gegen die englische Küste, 15-16.12.1914, 
(War Operation North Sea 27 Fleet Operation Against the English 
Coast). This file is critical to the understanding of Hipper's 
role as a combat commander and in evaluating his ability to 
benefit from tactical experience. This file also contains 
important evidence concerning the only contact between 
elements of the British and German main battle fleets before 
Jutland. There are copies of every war diary of every German 
ship involved and also copies of the English after-action 
reports as published. 
F 4062/PG 64771-64775/Reels 345,346, Kr. Op. Nordsee 35 
Doggerbank-Schlacht am. 24.1.1915, (War Operation North Sea 
35, Battle of the Dogger Bank on 24 Jan 1915). This exten- 
sive collection of documents contains the war diaries of 
every ship and plan involved including some later reports 
of S. M. S. Blücher survivors. The file includes some nine 
document submitted by Hipper and his staff to the Fleet 
Command, the report of the Fleet C-in-C to the Kaiser, 
an exchange of comments concerning possible relief of Hipper, 
complaints by German battle cruiser captains about the 
quality of their ships, lack of gun range and targeting 
ability of the British. 
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The following files concern several operations undertaken 
by the Fleet in which Hipper took a part but during which 
no notable contact with the enemy was made. They were 
researched to help trace Hipper's development of war-time 
tactical thought as well as his relations with his commanders. 
F 4063 PG 64780-64781/Reel 461, Kr. Op. Nordsee 40 Flotten- 
Operation gemUsz Op. Befehl 26,17-18.4.1915, (War Operation 
North Sea 40, According to Operations Order No. 26,17-18 
Apr 1915). Useful in evaluating Hipper's views on mine- 
laying; also contains an interesting paper by him on the 
war-time use of wireless telegraphy. 
F 4063/ PG 64782/Reel 461, Kr. a. Nordsee 41 Flotten- 
Operation gemHsz Op. Befehl 27,21-22.4.1915, (War Operation 
North Sea 41, Fleet Operation According to Operations Order 
No. 27,21-22 Apr 1915). This file was helpful in structuring 
Hipper's relations with the High Command because it contains 
Hipper's official comment and the Fleet Commander's comments 
on a repetition of the Dogger Bank sortie. 
F 4063/PG 64786/Reel 462, Kr. Op. Nordsee 45 Flotten-Operation 
eý mäsz Op. Befehl 28,25-26.5.1915, (War Operation North Sea 45, 
Fleet Operation According to Operations Order No. 28,25-26 
May 1915). This file provides additional information on 
tactical lessons learned by Hipper. 
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F 4063/PG 64791/Reel 462, Kr. Op. Nordsee 50 Angl. Angriff 
auf die deutsche Bucht am 4.7.1915, (War Operation North 
Sea 50 English Attack on the German Bight on 4 July 1915). 
This file contains another of Hipper's analyses as well as 
comment by the Fleet C-in-C and other authorities on his 
thinking. 
F 4064/PG 64801/Reel 408, Kr. Op. Nordsee 52 Vorstoss der 
Flotte zur Abwehr bei List gemeldeter feindliche Streitkrllfte 
und Fleiger 25-26.3.1916, (War Operation North Sea 52 Sortie 
of the Fleet for the Defence of the Island of List against 
Enemy Ships and Aircraft Reported, 25-26 March 1916). 
This file is useful in evaluating Hipper's ability to absorb 
tactical lessons despite physiological and psychological 
strain. 
F 4061/PG 64808-64813/Reels 347,348,443,444,445, Kr. OP- 
Nordsee 61 Seeschlacht vor dem Skagerrak 31.5.16-1.6.16, 
(War Operation North Sea 61 Battle at the Skagerrak 
31 May-1 June 1916). This is the most important file for 
the understanding of Hipper as a naval commander in battle. 
It contains hundredsof reports from every commander, ship, 
or admiral who participated in the action. It also contains 
a copy of Admiral Scheer's report to the Kaiser which details 
Hipper's role. Hipper's own reports, both operational and 
technical, are most complete. British official accounts, 
published and unpublished, are included. Press clippings 
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which extend to the 10-year anniversary of Jutland in 
1926, make no mention of individual German commanders. 
F 4067/PG 64825-64826/Reels 462,463, Kr. Op. Nordsee 70 
Flottenoperation gemllsz Op. Befehl 8,18.8.1916-19.8.1916, 
(War Operation North Sea 70 Fleet Operation According to 
Operations Order 8,18-19 Aug 1916). This file contains 
useful comment by Hipper on a major German effort to repeat 
the strategy but using lessons learned in tactics at Jutland. 
F 4069/PG 64839/Reels 411, '412, Kr. Op. Nordsee 82 Vorstoss 
zur Deckung und Hilfeleistung beim Festkommen U-20 und U-30, 
4-5.11.16, (War Operation North Sea 82 Sortie for the 
Assistance and Salvage of Stranded U-20 and U-30,4-5 Nov 1916). 
This file is particularly useful in analyzing the relationship 
between Hipper and Scheer, Fleet C-in-C. It contains docu- 
ments indicating the Naval High Command was not pleased 
with Hipper's performance. 
F 4070/PG 64846/Reel 446, Kr. Op. Nordsee 89 Gefecht der 
5. Minensuchflotilla mit englishchen Streitkr1fte 16.8.17, 
(War Operation North Sea 89, Battle of the Fifth Minesweeping 
Flotilla with English Warships 16 Aug 1917). This file 
includes analysis and comment on the operation by Hipper 
and Fleet C-in-C, Scheer. 
F 4070/PG 64849-64850/Reels'445, L46, r. 02 . Nordsee 92 
Gefecht der II. A. G. mit schweren englischen Streitkräften, 
17.11.1917, (War Operation North Sea 92 Battle of the Second 
Scouting Group with Heavy Enemy Warships 17 Nov 1917). ' 
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The records of this action provide a remarkable contrast 
with those of 28 Aug 1914, the last serious attack by the 
British on the German Bight. They are useful for an 
appreciation of Hipper's attitude to combat in the latter 
stages of war. 
F 4078/PG'64923/Reels 351,352, Flottenunruhen 1918-1918, - 
(Fleet Disturbances 1917-1918). This file is useful in 
establishing Hipper's lack of a significant role in dealing 
with the 1917 mutinies in the fleet; it indicates Scheer 
and higher naval authorities regarded discipline as their 
responsibility. Admiral Scheer's extensive evaluatinn 
appears in this file. 
F 4070/PG 64914-64919,64922/Reels 349,350,351,4499 
Revolution 1918 (1918 Revolution). This is the most complete 
collection in the German archives concerning the naval mutiny 
and revolution of 1918, and should be of great importance 
to any historian interested in this era. Assembled by the 
Ministry of Defence Naval High Command from 1919 through 
1938, the collection contains several documents worthy of 
particular note: the report by Hipper's chief of staff, 
von Trotha, on the causes of the navy's collapse, a copy of 
which may be found in the Levetzoe Nachlass and a partial 
translation in Marder, vol. 5; a report from Beodecker 
whose First Battle Squadron sparked the revolt; a report 
from Kraft of the Third Battle Squadron which began the 
revolution in Kiel; a report of Commodore Heinrich on the 
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entire mutiny, revolt and revolution. As Flag Officer, 
Torpedoboats, Heinrich's report is excellent for detailing 
Hipper's role in the events of late 1918. The war diary 
of the Second Scouting Group, one of the few surviving 
war diaries of a naval command for the period of the mutiny 
and revolution, is useful as a : chronicle of events. 
MGFA/DZ IM 46/13, Personal Akten Admiral Franz Ritter von 
Hipper 1863-1932, BA/MA,, Freibürg, FRG.. This is the service 
record of Admiral Hipper and is very useful for a confidential 
view of him from his superiors. 
b. Private Papers 
N 158, Bundesarchiv/Militarärchiv, Nachlass von Müller, 
1871-1926. This contains the diaries, notebooks and letters 
of Admiral Georg von Müller, Chief of the Naval Cabinet. 
Sections 4 and 5, dating from 1 Sept 1910 to 18 Nov 1918 
were useful in the study of Hipper's relations with the 
naval high command. 
N 162/1-10, Bundesarchiv/Militararchiv, Nachlass Hipper, 
May 1914-March 1919. This is Hipper's personal war diary 
kept in typed manuscript form. The document is the official 
copy of the original which was lost when the office of 
Hipper's brother, a Munich attorney, was burned during an 
air raid in 1944. Parts 1-9 are open, covering the above 
period. Part 10 is closed, not to be opened until 1992. 
His biographer noted that Hipper 'expressly declared that 
these ... brief business-like notes... were not intended for 
publication so that only a few real intimates have ever seen 
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them. ' It is a frank chronicle of Hipper's life in 
four years of war. Indeed it does a great deal more than 
provide 'insight into the planning aspects of German naval 
policy. '3 Of all German naval commanders, Hipper spent 
the most time in actual combat and his personal observations 
a 
are unique from/German admiral. These private papers, 
consisting entirely of a war journal, are an essential 
benchmark in understanding Hipper as a naval commander. 
N 170/1-2, Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv, Nachlass Capelle 
(Eduard), 1914-1918. This collection of letters and corres- 
pondence of Admiral Eduard von Capelle sheds some light on 
the appointment of Admiral Hipper as Fleet C-in-C in 
August 1918. 
N 171, Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv, Nachlass Waldeyer-Hartz, 
1918. These are the private papers of Hipper's biographer 
concerned primarily with Waldeyer-Hartz's tenure as commanding 
officer of the pre-dreadnought S. M. S. Schleisen in 1918. 
They do not contain any correspondence from Hipper. 
N 173, Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv, Nachlass Behncke, 1910- 
1926. This collection sheds some light on the strategical 
activists in the fleet and their general belief that relief 
of Hipper would be beneficial. 
2 Waldeyer-Hartz, op. cit., p. 230. 
3 Herwig, op* cit., p. 276. 
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N 239, Bundesarchiv/MilitUrarchiv, Nachlass Levetzow, 
1914-1938. Hipper is mentioned several times, usually in 
a derogatory manner, in correspondence between Levetzow 
and fellow battle cruiser captains; between Levetzow and 
Admiral Henning von Holtzendorff, chief of the Admiralty 
Staff, 1915-1918; between Levetzow and Erich Raeder, 
Hipper's chief of staff, 1913-1917; and between Levetzow 
and Admiral Adolph von Trotha, Hipper's last chief of 
staff, August-November 1918. The correspondence is useful 
in ascertaining attitudes of Hipper's subordinates. In 
later correspondence which goes to 1938 there are several' 
letters concerning Hipper which Levetzow exchanged with 
Raeder. The documents on the navy's reorganization in the 
summer of 1918 are useful in delineating Hipper's role as 
are the documents on the revolution and mutinies. 
N 253/213,218,227,232-235, Bundesarchiv/Milit1rarchiv, 
Nachlass Tirpitz. In hundreds of Tirpitz letters to various 
leading naval officers there is none to or from Hipper, 
indicating there was no personal Tirpitz-Hipper relationship, 
though other documents indicate there was an official one. 
The. latter, when cited by Tirpitz, never mention Hipper 
by name, only by title. 
De P. 18 A 132, Niedersllchsisches Staatsarchiv, Bücheburg, 
Nachlass Admiral Adolph von Trotha. This collection contains 
five letters from Hipper to Trotha, apparently the largest 
collection of personal letters extant from Hipper. They 
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date from 1918 to 1930 and are rich in personal opinion 
and observation. The von Trotha Nachlass is open only 
upon approval of Admiral Clamor von Trotha, the Admiral's 
son. 
There are no Nachlässe on deposit in the archives in 
Freiburg, London, or Washington for Admirals von Ingenohl, 
von Pohl, Scheer, or Raeder, though these four officers 
professionally important to Hipper did leave published 
memoirs which are cited elsewhere in this bibliography. 
Die Weizs1cker-Papiere 1900-1918 are at present a typed 
manuscript being edited for publication by Prof. L. E. Hill, 
University of British Columbia, Canada. Weizsäcker was a 
lieutenant commander in the High Seas Fleet, 1914-1918, 
flag lieutenant to Scheer, 1916, and later navigator of 
the battle cruiser von der Tann, 1918, while Hipper still 
commanded the First Scouting Group. Weizsäcker finished 
the war as liaison officer between the army and navy high 
commands in Grand Headquarters. His opinions on naval 
warfare, the changes in the high command in 1918, and the 
naval mutiny and revolution, -were particularly useful. 
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2. British Admiralty MSS 
To appreciate the naval environment in which 
Hipper operated and to check the accuracy and validity 
of his own observations as a commander it was imperative 
to consult the records of his enemies. Not all the docu- 
ments which concerned Hipper, especially those dealing with 
his materiel, survived in Germany. The search of Admiralty 
MSS was concentrated on operations, intelligence and ma- 
teriel. The following collections are listed in the order 
in which they appear in the archives. 
a. The Public Record Office. 
This main British archive is located in Chancery Lane, 
London, and contains most of the papers of the British 
Admiralty. Consulted were: 
Admiralty 1 (selected registered files of the Admiralty 
Secretary's Department). 
Adm 1/5691-8770 IND. This file contains the Admiralty Index 
for all information on Germany and was searched carefully 
for reference to Hipper; none was found. 
Adm 1/8367/27, 'Capital Ships Anti-torpedoboat Armament, ' 
28 Jan 1914. Useful for an appreciation of contemporary 
materiel problems. 
Adm 1/8404/450, 'Refusal of Arabs and Somalis on board 
H. M. S. Dartmouth at Simonstown to work, request for permission 
to use flogging, '29 Nov 1914. Useful for comparative analysis 
of German practices, despite1872 law against it. 
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Adm 1/8461/152, 'Complaint of Sir David Beatty re 
Dispatches on Battle of Jutland, Dogger Bank, and Heligo- 
land Bight, ' 21 June 1916. Useful for an appreciation of 
the problems of Hipper's opposition commander. 
Adm 1/8471/241, 'Experiments, Trials, etc. on Long Distance 
W /T on Submarines and Destroyers; Organization for W /T 
stations fitted with Poulsen Apparatus, ' 19 Oct 1916. 
Useful for an understanding of the naval environment. 
Adm 1/8484/116, 'Admiralty H. M. S. Marlborough in Action 
31 May 1916, List of Casualties, ' 7 June 1917. Useful for 
appreciation of damage inflicted by one of Hipper's ships 
at Jutland. 
Adm 1/8498/201, 'Unrest Among Lower Deck Ratings, Admiralty, ' 
10 Sept 1917. Useful in providing context for disturbances 
in German fleet, 1917. 
Adm 1/8489/119, 'Refusal of duty crew of H. M. S. Royal 
George, ' 11 June 1917. Useful in analyzing context of German 
mutinies, 1917. 
Adm 1/8495/188, 'Question of Maximum A&e that Birching should 
be inflicted on Boys, ' 27 Aug 1917. Useful in analyzing 
published accounts of World War I naval disciplinary problems. 
Adm 1/8501/299, 'Questions Raised Lower Deck Ratings' 
Grievances, ' 19 Oct 1917. Useful in analyzing the context 
of German naval mutinies in World War I. 
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Adm 1/8512/28B, 'Proposed use of certain "B" and "X" 
Directional Wireless Stations for plotting positions of 
enemy Submarines, ' 18 Jan 1918. Useful in evaluating the 
German communications security problems. 
Adm 1/8556/110, 'Memorandum of Wartime Courtsmartial and 
Legal Aspects of Naval Discipline, ' 16 Apr 1918. Useful in 
evaluating World War I naval discipline. 
Adm 1/8581/25, 'German Naval Officers Accused of Committing 
Offenses Against the Laws of War, ' 5 Feb 1920. This is 
interesting because Hipper is not mentioned. See German 
Ministry of Marine MSS supra for a listing concerning defence 
of these officers (F 151). 
Admiralty 12 (General Intelligence) 
Adm 12/1527/N 487, 'W /T Direction Finding Apparatus Mounted 
in German Ships in 1914. ' Useful for understanding the naval 
environment. 
Admiralty 116 (Cases) 
Adm 116/866B, 'Miscellaneous Memoranda from Director Naval 
Intelligence and others from 1899 onwards. ' Useful in out- 
lining pre-war technical and political developments. 
Adm 116/940B, 'Anglo-German Naval Relations 1902-1914. ' 
Useful for understanding the naval environment. 
Adm 116/1825, 'Internment of German Warships at Scapa Flow 
1918-1919. ' Useful in judging the extent of German demoral- 
ization. This includes signals between Hipper and Beatty 
on the surrender of the German fleet. 
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Adm 116/1931-2002, 'Naval; Inter-Allied Commission of 
Control. ' These records constitute a remarkable collation 
and collectinn-of'German technology and an interesting 
account of immediate post-war naval relations between 
Germany and her conquerors. File 1938 contains the 
correspondence with the German Naval Peace Commission and 
a list of plans and documents turned over to the Allies. 
Plans and documents relating to Hipper's battle cruisers 
are listed under National Maritime Museum below. 
Adm 116/3130-3131, 'Naval Manoeuvres and their effect on sea 
strategy: the. -Fleet in event of war with Germany 1914-1916. ' 
Helpful in evaluating the validity of German naval thinking, 
including Hipper's. 
Admiralty 137 (1914-1918 War Histories) 
Adm. 137/342, 'Grand Fleet W /T Memoranda, ' 1914-1918. Useful 
for determining British policy on wireless security. 
Adm 137/1943,1949,3139, '28 Auge 1914 Action in the Bight, ' 
1914-1918. This file contains British after-action reports 
on the battle which almost cost Hipper his career. For the 
German records see F 4059 cited above. 
Adm 137/1943,2084, 'Reports related to the raid on Scar- 
borough and Hartlepool 16 Dec 1914. ' This file contains 
British reports useful for analyzing Hipper's tactical de- 
cisions. For the German records see F 4061 cited above. 
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Adm 137/1943,1989,2134,2135,2138,2139, 'The Dogger 
Bank, ' 24 Jan 1915. Useful for analyzing Hipper's actions 
in the battle. The German records are found in F 4062 
cited above. 
Adm 137/1906,1945,1946,1988,2089,2134,2137,2139, 
2141-42,2151, 'The Battle of Jutland 31 May-. 1 June 1916, ' 
Useful in understanding not only Hipper's actions but in 
supplying important data on Hipper's opposition. For the 
German records see F 4061 listed above. 
Adm 137/1988, 'Grand Fleet Intelligence Office Files, ' 
1914-1918. Useful in understanding how much the British 
knew about Hipper's intentions, movements and materiel. 
This is. a fairly general file dealing more with strategical 
intelligence than daily operations. 
Adm 137/3838, 'Trials with various types of Explosive 
shells, ' 1917-1918. This file is useful in understanding 
British materiel improvements made as a result of Jutland. 
Adm 137/3839, 'Damage inflicted on (German) ships in the 
action 31 j-1 June 1916. ' Naval Intelligence Division, 
Admiralty War Staff, 13 Jan 1917. This file indicates the 
British high command had a very accurate picture of the 
damage suffered by the German fleet at Jutland. 
Adm 137/3849, 'Diary of High Seas Fleet Cruises, ' 1906-1914. 
Useful for an evaluation of German officer personnel policy 
in the fleet, treatment of minorities in the German navy, 
reports on the 1917 (sic) mutiny, High Seas Fleet morale, 
press articles by German naval commentators on the Fleet 
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collapse: -.:: Useful in evaluating the 1917-1918 troubles 
in the German fleet. 
Adm 137/3867, 'High Sea Fleet Exercises and Manoeuvres, ' 
1906-1914. These are interesting in that they do not 
specifically mention Hipper though there is some analysis 
of fleet commanders. 
Adm 137/3891, 'Papers concerning the German Navy Mutinies 
and Armistice 1918-1919. ' This file contains documents 
-useful in analyzing Hipper's part in the mutiny and collapse 
of the German fleet in 1918. 
Adm 137/3892-3893, 'High Sea Fleet. ' This contains a fasci- 
nating collection of intercepted German wireless signals 
from 29 Oct 1918-11 Nov 1918 in both the North Sea and 
Baltic. A unique record. 
Adm 137/3904, 'Details of German Fleet estimates, pensions, 
allowances and pay. ' This file includes translations of 
German transcripts of hearings before the Reichstag Budget 
Committee 1912 when Tirpitz argued for additional fleet 
materiel. 
b. Ministry of Defence Naval Historical Branch 
This repository for certain microfilm collections and 
documents of the Imperial German Navy is located in the old 
War Office building, Whitehall, London. The voluminous 
Levetzow Nachlass was investigated here though it is listed 
and described formally in the German documents above. The 
following documents were consulted: 
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Panzertreffer--Zusammengestellt im Konstruktions- 
Departement des Reichs-Marine-Amts (sic) nach den 
Trefferaufnahmenabgeschlossen Jan 1917, (Hits on 
Armour-Assembled in the Constructinn Department, Imperial 
Naval Office, after Completion of Damage Studies). This 
document bears the stamp of the Naval Arsenal Library at 
Kiel which was destroyed in World War II. Useful because 
it is the most detailed account of German surface ship 
damage by shellfire. It includes many diagrams. 
Gedanken über die Probleme der deutschen Seekriegsführung 
im Weltkrieg. (Thoughts on the Problems of the German naval 
high command in the World War). by Admiral Kurt Assmann, 
chief, German Naval Historical Branch, 1935-1945; a type- 
scrifftlof lecture delivered March 1938 at the Naval War 
College, Kiel; useful for analyzing Hipper's problems. 
c. Ministry of Defence, Naval Library 
Located in the Empress State building, Earl's Court, London, 
this is probably the western world's greatest single collec- 
tion of books on the naval art. The following were used: 
Director of Naval Constructinn, Admiralty, Records of Warship 
Construction During the War, 1914-1918 (1919). 
CA 0116, N. I. D., A. W. S., Germany: Results of Firing 
Practices 1912-1914. This document reveals the high gun- 
nery standards in the German fleet including Hipper's ships. 
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CB 1182, N. I. D., A. W. S., German Navy July 1919. This 
unpublished official work is the most complete analysis 
of the Imperial German Navy extant in English and provides 
valuable background for understanding Hipper's naval en- 
vironment. Though there are earlier editions this is the 
most complete. 
CA 0111, N. I. D., A. W. S., German Navy Warfare 1914-1919. 
This series of captured German naval manuals provide sub- 
stantial information on German tactics. 
CA 0121, N. I. D., A. W. S., Germany War Vessels 1914. This is 
an excellent summary of the characteristics and limitations 
of German ships, and discusses Hipper's ships in detail. 
There is a remarkable correlation between this volume and 
Deutsche Kriegsflotte, F 50/66. cited above. 
SL 3480, N. I. A. C. C., Report of the Visit of the Naval Inter- 
Allied'Commission of Control Armour Experts to Germany, 
June 1920. Useful in establishing the technical parameters 
of the shell used in Hipper's ships. 
d. National Maritime Museum 
Located in Greenwich, London, this is the repository for 
what is probably the largest surviving collection of Imperial 
German Navy ships' plans. The plans 
were little more than a rumour until the writer began a sys- 
tematic campaign lasting a year to get the Admiralty to 
catalog and release them for historical purposes. 
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Mr. J. D. Lawson, Naval Historical Branch, located the 
plans of Hipper's battle cruisers, some 700 drawings, 
in a MOD repository. Later Mr. Lawson located, cataloged, 
and forwarded the complete collection (over 2,000 drawings) 
of the N. I. A. C. C. Plans Office to the National Maritime 
Museum in December, 1973. These included battleships, 
cruisers, torpedoboats, and U-boats. The following plans 
were of use because they provided primary technical source 
material previously believed to have been destroyed in the 
1944 bombing of the Naval Ministry in Berlin: 
No. 14095, S. M. S. von der Tann, Fliegende Feuerleitungs- 
und Salvenzeichenanlage, 1910 (Rapid Fire Control and Salvo 
Signalling Installations). This is the clearest represen- 
tation available of the early German dreadnought battle 
cruisers' fire control arrangement, and it also provides 
an illustration of the ship's construction and compartment- 
ization. 
No. 437918, S. M. S. von der Tann, Takelriss, 1910 (Rigging 
Plan). This was the best representation available of the 
first German battle cruiser; note she appears without 
torpedo nets. 
No. 438329, S. M. S. Seydlitz, Telegraphenplan, Teil A, B, C, 
31 May 1913, (Command and Communications Wiring Circuitry). 
This plan shows internal and external communications in 
Hipper's longtime flagship as well as the ship's construction 
and compartmentization. 
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No. 438329, S. M. S. Seydlitz, Einrichtung für Wasser, 
Läng hnitt, (Scuttles, Starboard Elevation). This 
plan shows the ship's pumping system, critical in damage 
control. 
No. 428310, S. M. S. Moltke, Artillerie-Sprachrohrplan, 
Teil IIID, 3 November 1911, (Gunnery Voice Tubes Plan). 
This is a simplified plan and cross-section of the battle 
cruiser showing gunnery control installations. 
No. 438312, S. M. S. Moltke, Längesschnitt, 13 September 1911, 
(Starboard Elevation). This is a full cutaway plan showing 
general arrangement and the most complete and detailed 
picture of what a German battle cruiser looked like. 
No. 428312a, S. M. S. Moltke, Obere Ansicht, 13 September 1911, 
(Aircraft View). This plan provides a full overview of the 
ship's weatherdecks. It shows, among other things, the four 
range finders for the secondary armament mounted above the 
battery deck. 
No. 428312e, S. M. S. Moltke, Panzerdeck, n. d., (Armoured Deck). 
This clearly shows the living arrangements for officers and 
men right down to the piano in the wardroom. It illustrates 
German ships' habitability as no other document ever has. 
No. 428312c, S. M. S. Moltke, Batteriedeck, 13 September 1911, 
(Secondary Battery Deck). This plan shows the layout of the 
casemates for the l5 cm. secondary armament as well as the 
location and layout of administrative offices and protective 
bulkheading. 
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No. 42831m, S. M. S. Moltke, Hintere Querschnitte, 
13 September 1911, (After-Bulkheads). This plan provides 
a first-hand look at the famous German compartmentization 
and is also useful to illustrate fore and aft access in 
German battle cruisers. 
No. 439342, S. M. S. Moltke, Kabelschema der Richtungweiser- 
und Folgezeiger-Anlage für die Schwere-und Mittel-Artillerie, 
1911, (Wiring Diagram of the Direction pointer and result 
indicator system for the heavy and medium guns). This rep- 
resents the most complete diagram of German fire control 
design yet available for ships of Hipper's time. Note how 
the searchlights are directly integrated into the fire 
control system. 
3. United States Navy Manuscripts 
United States Navy papers before 1945 are located 
at--the National Archives, Constitution Avenue, Washington, D. C. 
Two collections were particularly useful in helping to estab- 
lish the naval environment in which Hipper operated. They 
were Record Group 38, Office of Naval Intelligence (Registers) 
1886-1922, and Record Group 45, Naval Records Collection of 
the Office of Naval Records and Library 1911-1927. 
RG 38, Box 119, O. N. I. Registers. This contains files on 
German navy punishments, organization and administration, 
training, inspections, national service, service regulations 
for the Marine Akademie (Naval War College), School of Naval 
Architects, captains' procedures, Admiralty Staff organization, 
and Mining Department organization. 
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RG 38, Box 120, O. N. I. Registers. This contains a file 
on the sea service of the Admiralty Staff Officer Corps, 
a file on food for German crews, a file on mining con- 
struction and training, a file on torpedo training courses 
in the German Navy, a file on the changes in the German 
naval high command, an article on the naval schools and 
training system, a file on the staffs of German flag 
officers. The information dates from 1901 to 1918. 
RG 45, Box 121, Naval Records Collection. This contains 
notes on the staffs of German flag officers and also gives 
an organization table for the staff of the High Seas Fleet, 
battle squadron commander and deputy battle squadron commander. 
RG 45, Box 200, Naval Records Collection. This contains a 
general description of the activities of the German and 
Austro-Hungarian navies 1914-1918 and an evaluation of 
various German admirals including Hipper. 
RG 45, Box 267, Naval Records Collection. This contains an 
analysis of the relative standings of the principal navies 
dated 1 May 1918 and a 1917 Naval War College comparison 
of U. S. and German battleships in a possible battle. 
RG 45, Box 752, Naval Records Collection. This contains a 
copy of the British Admiralty D. N. I. publication, 'German 
Navy, ' cited above, as well as numerous intelligence reports 
from Berlin 1914-1916. 
RG 45, Box 779, Naval Records Collection. This contains a 
file on early U. S. naval communications and a study of 
German naval communications in 1914. 
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RG 45, Box 802, Naval Records Collection. This contains 
the records of the battle of Heligoland Bight, Dogger Bank, 
the bombardments of the English coast; some interesting 
analyses by the American Navy on all these actions; English 
translations of the German official history by the Office 
of Naval Intelligence. 
RG 45, Box 802k, Naval Records Collection. This contains 
evidence it was German policy to conceal the identity of 
force and squadron commanders from their enemies; an in- 
teresting damage report on H. M. S. Marlborough after Jutland; 
a letter from Hipper thanking an American naval author for 
a copy of yet another analysis of Jutland, dated 5 July 1921. 
RG 45, Box 803,804, Naval Records Collection. This contains 
a report by Admiral Scheer on the battle of Jutlandýwhich. sheds 
new light on the Hipper-Scheer relationship; records cf *the 
Jutland action including an English translation of the German 
official history; translations of copies of almost all the 
German after-action documents concerning Jutland; a copy of 
the British Admiralty appreciation of the battle; an inter- 
esting report on the damage to H. M. S. Warspite. 
RG 45, Box 851, Naval Records Collection. This contains 
additional material on all the actions of the war at sea 
1914-1918; also two volumes on the commerce warfare by 
Erich Raeder in English translation. 
RG 45, Box 852, Naval Records Collection. This contains a 
summary of High Seas Fleet activites and some of the problems 
in planning should the United States have to fight the German 
Navy alone in 1914 to 1916; a criticism of the British dis- 
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tribution 6f-force; 
_. evidence of concern about a 
German 
fleet sortie against the Thames Estuary. 
RG 80, Box 124, Naval Records Collection, Secretary of the 
Navy, General Correspondence. This contains the United 
States records concerning the Naval Inter-Allied Commission 
of Control 1918-1921, useful for a study of German naval 
technology. 
B. Writer's Correspondence 
The following persons were contacted to further the 
course of research. Dates of the letters and communications 
received from these people are cited in the text where 
appropriate. 
Dr. V. R. Berghahn, School of European Studies, University 
of East Anglia. 
Direktor Diplom, Kaufman K. Buschenhagen, Bayerische 
Vereinsbank, Munich. 
Mr. N. J. M. Campbell, "Quarrhurst, " Isle of Wight. 
Grossadmiral Karl D8nitz, a. D., Aumlhle, Hamburg. 
Dr. Kapitän zur See F. Forstmeier, Militärgeschichtliches 
Forsuchungsamt, Freiburg. 
Professor Holger Herwig, Vanderbilt University, Tenn., USA. 
Professor L. E. Hill, University of British Columbia PCanada. 
Dr. Jarck, NiedersUchsisches Staatsarchiv, BUckeburg. 
Mr. J. D. Lawson, Ministry of Defence, Historical Branch, 
Old War Office Building, Whitehall, London. 
Dr. Inge Madden, M. D., B. S. C. Heidelburg; Baltimore, Md. 
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Mr. Antony Preston, 13 Crondace Road, London. 
Kapitiln zur See K. T. Raeder, FGN, Naval Attache, London, 
(1971-73). 
Professor Vize-Admiral Friedrich Ruge, a. D., University of 
Tübingen. 
Dr. Gert Sandhofer, Oberarchivrat, Bundesarchiv, Milit1rarchiv, 
Freiburg im Breisgau. 
Fr. Gabriel Streitel, Minich; Hipper's niece. 
Kontre-Admiral Clamor von Trotha, a. D., Fasanenhof, Bückeburg 
in der N. he Bielefeld. 
Kontre-Admiral Werner Schunemann, FGN,, Naval Attache, London, 
(1973- ). 
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